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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a study of the process of political liberalisation in Jordan, in the period 
from 1989 to 1993. In order to provide the necessary background for the analysis, the 
study provides a historical survey of representative institutions (or the lack of them) in 
Jordan, from its foundation as Transjordan in 1921 until 1989. The reasons for the 
initiation of the process of political liberalisation suggested are, the disengagement from 
the West Bank on July 31, 1988; the severe economic crisis faced by Jordan at the end 
of the 1980's; and the outbreak of the countrywide riots in April 1989. 
The process of political liberaUsation began with the change in the Electoral Law which 
laid the basis for the 1989 election. Three inter-related strands in the period 1989-
1993 are analysed as to their impact of the process of political liberalisation. The first 
of these strands was constituted by the political reforms - including the abolition of both 
martial law and the anti-Communist law, the drafting of a new National Charter, and the 
promulgation of the Political Parties Law and the Press and Publication Law. The 
second was the development of the relationship between the executive and the 
legislative, in which the legislature gradually used its increased power to question, alter 
and implement legislation. The third was the strengthening of the civil institutions, such 
as trade unions, professional associations and registered pohtical parties. 
The lead-up to the preparation for and the results of the 1993 election are then analysed 
to support the conclusion that the process of political liberalisation has reached the 
stage at which Jordan can be described as a democratic country, albeit without a fiiU 
transfer of power. Nonetheless, the process of democratisation is still in transition and 
requires to be completed and consolidated. 
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English Transliteration System 
The English transliteration system used in this thesis is based on that found in 
the Encyclopaedia of Islam (1960). Place names in the thesis match those 
provided by Jordanian official sources (the 1986 Electoral Law and its 
amendment in 1989). 
Consonants Diphthongs 
J- sh r m J aw 
1^ b s 0 n ^— ay 
t d h 
th J> t J w iyy (final form I) 
c di z y ]- uww (final form u) 
c h t Long vowels 
t kh t 
a 
i d f J u 
dh k 1 
J r k Short vowels 
j z J 1 a 
s u 
— i 
For practical purposes, the following changes to the transliteration system used will be 
implemented: 
1. Diacritical marks will be omitted. 
2, J will be used in place of jd. 
3, q will be used in place of k. 
4. Hussein will be used in place of Husayn. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Research Method. Theoretical Approach and Literature Review in Jordan 
Political Development 
Introduction: Objectives of the Studv and Structure of the Thesis 
Democratisation throughout the world, especially in third world countries, has been a 
subject of considerable interest and research analysis in recent years. However, despite 
such general interest, the democratisation process in Jordan has not been studied in any 
great depth to date. 
The main aim of the present study is to explore and analyse the development of poHtical 
liberalisation in Jordan, and in particular to provide a deeper understanding of the 
country's pohtical Hfe and democracy. The thesis will review Jordan's experience with 
representative institutions at earher periods, and wiU then cover the pohtical 
HberaHsation process over the period 1989-1993. The study wiU examine the following 
aspects of the recent political hberahsation process in Jordan: 
1. How pohtical institutions work. 
2. The reasons for the return of democracy. 
3. The extent to which political reform has taken place. 
4. The relationship between the government and parliament. 
5. The main achievements in terms of laws passed by parUament. 
6. The role of poUtical parties in the Jordanian parhament, and the extent to which 
they have influenced poUtical decisions taken by the government. 
The study is intended to be of use to those concerned with understanding poUtical 
development in Jordan, and wUl hopefuUy serve as a basis for future research. It bases 
its conclusions on both theory and raw data. Much of the evidence presented here 
appears for the first time outside Jordan. 
The thesis is organised into nine chapters as detailed below: 
Chapter one covers three parts: research method, theoretical approach and a 
literature review of Jordan's political development. 
Chapter two covers two parts: part one is concerned with the pre-constitutional 
period, 1921-1947; and part two covers the first constitutional period, 1947-1967. 
Chapter three continues with the development of the constitutional framework and 
political institutions for the period 1967-1989. 
Chapter four discusses the reason for the move towards democratisation in Jordan 
and analyses the conduct of the 1989 parhamentary elections, which were the first 
general elections since 1967. 
Chapter five covers the 1990s political reforms in conjunction with the operation of 
the parliamentary democratic system. 
Chapter six discusses the function of the legislature in relation to the executive 
authority. 
Chapter seven covers the political role of civil society institutions through trade 
unions and professional associations, as well as the official political parties. 
Chapter eight focuses on the emergence of formal poUtical pluralism, through the 
conduct of the 1993 elections. 
Chapter nine is the conclusion. 
1.1. Part One: Research Method 
The main aim of this study is to find evidence of democratisation in Jordan. This 
section will describe the methods used to carry out the empirical study (field analysis). 
Research Sources 
At this point, it is worth giving a brief account of the research instruments in general. 
The Uterature written on Jordanian political Uberahsation reveals that there are a 
number of methods for generating data that can be used. Information at different levels 
needs to be generated in order to answer the research questions. There are many kinds 
of methods which can be used to gather relevant information. I have used three main 
sources of research material: one is official and non-official documentation, the second 
is interviews with senior government officials and political party leaders, and the third is 
secondary sources. 
1.1.2. Documentation 
The majority of the data collected in this thesis is from primary sources, and comes 
from government pubUcations, proceedings of the Chamber of Deputies 1989-1993, 
Public Record Office documentation, poUtical parties' constitutions, manifestos and 
statements, and candidates' speeches. The secondary sources were books and articles, 
Ph.D. theses, newspapers and magazines. These pubHcations were used in this study in 
order to assess the process of democratisation in Jordan. 
1.1.2.1. Data Limitations 
Three main Umitations may be identified: 
1. Some information took a long while to obtain, especially documents from the 
Jordanian parliament and official government documents. 
2. The available references did not cover the whole period of the study and were not 
sufficiently detailed. 
3. Most secondary references were relatively small articles or book chapters. Few 
scholars had written at length about the democratic experience in Jordan. 
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1.1.3. The Interview 
Interviews constituted one of the main methods in obtaining information about 
deraocratisation in Jordan. The rationale behind the decision to use interviews takes 
into consideration the type of data to be collected and the purpose of the whole study. 
The method used here was deemed to be the most relevant for amassing original data in 
order to answer the research question. The interview method was also used to ensure 
that the form of data collected was valid and rehable. 
The interview is a common research method for gathering information in social 
sciences/'^ and refers to the method of collecting data from subjects face to face by 
asking questions. It is both flexible and adaptable to individual situations. Kerlinger 
states that: 
The interview is a face-to-face interpersonal situation in which one 
person, the interviewer, asked a person being interviewed, the 
respondent, questions designed to obtain answers pertinent to the 
purposes of the research problem. 
Its validity is described by Stavin as follows: 
In an interview, respondents can be asked to clarify or expand on 
responses, making the data from an interview potentially richer and 
more complete than that which can be obtained from a 
questionnaire. Interview data, however, is certainly much more 
difficult and expensive to collect and analyse.^ ^^  
The interview is the most systematic way of gathering information. Cohen and Manion 
state that the interview is: 
...a two-person conversation initiated by the interviewer for the 
specific purpose of obtaining research-relevant information, and 
focused by him on content specified by research objectives of 
systematic description, prediction, or explanation; it is an unusual 
method in that it involves the gathering of data through direct 
verbal interaction between individuals. In this sense it differs from 
the questionnaire where the respondent is required to record in 
some way his responses to set questions.^ '*' 
Oppenheim supports this view of the validity of the interview and adds that it saves 
time, allows for greater depth, and prevents misunderstandings: 
[Interviewers] can give a prepared explanation of the purpose of 
the study more convincingly than a covering letter can; wiU more 
easily reach less-educated respondents; help the ones with reading 
difficulties; offer standardised explanations to certain problems that 
arise; prevent many misunderstandings; and maintain control over 
the order or sequence in which the questions are answered.^ '^ 
These are not the only reasons why the interview method was employed in this study. 
The present researcher felt that it was the most appropriate method to use for analysing 
the problem in question. Since democracy has just started in Jordan, it was felt that the 
issues involved can be best understood if discussed face to face. Another reason is that 
the subjects had other paperwork to do, and it was felt that the questionnaire method 
might disrupt this (questionnaires usually take a long time). Cohen and Manion point 
out that the interview can serve three purposes: 
1. It may be used as the principal means of gathering information 
having direct bearing on the research objectives. 
2. It may be used to test hypotheses or to suggest new ones; or as 
an explanatory device to help identify variables and 
relationships. 
3. The interview may be used in conjunction with other methods in 
a research undertaking. In this connection, Kerhnger suggests 
that it might be used to follow up unexpected results, for 
example, or to validate other methods or to go deeper into the 
motivations of respondents and their reasons for responding as 
they do.^ ^^  
In this study, interviews were used as one of the principal means of data collection. 
1.1.3.1. Interview Limitations 
The interview method is subject to a number of limitations. Cohen and Manion note 
that the interview method does not allow for a large sample.^ '^ This may be true, but it 
does not affect the present analysis. The point to make clear is that, due to the focus of 
the research, there was a limited number of subjects who could be interviewed. 
Another limitation of interviews is that the presence of the researcher may affect the 
subject's responses to questions.In my case, this was not considered a problem, as aU 
the subjects were in high government positions and it was considered that'they would 
not feel that they were being forced to give information. 
1.1.3.2. The Sample 
The subjects of the interview fell into four categories, with each category having a 
specific purpose. To achieve this specificity, the structure of the questions had to be 
carefully constructed. The four categories were: 
1. Senior government officials: namely three prime ministers, four ministers (two of 
them deputy prime ministers). The main purposes of this section were to test the 
reaction of Jordanian senior officials towards the return to democracy in Jordan; to 
gather relevant information about government actions within the process of political 
liberalisation in the country; and to assess the relationship between the government 
and parliament. 
2. Political party leaders: A sample was chosen from most parties, including the 
Islamist, leftist, nationalist, and centrist (conservative and traditionalist) parties. The 
aim of this section was to study the role of political parties in Jordan during the 
transition to democracy and the extent of their involvement in this process. 
3. Leaders of blocs within the parhament. This group deals with the political blocs in 
particular, during the eleventh and twelfth parhament, and their roles in influencing 
the executive authority's decisions. 
4. Members of the National Charter Royal Commission. These interviews aimed to 
examine the process behind the creation and adoption of the National Charter and its 
subsequent role in the political HberaHsation process in Jordan. 
It should be noted here that these are the key subjects concerned with the practice of 
political liberalisation in Jordan. It was for this reason that they were selected as 
subjects for interview in this study. 
1.1.3.2.1. The Constraints 
The researcher faced a number of problems during the interviews. The main ones were: 
1. The problem of time was apparent in two ways. Much time was spent arranging a 
suitable time for the interviewer and the respondents to meet. Also, there was a 
shortage of time for some respondents, therefore the time allocated for the interview 
was not sufficient to eHcit a satisfactory response. 
2. Some of the respondents refused to consent to a tape recording, preferring note-
taking. 
3. The distance between the interviewer's home and the respondents often consumed 
part of the interview time. 
4. Some of the respondents were very reserved about giving relevant and important 
infonnation. 
5. Some of subjects refused to be interviewed when they knew that the interviewer was 
a student. 
1.1.3.3. Procedures of the Interview 
In general, the interview data were tape recorded, but some of the respondents 
preferred note-taking and the researcher therefore recorded their information that way. 
A few respondents preferred to take the questions and answer them in their own time 
and return them to the researcher. Generally, senior officials, centrist party leaders, and 
deputies agreed to having their responses tape recorded. 
It is worth mentioning that the schedule of interviews was very important, and drawn 
up in order to save time and achieve good results. The researcher made appointments 
with all respondents several days prior to the interviews. Thus, interviews were 
conducted at different times with respondents, according to their schedule and timetable 
of work. 
Recording was the most important tool in collecting interview data. It was carried out 
in such a way that respondents felt free to talk and this prevented bias in their answers. 
With regard to taping, Stavin suggests that: 
Taping is preferable, because it gives a permanent record of what 
was actually said instead of what the interviewer thought was said. 
This helps prevent the possibility that the interviewer's own bias 
might enter into what is recorded.^ '^  
The researcher supported the taped interview with note-taking. The significance of this 
is pointed out by Stavin: 
...tapes are sometimes difficult to understand, especially i f several 
individuals are speaking at once. For this reason, it is often a good 
idea to have the interviewer take notes and to tape the interview, as 
a double check on the interview responses.^ '"^  
1.2. Part Two: Theoretical Approach 
1.2.1. Defining the Terms 
This section wiU seek to define four of the terms which are much used in this thesis: 
democracy, political liberalisation, democratisation and partial democracy. As with 
many social science terms, there is no one agreed definition. The study will give brief 
resumes of possible definitions before putting forward those which wiU be applied in 
this thesis. 
1.2.1.1. Democracy 
Democracy is 'an ideal impossible of human achievement'.^ "^ It derives its meaning from 
the ancient Greek words: demos (people) and kratos (rule or authority). Huntington 
stresses that democracy is closely associated with the future of freedom in the world. 
He stipulates that the correlation between the existence of individual Uberty and the 
existence of democracy is extremely high.^ '^ ^ The guiding principle of democracy 
according to O'Donnell and Schmitter, is citizenship, which involves the right to equal 
treatment concerning collective choices (e.g., elections), the obUgation of the decision 
makers to be accountable (i.e., they can be dismissed from office by elections), the 
obHgation of the ruled to respect the legitimacy of the choices made (i.e., to respect the 
decisions made and act within the law), and the rights of the rulers to act with authority. 
In other words, citizenship involves a two way relationship between the chosen rulers 
and those who do the choosing, with each acknowledging the rights and obUgations of 
the other. Despite there being no defining rules/institutions for democracy, the authors 
Hst the minimum requirements for poUtical democracies as, "secret balloting, universal 
adult suffrage, regular elections, partisan competition, associational recognition and 
access, and executive accountabihty".''''^ Democracy can thus be defmed as "a form of 
government where the legislature is elected directly by universal adult suffrage and the 
executive government is chosen either directly as in the presidential system or indirectly 
from among the elected representatives of the people, as is the norm in the 
parliamentary system".^ ''*^ A more complex definition is given by Lipset. He defines 
democracy as: 
A political system which supplies regular constitutional 
opportunities for changing the governing official. It is a social 
mechanism for the resolution of the problem of societal decision-
making among conflicting interest groups which permits the largest 
possible part of the population to influence these decisions through 
their ability to choose among alternative contenders for political 
office.^ ^^^ 
More simply, democracy is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as: 
government by the people; that form of government in which the 
sovereign power resides in the people as a whole, and is exercised 
either directly by them or by officers elected by them. A state or 
community in which the government is vested in the people as a 
whole.^ '^ ^ 
It is clear from the above that the most crucial element in democracy is the rule of the 
majority through the election of representatives to office in free elections. A number of 
guarantees are required to enable democracy to be sustained including political 
competition, accountability of the executive to the elected representatives, freedom of 
the press and equality between citizens. Thus, a real democracy is a system in which all 
citizens can participate in the decision-making process and are protected from state 
action. 
Despite the differences in the definitions of democracy and its practical implementation 
throughout the ages, what forms the common factors between these definitions and 
their application are the ideas of popular representation, the guarantee of human and 
civil rights, and the accountability of political leaders to the public. 
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1.2.1. 2. Political Liberalisation 
The term "political liberalisation" is closely connected with, but not equivalent to, that 
of "democratisation", although the freedoms of liberalisation help to achieve 
democracy. 
In authoritarian regimes, the space between public and private interests tends to be 
blurred. According to Ayubi, poHtical Uberalisation can only occur where there is a 
clear division between public and private interests. The political sphere must mediate 
between the two.^'^' In this context, Huntington has defmed political liberalisation as: 
The partial opening of an authoritarian system short of choosing 
government leaders through freely competitive elections. 
LiberaUsing authoritarian regimes may release political prisoners, 
open up some issues for public debate, loosen censorship, sponsor 
elections for offices that have little power, permit some renewal of 
civil society, and take other steps in a democratic direction, without 
submitting top decision makers to the electoral test.^ '*^  
A rather more expHcit and detailed definition of poUtical Uberalisation has been given by 
O'Donnell and Schmitter, who define it as: 
A process of making effective certain rights that protect both 
individuals and social groups from arbitrary or illegal acts 
committed by the state or third parties. On the level of individuals, 
these guarantees include the classical elements of the Uberal 
tradition: habeas corpus; sanctity of private home and 
correspondence; the right to be defended in a fair trial according to 
preestabUshed laws; freedom of movement, speech, and petition; 
and so forth. On the level of groups, these rights cover such things 
as freedom from punishment for expressions of coUective dissent 
from government poUcy, freedom from censorship of the means of 
communication, and freedom to associate voluntarily with other 
citizens.^ '^ ^ 
They acknowledge that these rights are not fuUy guaranteed in any country, but 
movement in this direction is important to distinguish democracy from authoritarianism. 
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Rights are created as individuals push back the existing limits. When others see that 
individuals are not punished (in the words of the authors, 'do not incur cost'), then the 
spaces are taken up by groups. There is no logical sequence to this process and it can 
be reversed. The process is entirely dependent on the reaction of the ruling authorities, 
but if not considered threatening, then the 'space' allowed to society will slowly increase 
and become institutionalised. 
As O'Donnell and Schmitter stress: 
Liberalisation and democratization are not synonymous, although 
their historical relation has been close. Without the guarantee of 
individual and group freedoms inherent in the former, the latter 
risks degenerating into mere formalism (namely, the so-called 
popular democracies). On the other hand, without the 
accountability to mass publics and constituent minorities 
institutionalised under the latter, liberalisation may prove to be 
easily manipulated and retracted at the convenience of those in 
government.'-^ *'^  
Based on these definitions, this study will use "political liberalisation" to mean a process 
of opening the political system, and limiting the power of the state to intervene in 
citizens' lives, through the easing of various restrictions on civil society such as Lifting 
martial law and the censorship of the press. Paradoxically, for political liberalisation to 
be successful it requires further laws to be enacted, but this time to guarantee the basic 
freedoms associated with democracy. 
1.2.1.3. Democratisation 
Hudson defines democratisation as the "process through which the exercise of political 
power by the state becomes less arbitrary and exclusive".^ '^^  This emphasises the 
political power of the state. The definition by Brynen, Korany and Noble, on the other 
hand, is "political democratisation entails an expansion of political participation in such 
a way as to provide citizens with a degree of real and meaningful collective control over 
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pubUc poUcy"^ ^^ ^ which focused on the power of the citizens. However, Niblock argues 
that both elements are relevant, by stating that "democratisation is taken to include any 
measure of poUtical Uberalisation through the extension and buttressing of human rights 
or through the creation of poUtical institutions which provided greater opportunity for 
representation".* '^'^  This study wiU use O'DonneU and Schmitter's definition of 
democratisation. They state that democratisation involves: 
Processes whereby the rules and procedures of citizenship are 
either appUed to poUtical institutions previously governed by other 
principles [e.g., coercive control, social tradition, expert judgement, 
or administrative practice], or expanded to include persons not 
previously enjoying such rights and obUgations [e.g., nontaxpayers, 
ilUterates, women, youth, ethnic minorities, foreign residents], or 
extended to cover issues and institutions not previously subject to 
citizen participation.* "^*^ 
1.2.1.4. Partial Democracy 
In some countries although fuU democracy has not been achieved, nonetheless they are 
no longer subject to fuU authoritarian role. David Potter's concept of partial democracy 
helps to fiU this gap. He defined partial democracy as: 
A type of poUtical regime in which the accountabiUty of 
government to citizens is more or less qualified; rmUtary, traditional 
or other non-elected establishments within the state restrict the 
effect of elections and compromise the authority of elected 
government. Elections are held, but organised to ensure that only 
certain candidates can be elected; opposition poUtical parties may 
exist and even make some impact but the electoral system is 
organised to ensure that normaUy they would neither win an 
election nor form a government. There are restrictions on the 
rights to freedom of expression and access to aUernative 
information. Some independent associations and organisations 
critical of the state exist but are carefully monitored by the state.*^ ^^  
It is this definition which wUl be used in the study to iUustrate the position of Jordan by 
1993. 
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1.2.1.5. Relationship between Democracy. Liberalisation and 
Democratisation 
O'Donnell and Schmitter argue that liberalisation may occur without democratisation to 
achieve what they term 'liberalised authoritarian'. Where democratisation outpaces 
liberalisation then 'limited democracy' is gained. The authors list several generalisations: 
1. Liberalisation is a matter of degree and can not be measured, as the degree depends 
on the scope of the guarantees granted and the extent of the protection of the 
individual/group against violation of the guarantees. 
2. Democratisation is also a matter of degree. In the case of political democracy, 
which is restricted to public institutions of governance, two dimensions are 
important. Firstly, conditions may be imposed which restrict party competition and 
electoral choice. Secondly, the design of institutional/operational mechanisms to 
bypass accountability. 
3. Liberalisation can exist without democracy, in that guarantees of rights can occur 
without competitive elections. However, once liberalisation has started, then it 
tends to increase. 
4. The process of democratisation and liberalisation combine to an uneven and 
occasionally reversible maimer only in the event that a viable political democracy do 
the two processes become inextricably joined. 
5. Liberalisation is considered to start the transition, therefore, it is important to study 
the moment when liberalisation starts. 
6. When revolution or violence are used, this reduces the chances of political 
democracy.*^ ^^  
Whilst democracy can be seen as the outcome of various interactions between state and 
society, political liberalisation and democratisation are part of the process of transition 
which may or may not result in democracy. The concept of partial democracy becomes 
of relevance here. 
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1.2.2. General Theorv about the Paths to Democracy 
The concept of democracy is deeply rooted in history, and is closely connected with 
theories about the state. In the current literature of comparative politics, several 
dominant theories compete against each other in their attempts to explain the process of 
democratisation. 
Early scholars of comparative politics on the subject of transition to democracy, 
concentrated on discovering the required relevant conditions, such as socio-economic 
factors, civil society, political culture, national unity, regime legitimacy, and regional 
and international influences. In the literature on political liberalisation and 
democratisation, four theories have been particularly important. The research wiU 
examine the ideas of each theorist, comparing them and explaining their individual 
viewpoints. 
Rustow's theory about the transition to democracy, based on his study of the process in 
Sweden and Turkey, states that the emergence of democracy stems from the choices 
made by different political forces.^ ^^ ^ He argues that the process of transition evolves 
through four successive phases which are the basis for the consolidation of democracy: 
1. Background condition: where, for reasons which Rustow claims are diverse and 
irrelevant, national unity is achieved. By this he means, "that the vast majority of 
citizens in a democracy-to-be must hold no doubt or mental reservations as to 
which political community they belong". 
2. Preparatory phase: during this phase, "a prolonged and inconclusive political 
struggle" is fought between the old and new elite, which differs from case to case. 
However, in each case the phase sees an era of polarisation around the two groups, 
which creates the "hot family feud", setting the stage for the third phase, which 
marks the beginning of the establishment of a democratic order. 
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3. Decision phase: this phase commences when "a deUberate decision on the part of 
poUtical leaders to accept the existence of diversity in unity and, to that end, to 
institutionalise some crucial aspect of democratic procedure" is introduced. A smaU 
group of leaders, initiaUy to serve theU own interest, play a prominent role in 
making the decision which opens up the system. The outcome, which may be 
unintended, is unpredictable and may or may not result in democracy. Whilst the 
outcome will always be a compromise, it will also be dynamic and fluid. 
4. Habituation phase: in this stage the democratic procedures become institutionalised, 
with the resolution of conflict being undertaken by democratic means becoming the 
norm.*^ '^ 
Rustow himself admits that his model is only a sketch and thus requires some refuiing. 
SpecificaUy, he does not explore the factors which cause change. While Rustow's 
work does not explain how the different stages are initiated, the comprehensive analysis 
undertaken by O'DonneU, Schmitter and Whitehead, [eds.] Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy. 1986, looks specificaUy aU the factors in, 
and causes of, transition. The four edited volumes contain seven theoretical essays 
exploring the nuUtary, economic, international, and methodological aspects involved in 
transition from authoritarian regimes, and a conclusion reflectmg on the entire study. 
The theory is advanced in a tentative manner since it is only based on a few case studies 
confined to Latin America and Southern Europe. It is based on the premise that while 
international factors may influence the process, the main participants and influences are 
domestic. 
O'DonneU and Schmitter stipulate two necessary conditions for the emergence of 
democracy. These are, first, guarantees of the continued institutional existence of the 
mUitary in order to reduce the chances of nuUtary intervention, and second, the 
guarantee that the property of the bourgeoisie wUl remain in their hands in order to gain 
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their acceptance of the change. In addition to the necessary conditions for transition to 
democracy there are other factors which spark the transition. 
O'Donnell and Schmitter argue that since 1945, authoritarian regimes "practise 
dictatorship and repression in the present while promising democracy and freedom in 
the future".^^'^ This paradox has created space for opposition to demand the removal of 
authoritarian regimes. The central argument is that political liberalisation starts with a 
division or split between the hard liners and soft liners, both being present in 
authoritarian regimes. The hard liners believe that their rule can be perpetuated. While 
soft liners are initially indistinguishable from the hard liners, they come to recognise the 
need for eventual electoral legitimation. 
The authors argue that in the immediate post-war period, military defeat in an 
international conflict was the main cause in starting transition. However, since the 
1970s, domestic factors have been the main cause, with the principal factor being that 
of the cleavage between hard liners and soft liners. The latter can occur due to either of 
two domestic conditions: 
1. The failure of domestic policies leads the soft liners' camp to liberalise, in an 
attempt to spread the blame, while hard liners attempt to solve the problem by 
increased repression. 
2. Success of the regime encourages the soft liners to attempt to gain local and 
international legitimacy through the ballot box.^ °^^  
The transition to democracy is often completed by an implicit or explicit political pact 
between civilian political actors. O'DoimeU and Schmitter argue that pacts play an 
important role in the transition, and define a pact as: 
...an explicit, but not always publicly explicated or justified, 
agreement among a select set of actors which seeks to define (or, 
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better, to redefme) rules governing the exercise of power on the 
basis of mutual guarantees for the 'vital interests' of those entering 
into it.*^ )^ 
The pacts are often regarded as temporary but may finish up as the law of the land by 
becoming institutionaUsed. 
In summary, the authors argue that the period of transition is initiated by a spUt between 
hard Uners and soft Uners. The parameters of the process then depend on two factors: 
'calculation' (i.e. the amount of guarantees of rights which the regime is initiaUy wiUing 
to grant), and pacts. These factors determine whether or not the transition wUl proceed 
and provide important parameters to the extent of the possible Uberalisation and 
democratisation. They may trigger the resurrection of civil society. 
Przeworski, who has a wider framework, argues that writings on the breakdown of 
authoritarian regimes can be categorised into four types of explanation, the thUd of 
which includes the thesis of O'DonneU and Schmitter. These types of explanation are: 
1. The authoritarian regime has realised the functional needs that led 
to its establishment. It is therefore no longer necessary and so it 
collapses. 
2. The regime has, for one reason or another, with one possible 
reason being [1], lost its "legitimacy", and since no regime can 
last without legitimacy, it disintegrates. 
3. Conflicts within the ruling bloc, particularly within the nuUtary, 
for one reason or another, with one possibly being [2], cannot be 
reconcUed internaUy, and some ruUng factions decide to appeal to 
outside groups for support. 
4. Foreign pressures to "put on a democratic face" lead to 
compromises, perhaps through the mechanism of [3].*''^' 
Przeworski states that there is nothing to say about type number 1, that it has never 
happened in practice, whereas type number 4 can be 'unambivalently assessed', that it 
does not happen. Furthermore, loss of legitimacy [type number 2] is not a precondition 
to coUapse (see Iraq). The power struggle mentioned in type number 3 can be based 
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either on interest e.g. army , bourgeoisie or working class interests, or on strategic 
posture (soft liners/hard liners, raaxiniilists/mininialists). But again the author argues 
this line of explanation is not vaHd, as it does not "account for the kind of volatility that 
seems to be characteristic of the processes of regime transformation, in which alliances 
are extremely shaky and particular groups and pivotal individuals at times shift their 
positions by 180 degrees".^ ^^ ^ 
Przeworski analyses the reason for the success of the process of transition in achieving 
democracy, by highlighting three aspects of democracy which are crucial to the main 
power groups during the process of transition, namely: 
1. Democracy is a form of institutionalisation of continual conflicts. 
2. The capacity of particular groups to realise their interests is shaped 
by the specific institutional arrangements of a given system. 
3. Although this capacity is given a priori, outcomes of conflicts are not 
uniquely determined either by the institutional arrangement or by 
places occupied by participants within the system of production. 
Outcomes that are unlikely can and do occur.^ "^^ ^ 
As Przeworski later emphasises: "Struggle for poUtical power is necessary because 
without it all attempts to transform society are vulnerable to brutal repression".'•^ ^^  
Agreeing with Przeworski, in stressing that it is wrong to establish Just one factor to 
understand the various paths to democracy, Huntington synthesises six propositions 
which he argues have a certain validity: 
1. No single factor is sufficient to explain the development of 
democracy in all countries or even in a single country. 
2. No single factor is necessary to the development of democracy in all 
countries. 
3. Democratisation in each country is the result of a combination of 
causes. 
4. The combination of causes producing democracy varies from 
country to country. 
5. The combination of causes generally responsible for one wave of 
democratisation differs from that responsible for other waves. 
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6. The causes responsible for the initial regime changes in a 
democratisation wave, are Hkely to differ from those responsible for 
later regime changes in that wave/^ ^^ 
Huntington cites a list of twenty-seven factors which can contribute to democracy and 
the democratic process. These are: 
a high overall level of economic wealth; 
relatively equal distribution of income and/or wealth; 
a market economy; 
economic development and social modernization; 
a feudal aristocracy at some point in the history of society; 
the absence of feudalism in the society; 
a strong bourgeoisie ("no bourgeois, no democracy," in Harrington Moore's 
succinct formulation); 
a strong middle class; 
high levels of literacy and education; 
an instrumental rather than consummatory culture; 
protestantism; 
social pluralism and strong intermediate groups; 
the development of political contestation before the expansion of political 
participation; 
democratic authority structures within social groups, particularly those 
closely connected to politics; 
low levels of civil violence; 
low levels of poUtical polarization and extremism; 
political leaders committed to democracy; 
experience as a British colony; 
traditions of toleration and compromise; 
occupation by a pro-democratic foreign power; 
influence by a pro-democratic foreign power; 
elite desire to emulate democratic nations; 
tradition of respect for law and individual rights; 
communal (ethnic, racial, religious) homogeneity; 
communal (ethnic, racial, religious) heterogeneity; 
consensus on pohtical social values; 
absence of consensus on political and social values.^ "* 
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Whilst many of these factors are features of democracy, a number, such as the need for 
a colonial history, are contentious. Many of the factors may correlate with democracy 
but do not necessarily cause it. It is possible to distinguish some of Huntington's factors 
according to whether they affect the economy, civil society or poUtical culture. These 
are analysed in section 1.2.3. 
1 •2.2.1. Problem of Democracy 
It has not been possible to highlight one single factor which causes the transition to 
democracy, and the outcome of any process of democratisation can not be predicted. 
Huntington, while arguing that democracy is the only solution to the problem of 
tyranny, notes three paradoxes for democracy: 
1. The initiation of elections forces political leaders into competing via appealing to 
tribal, ethnic, and reHgious constituencies, this being the easiest method. 
Democratisation thus promotes communalism and ethnic conflict. 
2. Countries in a state of transition towards democracy are more aggressive in nature 
and thus more prone to fighting wars against foreign countries. 
3. Democratisation leads to the removal of state constraints on individual behaviour, 
and so to a relaxing of social inhibitions, and ultimate uncertainty and confusion 
about a moral code. This results in socially undesirable behaviour such as crime, 
drug abuse and the disintegration of the family.^ ^^^ 
Furthermore, Huntington argues that one threat to democracy can come from political 
leaders and groups who take power by election. He outlines three types of threat to 
democracy: 
1. "Red return", that is the restoration of power through the election 
of former communists and former communist parties in central 
and eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
2. The electoral victory of parties or movements apparently 
committed to anti-democratic ideologies. [Islamic fundamentalist 
groups, for example Algeria in the 1992 elections]. 
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3. Executive arrogation which occurs when an elected chief 
executive concentrates power in his hands, subordinates or even 
suspends the legislature, and rules largely by decree.^ '^^  
This study will attempt to understand the path to democracy which Jordan has 
followed, the scale of success of the experiment and finally, given Huntington's threats 
to and paradoxes of democracy, the likelihood of continued democracy in Jordan. 
1.2.3. Socio-Economic. Political and Cultural factors which Affect 
Democratisation 
This section moves the discussion away from the general theoretical analysis to a 
consideration of three factors which may affect the democratisation process. The 
factors discussed are economic structure, civil society and political culture. 
1.2.3.1. Economic Structure 
Huntington lists three economic factors which have affected the recent process of 
democratisation. First, the rise in the price of oil created an economic downturn in 
consuming countries, weakening authoritarian regimes. Second, many countries had 
achieved a level of economic development which provided a basis for democracy. 
Third, rapid economic growth in some countries destabilised authoritarian regimes, 
forcing them either to become HberaUsed or to intensify repression.^ ""^  He indicates that 
a country moving toward democracy may experience one of these scenarios. From this 
argument, it is clearly stated that change to economic structure, either positively as in 
the case of development or negatively as in the case of recession, can provoke moves 
towards democratisation. The effect of positive change is economic development, and 
the effect of negative change is economic liberalisation which has been implemented due 
to economic recession. 
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1.2.3.1.1. Economic Development 
Economic development is a basic condition for stable democracy, involving 
urbanisation, industrialisation, high education, and wealth. Lipset indicates that high 
per capita income and a high level of literacy are strongly correlated to the existence of 
democracy.^ '"^ Huntington fundamentally agrees with Lipset, and adds that democracy 
must depend on wealth. A wealthy society has less poUtical conflict, power tends to be 
shared and a substantial middle class needs to be supportive of democracy. He also 
argues that the Unk between economic development and democracy is "complex and 
probably varies in time and space".^ '^ ^^  He indicates that economic development is a 
significant factor involved in democracy but the two are not "determinative".^ ''^ ^ 
Economic development can not bring about democratisation by itself, but there is a 
correlation between the two.^ ''^ ^ 
Economic development leads to a strengthening of anti-authoritarian feeUng, poUtical 
trust, hfe satisfaction and efficacy, which in turn are correlated to the rise in support of 
the existence of democratisation.^ ''^ ^ 
Figure 1.1: Socio-Economic Development and Democracy 
^ More highly educated public 
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Source: Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave, 1991, p. 69 
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As shown in figure 1.1, economic development has a threefold effect according to 
Huntington. Firstly, he argues that the population becomes more educated, secondly a 
greater degree of civic culture is evident, and lastly a larger middle class is generated. 
All of these elements combine to support the process of democratisation. Economic 
development therefore creates a series of effects, such as education and wealth, which 
help form a positive basis on which to build the process of democratisation. 
1.2.3.1.2. Economic Liberalisation 
WhUe Huntington argues that economic development can aid democratisation, he also 
argues that recession could have a similar outcome, through the implementation of 
economic hberaUsation poMcies. This is expanded upon by Niblock in his discussion of 
democratisation and economic liberalisation in the Arab world. Niblock and Murphy 
define economic hberaUsation as: 
...any measure which strengthens the role of the market in the 
economy. The range of measures which are encompassed by the 
term is very extensive : the privatisation of formerly state-owned 
industry; the encouragement of private investment (whether 
domestic or foreign); the opening of stock markets, in which shares 
of public companies can be traded; the relaxation of state control 
over credit (whether as regards the level of interest rates or the 
purposes for which credit is made available); the cutting of state 
expenditure, with the consequent reduction of the overall burden 
which the state infrastructure imposes on the economy; the 
loosening of state controls over foreign and/or domestic trade; the 
re-ordering of labour laws such that wages and conditions reflect 
the value placed on labour by the market, rather than following 
governmental guidelines; and the re-structuring of the public sector 
so as to make pubUc corporations able to respond directly to 
market conditions, as opposed to being continually subject to 
decisions taken from above in ministries.^'"'' 
Economic and political reforms often appear to go together and are therefore worth 
comparative examination. '^'^ ' I f the poMcies associated with economic liberalisation are 
fully implemented, they wiU ultimately have both positive and negative effects on 
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groups within society and within the state, affecting class balance and social bases of 
(48) 
regimes. 
The early stages of economic UberaUsation have led to protests from the masses. The 
reduction of pubUc expenditure, largely for consumer subsidies, has caused riots and 
demonstration in Arab world countries such as Jordan, Egypt and Tunisia.^ ""'^  Wage 
reduction has resulted in increasing labour militancy. Limited and partial UberaUsation 
is a rational poUtical strategy for governments and bureaucrats, and expUcates much of 
what is termed "slippage" by World Bank economists.^^°^ 
The World Bank provides funds to counterbalance the effects of social upheaval, and 
these funds in turn boost government spending. However, this may be insufficient to 
avoid unrest. The resultant social protest has provided Middle Eastern regimes with 
fuel to fight against agencies seeking to implement poUcies of structural adjustment. 
Whether this is a consequence of inflation which can be prevented by structural 
adjustment or not, there is not enough evidence to point the finger at either side.^ '^^  
As Ayubi argues, when economic UberaUsation poUcies are initiaUy implemented 
"economic UberaUsation wiU not immediately lead to poUtical UberaUsation, but a more 
complex picture of multipUcity of interests and organisations in a state of competition, 
bargaining and intermediation".Pool Usts a general pattern which the poUcies of 
economic and political Uberalisation tend to foUow: 
Economic UberaUsation sets constraints on poUtical Uberalisation, 
and aUhough a degree of poUtical Uberalisation can faciUtate the 
introduction of economic reform measures, the social and poUtical 
consequences of such measures put Umits on the extent of poUtical 
reform. As a result of this symbiosis and dialectical tension 
between the two processes, economic UberaUsation is marked by 
progress and regress and poUtical UberaUsation is authoritarian, 
cautious and controUed.^ ^ '^ 
25 
In his analysis, Niblock identifies three factors which could establish economic 
Uberahsation: fiscal, monetary and development dilemmas facing the state, the 
international dimension and domestic poHtics, and social structure.'^ '*' He then extends 
the argument by differentiating between economic Uberahsation which is essentially 
internally-motivated and that which is externally-motivated. In the case of the latter, 
which is relevant to the Jordanian experience, there are tactical and structural reasons 
why economic UberaHsation becomes Hnked to political UberaUsation. Tactically, 
governments need to broaden the base of the responsibility in order to justify the 
implementation of unpopular poUcies, whilst structurally, the enforced economic 
policies reduce the ability of the government to buy the support of particular social 
groupings. In order to establish a new basis for legitimacy, the government is required 
to open, at least partially, the political system for public participation.^^ '^ 
In the Middle East, especially in the Arab countries, the economic crises which affected 
the non-oH states has led to a process of economic liberalisation. In order to offset the 
negative effects of this process such as reduced welfare and increased prices, a poUcy of 
poUtical UberaUsation has been implemented in a number of countries. By allowing 
political participation, the blame for unpopular policies can be deflected more easily 
from the ruling elite. 
1.2.3.2. Civil Society 
The concept of civH society has been highUghted in the literature of democratisation, 
which links democracy, liberalisation, development and peaceful management of 
domestic and regional conflict.^^^' Civil society can be defmed as the "framework within 
which those without poUtical authority Uve their Uves - economic relationships, family 
and kinship structures, reUgious institution and so on".^"' According to Brynen et al, it 
has three dimensions which are emphasised to different degrees by different writers. 
The first is an organisational one, where civil society is defmed as the way in which 
society organises itself "at the level between the family and the state". In this respect, 
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civil society takes the form of various groups, associations, unions and parties which 
come together and soften any possible blow between citizen and state. The second, 
more abstract dimension focuses on the "civiUty" of society characterised by pluralistic 
discourse, tolerance, and moderation. A third dimension emphasises a certain quaUty of 
state-society relations.^ ^^^ 
CivU society institutions include poUtical parties, trade unions, professional associations, 
community development associations, and other non-government interest groups. Thus, 
civil organisations form the institutional bedrock that is an important and necessary pre-
requisite for a true democracy.^ ^ '^ 
The correlation between democratisation and civil society is very high. Civil society 
organisations provide a basis for democracy, by checking and maintaining the balance of 
power in the state. 
1.2.3.3. Political Culture 
Whilst Niblock and other writers stress structural factors such as the economy in 
affecting the processes of poUtical Uberalisation and democratisation, others such as 
Michael Hudson stress that an understanding of poUtical culture is necessary to any 
attempt at understanding poUtics, regardless of the country, whether it be in the Arab 
world or elsewhere.^ '^*' Similarly, Lipset argues that cultural factors appear to play a 
more significant role in bringing about democracy than economic ones.^ '^^  
PoUtical culture could then clearly be an important factor explaining the emergence of 
democracy. It has been defined by David Robertson as "the totaUty of ideas and 
attitudes towards authority, discipline, governmental responsibiUties and entitlements 
and associated patterns of cultural transmission such as the education system and even 
family life".^ ^^^ The ideas and attitudes within poUtical culture are derived from the 
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broader culture of society itself. Thus, controversiaUy, Huntington argues that poUtical 
culture and therefore democracy are closely linked to reUgion.**'^ ' He argues that 
historicaUy, Protestant-based societies are more democratic than CathoUc or Islamic 
ones. Islam, Hinduism, and Confucianism support authoritarian regimes, being 
consumption-led societies. In contrast, an instrumental society wiU adapt more easily to 
change and so wiU be more democratic.^^' This thesis is open to argument in that 
democratisation has been successfuUy implemented in CathoUc countries such as Spain 
and Italy, the Hindu country of India, and the Islamic country of Turkey. Furthermore, 
Islamic society is based partly on the concept of shura (consultation), and ipna 
(consensus), which Ue at the heart of the democratic practices of accountabiUty and 
power-sharing. Lipset argues that reUgion is not the only factor in determining whether 
a country wUl become democratic or not. He indicates that the pre-requisites for 
democracy are general and universal, therefore democracy can be achieved in any 
culture. Economic, poUtical and social culture and reUgion aU influence the 
development of democracy. Legitimacy of existing poUtical institutions, popular 
support for democratic reform and successful economic development aU play an equal 
role in the transition to democracy.^ ^ '^ The most enduring poUtical cultures are those 
that evolve gradually. 
AUnond and Verba argue that social factors such as education are crucial for the 
development of those ideas and attitudes deemed adequate for the active participation 
necessary for democratic poUtics. They argue that the educated classes possess the key 
to poUtical participation and involvement, while those with less education are less weU 
equipped. Moreover, they indicate that the more highly educated may tend to consider 
themselves in a better position to influence the government and be freer to participate in 
poUtical discussion.^ ^ '^ Lipset agrees with Almond and Verba, adding that education 
presumably broadens the mind, enabUng one to understand the need for norms of 
tolerance, and restraining one from adherence to extremist and monistic doctrines, 
increasing the capacity to make rational electoral choices.'^ '^ 
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Huntington Usts four values and beUefs associated with poUtical culture that affect the 
emergence of democracy. Two of these values reduce the UkeUhood of a successful 
transition to democracy, namely where the poUtical culture values highly hierarchical 
relationships and extreme deference to authority, and where there is a great stress put 
on the need to acquire power. The other two values increase the chances of 
democracy. These are where there is a high degree of mutual trust and secondly, a 
wilUngness to tolerate diversity and conflicts.^ ^*^ 
Democracy requires both citizens and poUtical eUtes to accept the basic rights of 
freedom of speech, assembly, reUgion, and the press. More ftindamentally, democracy 
demands universal respect for institutions and processes of poUtical Ufe such that they 
create outcomes such as laws, regulations, poUcies, and election returns. It is this 
respect which writers such as Almond and Verba argue is determined by the poUtical 
culture of the country. This, in turn, reflects the broader culture of society which is 
influenced by such diverse factors as education, reUgion and family structure. The 
transition from authoritarianism to democracy is partially controUed by the values and 
beUefs of the dominant poUtical culture. Revolution and uprising have proved to be 
ineffective means of estabUshing a democratic poUtical culture.'^'^ It is therefore not 
enough for citizens to struggle against the state, they also require poUtical 
consciousness. 
Socio-economic, poUtical and cultural factors are clearly aU of importance in forming 
the basis for the transition towards democracy in most countries. These factors effect 
the possibiUties for democratisation, but they can not determine outcomes. In the case 
of Jordan, the factors which played the most important role in the process of poUtical 
UberaUsation include the high level of education, the economic recession in late 1988 
and the growth and strength of the role played by civil society. 
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1.3. Part Three: Literature Review in Jordan Political Development 
Introduction 
This section wiU review the relevant and available Uterature on poUtical development in 
Jordan. The Uterature review wUl first mention a number of books and articles which 
give a historical background to this study. As the focus of the present study is the post 
1989 period, there is Uttle point in covering these works in detail. Attention will 
therefore be directed at those pubUcations which cover specificaUy the democratisation 
process in Jordan since 1989. The review features thirteen significant pubUcations of 
relevance to the study, of which eleven are articles and two are Ph.D. theses. The 
review is divided into three sections. The first covers the process of democratisation in 
Jordan in general. The second section reviews Uterature which studies specific aspects 
of the democratisation process. The third section looks at the Uterature covering the 
1989 and 1993 elections. To date, there have been no pubUcations of books on the 
period between 1989 and 1993. 
1.3.1. Historical Background: Literature Review 
The most important works in EngUsh on the early poUtical development in Jordan are 
by Aruri, Jordan: A Study in PoUtical Development 1921-1965. which describes how 
the poUtical institutions evolved during that period; and AqU Hyder, Jordan: A PoUtical 
Study: 1948-1957. which is significant on the poUtical development in Jordan. Mary 
Wilson's King AbduUah. Britain and the Making of Jordan is valuable in highUghting the 
events which shaped the early poUtical history of Jordan. Kamel Abu Jaber's article 
"The Jordanian ParUament; 1921-1967", is also significant in describing the early 
experiences of Jordanian legislation. Of the works in Arabic, the most noteworthy is 
Madi and Musa's book, Tarikh al-Urdun fi al-Oarn al-Ishrin. (The History of Jordan in 
the 20th Century, 1900-1959), which explains the historical background of the country. 
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The second, AU Muhafazah's Tarikh al-Urdun al-Mu'assir. (The Modern History of 
Jordan, 1921-1946), is useful in explaining the estabUshment of the country. 
1.3.2. Literature Review: Overview of the Process of Democratisation 
The first four studies reviewed in this section help define and explain the determining 
factors in the process of democratisation in Jordan. The fifth is concerned with the 
evolution of the process of democratisation until 1993. Abd al-Fatah al-Rashdan 
(1994), conducted a study entitled, "Al-Tatawwar al-Dimuqrati fi al-Urdun" 
(Democratic Development In Jordan: 1952-1989). He describes the poUtical 
development in Jordan during three separate periods: the first from 1952 to 1967, the 
second from 1967 to 1984, and the third from 1984 to 1989. His article is based on 
books and articles addressing Jordan's poUtical development. He focuses briefly on the 
1989 elections and comments on factors which influenced the country and paved the 
way for political liberalisation m Jordan. 
Al-Rashdan states that there were several factors behind the initiation of poUtical 
Uberalisation in Jordan. These factors were the disengagement from the West Bank, the 
economic crisis of 1989, and the growing socio-economic infrastructure in Jordan. He 
concludes that the Jordanian poUtical system is a democratic system in terms of both the 
Jordanian Constitution and the international standard of democracy. His argument is 
that the previous setback was normal for most developing countries. However, it 
would appear that al-Rashdan could have explained in greater depth that setbacks have 
different backgrounds in different countries. 
A further general study is by Robert Satloff (1992) entitled "Jordan's Gamble: 
Economic Crisis and PoUtical Reform". This study is relevant in that it analyses the 
events which created the conditions for the start of the poUtical UberaUsation process. 
He studies the conflicts associated with poUtical Uberalisation, basing his research on a 
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Uterature review. He notes four poUtical events which shook the country during 1989 
and the early 1990s. These events were the economic crisis, the April riots, the results 
of the 1989 general election which brought in more than a third of parUamentary 
members from the opposition (mainly the Muslim Brotherhood), and Iraq's invasion of 
Kuwait which turned Jordan's economic and poUtical situation upside-down and 
resulted in the loss of Jordan's largest trading partner, Iraq. Satloff argues that if the 
idea behind the elections and popular participation was simply for the government to 
share the burden of responsibiUty for a continued austerity programme and 
retrenchment, the elections would be a step backward. He states that Jordan was 
engaged in a great gamble. The tension between the regime and the Jordanian citizens, 
both economically and poUticaUy remained great. Accordingly, he concludes that the 
only point of agreement among aU Jordanians was a need for economic recovery and 
political stability in the near future. 
In 1994 al-Hawamdeh carried out a study entitled "PoUtical Development in Jordan 
from 1988 until the Present". The 'present' referred to is 1994, the date when al-
Hawamdeh completed his Ph.D. thesis. His study is relevant as it explains the factors 
which encouraged the poUtical development process in Jordan, and its consequences. 
Al-Hawamdeh used a questionnaire method to coUect his data, along with relevant 
Uterature. His sample was 510 respondents between the ages of 21 and 60, selected 
randomly from the Jordanian population. The aim of his study was, in part, to fmd out 
the effect of three variables on the poUtical development in Jordan; the effects of 
education, economics, and urbanisation; how tribalism and communaUsm influenced the 
poUtical development process; and how the poUtical reform of 1989 influenced poUtical 
participation. He also focused on moderate consensus among Jordanian citizens, and 
estabUshed that they appeared to be poUticaUy informed, interested and active. 
However, other democratic norms were rare among Jordanians, and distrust and 
dissatisfaction with government institutions existed. Al-Hawamdeh conducted his 
survey in the summer of 1992, less than two years after the initiation of poUtical 
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UberaUsation, which was possibly too early to evaluate the success of poUtical reform in 
Jordan after two decades of parliamentary suspension. 
Katherine Rath (1994) carried out a study on democracy in Jordan entitled "The 
Process of Democratisation in Jordan". She looks at the 1989 election and the poUtical 
reforms which took place during 1989 to 1992. Rath reviews Uterature on democracy 
in Jordan and states that "the economic crisis coupled with the lack of poUtical 
pluralism and poUtical freedom appear to, have been the main factors creating the 
circumstances in which the uprising was triggered".^''°^ She notes that poUtical 
UberaUsation was initiated after the April riots of 1989, which generated strong popular 
pressure for poUtical change. Rath argues that the Gulf Crisis was a major poUtical 
crisis in Jordan after the initiation of poUtical UberaUsation, and adds that the Gulf Crisis 
had the potential to destabiUse the Jordanian regime and challenge the poUtical opening 
in the country. Rath emphasises that the crisis improved poUtical cooperation between 
the leadership and parUament and led to greater national unity. She concludes that the 
natural aim of the poUtical Uberalisation process in Jordan was the institutionaUsation of 
democracy. 
Beverley Milton-Edwards' 1993 study is also worth examining. Her article is entitled 
"Facade Democracy" and relates specificaUy to Jordan. She uses the concept 
developed by Finer (1970) who argued that a facade democracy was "a system where 
Uberal-democratic institutions, processes and safeguards are established by law but are 
in practice so manipulated or violated by a historic oUgarchy as to stay in office".^^'^ 
Milton-Edwards argues that these poUtical systems might not give way to Uberal 
democracy. The study has in the writer's view a number of weaknesses. Firstly, the 
article is based mainly on secondary sources and lacks a sense of 'hands-on-experience' 
of the situation. Secondly, whilst it is true that the role of the King in the poUtical 
environment is still very evident, a number of incidents highUght a changing relationship 
between the King, the cabinet, parUament and the people - for example, when 
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parUament overruled the King's rejection of the State Security Court Law. 
Furthermore, the article omits two important points, namely that the government must 
submit its intended programme to the Chamber of Deputies to obtain a vote of 
confidence, and that parUament has the power to alter the annual budget with the threat 
of a vote of non-confidence. 
MUton-Edwards concludes that democracy in Jordan is weak and likely to remain that 
way for a long time, but the present researcher feels that raw evidence leads to a 
different conclusion. Her contribution to the present study is that she identifies several 
distinct poUtical systems in Jordan, including the democratic system which is the subject 
of the present study. 
1.3.3. Literature Review: Specific Aspects of the Process of 
Democratisation 
The studies reviewed in this section look at specific aspects of the process of 
democratisation in Jordan. Of these, the first two concentrate on state-civil society 
relations, whilst the latter studies look at Islam's role and its influence on the process of 
democratisation. 
John M. Roberts, in his article published in 1991, analyses the Unk between the state 
and civil society and its role in poUtical UberaUsation in Jordan in the period from 1989 
to 1991. His study, "Prospect for Democracy in Jordan", focuses on elements of 
Jordanian civil society and the emergence of a Jordanian national identity. Roberts' 
study is based on relevant Uterature on Jordan's poUtical development. He states that an 
understanding of the current poUtical UberaUsation in Jordan can only be obtained 
through an investigation of specific national features. The author points out that the 
popular side of the transition reflects an awareness among Jordanian citizens of a 
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stronger relationship between state and civil society. Roberts concludes that the gap 
between state and society either decreased or was never large. 
In the same vein, Laurie Brand (1995) is also concerned with civU society. Her study 
entitled "In the Beginning was the State...The Quest for Civil Society in Jordan", links 
political liberalisation with the state-society relationship and arrives at a theory of 
democracy that takes account of different state-society relationships within other 
developing countries. Brand's contribution here concerns the general parliamentary 
elections in Jordan and the poHtical reforms which took place. She argues that the 
"state in effect conceded certain additional space to civil society, and enshrined in the 
National Charter of pluralism, tolerance, and civility as based on interaction in 
Jordanian society and politics". 
In terms of the events leading up to the 1993 elections and the obstacles to the 
liberalisation process, Brand's study is the most relevant. The events described in her 
study are the changing of the electoral law, the ban on rallies on public property, and 
the threat of delay to the general elections as a result of the signing of the PLO-Israel 
Accord in mid-September. Brand indicates that, despite these events, aspects of the 
liberalisation process in Jordan such as the one-person, one-vote formula were 
discussed in the press. The High Court of Justice's decision to allow political rallies was 
a positive sign of growing freedom of expression, as was the decision to proceed with 
the general elections on the originally scheduled date. Brand concludes that the 
historical development of the Jordanian state and economy gave the state a much larger 
role in civil society than has probably been the case in many other developing countries, 
although there are no raw data in her study to support this particular conclusion. 
Najib Ghadbian (1995) examines the idea of democracy with reference to the Islamic 
challenge. His Ph.D. thesis, "Democratisation and the Islamic Challenge in the Arab 
World", is based on interviews and literature, and uses Jordan and Egypt as case 
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studies. What is interesting about this work is the point that coDective identity is a 
major prerequisite for the transition to democracy. He indicates that most poUtical 
forces in Jordan have reached a working consensus on collective identity. In his study, 
he tries to explain why democratisation reached an impasse in the Arab world, the 
intersection of democratisation with the rise of the Islamists, and the prospects for 
democracy in the current contexts of the Arab world. He concludes that the Jordanian 
democratic experiment is useful in two ways: it provides an alternative to the 
polarization of violence which characterises the way other Arab regimes have dealt with 
opposition, and it succeeds in including the Islamists in the political process. Whilst his 
work concentrates mainly on the role of the Islamic movement in the political process in 
Jordan, it does include relevant information on the Jordanian democratic movement 
with reference to the 1989 and 1993 elections. 
Likewise, Leonard Robinson (1994) looks at political liberalisation in Jordan focusing 
on the Islamists' participation and success in the 1989 election. His study, entitled "Al -
Dawlah wa-al-Islamiyun wa-al-Infitah al-Siyasi f i al-Urdun" (State, Islamists and the 
political opening in Jordan), is based on secondary material, mainly periodicals and 
journals. His contribution is his examination of the background to the 1989 election 
and the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the move towards democratisation. 
Robinson argues that the Jordanian regime and the Muslim Brotherhood wil l continue 
to co-exist on a basis of mutual interest. He points out that, historically, the Islamists 
did not constitute any real threat to King Hussein's regime. Robinson concludes that 
the experience of political liberalisation in Jordan puts it in the list of countries which 
witnessed "a change f rom the top". He also indicates that the challenge to the regime 
did not come f rom fundamental radicalism but from the regime's need to establish the 
process of political liberalisation, in order to perpetuate both the regime and poUtical 
liberalisation beyond the end of the King's reign. 
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1.3.4. Literature Review on the 1989 and 1993 Elections 
The final four reviews look at specific writings on the 1989 and 1993 elections. The 
first, a study by Kamel Abu-Jaber and Fathi (1989) entitled "The 1989 Jordanian 
Parliamentary Elections", is based on an analysis of official documents and some 
secondary literature. This study is relevant as it analyses in depth the 1989 elections. 
The authors argue that some of the elements associated with democracy such as 
elections were actually present in the parliamentary history of the Jordanian 
government. Furthermore, Abu-Jaber and Fathi note that new elements of democracy 
have been added, such as women becoming actively involved in elections from 1989 
following the change in the election laws. Their work includes information on Jordan's 
democratic government established in 1989, which is the point from which the present 
study's analysis commences. Abu-Jaber and Fathi's work is only concerned with the 
1989 election, while the present study aims to base itself on what happened not only in 
1989 but also the years up to 1993. 
Another study is that of Asher Susser (1989), called, "Jordan, Al-Mamlaka al-
Urduniyyah al-Hashimiyyah", [The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan]. This focuses on the 
political development of Jordan in 1989, and is based mainly on information gleaned 
f rom the Jordanian media. Its relevance to this thesis is that it examines the background 
and the circumstances o f the 1989 events. Susser concentrates on three major events 
which shaped the domestic political scene in Jordan during 1989: the economic crisis; 
the outbreak of the riots; and the first general election for two decades. 
Susser argues that the Apr i l riots of 1989 prompted the regime to conduct an open 
process of liberalisation in order to restore the damaged legitimacy and credibility of the 
regime. He notes that the riots were not the only reason why general elections were 
called, and indicates that the desire for democracy at that time had a momentum of its 
own, arising f rom the severe domestic crisis. Susser's study includes information on the 
conduct of the general parUamentary elections of 1989, the results of the elections, and 
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the success of the Muslim Brotherhood as a large bloc in parliament. Overall, Susser 
argues that the liberalisation process is a step towards democracy. 
A further study by Abla Amawi (1994) looks at democracy in Jordan by focusing on the 
1993 general elections. "The 1993 Elections in Jordan" is based mainly on Jordan's 
newspapers and some other secondary sources. She points out that the 1993 elections 
marked a significant development in Jordan towards the consoUdation of Jordanian 
democracy because this was the first election to be held in the new and hberalised legal 
atmosphere and was the first multi-party election since 1956. Amawi argues that the 
measures which the government took prior to the election, including the changing of the 
electoral law and the banning of public meetings which was overturned by the High 
Court of Justice, affected the composition of parliament. She states that the result of 
the elections was a clear sign of a maturing democratic poUtical process in Jordan and 
the election underscored the predominance of tribalism, financial clout, and place of 
origin rather than poUtical ideologies. Amawi concludes that the 1993 elections 
brought a pro-government Chamber of Deputies with limited power which had no real 
influence on major poUtical issues. As Amawi's article was written only a few months 
after the elections, it is not possible to argue that the Chamber of Deputies had no real 
influence on major poUtical issues. 
Hani al-Hurani (1994) carried out a study entitled "Intikhabat 1993 al-Urduniyyah: 
Qira'ah f i Khalfiyatiha, Zurufiha wa Nata'ijiha" (Jordanian 1993 Election: Its 
Background, Circumstances, and Results), based on only one article by the New Jordan 
Research Centre. He points out that the 1993 elections were significant for two 
reasons. First, the elections constituted a practical experiment for the continuation of 
the democratic process, and were the first elections to be conducted after the initiation 
of the poUtical parties law. The second reason was the PLO-Israel Accord, which was 
signed a few weeks before the general elections in September 1993. The Accord 
influenced the pre-election atmosphere with strong indications that the Jordanian 
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election would be postponed and the future participation of Palestinians in Jordan 
political l i fe was questioned. 
Al-Hurani argues that the success of the first female politician in Jordan constituted a 
significant step towards increasing the role of women in Jordanian political life. He 
concludes that democracy in Jordan needed time and that the 1993 elections were 
conducted within a special environment, resulting in a pro-government parhament. 
From this review it is clear that no comprehensive study has been made of the process 
of democratisation in Jordan from the inception of the 1989 election. This study aims 
to f i l l this gap by introducing significant new information, which wiU assist in the 
analysis of the changing political environment in Jordan. 
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Chapter Two 
The Development of the Constitutional Framework and Political 
Institutions: 1921-1967 
Introduction 
Jordan came into being as a separate entity in 1921. Participative poUtical institutions 
have been an element in the poUtical structure in Jordan since the promulgation of the 
Organic Law of 1928 (the Constitution), which was foUowed by the election of five 
Legislative Councils over the period until the announcement of the independent state of 
Jordan in 1946. These Councils were controUed by the executive authority and did not 
play an effective role in advancing widespread poUtical participation. Real 
parUamentary Ufe in Jordan began with the promulgation of the 1947 Constitution and 
was enhanced by the 1952 Constitution which UberaUsed the poUtical system in the 
country. Although a relatively a new state, Jordan has a history of modifying and 
adapting its political institutions to suit the demands of the time. 
This chapter is composed of two parts. Part one covers the pre-constitutional period, 
1921-1947, and its importance stems from its coverage of the state-buUding process 
and the creation of government in Transjordan. It provides an explanation of the 
poUtical development and the emergence of the constitutional structure in Transjordan. 
Part two discusses the building of constitutional institutions in Jordan from 1947 to 
1967. The chapter covers the roots of poUtical participation established in the country 
following the 1928 Organic Law. I t also examines the early role of poUtical parties and 
their strength within the Jordanian system. 
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2.1. Part One: Pre- Constitutional Period. 1921-1947 
2.1.1. The Background to the Creation of the Transiordan State 
Between 1516 and 1917, the territory of Transjordan formed part of Syria under the 
Ottoman Empire. I t was a neglected governorate (mutasarrifiyyah), under the vilayet 
of Syria. The Ottomans did not wish to control directly the area which they called the 
"East of the Jordan River" because, being composed largely of Bedouin, it was difficult 
to rule. In the last decades of Ottoman rule, Transjordan was divided into three 
divisions under Ottoman administrative regulations: the sanjak of Ajloun, the kaza of 
Balqa, and the mutasarrifiyyah of Karak.^'^ 
When the First World War broke out, the Ottoman state supported Germany against 
Britain, France and their allies. During the war, secret agreements were made between 
Britain and France to share between them most of the Arab territories of the Ottoman 
Empire.^ '^* 
The Allies promised Sharif Hussein Bin AU of Mecca, widely seen as the leader of the 
Arabs of Syria as well as of Hijaz, an assurance of Arab independence and freedom i f 
the Arabs would revolt against the Turks. When the Arabs knew that they could not 
achieve their objectives without the help of a foreign country, correspondence began on 
July 14, 1915 between Sharif Hussein and Sir Henry McMahon, the British High 
Commissioner in Cairo, and continued until March 16, 1916.^ '^ In this correspondence 
the Arabs were promised independence in areas they inhabited in the ex-Ottoman 
territories in Asia. The correspondence did not however take the form of an official 
agreement between the concerned parties. In the meantime, the political situation was 
becoming more complicated. On May 16, 1916, the British and French governments 
reached an agreement on the division of the Ottoman Empire territories, called the 
Sykes-Picot agreement.^ "*' Under this agreement, the Arab areas were to be divided as 
follows [see map 2.1]: 
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1. France and Great Britain are prepared to recognise and uphold 
an independent Arab state or a confederation of Arab states in 
the areas (A) and (B) under the suzerainty of an Arab Chief 
France in area (A) and Britain in area (B) shaU have a right of 
priority in enterprises and local loans. In their respective areas, 
France and Great Britain shall supply foreign advisers to the 
confederation of Arab states. 
2. France was to control the Blue area (Coastal belt from a Uttle 
north of Haifa to apoint west of Mersina, including CiUcia and 
Mosul). Great Britain was to control the Red area (southern 
Mesopotamia from the Persian Gulf to a Une south of Baghdad, 
and the ports of Haifa and Acre). Both powers were to set up 
administration in the Blue and Red areas respectively after they 
had reached an understanding with the Arab state or 
confederation of states. 
3. In the Brown area there shaU be established an international 
administration of which the form wil l be decided upon after 
consultation with Russia, and after subsequent agreement with 
the other AlUes and the representative of the Sharif of Mecca. 
On June 9, 1916, Sharif Hussein declared an Arab revolution in an attempt to achieve 
Arab independence f rom the Ottoman Empire. The Arab revolutionary army, under the 
leadership of Amir Faisal Bin al-Hussein and with the help of Britain, marched from the 
Hijaz and captured Aqaba on July 6, 1917.^ ^* Consequently, the Arab revolutionary 
army cooperated with the British Army in Palestine in important miUtary operations 
against the Ottomans. 
After the capture of Damascus on October 1, 1918, General AUenby requested the 
Amir Faisal to form a miUtary government in the area located east of the Jordan River. 
This area extended from Aqaba to Damascus. On October 5, 1918, Amir Faisal formed 
a miUtary government in Damascus in the name of King Hussein Bin AU. The miUtary 
government was under control of AU Rida Pasha al-Rikabi, who was given the title of 
"General MiUtary Governor". The miUtary government was to report to General 
AUenby throughout the period of the war. The Arabs beUeved that their aUies would 
support their independence, but this hope was to be disappointed. Confronting the 
intrigues of the French and the British, Amir Faisal and his government decided to 
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Map 2.1: The Sykes-Picot Agreement, 1916. 
r „Kirkuk 
Mediterranean 
Haifap 
INTERNATIONAI, 
Jerusalem c , - Amman 
B' ZONE Karbal^i 
(under British influence) \ pgQ20|^|g 
^ " ^ " ' ^ I r B C t B r l t l . ^ 
. \ control) 
Aqaba 
Source: Deborah J . Gerner, "One Land, Two Peoples: The Conflict 
Over Palestine", (Westvlew Press, 1991), P.30. 
4.^  
involve the pubUc in sharing and bearing the responsibility. The Amir and his 
government determined to carry out elections to appoint formal representatives, and so 
assembled at a conference in Damascus to exchange ideas and views about the future of 
the country and the form of the government. On June 2, 1919, the conference was 
inaugurated formaUy in Damascus to discuss the above points, and Transjordan was 
represented by ten members (MPs) who were elected according to the old Turkish 
election law.'^' 
Amir Faisal failed however to win his point against British and French imperial 
aspirations in the area. On July 24, 1920, the French army, under the leadership of 
General Henry Gouraud, marched towards Damascus and defeated a smaU section of 
the Arab army at the Maysalun battle. The French army then occupied Damascus and 
ordered King Faisal to leave the city.^^' 
In accordance with the Sykes-Picot agreement, placing Transjordan under British 
influence, the French did not advance southwards into Transjordan. Consequently, 
Transjordan remained with neither government, army nor poUce to maintain security. 
This situation made Sir Herbert Samuel, the British High Commissioner in Palestine, 
take the initiative to appoint a smaU number of British officers in order to help the 
people of Transjordan organise their government. 
On August 20, 1920, a meeting was convened for the national leaders of Transjordan. 
A t that meeting, Samuel deUvered a speech declaring the interests of Britain in 
establishing a separate administration independent of Damascus east of the Jordan 
River. This administration would make use of the assistance of British governors and 
administrators.^'*'^ The foUowing local administrative districts were created: 
1. Aj loun Administrative District, under the leadership of A l i Khalgi Al-Sharayri. 
2. Al-Salt Administrative District, under the leadership of Mazhir Raslan. 
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3. Karak Administrative District (Mu'ab), under the leadership of Rufayfan al-
MajaU.^"' 
These administrative districts had similar characteristics. They were not internationaUy 
recognised, each one was under the guidance of a British poUtical officer, and their 
leaders were drawn from the strongest tribal leaders. Moreover, the local 
administrations did not receive any financial or miUtary aid from Britain or any other 
country.* '^^ ^ 
The local administrations did not last for long. The formation of the al-Salt 
administrative took place in August 1920, and was foUowed by the formation of an 
administrative district in Ajloun and another in Karak in September 1920. They were 
aU canceUed in Apr i l 1921 when the first central government was formed in 
Transjordan. 
2.1.1.1. Amir Abdullah's Movement in Transiordan 
The presence of the French in Syria and the removal of King Faisal in July 1920 
angered both Sharif Hussein and his son Amir AbduUah. As a result, they decided to 
attempt to reclaim the Syrian throne, especially after a great number of poUtical and 
tribal leaders in Transjordan and Hawran had contacted Sharif Hussein and asked him 
to send one of his sons to lead a national opposition movement against the French. '^^ ^ 
Amir AbduUah Bin al-Hussein, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in his father's 
government in Hijaz, was chosen for that mission. Heading a miUtary group, he moved 
towards Ma'an on November 11, 1920 '^'*^ [see map 2]. He then started to contact 
distinguished Syrians with a view to achieving the objectives of his mission, and 
declared himself deputy of the King of Syria. On December 5, 1920, he called on the 
Syrians to co-operate and fight for the sake of their country.*'^' France and Britain did 
not appreciate the movement of the Amir AbduUah into Transjordan. Whilst France 
started to prepare itself for any movement from Transjordan towards Syria, Britain did 
47 
not initially wish to make any changes that would disturb the local administrations. 
After the Iraqi revolution in 1920 and the new development in Transjordan however, 
Britain gradually began to change its policy.^'^' 
In accordance with a proposal made by Winston Churchill, Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, Britain held a conference of British military and government personnel in 
Cairo in March 1921, to discuss the post-war British policy in the Middle East.^ '^ ^ As 
the conference was discussing the question of Transjordan, members heard that the 
Amir Abdullah had entered Amman. 
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Map 2.2: King Abdullah's Movement from Hijaz to Transjordan 
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2.1.1.2. The Amir Abdullah-Churchill Agreement 
Before the opening of the Cairo conference, Britain announced its opposition to the 
presence of Amir AbduUah in Transjordan. On March 12, 1921, Amir Abdullah sent his 
secretary 'Awni Abd al-Hadi to Cairo. Abd al-Hadi's mission was to explain to 
Churchill the Amir's claims to Syria and to confirm the Amir's friendship with Britain. 
Churchill rephed that he would visit Jerusalem and meet Amir AbduUah.^'^^ 
Amir Abdullah and his secretary 'Awni Abd al-Hadi travelled to Jerusalem to meet 
Churchill at the invitation of Sir H . Samuel, and talks began between the two parties on 
March 27, 1921.^'^' After two days of negotiation, the following basic principles were 
agreed upon: 
1. The establishment in Transjordan of an Arab Government 
under the Amir Abdullah. 
2. Transjordan would be independent under a British mandate. 
3. The British Government would assist Transjordan with an 
annual subsidy to maintain a force to keep order in the country. 
4. The Transjordan Government would undertake to prevent 
hostile acts against Syria and Palestine. 
5. The policy of the Jewish national home would not be applicable 
to Transjordan. 
6. A British air force and some armoured cars would be stationed 
in Amman.^^°' 
This agreement between Amir Abdullah and Churchill offered two advantages to the 
British government. First, the local administrations which had failed to establish law 
and order were cancelled and replaced by a central authority. Second, the installation 
of a Hashemite ruler in Transjordan in 1921 (as well as Iraq) could be presented as a 
fulfilment of Britain's promises to Sharif Hussein for his cooperation with the British 
Army during the First World War.'^'' The creation of the Emirate of Transjordan in this 
agreement was an important step in the development of the Jordanian state. 
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2.1.2. Creating a Government for Transiordan: State-Building. 1921-1928 
After the agreement was reached between Amir Abdullah and Churchill, the Amir 
returned to Amman to establish his new administration. He appointed Rashid Talai' to 
head the Council of Consultants (majlis al-mashawirin), formed on April 11, 1921. 
This council could be considered to be the first central government of Transjordan. 
After the formation of the new government, Samuel visited Amman to participate in the 
establishment of the new administration. He named Julius Abramson as the chief British 
representative, and appointed seven political officers to give Amir Abdullah advice and 
to supervise his administration.^ ^^^ Most of the employees in the first Transjordanian 
administration were members of the Syrian Istiqlal (independence) Party who had been 
expelled from Syria by the French authorities.'^ ^^ 
On September 16, 1922, the council approved the British mandate (protectorate) over 
the Transjordan Emirate. In October 1922, Churchill invited Amir Abdullah to visit 
London to discuss the final settlement of the Transjordan Emirate question. Amir 
AbduUah arrived in London on October 15, 1922, accompanied by the administrative 
secretary of the Advisory Council al-Rikabi, to start negotiations with the British 
government the following day. Amir Abdullah's demands included complete 
independence for Transjordan under his rule; a declaration of the inapplicability of the 
Balfour Declaration to Transjordan; and a treaty between the two parties. However, no 
agreement was achieved as the British government changed on October 19, 1922 and 
the negotiations were thus postponed.^ '^^ ^ 
On May 25, 1923, the British government delegated Samuel to formally announce in 
Amman the recognition of Transjordan as an autonomous state under mandatory 
jurisdiction. The announcement ran as follows: 
Subject to the approval of the League of Nation, His Britannic 
Majesty's Government will recognise the existence of an 
independent government in Transjordan under the rule of his 
Highness the Amir AbduUah, provided that such government is 
constitutional and places his Britannic Majesty's Government in a 
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position to fulfil its international obligations in respect of the 
territory by means of an agreements to be concluded between the 
two Govemments/^^^ 
In June 1923, the Transjordan Emirate was divided into the following districts: Amman, 
Madaba, Karak, Jerash, Irbid, and al-Salt. 
2.1.2.1. Constitutional Framework 
In the period of the Ottoman Empire, the area east of the Jordan River was represented 
by Shaikh Tawfiq al-Majali, who was elected as a member in the Ottoman House of 
Delegates {majlis al-mabuthan) in both 1908 and 1914. The House of Delegates could 
be considered as a parliament for the Ottoman Empire. Following the 1914 meeting of 
the House of Delegates, the first session of the Council of Representatives for the 
vilayet of Syria was established, to which Transjordan sent six delegates, and to the 
second seven.^ *^** 
The initial system of representation in the Emirate of Transjordan was the unelected 
Consultative Council {majlis al-shura). This council was created on April 1, 1923, 
according to a recommendation from the Amir Abdullah. It was headed by the Chief 
Justice and included the Directors of Accounts, General Appeals, Education, Revenues, 
Land Registration, Agriculture, and Post and Telegraph. The Council was responsible 
for trials of civil servants, drafting laws and regulations, and dealing with appeals 
against administrative d e c i s i o n s . T h e council issued a number of laws and 
regulations and continued to carry out its functions until it was dissolved on AprO 1, 
1927_(28) 
2.1.2.1.1. The Basic Law of 1924 
On July 12, 1923, a Royal Decree was issued for the formation of a national committee 
under the Secretary of Justice, with two representatives from each district, in order to 
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draw up the law for the Council of Representatives.In November 1923, the 
committee laid down the Election Law for the Council of Representatives. This was 
approved by the government, and directives were issued for its implementation. The 
King then formed a committee composed of legislators on March 30, 1924, to lay down 
the Basic Law for the Transjordan Emirate. The committee, headed by the Director of 
Archaeology, laid down the Basic Law after consulting the national leaders and senior 
personnel, and thereby created a constitutional and legal framework for the Transjordan 
Emirate.*^ ''*'^  However, nothing followed from this as the British authority refused to 
accept the development. This Basic Law, which was to shape the political awareness of 
Transjordan, consisted of eleven chapters with 84 Articles.^ '^^  The most important 
chapters related to the rights of the throne, the rights of individuals and groups, the 
Representative Assembly and the audit office. 
Chapter two was related to the rights of the throne, and in so far as the throne was 
central to the system, was the most important. This chapter also established the 
position of the Amir. Article five declared: "The Amir of the Arab East is the Amir 
'Abdullah the Son of the Amir of the Faithful and King of the Arabs al-Hussein I Bin 
'Ali". 
Article [6] described the rules of succession, stating that: 
The Emirate succession is to the eldest son of the Amir 'Abdullah 
on vertical Une. If the Amir has no son it is to the nearest male to 
him and if no male son of the Amir remains, an Amir for the 
country will be elected from the Heirs of the Amir of the Faithful 
King al-Hussein I . 
Article [9] laid down the Amir's rights and authority in administration. This read as 
follows: 
The Amir is the General Commander and has the right of 
concluding treaties subject to approval by the Representative 
Assembly after its formation. He has the right of declaring a 
general amnesty, and the right to appoint the Prime Minister and 
53 
the approval of the formation of Cabinet and accepting its 
resignation and promulgation of Laws and special amnesty and 
reduction sentences of the sentenced and opening of the 
Representative Assembly and convoke it in accordance with Article 
[42] and call it in other than its normal times and extend its sessions 
when necessary and award medals, official ranks and issue currency 
and direct military ranks and Royal status in accordance with their 
special laws. 
The third chapter related to the rights of individuals and groups, and described their 
relationship with the central government. Article [12] provided for freedom of 
individuals and groups and declared that: "Personal freedom is safeguarded from 
aggression and it is not permissible to arrest any one except for reasons and manners 
described by law". 
Article [14], which declared the freedom of religion and race, stated: 
It is not permissible to interfere in the freedom of faith and religion 
and no objection is allowed against religious celebrations by all 
religious sects on condition that they may not harm public security 
and public decency and do not infringe on the devotions of other 
religions and sects. 
Article [16] covered the inhabitants' right to complain to the government on certain 
matters as follows: 
The inhabitants have the right to present their written complaints to 
the appropriate authorities as individuals and in the case of several 
complainers against a certain matter, their complaint shall be 
presented by one of them. 
The fifth chapter related to the Representative Assembly and gave a central democratic 
structure to this institution. The representatives who were to be elected according to 
the Electoral Law of 1923 had similar freedoms to those of their counterparts in the 
Western democratic world. Article [45] described these freedoms as: 
Members of the Representative Assembly are free to express 
thoughts and comments in the Assembly and no responsibility 
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whatsoever can be placed upon them because of that provided they 
do not contravene the Assembly's Internal Regulations. 
Article [49] added a further element: 
It is not permissible to arrest or to try any Representative for a 
normal crime before the session of the Assembly except by 
approval of the two thirds majority. An exception shall be made in 
case of witnessed crimes and in this case the Assembly must be 
informed immediately. 
The last chapter related to the Audit Office. It laid down the operating practices that 
would observe the implementation of the government budget and cover all matters 
relating to finance. Article [67] read as follows: 
The Audit Office shall examine the annual Government accounts 
and the Accountants records and observe the appUcation of the 
Budget; they shall submit a general report on their observations and 
the results of their examination during the year to the Assembly at 
the beginning of the session and report to the Government every 
three months on the financial situation with a copy to the Assembly. 
However, the envisaged Representative Assembly never had the chance to be formed and 
function, because the Basic Law was vetoed by the British Resident in Amman. The 
British Mandate Authorities preferred a consultative council rather than an elected body in 
this early period of the Emirate's existence. Importantly, the attempt to establish the Basic 
Law highlights the desire to promote the idea of representative institutions from the 
beginning of the Transjordan state. 
2.1.2.1.2. The Organic Law of 1928 
A further example of the early desire for representative institutions was illustrated by 
the 1928 Organic Law. In effect, the Emirate of Transjordan was ruled without any 
form of constitution until February 20, 1928, when the Anglo-Transjordanian 
Agreement was signed. This recognised Transjordan's self-government, but left finance 
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and foreign affairs under British control. The 1928 agreement provided for the 
adoption of an Organic Law for Transjordan, and the Organic Law was issued on April 
16, 1928.^ ''^ ^ According to the Jordanian historians, Madi and Musa, the 1928 Anglo-
Transjordanian agreement was 'imposed by the British Government without 
consultation or negotiation'.^ ^^^ The Organic Law was divided into seven parts and 
consisted of seventy-two Articles. The most important parts related to the rights of the 
people, the role of the Amir and the legislature. No mention was made of the source of 
authority, or the national identity of the country. 
The parts that related to the rights of the people described the rights and freedoms of 
Transjordanians. Article [6] declared that: 
The personal freedom of all dwellers in Transjordan shall be 
safeguarded from aggression and interference and no person shall 
be arrested or detained or punished or forced to change his 
residence or submitted to bonds or compelled to serve in the Army 
except in accordance with law. All dweUing houses shaU be safe 
from aggression and no entry therein shall be permitted except in 
the circumstances and in the manner prescribed by law. 
Article [7] covered the right of people to appeal to the court, stating that, "The Courts 
are open to all but no person shall be forced to submit to a Court other than the Court 
having jurisdiction in his case except in accordance with law". 
The 1928 Constitution gave the right to all Transjordanians to assemble, to publish and 
express their opinions. Article [11] stated that: "All Trans-Jordanians shall be free to 
express and publish their opinions and assemble together and to form and be members 
of associations within the provisions of law". 
Part two, deaUng with the rights of the Emirate, granted the Amir the right to sanction 
and to promulgate all laws, but did not entitle him to modify or suspend laws. Article 
[19] provision [1] declared that: 
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The Amir is the head of the State. He sanctions and promulgates all 
laws and supervises their execution. He is not entitled to modify or 
suspend laws or to give dispensation in their execution, except ui 
the circumstances and in the manner prescribed by law. 
The Amir had the right to conclude treaties with the consent of His Britannic Majesty. 
Article [19] provision [2] stated: 
The Amir concludes treaties, but His Britannic Majesty shall have 
power to accede, when necessary, on behalf of Transjordan to any 
commercial or extradition treaty or general international convention 
to which His Majesty is a party for Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland. 
According to Article [19], provision [3], the Amir had the right to order the holding of 
elections, and to convene and dissolve the Legislative Council. This provision read as: 
"The Amir issues orders for the holding of election to the Legislative Council, convokes 
the Council, opens it, adjourns it, prorogues it and dissolves it in accordance with the 
provision of the law". 
The Organic Law envisaged the formation of an executive council, which was to be 
made up of a Chief Minister and other members not exceeding five in number, who shall 
be appointed by the Amir on the recommendation of the Chief Minister. The role of the 
Executive Council was to give advice to the Amir to whom it was responsible and 
accountable. Article [21] put this as follows: 
There shall be for the purpose of advising the Amir an Executive 
Council consisting of the Chief Minister and other members not 
exceeding five in number who shall be appointed by the Amir on 
the recommendation of the Chief Minister either from among the 
principal officers of the Administration or the elected 
representatives of the people. The Executive Council is entrusted 
with the conduct of the affairs of Transjordan. It shall meet under 
the presidency of the Chief Minister to decide as to the measures 
which should be taken in matters appertaining to more than one 
Department and to investigate aH important matters concerning a 
single Department. The Chief Minister will communicate to the 
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Amir the decisions of the Council and wiU ascertain his wishes in 
regard thereto. 
Part three of the constitution dealt with the legislative power. According to Article 
[25] a Legislative Council would be brought into existence and would consist of: 
(a) .Representatives elected in accordance with the Electoral Law 
which shall have regard to the proper representation of minorities. 
(b) .The Chief Minister and other members of Executive Council not 
being elected representatives. 
Under the Electoral Law which came into effect on June, 17, 1928, Transjordan was 
divided into three districts, namely, Balqa, Ajloun, and Karak, and the sixteen elected 
members of the Legislative Council were to be divided as follows: 
1. The non-Bedouin Muslims received nine seats in the Legislative Council. 
2. The Circassians received two seats. 
3. The Christian community received three seats. 
4. The Bedouin received two seats. (These, however, were to be fiUed by appointment 
rather than election).^ '^^ ^ 
The Electoral Law of 1928 provided the Circassians with one seat for every 5,000 
inhabitants, while the Non-Bedouin Muslims received one seat for every 27,000 
inhabitants, indicating that the minorities were over-represented. 
The duration of the Legislative Council was for three years, but could be extended to 
five years in an exceptional case, according to a special or temporary Law. If the 
Legislative Council was dissolved, a new Legislative Council would be elected not 
more than four months after the date of dissolution. Article [30] declared that: 
If the Legislative Council be dissolved, a general election shall take 
place and the new Legislative Council shall assemble in extra-
ordinary session not more than four months after the date of 
dissolution. In any event this session shall be prorogued on the 
31st of October so that the first ordinary session of the Legislative 
Council may assemble at the beginning of November. 
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Although the 1928 Constitution was drafted by the British mandatory authority without 
any local consultation, it provided a legal framework for a democratic system and 
formed the basis for the future political situation in Jordan. It also highlighted the 
wishes of the Transjordanians to establish a representative body. It was flexible and 
gave the Amir the right to make amendments within two years of its issuance. 
2.1.2.1.3. The Transiordanian National Charter. 1928 (al-mithaa al-watani) 
Leaders of intellectual opinion, who had hoped for a truly democratic representative 
government, objected to the agreement with Great Britain and the Organic Law. On 
July 25, 1928 a National Congress {al-mu'tamar al-watani), composed of 150 notables, 
tribal leaders, intellectuals and Syrian nationalists, who perceived themselves as 
representing the people of Transjordan, met unofficially in Amman to discuss the first 
Anglo-Transjordanian Treaty. They rejected the Anglo-Transjordanian agreement and 
adopted a Transjordanian National Programme called the "National Charter" {al-mithaq 
al-watani), declaring Transjordan a sovereign, independent and constitutional Arab 
state. The National Congress refused to recognise the British mandate over the 
territory of Transjordan and called for the creation of a government responsible to the 
legislative council and urged the people of Transjordan to boycott the 1929 general 
election. They denounced the Electoral Law and the Legislative Council, on the 
grounds that they were unrepresentative of the Transjordanian people.^ ^^ ^ The National 
Congress indicated the strong desire within Transjordan both for independence and for 
a representative government. 
The National Charter, which was adopted by the National Congress, consisted of eleven 
Articles.^ ^^^ The Articles which were related to the sovereignty of the state defmed the 
Emirate of Transjordan as an independent Arab state, administered by a constitutional 
independent government and headed by His Royal Highness the Amir Abdullah Bin al-
Hussein [Article, 2]. 
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Article [3] added a further element: 
Transjordan does not recognise the principle of mandate except as 
an honest technical assistance for the country. This assistance shall 
be defined in accordance with an agreement or treaty to be 
concluded between Transjordan and Great Britain the AUy of the 
Arabs, on the basis of mutual right and interest without prejudice 
against national sovereignty. 
Article [5] which was related to representation in Transjordan, made clear the 
importance of the representative process: 
Every election for the general representation held in Transjordan 
contrary to the correct rule of representation or on the basis of no 
accountability of the government in the Representative Assembly 
win not be considered as representative of the general will of the 
nation and its national sovereignty within the rules of the 
constitution. In fact it wiU be considered an artificial election 
without correct representative value. I f members elected on that 
basis decide on a political financial or legislative right which harms 
the basic right of Transjordan, their decision wiU not have the 
power of right as recognised by the people; in fact, their decision 
will be a part of the behaviour of the Mandate authority and on 
their own responsibiUty. 
Article [7], rejected unequivocably British control of Transjordanian fmancial matters, 
which were controlled very strictly by the Anglo-Transjordanian agreement. It stated 
that "Transjordan rejects the liability of expenditure on any foreign occupation force 
and considers any money imposed upon it for that purpose, usurped money from its 
poor workers and miserable farmers". 
Article [10] in the National Charter considered any foreign loan to Transjordan 
occurring before the formation of the Representative Assembly to be void, stating that, 
"Transjordan does not recognise any loan which occurred before the formation of the 
Representative Assembly". 
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The National Congress elected a committee from its members to meet the Amir and 
present to him the National Charter and their demands. In fact all these members were 
very loyal to the Amir, and most of them were tribal shaikhs or close friends of the 
Amir. The Amir in turn submitted the National Charter to the British Resident as 
promised to the National Congress committee, but the National Congress's demands 
were ignored by the Resident.^ "^ 
Opposition to the Anglo-Transjordanian agreement and the 1928 Organic Law was 
widespread among Nationalists, who eventually realised that presenting petitions to the 
Amir, the Chief Minister, and the British Resident was futile.^ ^*^ 
The National Congress, which initially had the support of the Amir, met five times 
between 1928 and 1933. In addition to the rejection of the Anglo-Transjordanian 
Agreement, the first National Congress objected to some Articles and Provisions in the 
Organic Law.^ ^^ ^ Article [19], provision [3] stated that "the Amir issues orders to the 
Legislative Council for the holding of elections convenes the Council, opens it, adjourns 
it, prorogues and dissolves it in accordance with the provisions of the law" and Article 
[21] stating "there shall be, for the purposes of advising the Amir, an Executive Council 
consisting of the chief minister and other members not exceeding five in number, who 
shall be appointed by the Amir" were both rejected. The second Congress met on 
March 11, 1929 to urge the Transjordanian people to boycott the forthcoming election 
of the Legislative Council. The third Congress was convened on May 25, 1930 in Irbid, 
the fourth on March 15, 1932, and the fifth on June 5, 1933.* °^^  In all these 
conferences, the NationaUsts made similar demands and petitions, but were all ignored. 
2.1.3. The Legislative Councils. 1929-1947 
The elections for the Legislative Councils were carried out in accordance with the 
Electoral Law of 1928. The election system adopted was that of the old Ottoman law, 
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with primary and secondary elections. Every male, non-Bedouin Transjordanian over 
18 years of age was entitled to vote in the primary election. Those who were elected in 
the primary elections then became the electors entrusted with the fmal election of 
members of the legislature. Article [6] of the Legislative Council Electoral Law of 
1928 stated that: 
The election of members shall be conducted by primary and 
secondary elections. Primary election shall consist of the election of 
the voters, as hereinafter defined, as secondary electors; and 
secondary election shall consist of the election of members by 
secondary electors.^ "'^  
Article [7], of the Electoral Law described eligibility to vote as follows: "Every male 
Transjordanian, not being a Bedouin, who has completed the eighteenth year of his age, 
shall be entitled to vote at the primary election". 
Article [8] added a further element: 
For the purpose of primary elections every electoral district shall be 
divided into voting areas and the voters within such areas shall be 
entitled to elect a number of secondary electors to be determined 
on the basis that every 200 primary electors shall elect one 
secondary electors; provided that if any village, quarter, or locality 
has between 150 and 200 primary electors it shall be entitled to 
vote for one secondary elector; if it has between 350 and 400 
primary electors it shall be entitled to vote for two secondary 
electors, and the same principle will be maintained where the 
number of primary electors exceeds 400. 
The Bedouins were represented by two members, one from the Bedouins of the north 
and the other from those of the south. They were elected by two commissions 
appointed by the Amir, each composed of ten shaikhs, and electing one member. 
Article [16] in the Electoral Law described the process as follows: 
Two members shall be elected to represent the Bedouins of the 
Amara. His Highness the Amir shall by proclamation published in 
the official Gazette appoint from the Bedouins of the North and the 
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Bedouins of the South respectively two corrimissions each 
composed of ten shaikhs. Each commission shall elect one member. 
The Election Law allowed for the establishment of the Legislative Council which was to 
be composed of not just the elected representatives, but also the members of the 
Executive Council. Thus, the law merged the legislative and executive authorities into 
one, with the chairman of the Executive Council to preside in addition over the 
Legislative Council. This resulted in opposition to the Electoral Law spreading among 
Arab nationalist elements of the population, who declared that the law was not 
consistent with the principles of representative government. The opposition rejected 
the division of the country into electoral districts, the system of minority representation 
and the system of indirect balloting.^''^' 
2.1.3.1. The First Legislative Council. 1929-1931 
The first Legislative Council was elected on April 2, 1929.^ ''''^  It was quite effective in 
voicing its opinions and in acting as an opposition to the executive branch.^ '*^ ' The first 
important act of the first Legislative Council was to approve the agreement of February 
20, 1928 with Great Britain. After many delays and under pressure, it was fmally 
approved on June 4, 1929.^ '*^ ^ 
The end of the first Legislative Council came when it refused to pass the annual budget 
law, in which the government requested fmancing for the Desert Patrol. On March 9, 
1931, the Council was dissolved by the Amir. He explained that this was due to the 
lack of co-operation between the Executive Council and the Legislative Council. ^ '^ ^ 
2.1.3.2. The Second Legislative Council. 1931-1934 
The second Legislative Council was elected on June 10, 1931. '^'^ ' However, no 
members who had previously voted against the Anglo-Transjordanian treaty were 
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elected. The Speaker of this Council was Shaikh Abdullah Siraj, the Chief Minister. 
Only four of the sixteen representatives who had been members of the first Council 
were re-elected; three of them were tribal shaikhs and the fourth, Sa'id al-Mufti, was a 
leader of the Circassian community.^ ''^ ^ On November 1st, 1933, the second Legislative 
Council refused to elect members of the Executive Council (appointed members) to the 
legal, financial and administrative committee of the Legislative Council, thereby 
heightening the conflict between the two authorities.'"* '^ The members of the Legislative 
Council had been demanding that the executive and legislative authorities should be 
separated. This led to friction between the legislature and the chief minister, and 
members of Legislative Council boycotted meetings for two weeks. The Amir then 
dismissed Abdullah Siraj, the Chairman of the Executive Council and its members on 
November 17, and appointed Ibrahim Pasha Hashim as Chief Minister.*^"' 
The most important issue presented by the Government to the second Legislative 
Council was a law prohibiting the sale of land to foreigners. This law was enacted at 
the request of the Legislative Council members. The second Legislative Council 
completed its constitutional term and was dissolved on June 10, 1934.*'''' 
2.1.3.3. The Third Legislative Council. 1934-1937 
The elections for the third Council were held on October 16, 1934. This Council was 
headed by the Chief Minister, Ibrahim Pasha Hashim. The election of this Council was 
managed by the government and led to the successes of pro-government elements.*^^ ' 
The Council approved the "Defence Law" of 1935 which remained in effect until it was 
replaced by the new defence law of 1992. During the period of the third Council, the 
Executive Council with the support of the Amir, demanded the modification of the 
1928 agreement, national control of the budget, diplomatic representation abroad, and 
locally recruited armed forces. The British government responded positively to these 
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demands two years later during the 1939 Palestine Conference.'^ ^^ The Council 
completed its constitutional term when it was dissolved on October 16, 1937. 
2.1.3.4. The Fourth Legislative Council, 1937-1942 
The fourth Council was elected on October 16, 1937.*^ '*^  During the term of the fourth 
Council, the Palestine Conference was convened in London in June, 1939 as part of 
Britain's policy of winning over Arab public opinion and retrieving her military position 
in the region in the face of the impending war in Europe. Amir Abdullah and Hassan 
KhaUd Abu al-Huda the Chief Minister of Transjordan, represented Transjordan at the 
Conference. Abu al-Huda and the Colonial Secretary, Malcolm Macdonald, carried out 
separate negotiations during the sessions towards a revision in the Anglo-
Transjordanian Treaty.^ ^^ ^ This was announced by Mr. Macdonald as follows: 
1. The formation, in place of the present Executive Council in 
Transjordan, of a Council of Ministers or a Cabinet, each 
member of which will be in charge of a Department and will be 
responsible to the Amir. 
2. The deletion from Article 10 of the Agreement between His 
Britannic Majesty and the Amir of Transjordan dated the 20th 
February 1928, of the paragraph in which the Amir undertakes 
not to raise or maintain in Transjordan, or to allow to be raised 
or maintained, any military forces without the consent of His 
Britannic Majesty. 
3. The relaxation of the close control hitherto exercised by His 
Majesty's Government over details of fmance and 
administration, and the introduction of a scheme which wiU 
obviate the necessity of referring minor financial matters to the 
Secretary of State. The object of this relaxation wiU be to 
increase the authority and responsibility of the Government of 
Transjordan and its officials. 
4. The appointment by the Amir of Transjordan of Consuls in 
certain neighbouring Arab States, on the understanding that 
these representatives will confine themselves to consular duties. 
5. The replacement, as and when possible, of seconded Palestinian 
officials by Transjordans.^ ^ '^ 
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During the fourth Council, the Transjordan government decided to enter the Second 
World War on the British side. The Council also introduced some amendments to the 
Organic Law of 1928, which included the replacement of the Executive Council by a 
new Council of Ministers. The fourth Council completed its constitutional term in 
October 1940, but this was extended for two more years due to the Second World 
War.*"' 
2.1.3.5. The Fifth Legislative Council: 1942-1947 
The fifth Legislative Council was elected on October 20, 1942, for a three year term, 
and was extended for a further two years until October 10, 1947. The election results 
were managed by the government.*^ '^ During the fifth Council, Britain and Transjordan 
signed a new treaty on March 22, 1946, which declared Transjordan an independent 
state.* '^' As a result. Amir Abdullah called the Legislative Council to meet on May 22, 
1946 to amend the Organic Law. The amendment changed the title of the Amir to 
King, and the name of the state of Transjordan to the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Transjordan. 
2.1.4. Institutional Structure 
2.1.4.1. The Ministerial Establishment 
Amir Abdullah's arrival in Transjordan marked the end of the local administrations that 
were vainly attempting to bring law and order to the three districts of Irbid, al-Salt, and 
Karak. He organised his first government in Amman on April 11, 1921 after receiving 
the six month option from Winston ChurchiU to assume rule over the parts of the British 
Palestine mandate east of the Jordan River.*^*'' 
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It is confusing to follow the developments which took place in the emergence of the 
Jordanian executive authority, insofar as there were many different names used to 
describe this body. The first body was established on April 11, 1921, and was called the 
Council of Consultants (majlis al-mashawirin). The Amir had to rely mainly on non-
Transjordanian figures to fi l l the posts in the new administration. The first Council 
included only one Transjordanian, Ali Khalgi al-Sharayri, from Ajloun in the Irbid 
district. The other seven members were from Syria, Hijaz, and Palestine. Three were 
Arab nationalists of the Istiqlal Party, and most of them had served in different parts of 
Syria under Faisal's governments. The Council of Consultants was initially headed by 
Rashid Talai', a Druze from the Shuf region of Lebanon who had served Faisal Ibn al-
Hussein while he was ruler of Syria as mutasarrif and military governor of Hama, acting 
minister of the interior, and finally military governor of Aleppo. At the time of his 
appointment in Transjordan he was under sentence of death by the French in Syria. In 
fact the first Council looked like a government in exile. On April 27, 1921, its name was 
changed to "The Central Authority" (al-hay'a al-markaziyya). On August 5, 1921, the 
Central Authority of Rashid Talai' was replaced by an Advisory Council headed by 
MazhirRaslan.^^'^ 
Between April 11, 1921, and May 25, 1923, the Transjordanian government exercised 
the powers and authorities vested in it by the Amir, applying Ottoman Law and 
regulations. On May 29, 1923, after Transjordan obtained its recognition from Britain, 
the name of the Advisory Council was changed to the Council of Administrative Heads 
{majlis al-wukald) headed by an Administrative Secretary {al-katib al-idari)}-^^^ On 
June 26, 1926, Hassan Khalid Abu al-Huda formed a new government called the 
Executive Council {al-majlis al-tanfidhi). The Executive Council consisted of sk 
official members (the Chief Minister, the Minister of Justice, the Chief Secretary, the 
Treasurer, the Director of Health, and the Director of Education).'^ ^^ This system 
continued through different appointed executive councils for thirteen years. Between 
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1921 and 1939, the variously named Transjordan Councils acted as an advisory body to 
the Amir. 
In 1939, when the modification of the Anglo-Transjordanian agreement took place in 
London, revisions of the Transjordanian constitution were agreed upon. Among these 
was the conversion of the Executive Council into a Council of Ministers (majlis al-
wazara) directly responsible to the Amir. The constitutional revision was completed on 
August 5, 1939. Accordingly, Article [20] of the 1928 Organic Law was amended to 
change the name of the Executive Council to the Council of Ministers. On August 6, 
1939, Abu al-Huda formed the new Council of Ministers which consisted of five 
ministers, the same number as stipulated under the 1928 Organic Law.^ ^^ 
The number of ministers was not changed in the 1947 Constitution. Article [27] 
provision [A] of the 1947 Constitution stated that "The Council of Ministers shall 
consist of the Prime Minister as chief and other Ministers whose number shall not 
exceed five". However, on May 8, 1947, a Ministry of Supply was established to 
increase the number of ministers to six. In addition, on May 2, 1949 the number of the 
Council of Ministers was increased by three ministers from the West Bank following the 
unity between the East and West Banks. The 1952 Constitution did not stipulate the 
number of ministers but stated that the numbers would be governed by the needs of the 
public interest. Article [42] states this as follows: "The Council of Ministers shall consist 
of the Prime Minister, who shaU be the President, and of such number of Ministers as 
may be needed and as public interest may require". 
2.1.4.2. The Position of the Monarchy 
When Amir Abdullah arrived in Transjordan, he had no supporters in the area. He 
regarded Transjordan as part of Greater Syria. There was only Urriited public order and 
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security in Transjordan, and the area was under the direct supervision of the British 
authority as part of the mandate of Palestine.*^ ^^  
The political life in Transjordan during the early period was dominated by two distinct 
groups, the traditional leaders and the nationalists. The traditional leaders were mostly 
shaikhs of nomadic and semi-sedentary tribes, or community leaders whose positions of 
leadership were based on a combination of inherited family prestige and personal merit 
and wealth. They were from the Transjordan area, few had been formally educated and 
none had belonged to any nationalist organisations before 1920. 
The nationalists on the other hand, were from the towns of Syria, Palestine, and the 
north-west comer of Transjordan. They were educated, generally in secular institutions, 
and most were professionals (lawyers, military officers or bureaucrats). The nationalists 
were ideologically motivated, and most had been politically active with Faisal in 
Damascus. Amir Abdullah was considered an Arab nationalist when he arrived in 
Transjordan in 1921,^ *^*^  although he attempted to maintain a balance between the 
nationalists and the traditionalists, so as to gain and maintain power. The Amir 
explained that he came to Transjordan in response to a plea from the Arab nationalist 
movement in Syria. He declared that his objective was to expel the French from Syria 
and restore Faisal's throne. In order to win the nationalists' support, in April 1921, 
Abdullah offered them high posts in the Council of Consultants. 
When Abdullah established his first government in Transjordan, he took a number of 
practical measures to consolidate his regime. Among these were centralising political 
power in his hands; mobilising the population, especially the tribes, to accept the 
existence of the new Emirate; and building the Arab Legion to strengthen his rule. 
However, he faced many difficulties, including a tribal revolt. Some tribal shaikhs 
resisted the new government believing it would limit their control and prestige.^ *^^  The 
first tribal opposition came from Koura in Ajloun district, where Shaikh Kulaib al-
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Shraidah had established his own tribal government, refusing to submit to the authority 
of the Irbid governor, to pay taxes, and to obey the Amir's government. On May 14, 
1921, the Amir ordered a force consisting of 125 men to end the rebellion in Koura. The 
Shaikh's army surrounded the Amir's small force; eighteen men were killed and the rest 
of the Amir force surrendered, losing their horses and weapons. The following year, the 
Amir sent new forces northwards which captured the Koura villages and ended the 
revolt.^'') 
Challenges to Abdullah's authority also came from outside the country. In August 1922, 
Transjordan was invaded by Wahhabi expeditionary units from Nijad, but the raid was 
resisted by Transjordanian tribes with the help of British planes and armoured cars. In 
1924, a second Wahhabi expeditionary unit attacked Transjordan, reaching the outskirts 
of Amman, but it too was defeated.^™' 
Furthermore, on August 20, 1923, Shaikh Sultan Pasha al-Adwan, the leader of al-
Adwan tribes in al-Salt district, presented his grievances and demands to the Amir's 
government. In fact, the al-Adwan tribes were more heavily taxed than the other tribes 
in Transjordan, and most were excluded from the civH service. Shaikh Sultan al-Adwan 
submitted to Amir Abdullah a programme of reform that included relieving the country 
from heavy taxation, ending Transjordanian exclusion from the civil service, and 
allowing the al-Adwan to participate in the political process. Abdullah invited Shaikh 
Sultan to visit Amman. In response to the Amir's invitation, the Shaikh entered the 
capital with a thousand mounted followers who seemed more ready for battle than 
conference. They presented their demands to the Amir, who promised to pay a visit to 
the al-Adwan in their camps. The Amir and the nationalists disliked the manner of entry 
of the al-Adwan into the capital. Shortly after this the Advisory Council of Raslan 
resigned, and was succeeded by a Council led by Hassan Khalid Abu al-Huda. He 
introduced indigenous elements into his Council in an attempt to placate Shaikh Sultan, 
and with the blessing of the Amir, cancelled the al-Adwan visit. However, the 
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cancellation resulted in the al-Adwan marching on the capital again in September 1923 
in an effort to end Amir Abdullah's regime, but they were defeated by British planes and 
armoured cars who came to the rescue of the government forces.^ '^^  
In addition to the formal representative body, Abdullah held informal consultations with 
tribal leaders and notables during his reign (1921-1951). The Amir opened his palace 
every Friday for the notables of the country to discuss any matter with him.*'^ ^ George 
L. Harris indicates that Amir Abdullah's role was largely that of a super-chief, given a 
modem quaUty by the trappings of a constitutional monarchy.^ ^^ ^ 
In the early years, from 1921 to 1928, Amir Abdullah was under constant external 
pressure from Britain in terms of control and administration of Transjordan, and by the 
Wahhabi invasion. Internally, a number of tribal revolts had to be overcome. From 
1928, the Amir's position gradually became stronger both domestically and externally. 
2.1.5. The Emergence of Political Groupings: 1927-1947 
The emergence of political parties between 1927 and 1947 was the start of the process 
shaping poHtical consciousness in Transjordan. As early as 1927, political parties were 
permitted by Amir Abdullah to organise and operate under licence. The leaders of the 
parties represented communal interests of notables, tribal chiefs and landowners.^ '^'^  
The first officially licensed political party in Transjordan was founded in March 1927 
under the name "The Jordanian People's Party" (hizb al-sha'ab al-urduni), and was 
headed by Hashim Khair.^ ^^ ^ 
The party's constitution called for the country's independence by legitimate means; an 
improvement in economic and agricultural conditions; the maintenance of personal 
freedom, equality and brotherhood among the people; the establishment of a 
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representative institution and an accountable government; and the protection of the 
freedom of religion.^ ^^^ The Jordanian People's Party participated in the National 
Congress and boycotted the election of 1929 for the first Legislative Council. In 1930, 
the party ceased to exist because most of its members had resigned. 
The Executive Committee of the National Congress Party (hizb al-lajnat al-
tanfidhiyyah lil mu'tamar al-watani), was founded on April 10, 1929, and was headed 
by Hussein al-Tarawnah. The internal rules of the party outlined its objectives as 
follows: "To establish the independence of the country and to conclude the British 
mandate over the Transjordanian territory." The party urged the people to boycott the 
elections of the first Legislative Council, and led the opposition in Transjordan until it 
disintegrated in 1934.^ "^ 
The Liberal Moderate Party {hizb al-hurr al-mu'tadil), was established on June 24, 
1930, under the leadership of Rufayfan al-MajaU. It explained its aims as "The 
modification of the 1928 agreement with Great Britain, the realisation of national 
sovereignty, and protection of personal freedom and ensuring the rights of the people". 
Most of its members represented community interests, and were opposed to the 
Executive Committee of the National Congress. The party ceased to exist in 1933 as 
most of its members had resigned and joined the opposition.^ ^^^ 
The Jordanian Solidarity Party {hizb al-tadamun al-urduni), was established on March 
24, 1933. It consisted of landowners and tribal chiefs, and explained its principles and 
objectives as "The protection of the status of Transjordan by ensuring their rights and 
creating mutual co-operation between them". Article 36 of the constitution refused 
membership of the party to anyone who had not settled in Transjordan before 1922.^ ^^ ' 
The Jordanian Brethren Party {hizb al-ikha' al-urduni), was founded on September 25, 
1937. Its members consisted of tribal chiefs and landowners, and membership was open 
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to any Transjordanian interested in politics. The party's constitution called for the fuU 
independence of the country, to serve the Transjordanian people and to achieve Arab 
Unity. The party supported govemment policy.^*"' 
In general, political parties in this period were short lived and pro-government, save the 
Executive Committee of the National Congress Party, whose aim was to establish a 
truly representative body. Consequently, political parties in Jordan before 1950 were of 
little significance in political Hfe. None of these political parties were familiar to the 
general public, had no coherent programmes or platforms, and failed to develop as 
organisations. They largely represented the interests of the small propertied class and 
sought to achieve their moderate goals through negotiations with the Mandatory 
authorities and Amir Abdullah. Nevertheless, the existence of political parties was a 
significant facilitating factor in the introduction of democracy in modem Jordan. 
2.2. Part Two: First Constitutional Period: 1947-1967 
2.2.1. The Emergence of Jordan 
On March 22, 1946, a new Anglo-Transjordanian treaty was signed, in which Britain 
recognised Transjordan as an independent state; ended the Mandatory system; agreed to 
exchange diplomatic representatives; pledged subsidies to the Arab Legion; and 
undertook to defend the Emirate against extemal aggression. In turn, Britain secured 
the right to maintain troops in Transjordan. The treaty enabled the Amir to assume the 
title of King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan.^ *'^  
Following the Anglo-Transjordanian Treaty, the Transjordan government changed the 
name of Transjordan to the "Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan". Three years later, 
after the establishment of unity between the East and West Banks of the Jordan River 
on April 26, 1949, King Abdullah adopted a new name for the country, the "Hashemite 
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Kingdom of Jordan". In 1950 Britain recognised the new form of the state and 
extended its obligation to defend the Kingdom's new frontiers.'^ ^^ The incorporation of 
the West Bank in 1948-1949 after the Arab-IsraeU war helped to compensate for the 
influence the Hashemites had lost when driven out of the Hijaz by Ibn Saud in 1925, and 
from Damascus by the French in 1920. Abdullah apparently believed that the 
emergence of a separate Palestinian entity could threaten his regime if the territory was 
not controlled by the Hashemites.^ ^^ ^ 
2.2.2. The Constitutional Basis 
2.2.2.1. The 1947 Constitution 
The Constitution of 1947 was promulgated on February 1st, 1947, and replaced the 
1928 Organic Law,^ "^^  to which it was very similar as it introduced Mttie change into the 
formal relationships between the government agencies. The monarch remained 
powerful while the legislature continued to have limited power in the legislative process 
and had no control over the executive, which was responsible to the King alone. The 
Constitution became effective one month after its promulgation. The 1947 
Constitution described the country as an independent, sovereign and free state, and 
stated that its form of government should be a hereditary monarchy. No mention was 
made of the national identity of the state or the sources of power. 
The 1947 Constitution was composed of eight parts with seventy-nine Articles. The 
significant parts for the purpose of this study relate to the rights of the people, the role 
of the King, his rights, and the role of the Legislature. 
The part relating to the rights of the people covered personal freedom and equality 
among the Jordanian people. Article [6] stated that: "There shall be no difference in 
rights and duties before the law among Transjordanians although they may differ in 
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race, religion, and language". The Constitution ensured that personal freedom would 
be safeguarded [Article, 7], and every person would be free to express their opinion 
verbally and in writing within the limits of the law [Article, 17]. Article [18] stated: 
"All Transjordanians shall have the right to assemble together, and to form associations 
within the provisions of the law". 
The King's position was stated in article [26] of the Constitution, as follows: 
a. The King is the Commander in chief of the Navy, Army, and Air 
Force. 
b. The King declares war, and concludes treaties with the agreement of 
the Council of Ministers. 
c. The King issues orders for the holding of elections to the Council of 
Representatives, summon the National Assembly, opens it, adjourns 
it, prorogues it, and dissolves it in accordance with the provision of 
the law. 
The Executive Authority which consisted of the Prime Minister and his Ministers, was 
to conduct all affairs of state, both internal and external. All of the ministers were to 
serve at the pleasure of the King. Article [27] stated: 
a. There shall be constituted a Council of Ministers consisting of the Prime 
Minister, who shall be president, and numbers of Ministers not 
exceeding five in number. 
b. The King appoints the Prime Minister and may assign to him the charge 
of one or more departments. Ministers are appointed on the 
recommendation of the Prime Minister, and may by the orders of their 
appointment be entrusted with the charge of one or more departments. 
c. The respective duties of the Prime Minister, of the Ministers and of the 
Council of Minister shall be fixed by regulations made by the said 
Council and approved by the King. 
The said Council is entrusted with the conduct of all affairs of the State 
whether internal or external other than those which have been entrusted 
by this law or by any law or regulation enacted there-under to any 
other person or body. 
d. A Minister is responsible for the conduct of all matters affecting his 
Ministry. He shall refer to the Prime Minister any matter not within his 
powers. The Prime Minister shall dispose of aU matters within his 
powers and shall refer the other matters to the Council of Ministers. 
e. Decisions of the Council of Ministers shall be signed by the members of 
the said Council and shall be submitted to the King for approval where 
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this law or any law or regulation enacted there-under so required. Such 
decisions are executed by the Prime Minister and each Minister within 
the limits of his jurisdiction. 
The Executive Authority was collectively responsible to the King for matters of general 
policy of the state, and each Minister was responsible to the King for his department. 
The King could dismiss the Prime Minister or accept his resignation from office. 
Similarly, he could dismiss Ministers or accept their resignation on the recommendation 
of the Prime Minister. In the event of the resignation of the Prime Minister or his 
dismissal from office, all Ministers were considered to have resigned or to have been 
dismissed. Article [28] explained this as follows: 
a. The Prime Minister together with the Ministers are collectively 
responsible to the King for matters of general poMcy of the 
State. In addition each Minister is responsible to the King for 
his department or departments. 
b. The King dismisses the Prime Minister or accepts his resignation 
from office 
c. The King on the recommendation of the Prime Minister 
dismisses Ministers or accepts their resignation from office. 
d. In the event of the dismissal or the resignation of the Prime 
Minister all Ministers are automatically considered to have been 
dismissed or to have resigned. 
Part three of the 1947 Constitution dealt with the Legislature's powers, which 
were vested in the King and the National Assembly. Article [33] described this as: 
The Legislature power is vested in the National Assembly and the 
King. The National Assembly consists of the Council of Notables 
and Representative, and the Council of Representative consists of 
Representatives elected in accordance with the Electoral Law, 
which shall have regard to the proper representation of Minorities. 
The duration of the Council of Representative shall be four years. 
According to the provisions of the law, the Chamber of Deputies was to hold one 
ordinary session during each year of its duration [Article, 39]. The Chamber of 
Deputies could adjourn its sessions from time to time conforming with its standing 
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orders. The King could by decree, adjourn the sessions of the Chamber of Deputies 
only three times [Article, 40]. 
Article [41] described the steps to be taken if the Chamber of Deputies was dissolved, 
stating that: 
If the Council of Representatives is dissolved, a general election 
shall take place, and the new Council shall assemble in an 
extraordinary session not more than four months after the date of 
dissolution and such a session shall be deemed to be an 
extraordinary session. The conditions covering the prolongation 
and adjournment thereof shall be as prescribed for ordinary session 
in Article 40 of this law. In any event this session shall be 
prorogued on the 31st of October, so that the first ordinary session 
of the Council may assemble at the beginning of November. If such 
extraordinary session shall assemble in months of November and 
December, it shall be regarded as the first ordinary session of the 
said Council of Representative. 
The King may summon the Council to meet in extraordinary 
session outside the period of its ordinary session for the purpose of 
deciding specified matters, which shall be stated when the summons 
is issued. This session shall be dissolved by Irade. The said Council 
shall only discuss in its extraordinary session the specified matters 
stated in the Irade of summons. 
Article [43], dealt with the presidency of the Chamber of Deputies and stated that, "The 
King shall appoint a president for the Chamber of Deputies for a period of one year and 
he may re-appoint him". 
The Constitution could not be changed or amended unless this was approved by more 
than two-thirds of the members of the Chamber. Article [47] covered this as: "No 
change shall be made to the constitution except when passed by a majority of not less 
than two-thirds of the members of the Council". 
Article [48], clause [ I ] , explained the power and functions of the Council of 
Representatives to consider every proposal of law, but not the right of approval, that 
was vested in the two houses of the National Assembly and the King. It stated: 
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Every proposal for a law shall be laid before the Council of 
Representatives by the Prime Minister. I f the Council accepts what 
has been laid before it, it shall refer same to the Council of 
Notables. Proposals shall not be considered laws unless approved 
by the two Councils and sanctioned by the King. 
The 1947 Constitution provided for a bicameral parliamentary structure. The parliament 
{majlis al-ummah) was to consist of an Upper and Lower House. The Lower House 
was to be called the Chamber of Deputies {majlis al-nuwwab). The Upper House, called 
the Council of Notables {majlis al-a'yan), consisted of ten notables who were appointed 
by the King for a term of eight years. 
While the 1947 Constitution can be seen as a step in the direction of representative 
government in Jordan, a number of weaknesses prohibited the flowering of a fuUy 
democratic state. These weaknesses included the government being responsible to the 
King rather than to parliament; no separation between the executive and legislative 
powers; and the authority vested in the King. These points were, to a degree, addressed 
by the 1952 Constitution. 
2.2.2.2. The 1952 Constitution 
The most important event during the short reign of King Talal, who acceded to the 
throne on September 6, 1951, was the granting of a new constitution. This was 
promised by King Abdullah in his speech to the nation on March 18, 1950. He stated 
that a constitutional amendment would take place to make the government responsible 
to parhament.^ *^'^  On January 1, 1952 a new constitution was promulgated to replace the 
1947 Constitution and to effect important changes in the structure of government. 
The new constitution was based upon the principle of executive responsibility to 
parliament, and increased parliamentary authority. The cabinet became responsible to 
the legislature instead of to the monarch as had been the case in previous constitutions. 
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However, the King could still appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister, appoint members 
of the Council of Notables and dissolve the Council of Representatives. 
The Constitution of 1952 consisted of nine Chapters with 131 Articles. The Chapters of 
greatest significance were entitled:[see appendix 1] 
• Chapter One: The State and the System of Government. 
• Chapter Two: The Rights and Duties of Jordanian People. 
• Chapter Three: The Powers of the State. 
• Chapter Four: The Executive Power. 
• Chapter Five: The Legislative Power; The National Assembly. 
Chapter one relates to the state and system of government. Article [1] states that the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is an independent sovereign Arab state, that the people 
of Jordan form a part of the Arab Nation, and that the system of government is 
parliamentary with a hereditary monarchy. The national identity of the country is then 
clearly stated in the constitution, which was not the case in the previous two 
constitutions. The 1947 constitution declared this in Article [2] as: "The Hashemite 
Kingdom of Transjordan is an independent sovereign state whose religion is Islam", 
without stating the Jordanian national identity. 
Chapter two relates to the rights and duties of the Jordanian people and is described in 
Article [6] as follows: 
i . Jordanians shall be equal before the law. There shall be no 
discrimination between them as regards their rights and duties on 
grounds of race, language or reUgion. 
ii . The Government shall ensure work and education within the 
hmits of its possibihties, and it shall ensure a state of tranquillity 
and equal opportunities to all Jordanians. 
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Jordanian people have the right to hold meetings and to form societies and political 
parties. Under the 1947 constitution. Article [18] stated that: "Transjordanian have the 
right to assemble and to form societies within the Umits of the law", this was improved 
by Article [16] of the new constitution as follows: 
1. Jordanians shall have the right to hold meetings within the limits 
of law. 
2. Jordanians are entitled to establish societies and political parties 
provided that the objects of such societies and parties are lawful, 
their methods peaceful, and their bye-laws not contrary to the 
provisions of the Constitution. 
3. The establishment of societies and political parties and the 
control of their resources shall be regulated by law. 
Chapter three in the Constitution deals with the powers of the state. It states that the 
nation is the source of all powers [Article, 24]. Previously all authority had been vested 
with the King, Article [22a] of the 1947 constitution stated that: "With due regard for 
the provisions of this law, executive power shall be vested in King Abdullah Ibn al-
Hussein and his male heirs after him". The Legislative power shall be vested in the 
National Assembly and the King, and the Executive power shall be vested in the King, 
who shall exercise his powers through his Council of Ministers [Articles, 25 & 26]. 
Chapter four of the Constitution, which is divided into two sections, deals with the 
power of the executive authority. Part one relates to the King and his rights, and part 
two deals with the Council of Ministers. The throne of the Hashemite Kingdom is 
hereditary through the dynasty of King Abdullah Bin al-Hussein in direct line through 
his male heirs [Article, 28]. The King issues orders for the holding of elections to the 
Chamber of Deputies, has the right to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, to call the 
National Assembly to assemble, and may dissolve the Council of Notables or relieve any 
members from it [Article, 34]. Furthermore, the King retains the authority to appoint 
and dismiss the Prime Minister or accept his resignation from office. Ministers are 
appointed and dismissed by the King upon the recommendation of the Prime Minister 
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[Article, 35]. He also has the power to appoint the members of the Council of Notables 
and can accept their resignation from office [Article, 36]. 
Section two in part four deals with the Council of Ministers. In the 1947 constitution 
this part was included in part [2], the King and his rights. The Council of Ministers 
consists of the Prime Minister, who shall be the chairman and a number of Ministers, to 
be determined according to interest and general need [Article, 41]. The responsibility of 
the Cabinet before the Chamber of Deputies regarding the public policy of the state, is 
defined in Article [51], stating the following: 
The Prime Minister and Ministers shall be collectively responsible 
before the Chamber of Deputies in respect of the public policy of 
the state. In addition, each Minister shall be responsible before the 
Chamber of Deputies in respect of the affairs of his Ministry. 
This was an important improvement from Article [28a] of the previous constitution 
which stated "The Prime Minister and the Ministers are jointly responsible to the King 
for the general policy of the state; likewise, each Minister is responsible to the King for 
his office or offices". 
Several new articles were established in the new constitution, and included Articles [53], 
[54] and [56]. The Cabinet or a Minister could be dismissed from office by a vote of no 
confidence by absolute majority against the Cabinet or a minister. Article [53] stipulates 
the following: 
1. A motion of no confidence in the Council of Ministers or in any 
Minister may be raised by the Chamber of Deputies. 
2. I f the Chamber of Deputies casts a vote of no confidence in the 
Council of Ministers by an absolute majority of all its members, 
the Council of Ministers shall resign. 
3. If the vote of no confidence concerned an individual Minister, he 
shall resign his office. 
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Every newly formed Council of Ministers shall, within 30 days of its formation, present 
before the Chamber of Deputies a statement of its programme and ask for a vote of 
confidence [Article, 54]. The Chamber of Deputies has the right to impeach Ministers, 
Article [56] explains this as: 
The Chamber of Deputies is entitled to impeach Minister, but a biU 
of impeachment shall not be passed except by a majority of two-
thirds of the members of the Chamber. The Chamber of Deputies 
shall appoint, from among its members, deputies who shall present 
the impeachment to, and proceed before, the High Tribunal. 
Part five of the Constitution deals with the Legislative power and the National 
Assembly. The National Assembly consists of two Houses, the Senate and the Chamber 
of Deputies [Article 62]. The Senate, including its speaker, should not exceed one-half 
of the number of the Chamber of Deputies [Article, 63]. The duration of membership of 
the Senators in office shall be four years, except for the speaker of the Senate which 
shall be two years, but he may be re-appointed [Article, 65]. The Chamber of Deputies' 
members shall be elected by secret ballot in a general direct election and according to 
the provisions of the Electoral Law. Article [67] explains this as: 
The Chamber of Deputies shall consist of members elected by secret 
ballot in a general direct election and in accordance with the provisions 
of an Electoral Law which shall ensure the following principles: 
1. The integrity of the election. 
2. The right of candidates to supervise the process of the election. 
3. The punishment of any person who may adversely influence the 
will of voters. 
The period of membership in the Chamber of Deputies shall be four calendar years 
[Article, 68]. The speaker of the Chamber of Deputies shall be elected for one calendar 
year, but he may be re-elected [Article, 69]. Previously the appointment was by the 
King [Article 43]. The Chamber of Deputies has the right to determine the validity of 
the election of its members. Article [71] explains the power and functions of the 
parliament which had not been addressed by the 1947 constitution, as follows: 
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The Chamber of Deputies shall have the right to determine the 
validity of the election of it members. Any Voter shall have the 
right to present a petition to the secretariat of the Chamber within 
15 days of the announcement of the results of the election in his 
constituency setting out the legal grounds for invalidating the 
election of any deputy. No election may be considered invalid 
unless it has been declared as such by a majority of the two-thirds 
of the members of the Chamber. 
The 1952 Constitution like previous ones, was flexible, and could be amended with the 
agreement of two-thirds of the members of the Chamber of Deputies. Improvements 
since the 1947 Constitution included separation of the executive and legislative, 
improved individual rights, the establishment of political parties and legalisation of 
organisations. The 1952 Constitution hberahsed the political system in Jordan and has 
remained the fundamental law of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. 
2.2.3. The Conduct of Parliamentary Election 
The declaration of Jordan's independence marked the culmination of King Abdullah's 
reign since it fulfilled the objectives of building the modem institutional state which 
considered parUamentary life as an essential element. The Jordanian Constitution of 
1947 can be considered the first formal step in the direction of establishing 
representative parhamentary life in Jordan. According to the Chamber of Deputies' 
Electoral Law issued on April 5, 1947 the Kingdom of Transjordan was divided into 
nine electoral areas, and the elections of the twenty members for the Chamber of 
Deputies were divided as follows: 
1. The Qada of Amman including the Qasabat of Jerash and Madaba 
shall secure four Muslim members, two of whom shall be 
Circassians, and one Christian member. 
2. The Qada of al-Salt shall receive one Muslim member and one 
Christian member. 
3. The Qada of Madaba excluding the Qasabat of Madaba shall return 
one Muslim member. 
4. The Qada of Irbid including the Qasabat of Ajloun shall return two 
Muslim members and one Christian member. 
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5. The Qada of Ajloun excluding the Qasabat of Ajloun shall return one 
MusHm member. 
6. The Qada of Jerash excluding the Qasabat of Jerash shall return one 
Muslim member. 
7. The Qada of Karak shall secure two Muslim members and one 
Christian member. 
8. The Qada of Tafileh shall return one Muslim member. 
9. The Liwa of Ma'an shall return one Muslim member.[Article, 18] 
According to part two of the Electoral Law, which closely copied Article [16] of the 
1928 Electoral Law, the Bedouins were to be represented by two members, one from 
the Bedouins of the North and the other from the Bedouins of the South. The Bedouin 
Representatives were to be elected by a committee appointed by the King, consisting of 
two commissions each composed of ten shaikhs, and each commission electing one 
member. Article [31] of the Electoral Law described the election process as follows: 
His Majesty the King shall by proclamation published in the official 
Gazette appoint from the Bedouins of the North, and the Bedouins 
of the South respectively two commissions each composed of ten 
Sheikhs, and each commission elect one member. 
Moreover, when the Electoral Law was passed, the government went ahead with its 
plans to hold parliamentary elections according to the provisions of the constitution. 
2.2.3.1. The First Chamber of Deputies. 1947-1950 
The first Chamber of Deputies was elected on October 20, 1947, and only one party, the 
government-sponsored al-Nahda (Revival) party, participated (the only legal party 
during that time, established on May 7, 1947).'*'' The first Chamber was similar to the 
previous legislative councils and was dominated by the same land-owners and tribal 
leaders. At that time Transjordan had 100,000 registered voters of whom sixty per cent 
actually cast their ballots.'^''' The election campaign passed without any major 
disturbance, and was peaceful and uneventful.''^' Revival candidates won four seats, 
and the remaining sixteen were won by independent candidates. After the election of 
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2.2.3.3. The Third Chamber of Deputies. 1951-1954 
The third Chamber of Deputies was elected on August 29, 1951. The election campaign 
was again relatively free and uneventful.''^' The results of the elections gave the 
government a slight majority, but the opposition won eighteen of the forty seats. The 
third parliament at once began to press for the fulfilment of King Abdullah's promise to 
have a revision of the constitution to make the government responsible to the 
parliament. The opposition's efforts were successful, and on January 1, 1952, a new 
Constitution was promulgated."^' The third parHament was dissolved on June 22, 1954, 
due to its opposition to government policy and its non-co-operation with the executive 
power."*' 
2.2.3.4. The Fourth Chamber of Deputies. 1954-1956 
The election of the fourth Chamber of Deputies was held on October 17, 1954. Abu 
Jaber indicated that the elections were violent, fraudulent, rigged and not truly 
representative of the people."" Satloff also indicated that the army was used in the 
elections to favour government candidates.'^°''' The government further tightened its 
control on the opposition and revived the defence regulations, thus giving the Minister 
of the Interior the authority to ban any open meetings deemed not to be in the public 
interest. The results of the fourth parliamentary election were favourable to the 
government. The National-Socialists, who had won eleven seats in the third parliament, 
were reduced to two deputies, one of whom resigned from the party and accepted a 
post in Abu al-Huda's Cabinet. 
During the period of the fourth Chamber, Iraq and Turkey signed a mutual defence 
treaty on February 24, 1955 called the 'Baghdad Pact'.''"'' Jordan was invited to join 
this pact, but opposition came from Communist and pro-Nasir elements and Syria. 
Since the opposition could not be voiced in parliament, it took to the streets in a series 
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of violent disturbances. Parliament was dissolved by the King on December 19, 1955 
and new elections were officially called in order to decide on the Baghdad Pact.^ '"^ ' 
The dissolution of parliament was cancelled by a decision of the Supreme Council which 
declared the move unconstitutional, since the Minister of the Interior had not signed the 
dissolution order. Parliament thus remained in office until it was dissolved on June 26, 
1956. During this time the position on the Baghdad Pact was resolved when the new 
Prime Minister Samir al-Rifa'i on January 8, 1956 declared that Jordan would not join 
the Pact.^'°^^ 
2.2.3.5. The Fifth Chamber of Deputies. 1956-1961 
The elections of the fifth parHament were held on October 21, 1956. It was free from 
government interference, and at that time was the most democratic ever held in Jordan. 
The elections of 1956 were held on a party basis and proved to be a close contest 
between the government and the opposition. The election was a victory for the pan-
Arab nationalist and anti-British elements, with twenty-six seats in the Chamber of 
Deputies being captured by seven political parties (see table 2.1). The remaining 
fourteen were won by independent candidates.^ '"''^  The National-Socialists secured 
eleven seats from a total of forty, the Communists won three seats and the Ba'thists two 
seats. The government-sponsored party, the Arab Constitutional party won only four 
seats, while they captured 17 seats in the fourth Chamber of Deputies. The leader of the 
National-Socialist party, Sulaiman al-Nabulsi, who had been a candidate for Amman 
district but had not won in the elections, was invited by the King to form a Cabinet (the 
constitution did not require a prime minister to be a member of parUament). The new 
Cabinet was a coaUtion, composed of eleven Ministers, of whom seven were National-
Socialists, one a Ba'thist, one a Communist, and two were independent.^ '" '^ 
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Table 2.1: The Distribution of Seats by Party Representation in 
Parliament, 1950-1956 
Political Parties Second Parliament 
April 20, 1950 
Third parliament 
August 29, 1951 
Fourth parliament 
October 17, 1954 
Fifth Parliament 
October 21, 1956 
National Socialist 10 11 1 11 
Communist 2 2 2 3 
Ba'th 2 3 0 2 
Arab 
Constitutional 
8 9 17 4 
Community (al-
Umma) 
2 1 0 1 
Muslim 
Brotherhood 
- - 4 4 
Liberation 
(Tahrir) 
- - 1 1 
Independent 
Candidates 
16 14 15 14 
Total 40 40 40 40 
Source: Kamel Abu Jaber, "The Legislature of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: A 
Study in Political Development", in Muslim World. Vol. LVm, Nos. 3-4, July-
October 1969, p. 231. 
During the Ufe of the fifth parliament, the country was subjected to severe political 
tension. The election was mainly fought on the issues of foreign policy which centred 
around Jordan's position in the Arab world and the fate of the Anglo-Jordanian 
treaty.''"^' This resulted in the Chamber of Deputies recommending that the Anglo-
Jordanian treaty be cancelled. On November 1956, the Prime Minister, Sulaiman al-
Nabulsi, announced in the Chamber of Deputies that the government was determined to 
end the treaty as soon as Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia fulfilled their offer to replace 
British financial aid to Jordan. On January 19, 1957, an agreement was signed between 
Jordan and the three Arab states in which they promised to pay Jordan $36 million 
annually, (the amount of subsidy Jordan was receiving from the British government).''"^' 
Al-Nabulsi also announced that the government was working towards establishing 
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and China. The King was displeased with al-
Nabulsi's approach to the Communists, and on February 2, 1957, issued an open letter 
to al-Nabulsi in which he warned against the danger of communist infiltration. The 
letter was published in the press: 
Strange views have infiltrated into our midst. Unless these 
unwarranted principles, beliefs and views, which are in sharp 
contrast to our own, are curtailed and confined within certain 
limits, they will affect all the glory and the prestige for which our 
nation stands. Imperialism, which is about to die in the Arab East, 
wiU be replaced by a new kind of imperialism. If we are enslaved 
by this, we shall never be able to escape or overthrow i t . . . No gap 
must be left to allow the propaganda of communism to ruin our 
country.("'^ > 
On April 10, 1957, Sulaiman al-Nabulsi was asked to resign from office, as a result of 
the abortive Abu Nuwar mUitary coup which he had supported. AH poUtical parties 
were banned, martial law was imposed and remained in effect until November 1958.^'°'' 
2.2.3.6. The Sixth Chamber of Deputies. 1961-1962 
On October 22, 1961, the sixth Chamber of Deputies was elected, and was both a 
conservative and pro-government body. Voter participation in the elections of the sixth 
parliament did not exceed ten per cent of the electorate in the country and two-thirds of 
the candidates ran unopposed.*^""' No poHtical parties were allowed, nor was any 
candidate allowed to identify himself as representing a party. 
On January 28, 1962, Wasfi al-Tal formed a new cabinet, comprised of educated 
members and professionals of administration experience. However, because the 
government of Wasfi al-Tal was very progressive, and due to the unpopularity of the 
sixth Parliament, al-Tal convinced King Hussein that the election of the sixth parUament 
had not been representative of the Jordanian population and was a blot on the record of 
the modern history of Jordan. In response, the King dissolved the Parliament on 
October 1st, 1962, and called for a new election. During the life of the sixth parliament 
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the number of Deputies was increased from fifty to sixty and the number of the Senate 
to thirty in accordance with Election Law No. 33, 1960.''"' 
2.2.3.7. The Seventh Chamber of Deputies. 1962-1963 
On November 24, 1962, the seventh Parliament was elected. According to Abu Jaber, 
the eleventh Chamber of Deputies was not elected freely and the government suppressed 
all opposition.*^" '^ The elections produced a moderate parUament, in which more than 70 
per cent of the 450,000 registered voters participated.'"^' The seventh ParUament did 
not complete its legal term and was dissolved on April 21, 1963, as a consequence of 
the vote of no-confidence in Samir al-Rifai's Cabinet.'"'*' The latter was constitutionaUy 
unable to remain in power due to this vote of no-confidence. 
2.2.3.8. The Eighth Chamber of Deputies:1963-1966 
The Eighth Chamber of Deputies was elected on July 8th, 1963.'"" Only twenty 
deputies of the sixty were elected. Most of those who had voted against the previous 
cabinet were not elected.'"^' Its members who were conservative and pro-government, 
were tightly managed by the government in the same way that those for the sixth 
Council had been. The Eighth ParUament did not complete its legal term, and was 
dissolved on December 22, 1966, due to the wave of violence, unrest, and 
demonstrations that followed the IsraeU attack on the West Bank village of Sammu on 
November 13, 1966.'"^' 
2.2.3.9. The Ninth Parliament 
The elections for the ninth Chamber of Deputies were held on April 15, 1967. Once 
again the election campaign was managed by the government and aU opposition was 
suppressed. It was a pro-government and conservative body, and was a useful 
institution for the government.'"^' Its legal term began on April 18, 1967, two months 
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before the Six-Day War with Israel which resulted in the Israeli occupation of the West 
Bank of Jordan. Its legal term expired in April 1971. Due to the occupation of the 
West Bank, the term of the Chamber was extended several times. Officially it was 
dissolved on February 7, 1976 and remained so until it was recalled by King Hussein on 
January 9, 1984, to convene an extraordinary session to amend the Jordanian 
Constitution to allow for by-elections to fiU the vacant seats. 
In general, each of the elections in this period were managed to a greater or lesser 
degree by the pro-monarchy regime. The main exception to this was the 1956 election 
in which political parties were very active, and resulted in the election of a pro-Arab 
parliament. 
2.2.4. The Existence of Political Parties. 1950-1957 
Between 1950 and 1957, political parties played a significant poUtical role in the modern 
history of Jordan. The political groupings were organised by weU-estabUshed Jordanian 
politicians, and the political parties' programmes were carefully drawn up. 
The Jordanian Constitution of 1952 recognised the right of the Jordanian people to 
establish societies and political parties, provided that the objectives of these 
organisations were lawful, and their methods peaceful [Article 16, Clause 2]. 
According to law Number 15 (1955) for the organisation of political parties, aU political 
parties were required to secure a licence from the Ministry of the Interior. Section [3] 
of the law stated: "The Jordanians shall have the right to form political parties provided 
their aims are lawful, their means are peaceful and their organisation does not 
contravene the provisions of the Constitution".'"" 
Following the promulgation of the PoUtical Parties Law, the Cabinet disbanded the 
existing parties and provided for the licensing of new parties. The only parties licensed 
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were the moderate and conservative parties. The Muslim Brotherhood did not apply 
for Ucence, as it was recognised as a charity rather than a party. The pan-Arab 
Nationalists, and the Communists were denied official approval by the government. 
These parties were organised underground and were able to run candidates under 
different names, or with the unofficial acceptance of the government. Four types of 
poUtical party developed in the 1950s. These shaped poUtical Ufe and played a 
significant role in the history of modem Jordan. The types of parties were: 
1. The pan-Arab Nationalist parties: the National-SociaUst and the Ba'th parties. 
2. The govemment-sponsored parties: the Arab Constitutional and Community parties. 
3. The Marxist parties: the Communist. 
4. The Islamic parties: the Muslim Brotherhood and the Tahrir parties."^"' 
2.2.4.1. The National-Socialist Party 
The National-SociaUst party was founded on July 7, 1954, under the leadership of 
Hazza al-MajaU. In October 1954, al-MajaU resigned and the party was headed by 
Sulaiman al-Nabulsi.''^'' The party's domestic poUcies envisaged the preservation of the 
existing system of govemment, freeing the people from poverty, iUiteracy and disease, 
ensuring basic pubUc Uberties and the emancipation of the Arab Homeland from foreign 
domination.''^^' In the field of foreign affairs, the National-SociaUst party opposed aU 
forms of foreign influence, and sought a neutral foreign poUcy. The National-SociaUst 
party was outlawed m 1957."^ '^ 
2.2.4.2. The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party 
The Jordanian Ba'th party was a branch of the Syrian Ba'th party, which was estabUshed 
in 1940 under the leadership of Michel Aflaq and Salah Bitar. The Ba'th party of Jordan 
appUed for registration on three separate occasions, on March 5, 1952, June 23, 1953, 
and March 20, 1954. These petitions were refused by the Ministry of the Interior. 
Then, on August 28, 1955, the party appealed to the High Court of Justice which 
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granted the party the right to register as a legal political party, thereby overruling the 
Ministry of the Interior's decision."^''' It was revolutionary in principles and approach, 
believing in Arab unity and Socialism. It considered the Arab nation an indivisible 
nation, and called for a regenerated Arab state that would give equal opportunity to 
every citizen in every way. The Ba'th's slogan, was "one Arab nation with an eternal 
mission", and its three basis principles were Unity, Freedom and Socialism. The Ba'th 
party was outlawed in 1957 with the other political parties.''^^' 
2.2.4.3. The Arab Constitutional Party 
The Arab Constitutional party which had unofficially participated in earUer elections was 
finally registered on April 2, 1956.''^^' It was the most conservative and pro-
government party. It believed in Arab unity, national freedom, and social equaUty of 
education and poUtical agitation.''"' The party was dissolved in April 1957. 
2.2.4.4. The Community Party 
The Community party was established on July 7, 1954. The party's constitution caUed 
for the Uberation of aU Arab states from any foreign influence; the return of the occupied 
territories of Palestine; the guarantee of a reasonable standard of Uving for Jordanian 
people; support for the Constitution's aims to guarantee individual rights and freedom; 
an end to poverty and unemployment; and a national social and education system.'*'*' 
The party participated in second and third parUaments with unofficial recognition. On 
November 14, 1954 the party voluntarily dissolved itself after some members withdrew, 
declaring the reason to be lack of freedom and oppression by the government.''^" 
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2.2.4.5. The Communist Party 
The Communist party of Jordan was estabUshed in June 1951, under the direction of 
Fu'ad Nasar.''^°' The Communist party was denied government approval and operated 
underground. It continued to grow in the early 1950s despite restrictions and press 
censorship. It participated in the parUamentary election of 1951 under the name of the 
Popular Front (al-jabha al-shabiyah) and won two seats.'''"' The party beUeved in 
national freedom and national independence, and declared that their aim was to estabUsh 
a Communist state on the Soviet pattern. The party drew its support mainly from the 
lower middle class, students and teachers, and professional groups. It was especiaUy 
active and successful among the Palestinian refugees.''''^' 
2.2.4.6. The Muslim Brotherhood Party 
The Muslim Brotherhood party was founded in Jordan in 1953, as an off-shoot of the 
Muslim Brotherhood of Palestine, which in turn was an extension of the Egyptian 
MusUm Brotherhood, under the direction of Muhammad Abd al-Rahman Khalifah. It is 
a theocratic party beheving in a united Islam, which strives to apply the rules of the 
Islamic s,haria upon society, and enjoys a degree of official tolerance. The Muslim 
Brotherhood party was recognised as a charity rather than a party and was never 
dissolved."^^' 
2.2.4.7. The Islamic Tahrir Party 
The Islamic Tahrir party was founded in Jordan in 1952, by Shaikh Taqi al-Din Nabhani. 
It beUeved in the establishment of an Islamic CaUphate through a strategy of holy war 
{jihad). It operated underground and is still an outiawed party.''^ '*' 
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2.2.4.8. The Demise of Political Parties 
In April 1957 a coup against the King was attempted from within the Army under the 
command of Abu Nuwar, who had replaced General Glubb Pasha as Commander-in-
Chief of the Jordanian Army. A state of emergency was declared and aU poUtical parties 
were banned. The dissolution of poUtical parties in Jordan was justified by a number of 
reasons, which were related to the parties themselves. Abd al-Fatah al-Rashdan 
explained these reasons as: 
1. It was said that the parties and their leaders were working against the constitution. 
Each one was looking forward to take over, even by force if necessary, and spread 
its ideology. Therefore, the government saw that these parties contradicted the 
political system of the country and their means were iUegal as proved practically. 
2. It was related that these parties spread subversive ideas though Jordan using both 
the passiveness of ideology and actual violence. These practices changed the party 
from peaceful political organisations to armed opponents. 
3. Furthermore, they exercised secret activities and received funding from outside the 
country. Their ideas were imported to the extent that doubts were raised as to their 
loyalty towards the country and the poUtical system. Therefore, the parties lost 
their constitutional legitimacy officially, as a result of breaking the constitution.''^^' 
Conclusion 
The early history of Jordan has had a substantial influence in shaping the modern 
democratic experience in Jordan. Amir AbduUah's efforts to bring Jordan to fuU 
statehood can stiU be traced in the real power held in Jordan by the modem monarchy. 
However, Amir Abdullah's attempts to give the Jordanian people the right to poUtical 
self-expression have been carried on by the process of poUtical liberalisation today. 
The transitional period between 1928 and 1947 was marked by growing poUtical 
awareness in Jordan. It was during this time that the growth of poUtical parties began, 
which were to play an important role in the modem history of Jordan. However, 
95 
poUtical parties were involved in conspiracies against the King. Furthermore, they were 
supported by extemal countries which resulted in the banning of aU poUtical parties in 
1957. In spite of a continual process of building poUtical institutions in Jordan, the 
experience was weak and the government frequently intervened in the functioning of 
parUament. Thus, seven Chambers of Deputies out of nine in this period were dissolved 
due to non-co-operation between the executive and legislative authorities. 
Overall, the changes throughout this period contributed positively towards the 
emergence of representative democracy in Jordan. The successes of this period include 
constitutional development; the implementation of the legislative council; the formation 
of institutional structures; the role of poUtical groupings and parties; and regular 
parliamentary elections, albeit not always freely and fairly. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND 
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: 1967-1989 
Introduction 
The period stretching from 1967 to 1989 was characterised not only by major 
international and regional political events, but also by considerable internal social and 
economic change. At that time, Jordan faced two major challenges. First, the 
occupation of the West Bank by Israel in June 1967, which involved an influx of 
refugees from the West Bank. This added barriers and obstacles to communication 
with the West Bank deputies as well as delaying the functioning of legislative authority. 
Second, the Rabat Summit resolution in 1974 to appoint the PLO as the sole 
representative of the Palestinian people constituted a further turning point in the 
political hfe of Jordan. The importance of the two developments is that around half the 
population of Jordan are of Palestinian origin. The events inevitably affected the role of 
the parhament, and in fact led to its prorogation. However, whenever the King found it 
necessary to introduce or amend laws, parliament was re-convened for this specific 
purpose. 
With the prorogation of parliament, the Jordanian government began to search for a 
new formula to fiU the constitutional gap and to provide the opportunity for citizens to 
participate in the decision-making process. This took the form of the creation of the 
Jordanian National Union in 1971, the Tribal Council in 1972, and the establishment of 
a quasi-legislative body - the National Legislative Council - in 1978. In 1984 there 
were by-elections, and in 1986 the electoral law was changed to increase representation 
from the two Banks equally. The main objective of this chapter is to analyse these 
political developments and the role of parUamentary life in Jordan over the period in 
question. 
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3.1. The Impact of General Political Developments on the 
Constitution:1967-1988 
Two major events shaped the political life in Jordan during this time; the occupation of 
the West Bank and the Rabat Summit resolution. These will be discussed in turn. 
3.1.1. The Arab-Israeli War of 1967: Its Impact on Political 
Development in Jordan 
The 1967 Arab-Israeli War influenced the political system in the country and wrought 
political change, leaving its mark on all aspects of Jordanian life. As a result of this 
war, Jordan lost the West Bank of the Jordan River, and refugees and displaced 
Palestinians moved to the East Bank. Moreover, a new political challenge came from 
the Palestinian groups which gained control in the refugee camps, and used Jordan as 
the main base for guerrilla attacks against Israel. The Palestinian movement against the 
Israeli occupation was activated on Jordanian ground, and a new political climate was 
created.^ '^  Political opposition came to function more openly immediately after the war, 
and despite being illegal, political parties re-appeared. These included the Arab 
Nationalist Movement, al-Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP), and the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP).^ ^^ 
Under these circumstances, the PLO presence in Jordan became increasingly powerful, 
especially in the refugee camps and some parts of the main cities. It was said that the 
Palestinians tried to establish a state within a state, which would challenge the Kingdom 
internally. This state of affairs angered the Jordanian goverimient, leading it to enter 
into conflict with the Palestinians. As a result, organised Palestinian activity came to an 
end and poUtical parties withdrew to their earlier position practising their poUtical 
activities in secret, as they were being followed and closely monitored.^ ^^ 
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The occupation of the West Bank interrupted the normal functioning of parliament, 
since half its members were from the West Bank. Article One of the Jordanian 
Constitution states that: 
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is an independent sovereign 
Arab State. It is indivisible and inaUenable and no part of it may be 
ceded. The people of Jordan form a part of the Arab Nation, and 
its system of government is parliamentary with a hereditary 
monarchy. 
The West Bank still remained constitutionally a part of Jordan even after the 1967 war. 
However, travel between the West Bank and the East Bank became a complicated 
process. The Jordanian goverrmient had refused to call an election because it could be 
regarded as lending legitimacy to the IsraeH occupation of the West Bank and it was 
impossible for the West Bank to participate in the elections due to the IsraeU 
occupation. 
The West Bank suddenly found itself cut off from the East Bank, formerly the centre of 
aU Jordanian economic activity. The 1967 war, and the subsequent occupation of the 
area by Israel, resulted in economic dislocation and a flow of refugees to the East Bank, 
estimated to be in the region of between 150,000 and 250,000 people.^ "^  
On August 1, 1967, as a result of the Arab-Israeh war, the Cabinet resigned, and on the 
same day the King issued a Royal Decree forming a new Cabinet under the leadership 
of Sa'ad Juma'h. King Hussein also formed a nine man Consultative Council to help him 
deal with internal and external affairs. The Council was composed of the then prime 
minister Sa'ad Juma'h, and some former premiers and politicians, including Sulaiman al-
Nabulsi, Wasfi al-Tal, Bahjat Talhuni, Sharif Hussein Ben Nasir, and Field Marshall 
Habis al-MajaU. It was to meet weekly and "participate in the responsibility of 
power" .Th i s Council met a few times, and although it was not formally dissolved by 
the King, it gradually disintegrated.^ ''^  • 
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3.1.2. The Rabat Summit of 1974 and Its Effect on Jordanian 
Parliamentary Life 
In the 1973 October War between Syria and Egypt on the one side and Israel on the 
other, Jordan became partially involved by sending troops to fight on Syrian territory. 
Jordan followed the United States' lead and agreed to join the Geneva Peace 
Conference, which was to meet under the supervision of the United States and the 
Soviet Union in order to seek an overall peace settlement in the Middle East. The PLO, 
fearing that it would be excluded from participating in the forthcoming Geneva 
Conference, started to push Jordan into disengaging itself from its links with the West 
Bank, and pressed for PLO participation in any discussion of a peace settlement in the 
Middle East.^ '^ 
King Hussein aimounced at a meeting with President Anwar al-Sadat in Alexandria on 
July 18, 1974 that the PLO should be the sole legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people outside Jordan and at the coming Geneva convention. On September 
22, however, the King made it clear that Jordan would continue to claim the right to 
speak for the Palestinians in Jordan and the occupied West Bank.^ ^^  
As the latter position was clearly unacceptable to the Palestinian leadership, the PLO 
worked to secure support from several other Arab governments. This backing was 
obtained on October 26, 1974, at a summit meeting in Rabat. There, the heads of 
twenty Arab states united in recognising the PLO as the sole representative of the 
Palestinian people on any Palestinian land that was to be liberated. Among other points, 
the Palestinian people's right to return to their homeland, their right to self-
determination and their right to establish an independent national authority were 
recognised.^ ^^ 
Soon afterwards, on November 10, 1974, on the King's initiative, the Jordanian 
parUament adopted an amendment to article [34] of the constitution, allowing the King 
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to dissolve parHament for a period not exceeding one year. The King's reasons for 
doing so were based on the need for constitutional reform whereby the Kingdom could 
be limited to the East Bank so that there could be a separation of West Bank personnel 
from the government.^ "^^  In fact, there was a widespread feeling among the population 
that Palestinians should not participate in political Ufe, and that the Constitution should 
be amended accordingly.^"^ 
Apart from the 1967 war, no single event has had as much impact on Jordan's internal 
and external position as the Rabat decision of October 1974. Both King Hussein and 
Yasir Arafat attended the Rabat summit conference, with both parties determined to 
defend and plead their case before the Arab heads of state and government. King 
Hussein's standpoint was that the West Bank had become a part of Jordan through a 
referendum held in 1947, whilst Arafat played down the role of Jordan in the West 
Bank to that of trustee-administrator. '^^ ^ 
The King's position on the Rabat decision was made clear in an interview which he gave 
to Newsweek, published on November 11, 1974: 
Q: Many Arab heads of state reportedly told you privately before the summit that they 
believed only Jordan could obtain the return of the West Bank in negotiations with 
Israel. Then they went to Rabat and decided to turn responsibihty for the West 
Bank over to the Palestine Liberation Organisation. What happened? 
Hussein: It is the Arab conviction that a Palestinian entity is an imperative necessity. 
Israel has been doing its best to wipe out the very name of Palestine. The decision 
win compel Israel if not today, sometime in the future to recognise the Palestinian 
reality. 
Q: And you decided to acquiesce? 
Hussein: There is an Arab verse which says, in effect, where my tribe goes, I go. I 
was able to present my convictions to all responsible Arabs. As a part of the Arab 
nation, ever seeking its unity, I go with the general consensus - regardless of any 
previous feelings. 
Q: But you often said you would never agree to prejudge the future of the West Bank 
without a referendum to allow the Palestinians Uving there to exercise their right of 
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self-determination. Now, the PLO has the automatic right to take over any 
liberated part of the West Bank. What changed your mind? 
Hussein: We didn't change our mind. We have always said we would be willing to give 
our support to either option - our way, or the PLO way. The collective Arab wiU 
was to choose the PLO option. And we support it, regardless of the consequences. 
But there will be no change in our attitude toward all Palestinians on the West 
Bank. For as long as is needed, we shall honour our obUgations to help them in 
every way. 
Q: Does Jordan now consider itself reUeved of any further responsibility for the 
Uberation of the West Bank? 
Hussein: I f Israel refused to negotiate with Jordan on the ground that whatever 
Palestinian territory is returned wiU be turned over to the PLO, then there won't be 
much we can do about it. An entirely new situation exists now.^ '^ ^ 
However, the King avoided complete separation from the Palestinians and no official 
decision was taken by the government concerning the future of the West Bank. 
Instead, the King suspended the Chamber of Deputies, and the number of Palestinian 
ministers in the government was reduced from ten to four.*'''^  On February 4, 1976, the 
Chamber of Deputies was convened by Royal Decree to amend Article [73] of the 
Constitution. The amendment removed the time limits to postpone elections by the 
King and give him the right to convene the old Chamber of Deputies whenever 
necessary. This was followed on February 7 by a Royal Decree dissolving the Chamber 
of Deputies.^ ^^^ 
3.1.3. The Constitutional Amendments 
Between the years 1974 and 1989 constitutional amendments were driven by the 
resolution of the Rabat Summit, which resulted in poUtical tension between West Bank 
and East Bank. The situation was further complicated by the need to avoid giving 
legitimation to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, thus to keep nominally equal 
representation between both Banks. Since in practice this was virtually impossible, the 
operation of government became increasingly controlled by the King. The Jordanian 
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Constitution was amended several times between 1967 and 1984, to cope with the 
changing poUtical environment. Although the term of the ninth parliament was due to 
expire on April 18, 1971, the period of the Chamber of Deputies was extended for two 
years, until April 18, 1973, by a Royal Decree which was issued on March 3, 1971.*'^ ^ 
While there have been different interpretations of the King's objectives in amending the 
Constitution, the researcher would contend there were three main aims: to maintain a 
form of parliamentary body in the country; to avoid complete separation from the 
Palestinians; and not to violate the Constitution. The King was acting in accordance 
with Article [68] paragraph [1] of the Constitution, which laid down that the term of 
the Chamber of Deputies would be four calendar years, and the King had the right to 
extend the Chamber of Deputies for one year but not more than two years: 
The term of office of the Chamber of Deputies shall be four 
calendar years commencing from the date of the announcement of 
the results of the general elections in the Official Gazette. The 
King may, by a Royal Decree, prolong the term of the Chamber for 
a period not less than one year and not more than two years. 
Article [73] paragraph [2] of the Constitution, explained that if elections were not held 
within four months, the dissolved Chamber was to be restored to its fuU constitutional 
power and convene as if its dissolution had not taken place. This article explains this as 
follows: 
I f no elections have taken place by the end of the four months, the 
dissolved Chamber shall assume its full constitutional powers and 
assemble forthwith as if its dissolution had not taken place. It shall 
remain in office until the election of a new Chamber. 
Between November 1971 and November 1974, many Royal Decrees were issued 
convening, extending, and postponing ordinary and extraordinary sessions of 
parliament. This enabled the King to adhere to the provisions of Article [73] paragraph 
[2] of the Constitution. 
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According to Article [81] of the Constitution, the King could postpone the session of 
parliament three times only during each session, or two times if he had postponed the 
meeting of parliament according to paragraph [1] of Article [78] of the Constitution 
during any session and not exceeding two months. This is stated as: 
The ICing may by Royal Decree adjourn the session of the National 
assembly for not more than three times, or two times only if He had 
postponed the meeting of the National Assembly under paragraph 
(1) of Article (78), provided that during any one session the period 
of such postponement shall not exceed two months in the 
aggregate, including the period of postponement. In computing the 
term of the session, the periods covered by any such adjournment 
shall not be taken into account. 
According to the provisions of these Articles, the King tried to use his Constitutional 
right to maintain the existence of a parliamentary system in the country. On February 
24, 1973 a Royal Decree was issued convening the Chamber of Deputies in an 
extraordinary session as from March 1, 1973 to consider certain matters listed in the 
Royal Decree. '^^ ' The most important matter was the amendment of Article [88] of the 
Constitution in order to fiU the vacancies in the Chamber of Deputies. The amendment 
followed from the deaths of members of the Chamber of Deputies from the West Bank. 
This Article had previously stated the following: 
Should there occur a vacancy in either the Senate or the Chamber 
by death, resignation or any other cause, the vacancy shall be filled 
by appointment in the case of a Senator, and by special election in 
the case of a Deputy, within a period of two months from the date 
of notification of the vacancy to the government. The term of 
office of the substitute shall expire at the end of that of his 
predecessor. 
After its amendment, the article read as follows: 
When a seat becomes vacant in the Senate or in the Chamber of 
Deputies by death or resignation or for any other reason, it shall be 
filled by appointment in the case of a Senator and by the holding of 
a by-election in the case of a deputy within a period of two months 
from the date on which the Government is notified of the vacancy 
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by the House. The term of the new member shall be for the 
remaining part of the term of his predecessor. 
However, if a seat in the Chamber of Deputies becomes vacant for 
any constituency for any reason and should there be force majeure 
on account of which the Council of Ministers considers that 
rendering a by-election to fill that seat is impossible, the Chamber 
of Deputies, by the absolute majority of its members and within one 
month of its being notified thereof shall elect a member to fiU the 
said seat from amongst the inhabitants of the said constituency to 
whom the provisions of the Constitution are applicable and in the 
manner the Chamber deems appropriate. 
This Article was approved by the Chamber of Deputies on AprU 4, 1973.^ '^ ^ Al-Masri 
told the researcher that this amendment was due to "the need to elect the five 
replacement deputies from the West Bank Constituencies. These deputies were duly 
elected by an absolute majority of members of the Chamber of Deputies".^"' 
Following the Rabat Summit resolution. King Hussein issued a Royal Decree on 
November, 5, 1974, convening the Chamber of Deputies in an extraordinary session as 
from November 9, 1974 to amend Articles [34] and [73] of the Constitution.^^"' The 
amendment took the form of the addition of a paragraph in Article [34] of the 
constitution on November 10, 1974, giving the King the right to dissolve the Senate or 
reUeve any member of his functions for any reason. This amendment read as follows: 
"The King may dissolve the Senate or relieve any Senator of his membership". 
Article [73] of the Constitution was amended at the same time by the addition of a 
fourth paragraph, giving the King the right to postpone the general election for a period 
not exceeding two years, on condition that the Council of Ministers found it impossible 
to hold the elections. This read as: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs (i) and (ii) of this 
Article, the King may postpone the holding of the general elections 
if a force majeure has occurred which the Council of Ministers 
considers as rendering the holding of elections impossible. 
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Following the amendment to Article [73], the extraordinary session was prorogued by 
Royal Decree on November 10, 1974. The Senate and the Chamber of Deputies were 
dissolved by Royal Decree issued on November 23, 1974. The new Senate was formed 
by Royal Decree on December 1,1974.^ ^ '^ 
On February 4, 1976, a Royal Decree was issued convening the Chamber of Deputies in 
an extraordinary session, in order to effect other amendments to the constitution. 
Article [73] of the constitution was amended for the second time in the form of the 
addition of an extra paragraph. This amendment removed time limits on the King's 
power to postpone elections while maintaining his right to convene the old Chamber of 
Deputies whenever necessary: 
Should the force majeure provided for in paragraph (iv) hereof 
persist, the King may, upon a decision taken by the Council of 
Ministers, reinstate and convene the dissolved Chamber. Such 
Chamber shall be deemed as having been in existence in all respects 
from the date of the issue of the Royal Decree effecting its 
reinstatement. It shall exercise its fuU constitutional powers and be 
subject to the provisions of this Constitution, including those 
pertaining to the term of the Chamber and its dissolution. The 
session which it holds in such case shall be deemed to be its first 
ordinary session regardless of the date when it takes place. 
Following the resolution amending Article [73] of the Constitution, the Chamber of 
Deputies was dissolved once again on February 7, 1976 by Royal Decree with 
immediate effect. Elections were suspended on the grounds that they were impossible 
to carry out in the occupied West Bank and because it could be regarded as some form 
of recognition of the IsraeH occupation if parliamentary elections were to be limited to 
the East Bank.^ ^^ ^ However, the Senate was not dissolved by the application of the 
provisions of paragraph [2] of Article [66] of the Constitution, but instead remained in 
existence, although its sessions were suspended.^ ^ '^ This Article reads as follows, "If 
the Chamber of Deputies is dissolved, the sessions of the Senate shall be suspended". 
The reason behind this amendment was to maintain a representative body from both 
Banks. 
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3.2. The Creation and Operation of Non-Parliamentary Participative 
Institutions. 1967-1989 
Following the 1967 war and the Rabat Summit resolution of 1974, parliamentary life in 
Jordan become spasmodic, increasing the political gap between the public and the 
government. However, the cultural development which Jordan had witnessed and the 
absence of political institutions drew the authorities' attention to the need for a new 
method of bridging the gap between the government and the public. 
King Hussein's policy was to seek to create institutions which would provide the 
opportunity for popular participation in the decision-making process, to cover the 
period while parHament was unable to function properly. This resulted in the 
establishment of the Jordanian National Union in 1971, followed by the Tribal Council 
in 1972, and the National Consultative Council in 1978. This section wiU analyse the 
role and the nature of these changes in Jordan. 
3.2.1. The Jordanian National Union 
Following the Civil War of September 1970, involving Jordan and the Palestinian guerrilla 
movement. King Hussein overtly attempted to re-shape the Jordanian poUtical environment. 
On October 10, 1971, he issued a Royal Decree to estabUsh the Jordanian National Union, 
which was described as the nation's sole authorised political organisation.^ ^"' 
The Jordanian National Union consisted of 360 members, who would meet together as the 
Union Congress to represent their districts. On November 25, 1971, the National Union 
Constituent Congress elected King Hussein as the president of the Union and Crown Prince 
Hassan as its vice-president. King Hussein then appointed a provisional executive 
committee composed of thirty-six members. The Union membership was estimated to be 
about 100,000 at the time of its dissolution.^^ '^ 
I l l 
The Jordanian National Union, with its emphasis on the Jordanian state, was criticised by 
the Palestinian guerrilla movement as an attempt to move away from the path of the Arab 
nation.^ ^^^ This resulted in the National Union being renamed the Arab National Union on 
March 16, 1972. In April 1974 King Hussein dissolved the executive committee of the Arab 
National Union, and accepted the resignation of the Secretary General, and in February 
1976 the Cabinet approved a law aboUshing the Union.'^ ^^ 
The Jordanian National Union was not a political party as such but a forum for poUtical 
debate and activity. However, it failed to influence the poUtical process and to substitute 
adequately for the various poUtical organisations in Jordan. The experiment was 
unsuccessful and was not in harmony with democratic principles. 
3.2.2. The Tribal Council 
In September 1972, the King announced his decision to establish a Council of Tribal 
Shaikhs, to maintain control over tribal affairs. Members of the Council ranged 
between 12 and 15 appointees of the King, all of whom were tribal heads excluding the 
head of the council. The latter position was held by prince Muhammad, the King's 
brother. According to Article [5] of the Council Law, members chosen for this council 
were to fulf i l the following conditions: 
1. They shall be Jordanian citizens. 
2. They shall be heads of their wandering tribes (former MPs and 
Senators are preferred) 
3. They shaU not be interdicted, or sentenced to a prison term for 
a moral felony. The resignation of these members and the 
head of the Council shall be carried out via a Royal Decree.^ ^^ ^ 
The Council was entrusted with the task of recommending programmes and actions 
concerning tribal affairs, covering administrative, legislative, health, economic, 
agricultural, educational, and social matters. It was expected to: 
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1. Identify all means which can assist in promoting and raising the 
standards of Hving among the tribes, and in achieving a stable 
type of life. 
2. Explain the issues which would encourage prosperity in the lands 
owned by tribes and their villages, and which would improve 
their agriculture trade and their financial situation. 
3. Present all issues which pertain to the general requirements of 
the tribes and to their actual problems, and keep government 
officials informed of all shortcomings. 
4. Suggest an administrative approach which would be suitable for 
the nature of the tribes and their socio-spiritual conditions and 
leanings. 
5. Recommend to the government names of those members of 
tribes who are eligible for, and are in the need of some 'amiri 
Land' (state land) in accordance with the current laws and 
regulations.*^ '^ 
The reason for the establishment of the Tribal Council was clearly that the tribal shaikhs 
were deemed qualified to assess Bedouin needs. They were thus asked to give their 
opinion on how to fulfil these needs, and were entrusted with maintaining control over 
tribal affairs. However, the Council was short-lived, and was dissolved in 1973. There 
were several factors involved in the failure of the Council. First, it did not satisfy the 
majority of the tribes who were not represented in the Council as there were only 12 to 
15 members, while at least thirty tribes existed at that time. Second, Bedouin 
intellectuals felt that the Council would isolate them from the rest of Jordanian society. 
Third, many Bedouins saw the shaikhs as symbols of self-interest.*''°' 
3.2.3. The National Consultative Council ( NCC ) 
As a result of the failures of the National Union and the Tribal Council discussed 
earlier, both institutions were brought to a premature end. In a further attempt to 
bridge the gap between the government and the pubhc. King Hussein created the 
National Consultative Council (NCC) to serve as a quasi-parhamentary body, which 
could discuss public policy and the temporary laws which the government needed to 
issue in the absence of a parliamentary council.*^'' On April 14, 1978, King Hussein 
sent a message to the Prime Minister, Mudar Badran, which included the following 
directive: 
113 
We, therefore, beUeve that until conditions permit the return of fuU 
parUamentary Ufe, a National Consultative Council should be 
established and should be comprised of competent men who can 
truly represent various pubUc sectors and who are loyal to the 
country and its Constitution. The task of the Council would be to 
advise the government, discuss pubMc poUcy, and consider aU 
legislation and laws.'^ ^^ 
As a result, the National Consultative Council (NCC) was established on April 24, 
1978, as a partial and temporary replacement for the adjourned elected legislature 
which had been dismissed in 1976.^ '^'' King Husseui explained that, "It became obvious 
that it was unnatural for the country to remain without one of its main foundations 
while waiting for circumstances to improve".^ '^'^  The King also stated: "It is not 
possible for the burden of legislation to be borne by the Executive alone, and that the 
organisation in which free expression of the opinions, interests and feelings of the 
citizens on pubUc issues is permitted must not disappear".^ ^^ ^ 
The National Consultative Council's duties were to study and debate aU biUs and render 
its opinion and advice on them to the Cabinet, and to render an advisory opinion to the 
Cabinet on matters of general state poUcy when requested by the prime minister. 
According to Article [7] of the NCC Law, the responsibibties of the National 
Consultative Council, were: 
a. Studying and discussing aU proposals of laws and offering 
opinion and advice about them to the cabinet before being 
approved. These proposals are then forwarded to the N.C.C 
by the Prime Mmister. 
b. Offering opinion and advice to the cabinet about enacting a law 
or recommending, cancelling or amending any of the current 
laws. 
c. Offering opinion and advice to the cabinet on aU matters of 
pubUc poUcy at all levels and ranges. Each member has the 
right to question the Prime Minister and ministers on any of 
these matters. 
d. Offering opinion and advice to the cabinet on aU matters of 
pubUc services and faciUties. Each member has the right to 
question the Prime Minister and ministers on any of these 
matters. 
e. The Audit Office shall submit to the N.C.C a general report 
embodying its views and comments and indicating any 
irregularities committed and responsibility arising there from. 
This should take place within six months after the closing of 
the government fiscal year".*^ ''^  
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The appointment of the members by the King, on the recommendation of the Prime 
Minister, meant that the Council was clearly not in a position to challenge the executive 
authority, nor to act independently. It did not have any legislative power but assumed a 
purely consultative function.*"' Its role was advisory and its decision was not legally 
restrictive. The NCC was therefore not a substitute for any constitutional institution. 
The National Consultative Council was composed of members representing a whole 
range of the political spectrum as well as different localities and minorities. This 
Council's composition could be said to be 'better' than that of earlier legislative bodies, 
since its members were educated and from the political elite, that is, people with power, 
knowledge and political authority. Furthermore, they were representatives of different 
categories of the public: professionals, trade unions. Chamber of Commerce 
organisations, urban and rural areas, women, religious factions. Bedouins, and minority 
groups e.g. Christians and Circassians. The first council included six members known 
as leftists and three members of the Muslim Brotherhood organisations. These 
members had disengaged their links to anti-regime organisations.*^ '^ Women were 
represented for the first time in Jordan's poUtical life by three women.*^ '^ Tables 3.1 and 
3.2 provide the occupations and professional degrees held by the NCC members. These 
tables indicate that aU NCC members were from the upper class, in terms of poUtical 
influence, education, and mcome. 
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Table 3.1: Occupations of N.C.C Members 
Shaikh Ashira* 11 
Businessman 9 
Farmer/Landowner 14 
Teacher/Educator 4 
Professional 22 
Total 60 
Source: Nabeel A. Khoury, "The National Consultative Council of Jordan: A Study in 
Legislative Development", in International Journal of Middle East Studies. 
1981, p. 432. 
* Shaikh Ashira means Tribal Head 
High School Diploma 21 
BA. or BS. 11 
M.A 1 
Ph.D. 2 
Law Degree 13 
Engineering 5 
MD 7 
Total 60 
Source: Nabeel A. Khoury, "The National Consultative Council of Jordan: A Study in 
Legislative Development", in International Journal of Middle East Studies. 
1981, p. 432. 
The term of the NCC lasted for a two year period during which ordinary sessions of the 
Council were to last for four months of the year, while extraordinary sessions could be 
convened by Royal Decree if deemed necessary. Meetings of the National Consultative 
Council were scheduled on a weekly basis, and the NCC had regular contact with the 
government. The Prime Minister and the members of his Cabinet attended almost all 
the weekly NCC sessions. At these meetings the government's public policy and 
foreign and internal affairs were discussed, with different points of view being 
highlighted. The programmes and plans of the ministries were also discussed, as well as 
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other issues such as the future of the West Bank, its relationship with Jordan, and the 
approval of the budget. The NCC never, however, altered any proposed budget and 
passed the proposals with little difficulty/'*"' 
The NCC acted as a mediator between the people and the government. For the people 
it performed the function of an intermediary with the state bureaucracy. For the 
government it played the role of a conveyor, interpreting government pohcy and 
relaying the wishes of the government to the people. In the first session, for example, 
the government's agricultural policy was strongly debated by the Council, and members 
brought up detailed complaints and grievances of farmers and consumers as well as 
matters connected with the pubHc interest in general.^ '*'' All poUcy matters were 
normally explained by government members before the NCC. The first and second 
Councils were both composed of 60 members. The third Council was increased to 75 
members to cover a wider range of expertise. Its activities lasted for six years (six 
sessions), continuing until 1984. The National Consultative Council was dissolved on 
January 7, 1984, by Royal Decree to permit the resumption of the elected Chamber of 
Deputies.^^'' 
Since the NCC had no power to make poMcy or to approve, amend, or reject any bill, 
the main reason for the establishment of the NCC was not legislative but political. The 
dissolution of the Ninth Chamber of Deputies had left the country without any political 
institution through which representatives of the population could express their needs, 
aspirations, and grievances. The NCC therefore served to relieve poUtical tension, 
which to some extent it did successfully. 
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3.3. The 1984 Parliamentary By- Elections and the Parliamentary 
process. 1984-1988 
In January 1984, after seventeen years of frozen parliamentary Ufe in Jordan, King 
Hussein recalled the prorogued parliament of 1967. The recall of parliament in Jordan 
in 1984 was caused by both constitutional and political factors and led to a new era of 
regular parliamentary activity. Constitutionally, the King feared that the deaths of MPs 
would soon preclude the assembly of a quorum of forty. By 1984 only forty-four of the 
sixty deputies elected in 1967 were still aMve.'''^ ^ Politically, the King was responding to 
criticism of the lack of political participation in the country. The resumption of 
parliamentary activity took some of the pressure off him. Another political reason was 
to pressurise the PLO, who were stiU not recognised by either Israel or the United 
States, into joining Jordan for future political moves towards a peace agreement with 
Israel.'"^^ By ensuring continued equal representation for both Banks in the parliament, 
this maintained Jordanian legitimacy for the West Bank. 
On January 9, 1984, a Royal Decree was issued inviting the ninth parliament to convene 
an extraordinary session to consider an amendment to Article [73] of the Constitution. 
This amendment took the form of the addition of an extra paragraph to allow direct 
elections in the East Bank of Jordan to replace the eight members who had died since 
the 1967 poll. The eight vacant seats in the West Bank, on the other hand, were to be 
filled following an internal election within parliament, since it was impossible to hold 
(45) 
elections on the Israeli-occupied West Bank. The paragraph stated this as follows: 
Should the Council of Ministers consider that the holding of 
general elections in at least one half of the constituencies is possible 
in spite of the persistence of the force majeure referred to in this 
Article, the King may order the holding of elections in such 
constituencies. The successful members shall elect not more than 
one half of the number of the members for the other constituencies 
in which it was impossible to hold elections, provided that they can 
hold a (valid) meeting only by a majority of three-quarters of their 
number, and provided also that the elections shall be by at least a 
two-thirds majority and shall be in accordance with the provisions 
and in the manner provided for in Article (88) of the Constitution. 
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The successful members and the members elected in accordance 
with this paragraph shall elect the remaining members for the said 
constituencies in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph. 
Given that the election could be carried out in five of the ten constituencies which 
existed in the East Bank, West Bank constituencies could be elected by members of 
parHament who were already elected. The revised Article [73] constituted a clear basis 
in which new by-elections could be held. 
3.3.1. The 1984 Bv-Elections: Candidacy 
Nominations for the by-elections to the Ninth Chamber of Deputies began on February 
16, 1984 and lasted for five days. A hundred and one candidates competed for the eight 
East Bank seats. Thirty-six candidates ran for the single vacant position in Amman; 
twenty-seven for the three vacant seats in Balqa, two of which were reserved for 
Muslim candidates and one for Christians; nineteen ran for the single vacant seat in 
Irbid; sixteen for the two vacant seats in Karak, with one reserved for a Muslim 
(46) 
candidate and the other for a Christian; and three ran for the Tafileh vacant seat. The 
minimum age for candidacy was thirty. Table 3.3 shows the distribution of seats and the 
level of competition: 
Table 3.3: Distribution of Candidates By-election for the East Bank of 
Constituencies The Vacant Seats The Number of Candidates 
Muslim Christian Total Muslim Christian Total 
Amman 1 - 1 36 - 36 
Balqa 2 1 3 18 09 27 
Irbid 1 - 1 19 - 19 
Karak 1 1 2 11 05 16 
TafUeh 1 - 1 03 - 03 
Total 6 2 8 87 14 101 
Source: Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Center, [New Jordan], July 1984, p.52. 
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The competition level in the four Governorates was 12.6 persons per seat. The highest 
competition level for the vacant parliamentary seats was in the Amman Governorate 
with 36 candidates per seat, whilst in Irbid it was 19 candidates per seat, 9 candidates 
per seat in Balqa and 8 per seat candidates in Karak. The lowest competition level was 
in Tafileh, where it was 3 candidates per seat. In the 1984 by-elections, the level of 
participation represented a significant improvement over the 1967 election, and marked 
the beginning of the move towards restoring democracy in Jordan. 
3.3.3. The 1984 Bv-Elections: Campaigning 
In the by-elections of 1984, some of the candidates ran in the election with specific 
electoral platforms. These platforms covered a wide range of political, social and 
economic issues. Political issues were an important aspect in all candidate platforms, 
the most significant demands being the Hberation of IsraeU occupied land, and the 
recognition of the PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian 
people. There were also demands for democratic freedom, freedom of the press and 
opinion, lifting the ban on political parties and allowing new political organisations, the 
aboHtion of martial law, and a new representative electoral law. The significant points 
of the social issues involved fighting corruption, administrative reform, supporting 
women's rights, and providing public services for rural areas. Regarding economic 
issues, candidate platforms focused on the development of national industries and 
agriculture, support of local production, more restriction on imported workers, and 
support for the small farmer. '^'^ ' 
There were differences among candidates in how they dealt with poUtical issues. The 
nationalist candidates generally focused on issues such as the enhancement of 
democratic freedom, the recognition of the PLO as the sole representative for the 
Palestinian people, amending the Constitution to abolish the West Bank seats, and 
conducting a general election in the East Bank alone. The Islamist candidates stressed 
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the need for armed struggle for the liberation of Palestine including the Arab lands that 
had been occupied in 1948. They also called for the implementation of the Islamic 
Sharia, abolishing martial law, and fighting corruption. Centrist (conservative and 
traditionalist) candidates ran the elections with tribal affiliation and support.^ ''^ ^ 
Candidates campaigned by means of newspaper advertisements, posters, and printed 
pamphlets stating their platform, as well as cloth banners hung in the streets.'"'^  The 
variety of opinions in the debate contributed to the later strong move to democracy. 
3.3.4 The 1984 Election Results 
On March 12, 1984, by-elections were held in five of the ten East Bank constituencies 
for the eight vacant seats: three in Balqa Govemorate, two in the Karak Govemorate, 
and one seat each in the Amman, Irbid, and Tafileh Governorates.^ "^^  It should be noted 
that the 'election' of West Bank deputies had already occurred in January when the 
Chamber of Deputies elected the West Bank deputies by a majority vote among the 
remaining members of parliament. The elected deputies nominated themselves and they 
were chosen by members of parliament. Most of those elected replaced relatives who 
had died since the previous elections in 1967.*^ '^' Since women had been granted the 
right to vote on April 1, 1974, the by-elections of March 12 were the first opportunity 
for Jordanian women to exercise their right. During the election, women registered and 
participated in an unprecedented step towards involving them in political hfe. The 
number of women registering to vote was 48%. It was also the first time for anyone less 
than 37 years of age to vote in a national election.^ ^^^ 
The by-election results were published on March 13. The by-elections were left 
relatively free, in order to allow the regime to gain some indication of public opinion, 
and the government did not tamper with the election results.^ "^ Although no political 
parties were permitted, the candidates' platforms were known by the voters. The results 
showed that Islamic candidates won three out of eight vacant seats in the East Bank, 
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two were won by members of the Muslim Brotherhood group, and the other by an 
independent Islamist. The five remaining seats were won by a variety of groupings. 
Three seats were won by Nationalist candidates. Two of them were from Karak 
constituency, Dr. Riyadh al-Nawaisah, and Dr. Nazih Ammarin. The remaining one 
was Fawzi Tuaimah a Nationahst from Balqa Constituency. The two remaining seats 
were won by centrist (conservative and traditionalist), Zuhair Dhuqan al-Hussein and 
Marwan al-Hmud, both from the Balqa constituency. ^^ '^^ Table 3.4 shows the winners' 
votes and their affiliations. 
Table 3.4: Constituencies and Winners Affiliations and Votes 
Constituencies Winners Votes Affiliation 
Irbid Ahmad al-Kufahi 23,228 Islamist 
Amman Laith Shbailat 18,458 Islamist 
Balqa Marwan al-Hmud 10,692 Centrist 
Fawzi Tuaimah 7,692 Nationalist 
Zuhair al-Hussein 7,664 Centrist 
Karak Dr. Nazih Ammarin 9,961 Nationalist 
Riyadh al-Nawaisah 3,934 Nationalist 
Tafileh Abdullah al-Akaylah 5,230 Islamist 
Source: Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Centre, [New Jordan], July, 1984, pp. 43-45. 
According to the above table, the highest vote was obtained by Dr. Ahmad al-Kufahi a 
Muslim Brotherhood candidate and a former lecturer at Yarmouk University, from the 
town of Irbid in the north. He received 23,228 votes with a majority of 10,687 over his 
rival Dr. Qasim 'Ubaidat, a candidate identified with the nationalist left. This was 
followed by another Islamic candidate Laith Shbailat, a former president of the Jordan 
Engineers' Association, who polled 18,458 votes, ahead of thirty-five candidates.^ ^ '^ 
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3.3.5 The 1984 Bv-Election: Participation 
The population of the East Bank of Jordan at the end of 1983 was estimated at around 
2,495,300, a 16.2 per cent increase on the 1979 official census figure of 2,147,594.^ ^^ ^ 
The number of eligible voters in the five constituencies was 758,878, of which 542,813 
registered to vote, representing 71.5% of eligible voters (see table 3.5).^ "^ The 
percentage of those who registered was high for a country such as Jordan, where there 
had been no elections for seventeen successive years and in circumstances which 
involved a sudden return to parfiamentary practice. 
Table 3.5: Popula tion, Eligible and Registered Voters in the By-Election of 1984 
1983population Number of Eligible 
voters 
Registered 
Voters 
Per cent of Registered 
Voters to Eligible voters 
2,495,300 758,878 542,813 71.5% 
The number of actual voters was 274.020 representing 50% of registered voters. There 
were 870 polling stations, of which 375 were in the Amman constituency, 130 in Balqa, 
95 in Tafileh, 180 in Irbid, and 90 in Karak.(58) Table (3.6) shows the number of 
registered voters and actual voters in the by-election of 1984. 
Table 3.6: Registered and Actual Voters of 1984 By-Election 
Constituencies Registered Voters Actual Voters Prop, of Actual Voters to 
Registered Voters 
Amman 238200 102708 43.1% 
Irbid 148108 76246 51.0% 
Balqa 93737 48817 52.1% 
Karak 45421 36769 81.0% 
Tafileh 17347 9480 54.6% 
Total 542813 274020 50.0% 
Source: Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Center, [New Jordan], July, 1984,P.76. 
According to the above table, the highest percentage of actual voters was in Karak, 
where the number of voters reached 36,769, exceeding 80% of registered voters. The 
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lowest percentage of voters was in the Amman constituency where the number of actual 
voters was 102,708, representing 43.1% of registered voters. In the Irbid constituency 
there were 76,246 actual voters, representing 51.5 of registered voters. In the Balqa 
constituency, the number of actual voters was 48,817, representing 52% of registered 
voters. In Tafileh, the number of voters was 9,480, representing 54.6% of registered 
voters. The level of overall participation suggests that the population had active 
democratic leanings. 
The Chamber of Deputies resumed its function as if it were a new council. On October 
22, 1987, a Royal Decree was issued to extend the term of the Chamber of Deputies for 
a period not exceeding two years starting on January 17, 1988 ^^ '^ in application of the 
provision of paragraph [1] of Article [68] of the Constitution, as quoted earlier. 
The recalled Chamber of Deputies was ineffective and lacked the abOity either to 
represent different points of view or to meet the aspirations of the citizens. It was out 
of touch with the new generation of voters since most of its members had been elected 
in 1967. The ninth Chamber of Deputies was dissolved by the King on July 31,1988, as 
a result of his decision to dismantle the legal and administrative links between the two 
Banks.^^°* The dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies was a logical step because half 
its members were from the West Bank, which was no longer regarded as Jordanian 
territory. 
3.4. The 1986 Electoral Law 
With a few later amendments, the 1986 Electoral Law has laid down the basis for 
democracy in Jordan. In introducing equal representation between the two Banks of 
Jordan, this law has become the most important law in the country to date. 
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On November 2, 1985 King Hussein announced a forthcoming change to the Election 
Law to the Chamber of Deputies, and reiterated the need for a return to democracy. 
The King stated that "true democracy should be founded on the principle of popular 
participation in the political decision-making process in the country".'^'^ Following the 
King's speech from the throne, a committee was estabhshed by the Prime Minister to 
formulate the individual clauses of the new electoral law. The committee was 
composed of the Prime Minister and his deputy, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of 
the Interior, and two non-cabinet members.^ ^^ ' After a short period working on the new 
electoral law, the law was submitted to the Chamber of Deputies' legal committee, 
which met between January 7 and March 25, 1986, to consider the validity of the law's 
clauses.^ *^ ^ 
The new law went before the Chamber of Deputies on March 27, 1986 to be approved 
by the Chamber members. The debate in the Chamber took less than two hours, with 
one amendment accepted by the Prime Minister, Zaid al-Rifa'i. This amendment was in 
Article [18] paragraph [E], which said that members of illegal political organisations 
would not be allowed to run in parliamentary elections. This paragraph was changed 
such that it specified that illegal parties referred to those organisations whose goals 
contradicted the Jordanian Constitution.^^^ Article [18] paragraph [E] explained the 
restriction on an individual's candidature as follows, "That he does not belong to an 
unlawful organisation, defmed as any party or organisation whose principle, objectives 
and aims contradict the provisions of the Constitution". 
The law was issued on May 17, 1986 in the Jordanian Official Gazette. According to the 
new electoral law, the members of the Chamber of Deputies would increase from 60 to 142 
members. Seventy-one seats would be allocated to the East Bank representatives, and 
eleven seats to the Palestinian refugee camps on the East Bank, with the latter seats being 
considered part of the seventy-one seats allocated to the West Bank.^ ^^ ^ Moreover, the 
voting age was reduced from 20 to 19, which would significantly increase the electorate. 
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Due to the occupation of the West Bank, the election process for the skty West Bank 
members in the Jordanian parUament was to be carried out in two ways: first, thirty 
deputies would be chosen by the 82 directly elected members from the East Bank including 
the refugee camps' deputies, then the remaining thirty West Bank deputies would be chosen 
by the 112 members of pariiament.^ ^^^ 
As the 1986 Election Law led the basis for the parhamentary democratic system which 
developed, it is necessary to discuss the law in depth. The 1986 Election Law was 
composed of nine chapters with seventy-five Articles.^ ^^^ [see Appendix 5] These 
chapters related to: 
1. Definitions. 
2. The right to vote. 
3. Electoral Usts. 
4. Candidature for membership of the House of Deputies. 
5. Constituencies and their allotted seats. 
6. Election procedures. 
7. Canvassing votes and announcing election returns 
8. Election publicity. 
9. Election crimes. 
Chapter one supplied definitions of important words and expressions, wherever they 
appeared in this law. According to Article [2] in this chapter, "every person, male or 
female, who has acquired Jordanian nationality in accordance with the provisions of the 
Law of Jordanian NationaUty" could vote. 
Chapter two described the people who were entitled to vote according to Article [3] 
paragraph [A]. It established the principle that anyone aged 19 or over was entitled to 
vote unless otherwise stated, "Every Jordanian who has completed 19 solar years of his 
age has the right to elect members of the House of Deputies i f his name is registered in 
one of the Final Electoral Lists". 
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The Electoral Law prohibited the exercise of the right to vote by those who had been 
sentenced to prison for a period of more than one year for non-political crimes and had 
not been pardoned. Moreover, people who had been sentenced on charges of 
bankruptcy and had failed to redeem their status, were to be denied the right to vote. 
Article [3] paragraph [B], explained the prohibited categories as follows: 
1. Anyone who has been sentenced to a prison term exceeding one 
year for a non-political crime and has not been pardoned. 
2. Anyone who has been declared bankrupt and has not been 
rehabilitated. 
3. Anyone who has been interdicted for his person and the 
interdiction has not been lifted, or for any other reason and the 
interdiction has not been lifted, (sic) 
In an apparent attempt to separate the mihtary from political life in Jordan, Article [5] 
prohibited members of the Jordanian Armed Forces from participating in the election if 
they were still in service. This was stated as, "the right to vote is denied to members of 
the Jordanian Armed Forces, PubUc Security and Civil Defence throughout their actual 
service". 
The law sought to eradicate the possibility of cheating, by stating that voters could only 
register once and therefore only vote once. Chapter three, which dealt with electoral 
Hsts, explained the method by which election lists were to be drafted and the procedures 
for the registration of these lists. Article [6] stated: 
Electoral Lists shall be compiled for every Constituency, in which 
are included names of Electors, who belong to that Constituency or 
reside habitually therein, no Elector may be registered in more than 
one Electoral List. 
Provisions were made for objections to the electoral list and a revision committee was 
established which would consider both objections and alternative proposals. After the 
Revision Committee had concluded its work and the electoral lists had legal status, the 
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Revision Committee would provide the Ministry of the Interior with a copy of the final 
lists which were to be kept safe from tampering. Article [15] stated: 
After the Electors Lists have achieved their legal status, because 
there were no objections against them in accordance with the 
provisions of Article (13) of this Law, or because the decisions or 
objections against them have become final in accordance with the 
provisions of Article (14) of this Law, the revision Committee shall 
compile for every Constituency fmal Electors lists of all Electors in 
the concerned Department. The Committee shall send a copy of 
these final lists to the Ministry of the Interior for safekeeping. 
The Electoral Lists, which were to be organised in a final form according to the 
provisions of the Electoral Law, would be used for any Jordanian elections during a 
given year. Article [16] stated, 'The Electoral Lists compiled in final form in 
accordance with the provisions of Article [15] of this Law shall be adopted for the 
general parUamentary elections or by-elections that are conducted during any year". 
Chapter four explained the conditions which candidates were required to meet in order 
to be able to run in the elections. Article [18] described these conditions as follows: 
A. That he has been a Jordanian national for at least ten years and 
that he does not claim foreign nationality or protection. 
B. That he is an Elector registered in one of the final Electors Lists. 
C. That he has completed thirty solar years of his age on the day 
the candidature period ends. 
D. That he has not been sentenced to a prison term exceeding one 
year for a non-political crime from which he has not been 
pardoned, and that he has not been convicted of a moral felony 
or misdemeanour. 
E. That he does not belong to an unlawful organisation, defined as 
any party or organisation whose principles, objectives and aims 
contradict the provisions of the Constitution. 
F. That he does not have a material interest in any of the 
Government departments by virtue of a contract, other than 
contracts of land and property tenancy. This does not apply to 
anyone who is a shareholder in a company owned by more than 
ten persons. 
G. That he is not a relative of the King to a degree specified by 
special legislation." 
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There was a desire to maintain the boundaries between the legislative power of the 
government and its administration by the various branches of the civil service, both at 
the local and national level. Government employees, ministries, employees of 
international organisations, and chairmen of municipal and rural councils who received 
their salaries from the Government's Treasury, were not entitled to run in the election 
unless they had submitted their resignations from their post at least one month before 
the actual date of the elections. Article [20] stated: 
Employees of Government Ministries and Departments and official 
public organisations who draw their salaries from the Government's 
Treasury or public funds subject thereto or supervised thereby, as 
well as employees of international organisations and chairmen of 
municipal and rural councils, may not nominate themselves for 
membership in the House of Deputies, unless they have submitted 
their resignations from their positions at least one month prior to 
the date designated for the election. The concerned official 
department may accept or deny the resignation, but it shall be 
considered accepted by force of law if no decision has been taken 
thereon within the days of the date of submission thereof. 
Article [21] stated that nomination for candidacy for membership in the Chamber of 
Deputies would start twenty-five days before the election day and nomination would 
continue for three days, "Candidacy for membership in the House of Deputies shall start 
twenty-five days before the day designated for the election and shall continue for three 
days; no candidacy shall be accepted after the expiry of this period". 
Article [22] paragraph [A] declared that every person who was wiUing to nominate 
himself or herself for membership in the Chamber of Deputies would have to pay 500 
Jordanian dinars to the Treasury. 
Anyone wishing to nominate himself for membership in the House 
of Deputies shall pay to the Treasury Director in the Constituency 
in which he wishes to nominate himself the amount of (500) five 
hundred dinars which shall be entered as income for the Treasury 
and shall not be returnable under any circumstance. 
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Article [30] stated that a candidate would be able to withdraw his candidacy from the 
election up to the end of the day prior to the election day. 
Chapter five determined the country's constituencies and their allocated seats. According to 
Article [31], the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was to be divided into twelve electoral 
areas, with the election of one hundred and forty-two members from both the East and West 
Banks, each securing half of the Chamber of Deputies' seats. Table 3.7 shows the 
govemorate, their constituencies and the distribution of seats. 
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Table 3.7: Governorate, Constituencies and Distribution of Seats 
No. GOVERNORATES DISTRIBUTION OF 
SEATS 
M C CI Total 
1 AMMAN 
1.1 City of Amman 5 1 1 7 
1.2 Al-Assima govemorate (Except City of Amman Area (A) and (B) 3 3 
1.3 Wadi al-Seer District 1 1 2 
1.4 Sahab, Muwaqqar and Jiza District (except the Central Bedouins) 1 1 
1.5 Na'our District 1 1 
1.6 Madaba District 1 1 2 
1.7 Dhiban district 1 1 
1.8 Al-Wihdat Camp in Amman 1 1 
1.9 Jabal al-Hussein Camp in Amman 1 1 
1.10 Al-Mahatta Camp 1 1 
1.11 Talbiyya Camp 1 1 
2 .JERUSALEM 
2.1 Jerusalem City with Jericho District 6 4 10 
2.2 Ramallah District 6 2 8 
2.3 Bethlehem District 4 4 8 
3 IRBID 
3.1 Irbid Govemorate 7 1 8 
3.2 Irbid Camp 1 1 
3.3 AI-Husn Camp 1 1 
3.4 Ajloun District 2 1 3 
3.5 Jerash District 2 2 
3.6 Jerash Camp 1 1 
3.7 Souf Camp 1 1 
3.8 Ramtha District 1 1 
3.9 North Ghor District 1 1 
3.10 Koura District 1 1 
3.11 Bani Kinanah District 2 2 
4 NABLUS 
4.1 Nablus City and District 12 12 
4.2 Jenin District 6 6 
4.3 Tulkarm District 6 6 
5 HEBRON 10 10 
6 B A L Q A 
6.1 Al-Salt City and Zai District 3 1 4 
6.2 Balqa Govemorate (except al-Salt City and Zai DistricO 2 1 3 
6.3 Baqa' Camp 1 1 
7 K A R A K 
7.1 Karak Governorate 3 1 4 
7.2 A'y District and Al-Safi District 1 1 
7.3 South Mazar District 3 1 4 
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Table 3.7: Governorate, Constituencies and Distribution of Seats (Cont.) 
No. GOVERNORATES DISTRIBUTION OF 
SEATS 
M C CI Total 
8 MA'AN 
8.1 Ma'an Govemorate (except southern Bedouin) 2 2 
8.2 Aqaba District 1 1 
8.3 Shobak District 1 1 
8.4 Wadi Mousa District 1 1 
9 ZAROA 
9.1 Zarqa Govemorate 2 1 1 4 
9.2 Zarqa Camp 1 1 
9.3 Hittin Camp 1 1 
10 MAFRAO 2 2 
11 T A F E L E H 3 3 
12 BEDOUIN REGIONS 
12.1 North Bedouin 2 2 
12.2 Central Bedouin 2 2 
12.3 Southern Bedouin 2 2 
T O T A L 120 19 3 142 
M.M [uslim, C . Christian, C I . Circassian and Chechen 
Source: Law of Election to the House of Deputies, No. 22, 1986. pp. 27-29. 
Chapter six laid down election procedures and how the elections were to be conducted. 
I t described the procedure of electing deputies and the role of the Ministry of the 
Interior in the elections. Article [32] stated: "Voting to elect the deputies shall be 
general, secret and on one level". Article [33] explained the timing of election days and 
the Ministry of the Interior's role in this: 
Voting for the election of members of the House of Deputies shall 
be conducted on the same day for aU the Constituency. The 
Minister of the Interior, however, may designate a special day for 
every Constituency, or any number thereof, i f the safety of the 
election and the pubUc interest necessitated such action. 
According to Article [35], the Ministry of the Interior was to issue a voting card for 
every voter, containing the necessary information taken f rom the family book. The 
family book is an identity paper containing detailed information on the elector: 
The Minister of the Interior shall issue a Personal Election Card to 
every Elector, containing a photograph of the Elector, the complete 
particulars of his identity taken f rom the family Book issued by the 
Department of Civil Status, his Constituency, the Polling Centre in 
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which he may vote, and his number in the List of Electors in the 
Centre. The Personal Election Card shaU be valid for the period, 
circumstance and conditions decided by the Minister of the Interior 
in the Card itself, or in accordance with any instructions he may 
issue thereon. 
Votes could be cast in two ways. Literate people would write the name of the 
candidates of their choice on a paper given to them by the chairman of the balloting 
panel. This was printed with the phrase "Ministry of the Interior", and stamped with the 
seal of the district, which then had to be signed on the back by the chairman of the 
balloting centre, and returned to the ballot box. Article [46] paragraph [B] described 
how illiterate people were to vote in the election as follows: 
An iUiterate Voter may ask the Chairman of the Balloting panel to 
write the name of the candidates the Electors wishes to elect; after 
having written down the name, the Chairman shall read the name 
out within earshot of the Balloting panel. 
Chapter seven described the polling process and the announcement of the election 
results. After the completion of the voting process, the Voting Committee was to 
organise a report, signed by the candidates or their delegates. The report was to 
include the number of registered voters, the number of actual voters, the number of 
voting papers received by the balloting panel, and the number of used and unused 
voting papers. Article [48] stated: 
A. Following the completion of the poUing process, the Balloting 
Panel shall minute a record to be signed by the candidates and 
their delegates who are present and wish to do so; the record 
shall include the following: 
1. The number of registered Electors in the Electoral List in the 
Polling Centre. 
2. The number of Electors who exercised their right to vote. 
3. The number of Ballot papers received by the Balloting Panel. 
4. The number of Ballot Papers used in the voting, the number of 
those unused, and the number of those destroyed and the reason 
for such destruction. 
B. The record mentioned in Paragraph (A) of this Article together 
with the unused Ballot Papers, shall be placed atop the upper 
side of the Ballot Box and wrapped therewith with a piece of 
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cloth sealed with a knot to be stamped with the seal of the 
Balloting panel. 
G. The Balloting panel shall transport the Ballot Box with the its 
three keys, as well as the Panel's seal and the Electoral List, to 
the Constituency headquarters, where it shall deliver same to the 
Central Committee against an official receipt thereof signed by 
the Central Committee Chairman. 
The Central Committee was to count the votes received by each candidate in the 
electoral constituency, with the result announced openly in the presence of the 
candidates or their delegates. The committee was to organise a report to be sent to the 
Ministry of the Interior to keep for a period of at least six months (Article 56). The 
candidate in the election who received the largest number of votes would be declared 
the winner. However, i f two candidates in the same constituency received the same 
number of votes the election would be repeated not later than seven days from the 
actual date of the election (Article 57). The general election result would then be 
announced by the Minister of the Interior not later than two days after the arrival of the 
central committee report (Article 58). 
Chapter eight covered election publicity, declared as free according to the provisions of 
this law. A l l candidates were entitled to election publicity from the beginning of the 
nomination period until the eve of the election day. Electoral meetings and speeches 
were prohibited in places of worship, learning institutions, and government buildings. 
Article [60] stated: 
A. According to the provisions of this law, Election publicity shall 
be free and every Candidates may resort thereto from the date 
of the beginning of the candidature period until the day 
immediately preceding the day designated for the Election, on 
which any kind of Elections Publicity is prohibited and subject 
to the penalties provided for this Law. 
B. The organisation and convening of Electoral meetings and the 
delivery of electoral speeches is prohibited in places of worship, 
institutions of learning and buildings occupied by Government 
ministries and department and official public institutions or those 
under the supervision of the Government. 
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Candidates could issue pubUcations and advertisements containing their aims and 
objectives and a statement of their plans and programme. These would be exempt from 
government fees.(Article 61) 
The new electoral law maintained the principle of equal seats between the two Banks of 
Jordan. This principle was implemented in parliamentary life according to the 1960 electoral 
law, which allocated 30 seats to the East Bank and 30 seats to the West Bank. Moreover, 
the new electoral law also maintained a specific number of seats for minorities. As before, 
the Bedouins were given a specific number of seats in their areas. Despite aU the effort 
involved, the new electoral law never had the chance to function because of King Hussein's 
decision on July 31st, 1988 to dismantle the legal and administrative hnks with the West 
Bank. 
Conclusion 
The period f rom 1967 to 1984 was dominated by two events, the 1967 war which 
resulted in the loss of the West Bank to Israel and the 1974 Rabat conference which 
recognised the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. As 
the poUtical process was based on equal representation of both Banks in the Chamber of 
Deputies, these events made it difficult for the parUamentary system to operate. 
Consequently, the Chamber of Deputies only met between 1967 and 1984 at the 
express wish of the King when constitutional amendments were needed. 
This led King Hussein to make a number of attempts within the constitution to allow 
public participation in the functioning of the political process. These were the 
Jordanian National Union (Oct 1971-Feb 1976), the Tribal Council (Sept 1972-July 
1973) and the National Consultative Council (April 1978-Jan 1984). The monarchy's 
aim in creating these bodies was to utihse the country's political institutions to mobilise 
the support for royal policies, as there had not been a general election since 1967. The 
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King's decision to recall parliament in 1984 represented an attempt to implement 
orderly political change and to scale down the growing dissatisfaction and grievances of 
the Jordanian people. 
Consequently, political parties did not play any significant role in Jordanian political Hfe 
in this period. From 1971, many attempts were made by Jordanian figures to form new 
political parties, but they were not approved by the government. Political parties in the 
1984 by-elections did not exist openly, nor did they play any practical role during the 
election campaign. However, the electorate did recognise individual candidates as 
belonging to specific political trends. The only legal organisation in Jordan at the time 
of the 1984 by-elections was the Muslim Brotherhood, although its candidates did not 
run as members of the movement. It was only after 1989 that genuine democratic 
participation began in Jordan. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE INITIATION OF POLITICAL LIBERALISATION: 1989 
Introduction 
In November 1989 the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan witnessed free parUamentary 
elections for the first time in more than thirty-two years. These parhamentary elections 
were conducted with the fuU participation of groups and individuals from across the 
poUtical spectrum, including Islamists, Leftists and Pan-Arab Nationalists, and Centrist. 
The 1989 elections were Jordan's first general parUamentary election since the 1967 
war. The success of the poUtical experiment in Jordan owes a great deal to King 
Hussein's strategy of including aU groups wilUng to abide by the new rules. 
The King's decision to resume parUamentary Ufe in Jordan in 1989 can be Unked to 
three major events: the disengagement f rom the West Bank in 1988; the severe 
economic crises faced by Jordan in mid-1988, which resulted in an agreement with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) on Apri l 16, 1989 to reschedule Jordan's relatively 
large foreign debt; and the outbreak of riots in southern Jordan a few days after this, in 
the wake of new austerity measures imposed in accordance with I M F requirements. 
Together these factors brought about the decision to hold parfiamentary elections. 
This chapter focuses on an analysis of the factors which pushed King Hussein to open 
the poUtical system and initiate the poUtical UberaUsation process. I t also includes an 
examination of the 1989 elections, the poUtical trends, candidates' platforms, and the 
result of the elections. 
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4.1. The 1989 Elections: Factors and Catalysts 
As already indicated, the 1989 parliamentary elections came about as a result of three 
major causes: the disengagement f rom the West Bank; the economic downturn from the 
mid-1980s; and the "food riots" in Ma'an in Apri l 1989. Each of these factors wiU be 
discussed in turn. 
4.1.1. The Disengagement from the West Bank. 31 July 1988 
On July 31 , 1988, in his address to the nation. King Hussein announced his decision to 
dismantle the legal and administrative links between the two banks of the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan and relinquish any Hashemite claims to the territory lost in the June 
1967 war.^ ^^ King Hussein emphasised his decision to aid the Palestinian 'national 
adjustment', and stressed the Mnk with what had been decided at the 1974 Rabat 
conference. He stated: 
This is all the more important at this juncture when we have 
initiated, after seeking God's assistance, and in light of thorough 
and extensive study, a series of measures with the aim of enhancing 
the Palestinian national orientation and highlighting the Palestinian 
identity. Our objective is the benefit of the Palestinian cause and the 
Arab Palestinian people ... We are certain that our decision to 
initiate these measures does not come as a surprise to you. Many 
among you have anticipated it, and some of you have been caUing 
for it for some time. As for its contents, it has been, for everybody, 
a topic for discussion and consideration since the Rabat 
Conference.*^^^ 
The King's decision to sever links with the West Bank came as a response to the wishes 
of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) to be recognised as the sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people. It is important to mention here that the Arab 
summit conferences which had followed the Rabat Summit (especially the Fez Summit 
of 1982 and the Algiers Summit of June 1988) had called for the establishment of an 
independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip under the leadership of 
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the PLO to highUght Palestinian identity in a complete maimer and as a basis for a 
peaceful settlement.^^^ To show respect for and appreciation of these summit 
resolutions, Jordan consequently relinquished its claims and severed aU legal and 
administrative links with the West Bank. 
Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origin in the Kingdom retained the ftiU right of 
citizenship with aU its obUgations. King Hussein stated their right to citizenship in his 
speech as follows: "They [Palestinian Jordanians] are an integral part of the Jordanian 
state. They belong to it , they Uve on its land, and they participate in its Ufe and aU its 
activities''.^'*^ In addition, those Palestinians Uving on the West Bank before July 31 
would be regarded as Palestinian and not Jordanian citizens. There were, however, 
changes to the passports which West Bankers were eUgible to carry. When West 
Bankers' passports expired after five years, they were to be replaced by temporary two-
year passports.^^^ The Jordanian parUament was also affected by the decision to 
disengage, since half its members, representing the West Bank, lost their membership. 
From 1967 to 1988 Jordan held the view that elections could not be held while a major 
portion of its territory was under IsraeU occupation. However, the disengagement 
decision made it possible for Jordan to return to parUamentary hfe, since a major 
obstacle blocking the way towards general parliamentary elections had been removed. 
On August 30, 1988, King Hussein issued a royal decree dissolving the Lower House of 
ParUament. The King gave an assurance that parUament would be re-instated as an 
institution accountable to the people. His objective was to re-buUd parUament in the 
East Bank only, thereby giving substance to the separation of the West Bank.^ ^^ 
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4.1.2. The Economic Crisis and the IMF Deal 
The economic problems faced by Jordan seem to have created a direct impetus for the 
initiation of the process of democratisation. The 1980s saw a decline in the economic 
boom witnessed in the 70s and early 80s, and left a severe economic problem for 
Jordan. Greater public participation in government became a political necessity. As the 
standard of living began to decline, demands for wider public participation were more 
frequently voiced.^^^ 
The economy declined gradually, reaching its lowest point in Apri l 1989. The collapse 
of the Arab oil market in the early 80s and the substantial fall in oil prices had severe 
economic and political consequences for the country. Petro-dollar foreign aid and 
worker remittances, Jordan's two most important sources of income, fell dramatically 
between 1981 and 1987, f rom about US$2.3bn. to US$1.5.bn. During the same period, 
the share of external grants in government expenditure fell f rom more than one third to 
less than one sixth.*^^ 
Despite this substantial decline in income, the government was averse to cutting 
expenditure, which would have meant a withdrawal of economic benefits used to co-opt 
support for the regime. Instead, state expenditure continued to increase at an average 
of over 6 per cent per year, resulting in a chronic and slowly increasing budget deficit. 
By 1987 this had grown to JD298 million (US$880m), almost one-half of the 
expenditure and more than 25 per cent of the GDP.^ ^^ In order to fmance the national 
budget, the government resorted to both domestic and external borrowing. The 
external debt grew rapidly and became increasingly difficult to handle. By 1989, 
Jordan's real external debt amounted to US$8.4bn. representing more than twice the 
country's total GDP.^'°^ 
From mid-1988, the economic crisis worsened further. In early November 1988, the 
government implemented its first major austerity programme including a ban on a whole 
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range of luxury imports, freezing spending on development projects, and sharply raising 
fees for foreign worker permits, custom duties, and taxes on hotels and restaurants. 
Finance Minister Hanna Audah announced these measures and claimed that this 
austerity programme would save the Kingdom $200 miUion in foreign currency by the 
end of 1989 and "shift Jordan from a consuming to a producing society".* '^ 
These austerity measures however, failed to remedy the economic crisis. Within days, 
speculative trading pushed the dinar even lower. Throughout 1988, the Jordanian dinar 
had experienced a sharp decUne against the US doUar, losing 45 per cent of its value. 
On February 8, 1989, the government invoked martial law powers to close down aU the 
country's private money-changing offices, which operated on the margins of Jordan's 
banking regulations, in an effort to stabilise the value of the Jordanian dinar. Money 
changers had been trading dinars at around 660 fils to the doUar, compared to the 
official rate of the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ) of 570 fils (as opposed to 380 fils in 
October 1988), amidst speculation that Jordan intended to reschedule its debts and seek 
assistance f rom the IMF.^^^* GDP decreased in 1988 by an estimated 3.5 per cent, and 
zero-growth was predicted for the foUowing year. Unemployment grew as job 
opportunities in the Gulf were reduced, in 1987 alone about 35,000 Jordanians returned 
home. By 1989 the official unemployment figure was about 12 per cent.^"' 
In February 1989, the goverimient of Jordan was unable to meet its debt payment for 
the first time in its history. King Hussein and Prime Minister Zaid al-Rifa'i were 
reluctant to approach the I M F because of the possible poUtical ramifications. By that 
time, Jordan was already $185 milUon in arrears on external debt payment, $77 miUion 
of which was interest. '^'** 
On March 17, 1989, an I M F team arrived in Jordan to look into rescheduUng the 
country's foreign debt and restructuring the economy. On 23 March, during the talks 
between Jordan and the I M F team, the government announced that the Tornado strike 
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fighter aircraft purchase valued at about $688 miUion from the UK, would be suspended 
indefinitely. This move was symptomatic of the precarious fmancial state of Jordan and 
showed the need for the government to tighten the purse strings as it sought agreement 
for a standby credit f rom the IMF.^'^^ 
On Apri l 16, 1989, the government reached an agreement with the IMF. Its main 
purpose was to reduce steadily the budget deficit from 24 per cent of GDP (excluding 
external grants) in 1988 to 10 per cent at the end of the process. Real GDP growth was 
expected to revive, reaching 4 per cent by 1993. Export earnings were to increase from 
a projected $ l . l b n . in 1989 to $1.7bn. in 1993. Foreign reserves excluding gold were to 
be replenished to the level of $500m., to cover three months of imports. Inflation was 
to be brought down from the official estimate of 14 per cent in 1989 to 7 per cent in 
1993(16) 
The readjustment programme sought first to restore and then increase the rate of 
economic growth while maintaining relative price stability, and to bring about 
substantial improvements in both the budget deficit and the balance of payments. 
According to the I M F agreement, the government would adopt a five-year economic 
stabilisation programme (from 1989 to 1993), which would entail the adoption of more 
careful borrowing policies, the strengthening of foreign reserves, the promotion of 
exports, remittances, and tourism, and the elimination of the external current account 
deficit.* '^^ ^ The Economist IntelUgence Unit, in its Jordan Country Report No 3, 1989, 
quotes Hanna Audah, Jordanian Finance Minister, who listed the specific poUcy 
components as follows: 
1. A reduction of the budget deficit from about 24 per cent 
(excluding external grants) of GDP in 1988 to 10 per cent in 
1990, or 6 per cent i f external grants are included. 
2. A reform of the tax system, including a study of the existing 
regime which should help to make it more flexible. Steps to 
introduce value added tax (VAT) wi l l be made next year, to be 
applied by 1991. 
145 
3. A tight credit poUcy to reinforce the goverrmient's budgetary 
measures. The increase in net domestic assets as a percentage 
of the initial money stock wiU be reduced from 14 per cent in 
1988 to 9 per cent in 1989. Net claims on the goveniment wiU 
be reduced from 11 per cent to 5.5 per cent during the same 
period. Further reductions are envisaged for 1990. 
4. A more prudent debt management and borrowing poUcy wil l be 
adopted. CeUings wil l be placed on the contracting of new non-
concessional public and pubUcly guaranteed loans. 
5. The rate of inflation is to be brought down from its official 
estimate of 14 per cent in 1989 to 7 per cent by 1993. 
6. On the external front, the government wiU aim at improving the 
balance on the current account from a deficit representing 6 per 
cent of GDP in 1988 to a balanced position in 1993. The 
country's foreign reserves (other than gold holdings) are to be 
built up to cover three months worth of imports.''^^ 
Jordan's dealings with the I M F thus required serious deficit reduction measures, in 
keeping with budget-balancing goals. On Apri l 16, 1989, the government removed 
subsidies on a number of basic products, thus increasing prices on a wide range of 
goods including rises of 11-28 per cent on petrol products, alcohoUc prices were raised 
40-50 per cent, cigarette prices 25 per cent, soft drinks and mineral water increased by 
18 per cent, detergents by 25 per cent, and steel bars increased by 67 per cent. More 
importantly, cooking gas gasoUne, diesel fuel and kerosene, increased by 10 per cent to 
30 per cent.''^^ These measures were supposed to contribute to a decUne in the budget 
deficit from 23.7 per cent of GDP in 1988 to 19.6 per cent in 1989. Moreover, the 
government reduced all subsidies for production and exports. 
As a result of the economic crisis, the King found himself at a cross-roads. Abolishing 
the austerity measures could buy him some time, but would not provide a lasting 
solution. Alternatively, he could implement the measures by force which would entail 
greater authoritarianism and popular antagonism. Thus, the only real option available 
to him was to seek popular support for the necessary economic reforms through a 
political process with promises of democratisation and poUtical freedom.^^'^ 
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4.1.3. The April Riots of 1989 
Immediately following the announcement of the I M F agreement in which the Jordanian 
government declared an increase in prices on a wide range of goods as part of an 
economic adjustment plan, disturbances broke out in Ma'an, in the south of the country. 
For four days, protests spread across the country to Karak, Tafileh, Madaba and as far 
as al-Salt, about 20 rdles from Amman. Protesters chanted slogans against al-Rifa'i 
government's alleged mismanagement of the country, charging officials with wanton 
corruption and an uncaring attitude.^^^^ The protests were only quelled by bringing in 
Jordanian security forces. Twelve people were killed and several others were injured, 
and millions of dollars of damage to property was done.^ ^^ ^ 
The significant feature of the 1989 disturbances, which had originated in the south of 
the Kingdom, was that it was the East Bank Transjordanians, long considered the 
bedrock of the Hashemite family's popular support, who had risen in protest, and not 
the Palestinians.^^'*' The latter, along with Jordan's professional organisations, did little 
more than send a petition to the Palace urging it to reconsider the austerity programme 
and to dismiss the Prime Minister, who was personally attacked as the man responsible 
for the Kingdom's economic crisis.*^^' 
The political stability of Jordan was under threat. On Apri l 19, community leaders from 
Karak submitted an appeal to the authority outlining a Hst of demands. These demands 
included the resignation of Prime Minister Zaid al-Rifa'i; a change in the electoral laws 
away f rom protected minority representation; the punishment of officials convicted of 
corruption; the granting of broader political freedom; freer press and greater 
democratisation; the revocation of the austerity measures and price increases; and the 
formulation of a national economic programme. The demands were endorsed by other 
towns and villages, and in several places the demands were expanded to include the 
termination of martial law which had been in operation since 1967, and the granting of 
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financial support to small f a r m e r s . I n addition, the elected leaders of the country's 
professional associations endorsed the community leaders' demands by making public a 
telegram to Crown Prince Hassan who had been placed in charge during King Hussein's 
visit to Washington. It read in part: 
This small country, whose very entity is threatened, is looking 
forward to a change in the leadership's attitude. Consecutive 
governments were able to convince themselves that every criticism 
directed at the government was actually aimed at the leadership, 
which enabled the government to claim the leadership's fuU 
endorsement of its behaviour.... Consequently governments have 
shrunk in role and influence, yet at the same time have grown in 
tyranny. They stopped depending on their efficiency. Instead they 
were hiding under the umbrella of his Majesty the King, capitalising 
on the King's popularity ... while exploiting this without adding any 
assets .... It is our advice that if the situation remains the way it is, 
the King's credibility, which constitutes the basis of national unity, 
wiU be undermined.^ ^^^ 
Although the slogans of the disturbances were targeted against Rifa'i's government and 
not against the King, the monarchy could not help but reaUse the depth of the 
dissatisfaction with the country's political and economic management. The King took 
steps to meet all of the rioters' demands save one. The regime was determined not to 
step back from the austerity programme that had served as a catalyst to the riots in the 
first place.*'^ ^ 
The first measure, carried out on April 24, 1989, was King Hussein's dismissal of Prime 
Minister Zaid al-Rifai's government, which had been widely blamed for the economic 
crisis.^ ^^ ^ "He has achieved much and it is unfair to burden him with the government's 
negative responsibilities," said King Hussein of al-Rifa'i, adding that "he was able to 
carry out his duties the way we wanted him to".*^ "^' 
King Hussein replaced Zaid al-Rifai's government with an interim government under the 
leadership of the chief of the Royal Court, Sharif Zaid Bin Shakir who had a solid 
reputation for honesty and wisdom.^ '^ '^  
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King Hussein's letter of appointment to his new prime minister on April 28, 1989, called 
upon the government to bridge the gap between the authorities and the people; to 
prepare for a return to parliamentary life in Jordan; to establish continuity between 
government and the public within the frame of dialogue through direct communication 
or through the media; to create popular enthusiasm towards the democratic process; to 
support freedom of journals and magazines; to end favouritism and corruption; to 
implement administrative and economic reforms; to improve conditions for trade 
unions; to establish social justice; to consolidate decentralisation in aU districts; to halt 
the politicisation of reUgion; to establish national unity; to give special attention to 
young people, to the pubUc and to individual behaviour; to encourage the private 
sector; to promote health services; to promote education development; to keep the 
environment clean; and to consolidate Arab sohdarity.'^ ^^ 
As a second measure in response to the rioters' demands, the government took steps to 
restore confidence in the dinar. The most important of these was the appointment of 
Basil Jardanah as Minister of Finance on April 27, 1989 and the reappointment of Dr. 
Muhammad Sa'id al-Nabulsi on May 29, 1989 as the new Central Bank Governor, after 
years out of office. Al-Nabulsi and Jardaneh introduced a series of sound reform 
measures aimed at stabilising the dinar, bolstering the central bank's currency reserves, 
rationalising the use of foreign exchange, and reaching agreements with the lending 
agencies and states.^ ^^ ^ The Jordanian government received millions of dollars in 
emergency aid from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States, which was very important to 
the short-term stability of the Jordanian dinar.^ "^*^  
The most important aspect of the regime's response to the April 1989 disturbances, 
however, was its decision to soften the blow of the IMF adjustment plan by moving 
towards domestic political UberaHsation. Instead of imposing more restrictions, the 
King decided to initiate poUtical reform and democratisation. His aim was for the 
democratisation process to legitimise the monarchy as weU as to guide the country 
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through a period of economic restructuring.^ ^^^ On April 26, 1989, the King declared 
that the elections would be held before the end of the year and that a new parUament 
would convene to represent the public interest. ^ ^^^ 
Immediately upon taking office. Bin Shakir together with the King undertook to 
prepare the ground for the difficult transition phase, and to break the link between 
economic and poHtical privation, paving the way for the first general parliamentary 
elections in the country since 1967.^"' That process of liberalisation was emphasised by 
the resumption of parliamentary life as an outlet for political dissatisfaction. 
4.2. Run-UD to the 1989 Elections 
The general parUamentary elections, to be held on November 8, 1989, were officially 
announced by the government on August 16, 1989. The government had already 
begun, however, to open the way for poUtical freedom as well as freedom of opinion 
and expression. For the first time, on May 10, 1989, the King spoke about a National 
Charter which would represent a national code of conduct and ultimately legalise the 
establishment of pohtical parties in Jordan. In his speech, he announced the easing of 
restrictions on the media. The first sign of this came on May 15 when the government 
allowed five previously banned journalists to resume their work.^ *^^  Matters related to 
the process of hberalisation, such as those which concerned limits on free expression 
and the establishment of poUtical parties, also started to receive critical attention in the 
press. Moreover, on May 21, the government freed thirteen people, mainly university 
students, who had participated in the disturbances.^ '^' This dynamic development was 
repeated in July, when the King released a number of those who had been detained for 
their role in the disturbances, as weU as authorising an amnesty for 19 poUtical 
prisoners.^ '*'^ ' On September 1, 1989, sixty more poUtical detainees Unked to the April 
disturbances were released.^ '*'' 
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However, the most pressing question which concerned the people who had in the past 
been affiliated with particular political parties or organisations, was whether they would 
be allowed to run for election. Paragraph [E] of Article [18] in the electoral law in 
effect banned any person with a "political past" to run as a candidate. This is stated as 
follows, "That he does not belong to an unlawful organisation, defined as any party or 
organisation whose principles, objectives and aims contradict the provisions of the 
Constitution".^ '•^^ 
On October 17, 1989, the King suspended paragraph [E] of Article [18] in the 1986 
Electoral Law and announced formally that no candidates would be prevented from 
running in the election. In practice, candidates with past political affiliations had been 
allowed to register as candidates even before this date. The formal move towards 
political liberalisation came just three weeks before the actual election day.^ '*^ ^ Although 
political parties officially remained illegal, all candidates who belonged to such parties 
and groupings simply ran for election as individuals. 
4.2.1 • Changes in the Electoral Law 
Following the disengagement decision between Jordan and the West Bank on July 31, 
1988, the electoral law had to be changed before elections could take place. It was no 
longer appropriate to have representatives from the West Bank in the Lower House, as 
Jordan now insisted on treating West Bank citizens as if they were already citizens of 
the state of Palestine. A l l seats allocated for the West Bank were abolished.^ ''^ ^ 
The electoral law of 1986 went through two amendments. The first amendment was 
approved by royal decree on April 16, 1989, shortly before the disturbances broke out 
in the south of the country. The amendments cancelled the sixty-seat representation of 
the West Bank, along with the eleven Palestinian refugee camp seats. The Palestinian 
camp residents would be entitled to vote in the constituencies in which their camp was 
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located and were eUgible to stand as candidates in the elections. Under this new 
system, the Lower House of ParUament would have seventy-one seats representing the 
East Bank constituencies.^ '* '^ 
On July 8, 1989, the second amendment to the electoral law increased the number of 
seats from seventy-one to eighty seats. This aUowed for the population increase and the 
re-zoning of districts.^''^' The number of seats was increased in the major population 
centres: Amman changed from 17 seats to 21, Zarqa from 4 to 6, Irbid from 18 to 19, 
Balqa from 7 to 8, and Mafraq from 2 seats to 3. 
According to Article [2] of the provisional law number 23 for the year 1989, which 
amended the Electoral Law of the House of Deputies, the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan was to be divided into twenty electoral areas, with the election of eighty 
members. Table 4.1 gives details of the govemorates, their constituencies and the 
distribution of seats. 
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Table 4.1: Governorates, Constituencies and Distribution of Seats 
No. GOVERNORATES DISTRIBUTION 
OF SEATS 
M C CI Total 
1 AMMAN 
1.1 First Constituency, including Basman, Marka and Tareq 3 3 
1.2 Second Constituency, including Yarmouk, Nasr, Ras Al-Ain, 
and Badr 
3 3 
1.3 Third Constituency, including the City Centre, Zahran and 
AbdaH 
3 1 1 5 
1.4 Fourth Constituency, including Al-Quwaismeh, Abu Alanda, 
Khreibet Al-Souq, Jawa, Al-Yadoudeh, Umm Qusair and Al-
Muqablein, Al-Jizah and Al-Muwaqqar (Except Central 
Bedouin) 
2 2 
1.5 Fifth Constituency, including Shafa Badran, Abu-Nusseir, 
Al-Jubeiha, SuweHeh, Tla'a AI-Ah, Umm Al-Summaq, 
Khaldah, Wadi Al-Seer and Na'our 
4 1 5 
1.6 Sixth Constituency, including Madaba and Dhiban District 2 1 3 
2 IRBID 
2.1 Irbid City 8 1 9 
2.2 Jerash District 2 2 
2.3 Ajloun District 2 1 3 
2.4 Ramtha District 3 3 
2.5 Koura District 2 2 
3 BALQA 6 2 8 
4 K A R A K 7 2 9 
5 MA'AN 5 5 
6 ZARQA 4 1 1 6 
7 MAFRAQ 3 3 
8 T A F I L E H 3 3 
9 BEDOUIN REGIONS 
9.1 Central Bedouin 2 2 
9.2 Northern Bedouin 2 2 
9.3 Southern Bedouin 2 2 
TOTAL 68 9 3 80 
M. Muslim, C. Christian, CI . Circassian and Chechen 
Source: Law of Election to the House of Deputies, No. 22, 1986, and its 
Amendment, Amman, 1993, pp. 27-29. 
The seats in the constituencies were not allocated proportionally, with the big urban 
constituencies containing more people than their rural counterparts. Furthermore, the 
Bedouin, Christian, Circassian and Chechen constituencies contained even less people. 
153 
Thus, the three major urban centres, (i.e. not bedouin) Amman with an estimated 
population of 1,207,838, Irbid with 414,769 and Zarqa, with 494,680, together made 
up a population of 2,117,287 out of a total of 3,370,867. These cities received only 36 
of the total 80 seats, or 45 per cent of the seats, but accounted for 63 per cent of the 
population. SpecificaUy, the second district of Amman with 73,435 registered voters 
received only three seats while the Ma'an district with 27,981 registered voters was 
aUocated five seats. Similarly, Tafdeh district with 21,908 registered voters, obtained 
the same seats as the second district of Amman. In other words, every deputy from 
Ma'an represented 5,596 voters, every deputy from TafUeh 7,303, while every deputy 
from the second district of Amman represented 24,478 voters. Similarly in the central 
Bedouin district only 18,155 registered voters were represented by 2 deputies. The 
reason for this imbalance in seats was due to the traditional support for the Hashemite 
regime from the rural, bedouin and minority groups. 
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that the amendment to the electoral law did reduce 
the over-representation of minorities in parUament. The Election Law of 1960 had given 
the Christian minority in the East Bank (estimated at 6 per cent of the total population) 
five seats out of thirty, while in the late amendment of the election law of 1989 they 
were aUocated nine seats out of eighty, instead of 19 seats out of 142 as in the 1986 
Election law. The Bedouin, Circassian and Chechen seats in the 1989 amendment 
remained unchanged, at 6 and 3 respectively. 
4.2.2. The 1989 Election: Candidates Nomination 
The candidates began to declare themselves informally, and to make clear their intention 
to stand for election, immediately after the government announced that November 8 
would be the voting day. According to the Electoral Law of 1986, the right to 
nominate a person as a candidate in the election was afforded to aU Jordanians over the 
age of thirty years, who had been Jordanian nationals for at least ten years, and were 
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being registered on one of the electoral lists. Anyone imprisoned for more than a year 
for a non-political crime, or who belonged to an unlawful organisation, or who had a 
material interest in government departments by virtue of a contract, or was a relative of 
the King was denied the right to vote. Article [18] stated this as follows: 
A candidate for Membership in the House of Deputies must meet 
the following conditions: 
A. That he has been a Jordanian national for at least ten years and 
that he does not claim foreign nationality or protection. 
B. That he is an Elector registered in one of the final Electors Lists. 
C. That he has completed thirty years of his age on the day the 
candidature period ends. 
D. That he has not been sentenced to a prison term exceeding one 
for a non-political crime from which he has not been pardoned, 
and that he has not been convicted of a moral felony or 
misdemeanour. 
E. That he does not belong to an unlawful organisation, defined as 
any party or organisation whose principles, objectives and aims 
contradict the provisions of the Constitution. 
F. That he does not have a material interest in any of the 
Government departments by virtue of a contract, other than 
contracts of land and property tenancy. This does not apply to 
anyone who is a shareholder in a company owned by more than 
ten persons. 
G. That he is not a relative of the King to a degree specified by 
special legislation.^ '*^^ 
Official nomination of candidates for the election to the eleventh Chamber of Deputies 
took place during a three-day period starting on October 14, 1989, twenty five days 
before the voting day. Article [21] of the Election Law No. 22 for the year 1986 
stated: 
Candidacy for membership in the House of Deputies shall start 
twenty five days before the day designated for the election and shall 
continue for three days. No candidacy shall be accepted after the 
expiration of this period.^ '*^ ^ 
The list of candidates in the 1989 elections reached a total of 647 candidates. There 
were over eight candidates vying for each of the eighty seats in the Lower House of 
Parliament. Candidates representing a wide range within the political spectrum, 
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including Islamists, Ba'thists (both pro-Iraq and Syria), Communists, Nationalists and 
Centrist, were aUowed to participate. However, only those candidates with Muslim 
Brotherhood affiUations formaUy represented an organisation, as it was the only legal 
political organisation.''* '^ 
Women stood as candidates for the first time in general elections since being given the 
right to vote in 1974. Out of the 647 candidates running for election, twelve were 
women candidates.'^°' These women ran for election in seven constituencies, one in 
Amman first constituency, three in Amman third constituency, three in Amman fifth 
constituency, two in Irbid constituency, one in Balqa constituency, one in Zarqa 
constituency, and one in Ma'an constituency.*^*' 
The high number of candidates could be attributed to several factors: first, the 1989 
election was the first in twenty-two years; second, popular feeUng was strong for the 
resumption of a parUamentary body; third, many Jordanian citizens were able to 
participate in the poUtical Ufe for the first time; and fourth, the increased level of 
education.*^ '^ 
4.2.3. The 1989 Election Campaign 
On October 17, the government announced that poUtical party activists would not be 
prevented from standing for election. Most candidates started campaigning seriously 
once the ban had been officiaUy lifted. Banners and posters of various candidates began 
increasmgly to decorate cities, towns, vUlages, and refugee camps. PoUtical seminars 
and meetings were held in the last three weeks before the election.'^^' 
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4.2.3.1. Candidates' Platforms 
The 647 candidates registered to contest the elections can be categorised into three 
major trends. The main poUtical trends which participated in the elections were the 
Islamic trend comprising the influential MusUm Brotherhood and Islamic independents 
'^ '*', the leftists and pan-Arab nationalist trend which included the Ulegal Jordanian 
Communist Party (JCP), the Jordanian People's Democratic Party (JPDP), the 
Jordanian wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the pro-Iraqi 
and pro-Syrian Ba'thists and some former members of the Qumiyun NationaUst 
movement and independent Leftists *^ '^, and the centrist trend which included loyalist 
poUticians, ex-ministers, former officials, and tribal leaders.*^^ ' It is also important to 
note that within many of the individual constituencies there were informal arrangements 
between candidates to create blocs. This was an attempt to capture the "loyalty" vote 
attached to other members of the bloc. 
In general, most poUtical trends' electoral platforms related to similar issues, albeit with 
a different emphasis. The main issues related to poUtical and economic corruption; 
freedom of expression including the aboUtion of martial law (in force since 1967); the 
legalisation of poUtical parties (banned since 1957); the release of poUtical prisoners and 
freedom of the press; economic issues including mounting unemployment, increase in 
prices, the national debt and the high level of government expenditure; Arab soUdarity 
including the Arab-IsraeU conflict and support for the intifada; and women's rights. 
There was a strong emphasis on women and the role of women in society by aU 
candidates, regardless of their gender or poUtical orientation. 
4.2.3.1.1. The Platform of the Muslim Brotherhood 
The MusUm Brotherhood's platform contained many elements similar to other trends, 
although it did contain several distinctive elements. It noted that the Brotherhood had 
been established in order to Uberate the Islamic world from foreign domination and to 
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"apply the Islamic Sharia". Islam was to be the sole source of legislation and the 
solution to all the nation's political, social, economic and moral problems.^ ^^ ^ The 
electoral platform of the Muslim Brotherhood was concentrated around the following 
major issues: 
1. The reconsideration of laws and regulations which were in effect in 
Jordan (i.e. martial law), calling for freedom of the press, of 
expression, of religion and the abrogation of all laws violating these 
rights. 
2. The defence of citizens' rights and promoting their liberties 
according to provisions of the shura and the Jordanian 
Constitution. 
3. They sought the right to form committees to direct the masses in 
accordance with the rules and morals of the Islamic Sharia. These 
committees would oversee all publications, banning those they 
considered harmful. 
4. The right to form trade unions youth and student organisations. 
5. The revealing of the causes of corruption and the prosecution of 
those responsible for corruption. 
6. To reduce the commodities' prices to suit the citizens' income. 
7. To study the issue of unemployment and make an effort to reduce 
its severity. 
8. To define a number of educational goals which sought to expand 
education in quantity and quality in different stages. 
9. To determine ways to reform the information process which 
includes reforms of programmes and employees. 
10. To define a goal which guarantees the promotion of society 
through concentrating on achieving brotherhood and promoting the 
basic standards, chUd care, family protection, securing the basic 
needs for the citizens, and fighting against deviation.'^*' 
In addition, the Mushm Brotherhood candidates had individual electoral programmes in 
each district. For example. Shaikh Hamzah Mansur, a Muslim Brotherhood candidate 
from the fourth constituency (Amman), had an electoral manifesto which consisted of 
the following ten points, a number of which were included in the party platform. 
1. To acknowledge full application of the Islamic Sharia as the only 
effective solution for our problems. 
2. To enhance national unity and reject regionalism and 
sectarianism. 
3. To emphasise the Arab and Islamic character of Palestine and 
consider Palestine as an Islamic endowment, not allowing it to 
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give up any part of its land; jihad is the only means for 
liberating Palestine and supporting the intifada. 
4. To reconsider the laws and regulations to conform with the 
Islamic Sharia according to Article 2 of the constitution (Islam 
is the official state religion). 
5. To foUow an educational poUcy which aims to develop good 
character and expand university-level education. 
6. To pay attention to the media to make sure that it performs its 
task without violating Islamic instructions. 
7. To pay attention to the promotion of the armed forces as a 
vanguard of the Arab armies to attain the Prophet's promise 
(prophecy) of victory and liberation. 
8. To enhance trade unionism and youth movements and defend 
their members' interests in a cUmate of free expression. 
9. To foUow an economic poUcy which encourages investment and 
fights against interest, bribery, nepotism, and monopoly. 
10. To enhance the status of both men and women to complement 
one another on an equal footing with dignity.'^'' 
A further example is that of Hammam Sa'id, Muhammad Abu Faris, and Dawud Qujaq, 
aU Muslim Brotherhood candidates from the fifth constituency (Amman), who caUed in 
their manifesto for the following measures to be implemented: 
CaUing upon the government to respect pubUc freedom and to aboUsh 
martial laws; making efforts to aboUsh aU laws which contradict the 
Islamic Sharia; making efforts to mobUise the people for jihad in order 
to Uberate Palestine; supporting the armed forces and raising their 
efficiency in planning, administration, training, and providing them with 
modern armaments; resisting the Jewish idea of the "alternative 
homeland" as stated by Sharon; bringing to trial those people who 
smuggled money and abused both the national economy and citizens; 
supporting the work force and solving the problem of unemployment; 
reclaiming agricultural land and supporting farmers; reforming the media 
who deviate from Islamic instructions; reforming education; reforming 
the health services; paying attention to women's affairs; regarding the 
Palestine question as an Islamic cause with no-one being forced to give 
up any part of their land; and supporting the intifada.^^^^ 
Most candidates from the Muslim Brotherhood bloc included consideration of similar 
issues to those mentioned above in their platforms. 'Islam is the solution' was the most 
common slogan in the weeks which preceded the election. The Islamic independent 
candidates closely followed the MusUm Brotherhood platform. 
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4.2.3.1.2. The Leftists' and Nationalists' Platforms 
The Leftists' and Arab Nationalists' platforms generally concentrated on issues of fair 
distribution of wealth, Arab solidarity and social justice. Their candidates called upon 
the government to give citizens more freedom of expression and to depend less on 
foreign countries. Women received special attention from the Leftist candidates who 
were concerned with protecting women's rights to work and equality. Fakhri Qawar 
(Nationalist), who campaigned in the third constituency (Amman), called for a national 
government which would make accountable officials responsible for previous economic 
corruption; implement economic policy to reduce inflation and unemployment; aboUsh 
martial law; decrease government expenditure; safeguard the freedom of political 
parties; support the Palestinian cause and the intifada; and consolidate Arab 
soHdarity.^ '^^  Mansur Murad, a Circassian and an Arab Nationalist, demanded freedom 
of political movement, freedom of the press, women's rights, job security, freedom of 
travel and the release of political prisoners.'^ ^^ Ya'qub Zayadin, the Secretary General 
of the Communist Party, similarly focused on both economic and poUtical issues. His 
manifesto included: 
Calling upon the goverimient to offer people more democratic 
hberties; protecting national unity and resisting the forces of 
regionalism and tribalism; forming a national front; defending 
Jordan's independence in order to get rid of poUtical and economic 
dependence; enacting a new labour law and raising the standard of 
living for workers; protecting the interests of the working woman 
and her struggle for equality with men.^ ^^ ^ 
4.2.3.1.3. The Centrist Platform (Conservatives' and Traditionalist's) 
Conservative and traditionalist candidates fell into two categories. First was a small 
group of former officials and loyalist politicians, who mainly emphasised issues 
concerned with the economic crisis, the accountability of officials who were involved in 
corruption within previous governments, support for small farmers, and the 
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estabUshment of qualified educational institutions in rural areas. For example, AU Abu 
al-Raghib, who campaigned in the third constituency (Amman), focused on economic, 
poUtical and social issues. His manifesto included the abolishment of restrictions on the 
media, strengthening the legislative role over the executive authority, maintaining 
personal freedom as mentioned in the Jordanian Constitution, establishing qualified 
educational institutions, strengthening national unity, controlling government 
expenditure and providing a reasonable level of Uving to aU Jordanian people.* '^ Second 
were tribal candidates who concentrated mainly on tribal issues. For example, AbduUah 
al-Khraishah focused on improving the level of education; distributing 'amiri land' (state 
land) to Bedouin farmers; bringing more Bedouins into official government posts and 
reducing the price of animal feed. Furthermore, they stressed the importance of 
national issues.*^ '^ 
4.2.3.1.4. Women Candidates 
Most of the 12 women candidates concentrated almost exclusively on women's issues. 
However, Haifa al-Bashir, who campaigned in the third constituency (Amman), not 
only focused her manifesto on supporting the role of women and their participation in 
the poUtical development process, but also on supporting national unity, strengthening 
democratic institutions, supporting youth, resolving the problem of unemployment and 
Ufting foreign influence on the national economy.'^ '^ A further example, Janit al-Mufti's 
manifesto in Amman third constituency focused on social, economic and poUtical issues, 
and the problems facing Jordan. Her manifesto listed the issues to be addressed as 
follows: 
Soaring unemployment and the rise in prices; the consumer attitude 
among some of the social strata; greater imports than exports; 
procrastination in the appUcation of laws concerning women's 
rights, martial laws and extra-ordinary laws affecting the power of 
the constitution; non-independence of judiciary power and issuing 
unfair verdicts against citizens; sectarianism, regionaUsm, and 
extremism; immigration of large numbers of people from vUlages to 
cities affecting demographic and development balance; 
discrimination, nepotism, and benefiting from official posts; moral 
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corruption of women and youths; non-application of tax laws on all 
citizens on an equal footing, the gap of mistrust between officials 
and citizens; and irrational governmental expenditures.^ ^^^ 
In the political field, Janit al-Mufti's platform went on to call for the government to: 
Abide by the provisions of the constitution; create a multi-party system; 
enhance national unity; separate the executive, legislative, and judicial 
authorities; establish an independent Palestinian state and support the 
PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people; 
observe the resolutions and directives of the Arab official bodies and 
work to enhance Arab unity. 
Although in general there was a great deal of similarity in the main issues addressed by 
the candidates, and shared concerns for future national and economic stability in Jordan, 
the variety of approaches and the plurality of opinions were new developments in 
Jordanian politics. 
The Muslim Brotherhood platform was distinctive in calling for the implementation of 
the Islamic Sharia. Along with the Leftists, the Islamic candidates condemned the IMF 
agreement and called for its abrogation. The Leftist and Pan-Arab Nationalists stressed 
the importance of Arab unity, economic policy, unemployment and social justice, while 
Conservative and Traditionalist candidates focused on education, support for farmers, 
and economic corruption. 
4.2.4. The 1989 Elections: Level of Competition 
The Election Law had allocated categories for the distribution of seats in each of the 
electoral districts: Mushm, Christian, and Circassian and Chechen. The 647 candidates, 
were distributed as follows: 565 Muslim candidates, 65 Christian candidates, and 17 
candidates from the Circassian and Chechen communities. As to the number of 
candidates contesting each constituency, Irbid had the most with 69 candidates, 
followed by Karak with 64 candidates, and Zarqa with 60 candidates, while the 
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Southern Bedouin had only 13, the smallest number of candidates. Table 4.2 details the 
distribution of candidates and the number of candidates per seat. 
Table 4.2: Distribution of Candidates and the Candidates per Seat 
Constituencies Distribution 
of Seats 
Distribution of 
Candidates 
Total 
Seats 
Total 
Candi 
dates 
Candidates Per Seat 
M C CI M C CI M C CI Gener 
al 
Amman (1) 3 - - 22 - - 3 22 7.3 - - 7.3 
Amman (2) 3 - - 35 - - 3 35 11.6 - - 11.6 
Amman (3) 3 1 1 34 13 8 5 55 11.3 13.0 8.0 11.0 
Amman (4) 2 - - 19 - - 2 19 9.5 - - 9.5 
Amman (5) 4 - 1 46 - 6 5 52 10.5 - 6.0 10.4 
Amman (6) 2 1 - 16 12 - 3 28 8.0 12.0 - 9.3 
Balqa 6 2 - 34 8 - 8 42 5.6 4.0 - 5.3 
Karak 7 2 - 55 9 - 9 64 7.8 4.5 - 7.1 
Tafileh 3 - - 17 - - 3 17 5.7 - - 5.7 
Ma'an 5 - - 27 - - 5 27 5.4 - - 5.4 
Zarqa 4 1 1 51 6 3 6 60 12.7 6.0 3.0 10.0 
Mafraq 3 - - 21 - - 3 21 7.0 - - 7.0 
Irbid 8 1 - 64 5 - 9 69 8.0 5.0 - 7.7 
Ajloun 2 1 - 19 12 - 3 31 9.3 12.0 - 10.3 
Jerash 2 - - 20 - - 2 20 10 - - 10.0 
Ramtha & 
Bani Kinanah 
3 - - 18 - - 3 18 6.0 - - 6.0 
Koura & N. 
North Ghor 
2 - - 18 - - 2 18 9.0 - - 9.0 
North Bedouin 2 - - 19 - - 2 19 9.5 - - 9.5 
Central 
Bedouin 
2 - - 17 - - 2 17 8.5 - - 8.5 
South Bedouin 2 - - 13 - - 2 13 6.5 - - 6.5 
Total 68 9 3 565 65 17 80 647 8.5 8.0 5.7 8.3 
M. Muslim, C. Christian, Ci. Circassian and Chechen 
Source: The 1989 Elections: Facts and Figures, Al-Urdun al-Jadid Research Centre, 
[New Jordan],, Amman, Jordan, 1993, p. 21. 
According to the above table, the average competition level between candidates in the 
Kingdom was 8.3 candidates per seat. The highest competition level for parliamentary 
seats was in the capital where three constituencies had over 10.4 candidates per seat, 
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dropping in Balqa and Ma'an govemorates where it was under 5.5 candidates per seat. 
The high competition level was due to a number of factors including the 1989 election 
which had been the first in more than twenty-two years, the increased level of 
education, many Jordanian citizens being able to participate in the poHtical life of the 
country for the first time, and popular support for the return of a parliamentary body. 
4.2.5. The 1989 Election: Participation 
According to the Ministry of the Interior's official electoral report, the estimated 
population of Jordan by the end of 1989, was 3,280,244. The total number of eligible 
voters in the country over the age of nineteen was 1,350,000. This figure excluded 
members of the Armed Forces, the police, and the security service, as they were not 
allowed to vote in the election by law. Of that total, 1,020,446 voters actually 
registered their names, and 877,475 collected the necessary voting cards. The number 
who voted in the election came to 541,426, representing 62 per cent of those who 
collected the voting cards and 53 per cent of registered voters, and some 40 per cent of 
all eHgible voters.^ ^^ ^ Table 4.3 gives details of participation in the election of 1989. 
Population of Jordan at the end of 1989 3.280.244 
Number of Eligible Voters 1.350.000 
Number of registered voters 1.020.446 
Number of Voting Card Holders 877.475 
Number of Actual Voters 541.426 
Proportion of Actual Voters to Voting Card Holder 62 
Proportion of Actual Voters to Registered Voters 53 
Proportion of Actual Voters to Eligible Voters 40 
Proportion of Registered Voters to Eligible Voters 76 
Proportion of Voting Card Holder to Eligible Voters 65 
Proportion of Voting Card Holders to Registered Voters 86 
Source: The Ministry of the Interior, Official Electoral Report. Amman, 1989. 
As is clear from the table, the proportion of registered voters in the election to eligible 
voters was high (about 76 per cent), and the proportion of voting card holders to 
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registered voters was even higher, reaching 86 per cent. However, the proportion of 
actual voters to voting card holders was low (about 62 per cent). With the resumption 
of parliamentary life in Jordan after a long hiatus of twenty-two years of non-elected 
parliamentary government, large sections of the population stiU appeared to remain 
hesitant about participating in the democratic process. 
Although the level of voters may have been relatively low, the high participation level of 
candidates strengthened the value of the democratic experience in Jordan. The fact that 
a high proportion of eligible voters did register gives testament to the encouraging 
climate in Jordan for popular democracy. The experience of democracy was positive 
and pointed the way forward. 
Table 4.4 shows the number of registered voters, voting card holders, and actual voters 
according to the electoral districts, and the country's population at the end of 1989. 
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Table 4.4: Participation in the 1989 Elections 
Constituency 1989 
Population 
Number of registered 
voters 
Number of 
voting card 
holder 
Actual 
voters 
Amman (1) 210716 65342 45290 27610 
Amman (2) 391849 73435 57000 33170 
Amman (3) 221131 60824 46199 27590 
Amman (4) 103475 35788 33512 19013 
Amman (5) 186117 60289 47373 28000 
Amman (6) 94550 35134 30692 22158 
Balqa 195868 91303 83408 53143 
Karak 158435 67563 63605 35722 
Tafileh 54589 21908 20781 15364 
Ma'an 79090 27981 25535 19427 
Zarqa 494680 116371 88028 58153 
Mafraq 77925 21825 20046 14622 
Irbid 414769 126903 109696 53400 
Ajloun 87961 36207 34500 21700 
Jerash 99121 31567 29577 19400 
Ramtha & Bani Kinanah 122164 41360 40817 26727 
Koura & North Ghor 134743 45955 43101 28500 
Northern Bedouin 74000 24060 23305 13293 
Central Bedouin 43551 18155 17816 12243 
Southern Bedouin 35510 18476 17194 12191 
Total 3280244 1020446 877475 541426 
Source: The Ministry of Interior, Official Electoral Report. Amman, Jordan, 
1989. 
* The researcher has corrected the overall total given, as these were incorrect in the 
Official Electoral Report. 
According to the Ministry of the Interior's official electoral report, the people in the 
Southern Bedouin constituency were more enthusiastic in registering for the election 
with a percentage of 52 per cent of the total population, followed by Balqa constituency 
with 46.6 per cent, Karak constituency with 42.6 per cent, and the Central Bedouin 
constituency with 41.6 per cent. The lowest registration for the election was in Amman 
Second constituency with 18.7 per cent registered voters of the total population. From 
these figures, it seems that enthusiasm for the election was highest among the rural 
population, the bedouin and other minorities. 
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The highest percentage of voting card holders was in Ramtha and Bani Kinanah 
constituency in Irbid governorate with 99 per cent of the total number of the registered 
voters in the Kingdom, followed by Central Bedouin with 98 per cent, and North 
Bedouin 96.8 per cent. The lowest percentage in the Kingdom was in Amman First 
constituency with 69.3 per cent. It can be concluded that the highest number of voters 
collecting the necessary voting cards were in the rural and bedouin areas. The highest 
percentages of actual voting were in Ma'an with 76 per cent and Tafileh governorate, 
where it was 73.9 per cent. The lowest actual voting was in Karak with 56 per cent. 
Although there were significant discrepancies between the patterns of registered voters, 
voting card holders and actual voters in the constituencies, overall the level of 
participation was low. A number of reasons contributed to this. Firstly the large 
number of candidates and the similarity in their platforms, confused the voters. 
Secondly, many of the candidates were new faces previously unknown to the electorate. 
Thirdly, many Palestinians did not participate in the election process due to PLO 
instructions not to have many deputies in the Jordanian Parliament. On November 1, 
1989, the PLO issued a statement urging candidates to "refrain from involving its name 
in their campaign propaganda in favour of any candidate". The statement stressed that 
the elections were a "purely Jordanian affair".*'"'^  Many Palestinians opposed substantial 
representation in the Chamber of Deputies for fear that Israel would insist on admitting 
those Palestinian representatives to the peace process, and so threaten the position of 
the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. As a result, 
only twelve deputies with Palestinian origins were elected in 1989. 
4.3. The 1989 Elections Result 
On November 8, 1989, 541,426 Jordanian citizens turned out to elect the eighty 
members of the eleventh Chamber of Deputies at the 1,109 polling stations throughout 
the country's 20 electoral constituencies. The polls were the first general elections in 
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more than 23 years and were easily the freest and fairest elections ever held in Jordan. 
Although the election was on a non-party basis, various groups and organisations 
functioned as quasi-parties. The election resulted in Islamic trends winning 42.5 per 
cent of the seats available, the conservatives and traditionalist winning 41.3 per cent, 
and leftists and nationalists winning 16.2 per cent. 
After the announcement of the election result, the King expressed his satisfaction: 
It was what I promised and I have fulfilled my promise...I am 
satisfied with all the results of the election. We were totally 
successful in the process: every element in Jordan was given an 
opportunity to take part in the election, the people have chosen 
their representatives, who hopefuUy, wOl share the responsibility in 
a diUgent manner. ^ ^^^ 
There was a delay of about 24 hours in the publication of the final result, caused by a 
re-taUying of the ballots cast in Karak Govemorate. This was due to what was 
described by the Jordanian Interior Minister, Salim Masa'adeh, as "confusion created by 
supporters of some candidates". He made it clear that there was "no recounting of 
ballots in Karak, we only carried out a confirmation of the votes".*"^ Table 4.5 shows 
the election winners, number of votes and their affiliations. 
Table 4.5: Electoral Districts, Winners, and Political Affiliation 
Constituency Deputies Winners No. of Votes PoUtical AffiUation 
Amman (1) Al i al-Faqir 13,418 Islamist 
Abd al-Aziz Jabr 11,188 MusUm Brother 
Majid Khalifah 9,708 Mushm Brother 
Amman (2) Abd al-Mun'im Abu Zanat 19, 343 MusUm Brother 
Al i Hawamdah 12,765 MusUm Brother 
Ya'qub Qarrash 5,082 Islamist 
Amman (3) Laith Shbailat 14,740 Islamist 
Paris al-Nabulsi 7,801 Arab Nationalist 
Tahir al-Masri 6,482 Centrist 
Mansur Murad(Circassian) 8,747 Leftist 
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Fakhri Qawar (Christian) 6,211 Leftist 
Amman (4) Nayif al-Hadid 6,458 Centrist 
Hamzah Mansur 4,260 MusUm Brother 
Amman (5) Hammam Sa'id 9,842 MusUm Brother 
Muhammad Abu Paris 8,601 Mushm Brother 
Ata al-Shahwan 4,845 Centrist 
Ahmad al-Abbadi 4,764 Centrist 
Dawud Qujaq (Circassian) 8,012 MusUm Brother 
Amman (6) Ahmad Qutish al-Azaydah 6,534 Muslim Brother 
Abd al-Hafiz Alawi Braisat 5,953 MusUm Brother 
Sa'ad Haddadin (Christian) 3,088 Centrist 
Zarqa Dhib Anis 25,517 MusUm Brother 
Muhammad Ahmad al-Hajj 8,905 MusUm Brother 
Salamah al-Ghuwairi 7,036 Centrist 
Ziyad Abu Mahfuz 6,513 Islamist 
Abd al-Baqi Jammu (Chechen) 14,181 Islamist 
Bassam Haddadin (Christian) 14,698 Leftist 
Ma'an Yusif al-Azum 5,841 MusUm Brother 
Sulaiman Arar 5,590 Centrist 
Ziyad Kamal al-Shuwaikh 4,896 Centrist 
Hisham Sharari 4,538 Centrist 
Abd al-Karim al-Kabariti 4,482 Centrist 
Tafileh Dr. Abdullah al-Akaylah 4,587 MusUm Brother 
Fu'ad al-Khalafat 4,454 MusUm Brother 
Ibrahim al-Ghababshah 3,526 Nationalist 
Irbid Ahmad al-Kufahi 32,651 MusUm Brother 
Abd al-Rahim al-'Ukur 22,920 MusUm Brother 
Kamil al-'Umari 19,858 MusUm Brother 
Yusif al-Khasawnah 19,604 MusUm Brother 
Muhammad al-Alawnah 14,459 Islamist 
Dhuqan al-Hindawi 14,171 Centrist 
Husni al-Shiyyab 12,246 Nationalist 
Abd al-Ra'uf al-Rawabdah 11,178 Centrist 
Dhib Marji (Christian) 11,694 Leftist 
Jerash Tsa al-Rimuni 3,480 Centrist 
Hussain MijaUi 2,787 Nationalist 
Ajloun Ahmad Annab 5,280 Centrist 
Abd al-Salam al-Fraihat 4,473 Islamist 
Jamal Haddad (Christian) 2,855 Centrist 
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Koura & 
North Ghor Abd al-Majid Shraidah 7,628 Centrsit 
Nadir Zuhairat 6,163 Centrist 
Ramtha & 
Bani Kinanah Muhammad Dardur 11,734 Centrist 
Qasim 'Ubaidat 9,203 Nationalist 
Salim al-Zu'bi 5,483 Nationalist 
Mafraq Abd al-Karim al-Dughmi 3,025 Nationalist 
Muhammad Abu 'Uhlaim 2,389 Centrist 
Nawwaf Alayan al-Khawaldah 2,533 Centrist 
Balqa Abdullah al-Nsur 19,609 Centrist 
Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat 15,451 Muslim Brother 
Ibrahim Khraysat 13,071 Muslim Brother 
Awni al-Bashir 10,611 Centrist 
Marwan al-Hmud 9,751 Centrist 
Sultan al-Adwan 8,721 Centrist 
Fawzi Tuaimah(Christian) 13,993 Centrist 
Samir Qawar (Christian) 10,196 Centrist 
Karak Ahmad al-Kafawin 13,184 MusUm Brother 
Jamal al-Sarairah 10,411 Islamist 
Atif al-Batush 10,355 Islamist 
Mahmud Hwaimil 10,062 Islamist 
Matair al-Bustanji 9,977 Islamist 
Yusif al-Mbaidin 9,810 Islamist 
Muhammad al-Tarawnah 9,378 Nationalist 
Tsa Mdanat (Christian) 10,274 Communist 
Abdullah Zuraiqat (Christian) 9,478 Centrist 
N. Bedouin Muhammad al-Mu'arar 3,845 Centrist 
Sa'ad al-Surur 3,569 Centrist 
C. Bedouin Jamal al-Khraishah 3,532 Centrist 
Muhammad al-Zaban 2,814 Centrist 
S. Bedouin: Faisal al-Jazi 5,377 Centrist 
Nayif Abu Tayih 4,303 Centrist 
Sources: Jordan Times. 9-11 November, 1989. 
From the above table, the winning Islamic candidates polled 401,224 votes, 
representing 54.4 per cent of the winning votes casts. The winning Centrist 
(conservative and traditionalist) candidates polled 230,165 votes, representing 31.2 per 
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cent. Finally, the winning Leftist and NationaUst candidates poUed 106,073 votes, 
representing 14.4 per cent. 
It is significant that the candidates obtaining the highest votes were all from the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The largest number of votes was obtained by Ahmad al-Kufahi, who 
scored 32,651 votes in Irbid constituency, followed by Dhib Anis with 25,517 in Zarqa 
constituency, Abd al-Rahim al-'Ukur with 22,920, Kamil al-'Umari with 19,858 both 
from Irbid constituency, and Abd al-Mun'im Abu Zanat a former reUgious judge with 
19,343 votes in Amman's second constituency. 
Despite women constituting 50% of the total population, only twelve female candidates 
had nominated themselves for the elections and none managed to secure a parUamentary 
seat. In total, these candidates poUed 20,500 votes, an average of approximately 
1,700.^ ^^ *^  This was the first time in Jordan's history that women had fought an election, 
despite having been granted the right to vote in 1974. Women had, however, 
participated in the by-election of 1984 as voters. According to a survey conducted by 
the Department of Research and Studies of the Jordanian parUament in May 1993, 
concerning the participation of women in poUtical life, 77% of the reasons given were 
that people were unconvinced of the abiUty of women to represent them; the reUgious 
consideration which argued that women were not entitled to run the state's affairs; the 
absence of female support to women candidates in the election; the feeling that women 
are not qualified to undertake poUtical decisions; tribal and family values preventing 
people from giving their support to women candidates, and women's lack of experience 
in parhamentary affairs.^ ^^^ Interior Minister SaUm Masa'adah answered a relevant 
question on the women's failure by saying that "it was the people who went to the 
elections; it was up to them to elect whoever they wanted".^ ^^ ^ 
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4.3.1. The Political Groupings Reflected in the 1989 Elections Result 
Following the 1989 election result, three trends were apparent in the Chamber of 
Deputies. These were the Islamic trend, the Leftist and pan-Arab Nationalist trend, 
and the Conservative and Traditionalist trends. 
4.3.1.1. The Islamic Trend 
Although, a broad grouping of candidates came under the Islamic umbrella, the Muslim 
Brotherhood played a central role, as the best organised and most impressive group in 
the election campaign. Their candidates formed a recognised bloc. They had enjoyed 
relative political freedom over the years, although as an "association" and "charity" 
rather than a party, and had never been banned.^ "^ Jordan was one of few countries in 
the region which allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to operate openly, under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Social Development. King Hussein emphasised his 
support for the Muslim Brotherhood over the years by saying, "we protected them 
when (they) were persecuted elsewhere".^ '*' The Muslim Brotherhood had therefore 
the advantage of having been effectively the only political grouping permitted in the 
country since the ban on parties in 1957. 
The influential Muslim Brotherhood was one of the first groups to establish a coherent 
organised platform, thus accounting for the success of most Muslim Brotherhood 
candidates. The Muslim Brotherhood fielded candidates in most of the country's 
constituencies. Twenty-two of its twenty-six candidates won seats in the election. 
Twelve candidates, caUing themselves Islamic independents, also won seats to the 
Chamber of Deputies. Overall, the Islamic trend won a number of seats equal to that of 
the overt supporters of the regime: conservative and traditionalists, (tribal leaders and 
ex-governmental officials). The Islamic groups polled particularly well in the urban 
areas. In the Amman constituencies, thirteen of the seventeen seats reserved for Muslim 
Arabs were won by Islamic candidates. The Muslim Bloc candidates in the Irbid 
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constituency captured the top five positions of the eight seats reserved for Muslim 
Arabs. In the Zarqa constituency, the Islamic candidates won four of the five seats 
reserved for Muslim deputies. Of the seven seats reserved for Muslim members in the 
Karak constituency, six seats were won by Islamic candidates. 
The election result revealed the hidden strength of the Islamic movement in the country. 
In response to this. King Hussein expressed his complete satisfaction with the election 
process and rejected suggestions that the "strong showing by Islamic Fundamentalists in 
the polls represented an 'opposition' in the House".^ ^^ ^ 
The success of the Islamic movement in the election can be attributed to several factors. 
First, the Palestine Liberation Organisation's decision not to intervene in the elections 
was crucial. Due to the absence of the PLO and its supporters from the poUtical scene, 
the Islamic movement achieved success in the refugee camps and attracted support 
from Jordanians of Palestinian origin in other cities.^ *"^  The Palestinians supported the 
Islamic candidates because the Islamic platform rejected the West Bank disengagement 
and called for a holy war against Israel for the liberation of aU Palestinian lands. 
Second, the success of the Islamic movement was the disintegration of tribal and family 
Unks. This can be attributed to a number of inter-related factors. Firstly, the loyalty 
vote towards the tribe was often spUt as more than one member of the tribe contested 
for the same constituency. Moreover, it was difficult to distinguish between the 
individual platforms of the tribal candidates. FinaUy, the platforms themselves were 
often vague both in terms of ideology and poUcies.^ '^^  
Third, the MusUm Brotherhood had been the only quasi-poUtical organisation allowed 
to function in Jordan over the past three decades.^ *^ ^ 
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Fourth, the Islamic platform called for the prosecution of former government officials 
who had allegedly mishandled the economy into bankruptcy, and for the abrogation of 
the Kingdom's agreement with the IMF ^ ^^ \ thus increasing their appeal to the majority 
of Jordanian voters. 
4.3.1.2. The Leftist and Pan-Arab Nationalist Trend 
The Leftists and pan-Arab Nationalists fought the election in a number of constituencies 
such as Karak on an informal arrangement basis. However, they did not do well in the 
election, winning only thirteen seats out of eighty contested in the election. The Leftists 
included Issa Madanat of the Jordanian Communist Party. Pan-Arab Nationalists 
included two Ba'thists, Husni al-Shiyyab and Muhammad al-Tarawnah.^ '^'^  The Leftists 
were represented in Parliament for the first time since 1957. 
The lack of success of this trend could be attributed to a number of factors. Firstiy, the 
Leftists and the Pan-Arab Nationalists made great efforts in order to co-ordinate 
activities to run in the election on an informal basis, but these attempts did not succeed 
in most constituencies. Isa Mdanat stated to the researcher that a list was formed by 
the Leftists and Pan-Arab Nationalists of Karak governorate, "and they partially 
succeeded in reducing the number of successful Islamic candidates, with two candidates 
gaining seats in the Chamber of Deputies".^ ^^^ Since their candidates ran for election as 
individuals, they failed to achieve any coalition despite some degree of co-operation and 
similarity in their outlook and programmes. 
Secondly, the shortness of the election campaign (officially 25 days) was an obvious 
advantage to those who had previously been allowed free political activities. Thirdly, 
Leftists and Pan-Arab Nationalists were unable to find the means of promoting their 
ideas and their programme to the electorate at large. 
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Fourthly, the Leftists also suffered from a further disadvantage in that most of their 
leaders had been released only shortly before the election. In addition to the detention 
of 120 members of the Communist party in the aftermath of the disturbances of April 
1989, Ya'qub Zayadin, the secretary general of the Communist party had gone 
underground until September 1989. SaUm al-Nahhas, a key figure in the Jordanian 
Democratic People's Party (JDPP) was released from prison in the same month.^ ^ '^ 
Fifthly, the leadership was spUt by a series of personaUty clashes. These five conditions 
were aU disadvantageous to the Leftists and pan-Arab Nationalist. 
4.3.1.3. The Centrist Trend (Conservative and Traditionalist) 
The Conservative and Traditionalist trend comprised a smaU group of former officials 
and loyalist poUticians whose main concern was to control the process of change, and 
also a group of prominent tribal notables who felt that they had been losing their 
privileged positions. However, the tribal leaders were in fact being chaUenged by 
younger elements from within the clans themselves.^ ^^ ^ 
Thirty-three seats were won by the Conservatives and Traditionalists. Among those 
who won seats in the election were former ministers AbduUah al-Nsur and Marwan al-
Hmud from Balqa Govemorate, Dhuqan al-Hindawi and Abd al-Ra'uf al-Rawabdah 
from Irbid Governorate, Sulaiman Arar from Ma'an Govemorate, and Muhammad al-
Zaban from the central Bedouin district.^^ '^ 
Although the candidates from the Conservative and Traditionalist trend were drawn 
from the traditional ruling eUte, the trend was not as successful as anticipated. The 
main reason for the Conservatives and Traditionalists not winning more parUamentary 
seats in the election was the lack of consensus among them. This was further 
exacerbated by so many candidates from the same tribe, making the choice for voters 
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difficult.^*^^ Related to this was the decline in tribal loyalties within the Kingdom, and 
consequentiy votes were lost to Islamic candidates. 
There were many examples of failure among establishment figures from the 
Conservative and Traditionalist trend. Among these were several former nunisters 
who failed to win seats in the Lower House, emphasising that personal affiUation with 
the government was not sufficient to guarantee political success. The failures included 
Shafiq Zawaidah from Amman's sixth constituency, Hamdi al-Tabba and Muhammad 
al-Dabbas from Amman's third constituency. Akif al-Fayiz of the Bani Sakhir tribe 
from the central Bedouin constituency failed to win his seat. Al-Fayiz was of the idea 
that one of the two assigned seats was guaranteed for himself, and the other to be 
actively competed for by the other 17 candidates. He did not regard the high number 
of candidates as representing any major challenge to the traditional authority of the 
tribe. Al-Fayiz also saw his failure as a "reflection of the younger generations who 
wished to experience politics for themselves and test their own strength".^'"' In 
addition, more than twelve former senior officials and heads of large quasi-
government organisations, ex-mayors, ex-ambassadors and retired armed forces 
officers failed to win. Tribal leaders were "defeated by young, enlightened members of 
their own tribe".^ '^^  As there was such a disparity of views throughout the tribe, some 
of the established clans failed to win any parliamentary seats. 
Conclusion 
The political liberalisation in Jordan was initiated by three factors. These were the 
disengagement from the West Bank and the recognition of the Palestinian identity in the 
area; the severe economic crises which Jordan faced in the run-up to the elections; and 
the popular disturbances which broke out throughout the country as a protest against 
the price increases. 
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The election of 1989 was characterised by confusion. The ordinary voters could not 
always distinguish between candidates' positions on issues, due to the absence of 
poUtical parties and also the short time period of the election campaign to prepare and 
present the platforms to the electorate. The general election of 1989 gained special 
attention from a wide range of younger generation voters, between the ages of 19 and 
40, participating in elections for the first time or standing as candidates. 
The election was judged by many external and internal observers to be fair and honest, 
despite the fact that it had taken place before the issuance of the law for poUtical 
parties. The 1989 election confirmed the existence of poUtical pluralism in the country. 
Although poUtical parties were not yet legal, candidates with a poUtical affiUation stood 
for the election as individuals. It was understood that this was simply the first step in a 
transitional process and that it was only a matter of time before poUtical parties with 
their own identities would be permitted and legalised. Although the 1989 election left 
certain matters to be desired, the process of democratisation had taken hold in Jordan, 
and further poUtical reforms were both desirable and inevitable. 
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Chapter Five 
The Operation of the Parliamentary Democratic System: 
Political Reforms. 1989-1993 
Introduction 
The process of political liberalisation in Jordan continued after the election of 1989 into 
the 1990s. One month after the November 1989 election, the Jordanian government 
began to consider moves towards further political liberalisation. Even before it had 
won its vote of confidence in parliament, Mudar Badran's government had initiated 
moves towards suspending laws and regulations that had been in force in the previous 
period. 
This chapter will examine how political liberalisation from 1989 to 1993 was carried 
forward with the implementation of a number of political reforms. The major reforms 
which were introduced were the adoption of the National Charter on June 9, 1991, 
which was intended to serve as a supplement to the Constitution in redefining the 
relationship between the state and its citizenry; the repeal of martial law on July 7, 
1991; the abolition of the anti-Communist law on December 23, 1991; the Political 
Parties Law permitting the licensing of political parties in Jordan for the first time since 
1957 and endorsed by the Chamber of Deputies on July 7, 1992; and the Press and 
Publication Law which was passed by the Chamber of Deputies on March 14, 1993. 
Each of these political reforms will be discussed below. 
5.1. The Lifting of Laws and Regulations which Contradicted the 
Process of Political Liberalisation in Jordan 
The government's official commitment to reconsider all extraordinary laws, and laws 
which affected public freedom and to work towards cancelling them, constituted a 
major step in changing the political climate in Jordan. Some of the actions which the 
government took in lifting laws and regulations could take immediate effect, without 
needing any additional legal changes, while others required changes in the law. These 
are dealt with separately below. 
5.1.1. Changes in Regulations with Immediate Effect 
Among the changes in regulations which could take immediate effect were the release 
of political prisoners, the return of all confiscated passports, the lifting of limitations on 
movement and travel, and the abolition of state control over the main daily newspapers. 
Moreover, the government also took the decision to curb the intervention of the 
Intelligence Service (mukhabarat) in the political activity of Jordanian citizens, to 
suspend mukhabarat certification of passport renewals, to allow employees who had 
been dismissed because of their poHtical leanings to return to their posts, to offer 
poUtical exiles the opportunity to return home and to grant the public the right to hold 
poUtical demonstrations. '^^  In addition, in December 1990, the government permitted 
the Jordanian Writers Association, which had been dissolved in 1987 after accusations 
of political activity, to resume its activities. 
5.1.2. The Lifting of Martial Law 
The repeal of martial law in Jordan was the most important of the poUtical reforms 
introduced between 1989 and 1993, as none of the other major poUtical reforms would 
otherwise have been effective. Mudar Badran promised to suspend martial law at the 
end of December 1989. Martial law had been introduced on June 5, 1967 following the 
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1967 Arab-Israeli War, and had given the central authorities the right to search or 
detain any person without further notice. Moreover, the decision of the martial courts 
was final and not subject to appeal. Article [4] of the martial law regulations had stated 
that: 
Despite any law or any other regulation, the General Military 
Governor and local military authorities have the power to arrest, 
search, and detain any person for a period of time deemed 
necessary, any where in the Kingdom as well as enter any houses, 
or other places to investigate and to search at any time day or 
night. '^^  
On July 7, 1991, King Hussein issued a royal decree repealing the majority of martial 
law regulations. The decree stated that the martial law courts would continue to 
investigate the cases they were already handling, and the Economic Security Committee 
would continue to work on cases of mismanagement and corruption by former 
officials.^'*' However, all of the remaining martial law provisions were formally repealed 
on March 24, 1992 by royal decree. Security offences such as espionage and treason 
were to be dealt with by state security courts. 
5.1.3. The Lifting of the Anti-Communist Law 
The anti-Communist law had been introduced on December 1, 1953. This decreed 
temporary imprisonment with hard labour for any person belonging to a communist 
organisation or supporting communist thought. Article [3] of the anti-Communist law 
declared that the following should be punishable with hard labour: 
a. Association with a Communist organisation with the object of 
propagating Communism; 
b. Association with a Communist organisation, working for it, 
holding office in it, or being employed as secretary or a delegate 
for it; 
c. Spreading of propaganda for Communism through speech, 
writing or pictures; 
d. Distribution of any Communist document with the intention of 
propagating Communism; 
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e. Possession of a Communist document with the intention of its 
publication or propagation.'-^ ^ 
The anti-Communist law was repealed relatively quickly and easily on December 23, 
1991, after a short parUamentary debate, despite opposition from the Islamic Action 
Front.^ ^* AbduUah al-Akaylah, a MusUm Brotherhood member, argued that Communist 
thought should not be aUowed in a country in which more than 97 per cent of the 
population was Mushm.^ ^^  He pointed out that this contradicted Article [2] of the 
Jordanian Constitution, which stated that "Islam is the reUgion of the state and Arabic is 
its official language". 
5.2. The National Charter. June 1991 
5.2.1. The National Charter Framework 
A key element in the process of poUtical UberaUsation in Jordan was the adoption of the 
National Charter. The idea of the National Charter (al-mithaq al-watani) was first 
mentioned by King Hussein in a speech on May 10, 1989, only three weeks after the 
disturbances in the south of the c o u n t r y . H e declared that a National Charter should 
be prepared at some as yet unspecified date and should represent a national code of 
conduct.^ "^ ^ The King again referred to the idea of a charter in his speech to the two 
Chambers of ParUament at the opening of the first regular session of the Eleventh 
National Assembly on November 27, 1989.^ "^ He stated: "A Royal Commission wiU be 
formed to draft a National Charter that defines the parameters of our path, based on our 
constitution and the basic principles that are fundamental to the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan".^ '^ ^ 
On April 9, 1990, King Hussein appointed a Royal Commission to draw up the National 
Charter, outlining the rules for poUtical Ufe in the country.^ '^ ^ The former prime 
minister and security chief Ahmad 'Ubaidat was to act as chairman. At the first meeting 
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of the Royal Commission, on April 10, 1990, the King delivered a speech in which he 
made clear the significance of the National Charter to the process of democratisation. 
He stated: 
The democratisation of Jordan is an irreversible process and 
democratic tolerance of opposing views should be the guiding force 
for political life in the Kingdom under guidelines set by the 
proposed National Charter...If democracy is to be the means to 
build and to mobilise, and an incentive to release talents and 
rejuvenate individuals and institutions, as well as a cornerstone of 
our national security, then it becomes essential that we agree on a 
broad and flexible framework for national action. This framework 
wUl be the Charter....The Charter will not be a substitute for the 
Constitution. It wiH posit basic visions and national concepts that 
determine the functioning of the state. It will constitute a regulator 
of the state's various activities in political, economic, security, 
social, and cultaral affairs.^ ''*^ 
5.2.2. Composition of the Roval Commission 
The Royal Commission which was to draw up the National Charter, consisted of sixty 
members drawn from members of different political tendencies.^ '^ ^ It included eight 
members of the Islamic tendencies, of whom six were known to be associated with the 
Muslim Brotherhood and two known as Islamic independents. Thirteen were known to 
be sympathetic to pan-Arab nationalists, and eight had a reputation for leftist 
sympathies. Conservatives and Traditionalists accounted for 31 members of the 
Committee. It should be noted that twenty-five members out of the sixty were 
members of the National Assembly, of whom 17 were deputies and eight were 
senators.^ ^^ ^ The members, all of whom were public figures, were appointed by the 
King on the recommendation of the Prime Minister and the King's advisers. 
5.2.3 Differing Approaches within the Committee 
On April 10, 1990, the day following the issue of the royal decree, the Royal 
Commission began its meetings. It was not long before some of the political factions 
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began to suspect that their particular standpoints were not going to be given sufficient 
recognition in the Charter. They had hoped to stamp the Charter with their own 
ideologies and principles. For example, the Islamic members tried to create a 
framework for the implementation of Islamic ideology within the provisions of the 
Charter. Members of the various poUtical factions became fearful that the Charter 
would go against their interests and might lead to their poUtical isolation. According to 
Ahmad 'Ubaidat, "there was a crisis of confidence among the members".^ '^ ^ 
However, after the actual drafting of the Charter had begun, the members of the various 
factions graduaUy acquired greater confidence. 'Ubaidat told the researcher that when 
it became clear to everybody that the government was not intent on influencing the 
content of the Charter, doubts and suspicions evaporated and were replaced by trust on 
aU fronts. Members became convinced of the need for compromise, and so were 
prepared to make concessions in order to achieve a common goal.''^ ^ 
5.2.4. Procedures Used in Drafting the Charter 
The initial stage of drafting the Charter involved aU the members of the Royal 
Commission meeting together to decide how the Charter should be composed, in terms 
of chapters. Once the structure of the chapters had been determined, the members of 
the commission divided into working groups to decide the content of each chapter. 
Members attended the working groups which covered the concerns of greatest interest 
to them. 'Ubaidat informed the researcher that "at no stage in the course of these 
discussions did the government play any part in drafting the text, which was done 
entirely by the commission".^ '^ ^ 
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5.2.5. The Content of the National Charter 
The National Charter is the basic statement of democratic intent for the Jordanian 
people. It consists of an introductory background and eight chapters, under the 
following titles:[see Appendix 2] 
• Chapter One: 'The Charter: Rationale and Aims'. 
• Chapter Two: 'State Governed by Law and Political Pluralism': 
• The State of Law and Political Pluralism. 
• Basic Pillars of a State of Law. 
• Guarantees of the Democratic Approach. 
• Principles and Limitations Governing the EstabHshment 
of Parties. 
• Chapter Three: 'Jordan National Security'. 
• Chapter Four: 'The Economy'. 
• Chapter Five: 'The Social Aspect'. 
• Chapter Six: 'Culture, Education, Science and Information'. 
• Chapter Seven: 'The Jordanian Palestinian Relationship'. 
• Chapter Eight: 'Jordanian, Arab, Islamic and International 
Relations'. 
Chapter one explains the rationale and aims behind the creation of the National Charter. 
It states that the Jordanian Constitution lays down the objectives and principles which 
regulate the form of government in Jordan, and governs the relationship between these 
principles and Jordanian society. The principles reflect the pride of all Jordanians in 
their national identity as part of the Arab nation. The Charter makes it clear that 
democracy, which enables society to safeguard the rights of each individual and 
empowers those individuals, regardless of their status, to participate fuUy in the 
decision-making process, is the only way that Jordan can remain faithful to both its 
modern concerns and its Arab and Islamic traditions. The choice of democratic 
government is therefore the most important step towards fulfilling the Jordanian 
people's hopes and aspirations at national, Arab, and global levels. 
187 
The Charter argues that the principles it puts forward are intended both to create and to 
regulate the relationships between the government, officials and other pubUc bodies in 
Jordanian society. National agreement on these principles can be seen not simply as an 
advanced form of cultural achievement, but also as a comprehensive platform for the 
future of the country. 
The saUent features and fundamental concepts of the state system are defined in the 
Charter in terms of eighteen facts, principles and constants. The most significant of 
these points which most clearly defme the nature of the relationship between the 
government and its citizens are covered below. The system of government in the 
country is described as at once parUamentary, monarchic and hereditary. The 
importance of aU citizens respecting the different aspects of governance if unity is to be 
accompUshed is stressed. Point one states: 
The system of government in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is 
parUamentary, monarchic and hereditary. Adherence by aU to its 
legitimacy and respect for the letter and spirit of the constitution 
shall enhance the union between the people and thek leadership. 
Point two stipulates that the Jordanian people are part of the Arab nation and that Arab 
unity is the only option for both Jordan and national Arab security. This is stated as 
follows: 
The Jordanian people are part of the Arab nation. Arab unity is the 
only option that would achieve national security for Jordan and the 
Arab nation in aU Arab countries, guarantee economic and 
psychological stabiUty and ensure preservation, progress and 
continuity. 
Point eight, whilst affirming equal rights for aU to participate in the democratic process 
regardless of gender, race, reUgion or language, also reminds people of their obUgation 
to exercise that right responsibly in the interests of building a just and united country. It 
states: 
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Jordanian men and women are equal under the law. There shall be 
no distinction between them in rights and obligations regardless of 
difference in race, language or religion. They shall exercise their 
constitutional rights and uphold the higher interest of the state and 
the national ethic in such a manner as to ensure that the material 
and spiritual resources of Jordanian society are freed and directed 
towards achieving the national objectives of unity, progress and 
building a better future. 
Point nine declares that state institutions, as well as individuals, have an obligation to 
strengthen the democratic process based on political pluralism. Point ten states that 
political pluralism is the only means of ensuring fuU participation in the democratic 
process and of bearing witness to national unity whilst acknowledging the need for a 
respectful and mutually balanced, civil society. 
The goal of a mutually balanced civil society is clearly seen as part of the fundamental 
national goal of democracy. This is explored further in point sixteen, which deals with 
the need for good local government and administration. It states that while local 
leaders are answerable to central authority for obvious reasons of supervision, they 
should also try to provide as much opportunity as possible for the people to exercise 
self-government. This is phrased as follows: 
Respect for human rights, strengthening of democratic practices, 
guaranteeing a continued balance in development and achieving 
administrative efficiency in the Kingdom are fundamental national 
goals. They require a constant effort to promote a unified 
administrative system for the Jordanian state and to ensure that 
local councils become answerable to central authority for 
supervision and guidance purposes. They also require a 
strengthening of the social, political and economic structures of the 
state through supporting the concept of local administration in the 
various districts and governorates in such a manner as to provide 
practical opportunities for the people to exercise self-government, 
enable continued close co-ordination between governmental and 
popular bodies and lead to better democratic practices through 
responsible participation within a framework of balanced rights and 
obligations. 
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Chapter two of the National Charter establishes the principles and the basic pUlars of 
the state to enable the objectives and aims of the Charter to be achieved. It concerns 
the nature of a state governed by law and poUtical pluralism. A 'state of law' is defined 
here as: "a democratic state committed to the principle of the supremacy of the law 
which derives its legitimacy, authority and effectiveness from the free wiU of the 
people...The state of Jordan is a state of law in the modern sense of a democratic state". 
The National Charter explains the basic piUars of a 'state of law' as: 
1. Adherence to the letter and spirit of the constitution by the 
legislative, executive and judiciary authorities in aU their actions, 
within a framework of priority of the right. 
2. Adherence to the principle of the supremacy of the law, within a 
framework of comprehensive review by an independent 
judiciary. 
3. Adherence, in the exercise of democracy, to the principles and 
requisites of social justice. 
4. Ensuring that laws in general and laws pertaining to poUtical 
parties, elections and pubUcations in particular are dedicated to 
safeguarding the citizens' basic rights and pubUc freedoms. 
5. Adoption of the democratic dialogue as the basis of expressing 
the views, free from any form of coercion or inteUectual 
terrorism, at all official and public levels. 
6. Adherence by aU government institutions, in the exercise of their 
duties and services to the pubUc and entities to the principle of 
complete equaUty. Said institutions, whether civil or nuUtary, 
should not be exploited by any group, party or faction for 
poUtical or party purposes, without prejudice to the rights of 
citizens to organise themselves poUticaUy, provided that aU of 
the above is considered as a basic condition for the success of 
the democratic system." 
In order to support these principles, the Charter maintains that it is important to 
establish two separate autonomous bodies. The first caUed the 'Complaints Bureau', 
reporting to parUament and the Council of Ministers would "exercise administrative 
inspection and review the performance of the administration and the individuals 
therein". The second unnamed body would be established by special law with 
instructions "to update and develop legislation". In addition, the Charter also sought 
the estabUshment of a Constitutional Court with the jurisdiction to: 
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a. Interpret the provisions of the Jordanian Constitution in matters 
referred to it by the Council of Ministers. 
b. Decide on matters referred to it by the courts with regard to 
constitutional issues arising from cases entertained before these 
courts. 
c. Decide on disputes and challenges pertaining to the 
constitutionality of laws and decrees which are brought before it 
by interested parties. 
Part three of chapter two deals with the principles which need to be respected if 
democratic institutions are to exist. In this chapter, the Charter envisages guarantees 
for the basic rights and freedom of all citizens. The Charter lists the elements of 
democratic behaviour as foUows: 
1. Respecting the fundamentals of democratic action by organised 
political groups and parties in their general conduct since it 
constitutes a guarantee to justice and stability. 
2. Strengthening the traits of tolerance and objectivity, respect for 
the beliefs of others and, groups in the exercise of political and 
party affairs, avoiding narrow personal conflicts and the slander 
of individuals and entities. 
3. Guaranteeing the basic freedom of all citizens in such a manner 
as to protect the structure of a democratic society, preserve the 
rights of individuals and ensure full freedom of expression and 
its declaration with complete liberty within the limits of the 
Constitution. 
4. Attaining equality, justice and equal opportunities for all citizens, 
male and female, without discrimination. 
5. Preserving the civilian and democratic character of the state, and 
regarding any attempt to abolish or undermine this character as 
invalid ab initio as it would constitute a violation of the 
constitution and the pluralism principle and its perception." 
Chapter two, part four of the Charter provides the basis for the legitimation of the 
existence and registration of political parties, thereby paving the way for the legalisation 
of multi-party political competition, which had been banned in 1957. According to the 
provisions of the Charter, every Jordanian has the right to establish and belong to a 
political organisation, as long as its objectives are legitimate and do not contradict the 
provisions of the constitution. All parties are required to declare their internal 
regulations, stating their aims and democratic methods, and no member of any party 
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may have connections with any non-Jordanian poUtical party or organisation. These 
principles and limitations to the organisation of political parties are stated as follows: 
1. Jordanians enjoy the right to establish and belong to poUtical parties 
and groupings provided that their objectives are legitimate, their 
methods are peaceful, and their statutes do not violate the provisions 
of the Constitution. Laws regulating the operation of parties should 
not include any provisions which overtly or impUcitly call for 
abrogating the constitutional right to estabUsh political parties. 
2. PoUtical and party work in Jordan is based on the principle of 
pluralism of thought, opinion and organisation and on securing the 
requisites of democratic competition and its legitimate means. 
3. A party must announce and declare its statutes and internal regulations 
which specify its aims, fmancial resources and poUtical, economic, 
social and cultural platforms. 
4. The judiciary is solely empowered to decide on any infringement 
pertaining to the appHcation of the Parties Law. 
5. PoUtical parties shall, in their internal workings as weU as in their 
programmes, approaches, actions and pubUc and party activities, 
adhere to the following principles: 
a. Parties must employ democratic methods in their internal workings, 
choice of leadership and in the exercise of their activities within a 
framework of democratic dialogue and free competition among the 
poUtical parties. The same shaU apply to relations and deaUngs by 
any party with other poUtical parties and groupings as weU as with 
popular and constitutional institutions in a spirit of mutual respect 
for opposing views. 
b. There shaU be no structural or financial affiUation by the leadership 
or members of any party with any non-Jordanian. Also, no 
activities by any party or grouping shall be conducted upon 
instructions or directions from any foreign state or body. Taking 
into consideration what is stated in this paragraph and aU principles 
and limitations governing the organisation of parties, any provisions 
in the statute, internal regulations or programmes of any Ucensed 
Jordanian party serving Palestine, Arab unity or Islamic soUdarity 
shall be regarded as a national Jordanian undertaking. 
c. Any party in government or participating therein shaU adhere to the 
principles of equaUty and equal opportunities for aU citizens and 
must regard abiUty and qualifications as basic criteria for any 
appointment to pubUc office. 
d. In the matter of fmancial revenues, aU parties shaU rely on local, 
recognised, declared and specified Jordanian resources. These shaU 
be subject to financial audit and legal review in the manner 
prescribed by law. 
e. In matters of organisation, activities and orientation, all parties shaU 
refrain from organising or recruiting for party purposes within the 
ranks of the Jordanian Armed Forces and security departments or 
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establishing military or paramilitary (militia) groups of any 
description whatsoever. 
f All parties whatever their form of organisation shall maintain 
premises with known and declared addresses. Parties shall not use 
state, public, charitable or religious institutions or bodies for the 
benefit of any party or grouping. Nor shall they involve any such 
institutions in any political or factional conflicts. 
Chapter three is concerned with Jordan's national security, which it states is dependent 
on the resolve and inner strength of society to protect and guarantee the safety and 
freedom of citizens. Jordan's strength, security and stability are considered to be part of 
a greater Arab security. Jordanian policies spring from a recognition of the dangers of 
division and dependency, which threaten the political, economic, and social security of 
Jordan and the Arab states. Point [1] of the chapter states this as follows: 
Jordan's security is part of the Arab national security. In both good 
times and bad, each has a direct bearing on the other. This makes 
Jordan's steadfastness and strength indivisible from that of the Arab 
nation, and emphasises the Arab dimension with regard to Jordan's 
strength, security and stability. 
As far the country's economy is concerned, chapter four states that Jordan has enjoyed 
the support of foreign aid and remittances from Jordanian workers abroad. The Charter 
acknowledges the scarcity of minerals, energy and water resources, arable land, and the 
rapid increase in population have all contributed to slowing economic growth and 
development in the country. As a result, the National Charter emphasises the need for 
economic and social development in the areas of private ownership and enterprise, self-
reliance, and the use of scientific and technological means to improve productivity. It 
encourages reliance on updated and accurate data, the establishment of trade unions in 
aU economic sectors, the fight against poverty, the regulation of public borrowing by 
the state, and the protection of the environment. The National Charter reflects to some 
degree the pressure to adopt policies of economic liberalisation. Point [1] states that: 
"The Jordanian economy must be based on respect for private ownership and 
encouragement of private enterprise". At the same time it acknowledges the 
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involvement of the state, especially in the areas of management of natural resources and 
in strategic projects. 
Chapter five provides a brief description of the basic principles of Jordanian Ufe, in 
which the family is considered to be both the heart and the foundation stone of 
Jordanian society, deriving 'its morals and values from the Arab and Islamic system of 
values as well as from the universal human ethic'. Such a system demands that all 
groups in society contribute to the mutual development of individual members, and 
demands that state institutions must protect the rights of individuals to participate in 
society while observing the principles of freedom, justice and equality. 
In a very strong statement, chapter five also guarantees the rights of the less powerful 
groups in society. Thus, all children should receive care and protection not only from 
their parents but also from the state. This right continues throughout adolescence and 
belongs to all. The handicapped, in particular, must be given all the opportunities they 
need to overcome their difficulties. According to the Charter, women must be afforded 
the same rights as men and are considered equal in all respects before the constitution. 
Chapter six in the National Charter emphasises the importance of culture, education, 
science and information to the development of Jordanian institutions. The Arabic and 
Islamic culture is the basis of Jordanian national culture, according to the Charter. "The 
Arabic language is the nation's tongue and its means of expressing its cultural identity". 
The nation's heritage must be documented through scientific methods. 
Part two of Chapter six is concerned with the education system which ought to be 
integrated spiritually, physically, psychologically and mentally to achieve social growth, 
and be both comprehensive and flexible. The Jordanian education system is described 
as an integrated and developed system, which reflects the nation's thought and values. 
Jordanian teachers must be qualified and participate in any educational decision-making. 
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Part three of Chapter Six stipulates that science and technology should play a significant 
role in the development of Jordanian society, in solving social and economic problems: 
"a clear poUtical decision and national wUl must exist to acquire, develop and utilise 
technology to meet the country's needs." 
The National Charter declares that information planning must be based on the principles 
of freedom and national responsibiUty. Point [1] of part four, in Chapter Six, states, 
"Jordan's information philosophy must be based on the principles of freedom, national 
responsibiUty, respect for the truth and regard for the values of the Arab and Islamic 
nation". Point [2] declares freedom of thought and expression as a right of aU 
Jordanian citizens: 
Freedom of thought and expression, and access to information, 
must be viewed as a right of every citizen as weU as of the press 
and other mass media. It is a right enshrined in constitution and 
should under no circumstances be abridged or violated. 
Chapter seven is concerned with the Jordanian-Palestinian relationship. The significance 
of this Chapter is that it lays down the relationship between Jordanians and Palestinians, 
to ensure that Jordan carmot be exploited as an alternative to a Palestinian state. The 
relationship between Jordanians and Palestinians citizens should be based on the 
following guidelines: 
1. The support for the Palestinian identity. 
2. The recognition of the special and distinctive nature of Jordanian-
Palestinian relations. 
3. The necessity to ensure stabiUty in Jordan, in order that Zionists cannot 
use Jordan as an alternative to a Palestinian state. 
4. The Jordanian-Palestinian relationship to be safeguarded, so that when 
the "unity-infused relationship between the states of Jordan and 
Palestine" occurs, then it wiU serve as "a model for comprehensive Arab 
unity". 
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Chapter eight is concerned with Jordanian, Arab, Islamic and international relations. 
The National Charter states: 
Jordan is an indivisible part of the Arab and Islamic nation. Hence, 
its national identity is Arab just as Islam is the faith of the nation. In 
the Hght of these facts, the people, leadership and democratic 
institutions of Jordan firmly beheve in the inevitability of union 
among the Arab states and aspire to achieve union by aU legitimate 
means. 
The Charter states that Arab unity depends on the following principles, summarised 
below: 
1. The historical, geographic, and cultural aspects, which identify 
the similarity of Arab states are the fundamental bases of Arab 
unity. 
2. The challenges and external threats confronting the Arab nation 
call for Arab unity. 
3. The strategic resources of the Arab states belong to all Arabs, 
and must be used by the Arab nation to build its economy and 
strengthen its national security. 
5.2.6. The National Charter and the Issue of a Referendum 
During his speech to the National Assembly on November 27, 1989, the King indicated 
that the National Charter would be presented to the Jordanian people via a referendum. 
He declared that: "This Charter will then be presented to the people in a general 
plebiscite, so that it becomes the product of a comprehensive national decision".The 
Royal Commission correctly understood this as an obUgation to subject the National 
Charter to a pubHc referendum.Within the Commission, however, there were those 
who argued that there was no provision in the Constitution for a referendum. In order 
to put an end to the debate, a Technical Committee was formed from members of the 
Royal Commission, headed by the Commission's chairman. The chairman himself chose 
the members of the committee from those members of the Commission who had legal 
training and others who wished to participate. The Technical Committee was asked to 
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submit the outcome of its considerations to the main body of the Royal Coramission/^^' 
According to 'Ubaidat, the Committee reached the following conclusion: 
1. Although Article [24] paragraph [1] of the Jordanian Constitution states that, "The 
nation is the source of all power", paragraph [2] of the same article specilies the 
manner by which people may exercise their power, by stating that: "The Nation 
shall exercise its powers in the manner prescribed by the present Constitution." 
Accordingly there was no constitutional provision for referenda. 
2. A referendum should also be avoided due to 'poUtical inconvenience'. Specifically, 
a referendum could be interpreted as a test of the King's credibility, and this would 
not be desirable.^ ^^ ^ 
'Ubaidat explained to the researcher that "the Royal Commission reached a consensus 
not to submit the Charter for general referendum. The chairman of the Royal 
Commission was then entrusted by the members of the Commission to explain this 
matter to the King".^ '^*^ The King respected the Commission's views, and a National 
Congress was convened on June 9, 1991 under the auspices of King Hussein, to 
endorse the Charter. This consisted of 2,000 members, among whom were 
representatives from Jordan's various political, economic and social bodies, members of 
the elected municipal councils, tribal leaders, liberals, youth associations, and National 
Assembly members.^ ^^ ^ The King delivered a speech to the opening of the Jordanian 
National Congress to endorse the National Charter in which he reiterated that the 
process of democratisation should be completed. He stated: 
It was clear to us from the beginning that a real true democracy should 
meet all the following prerequisites: 
1. Separation between the executive, legislative, and judicial 
authorities. We have always been careful to maintain this 
separation, and we shall uphold it in accordance with the 
Constitution. Each one of these authorities must realise its 
limits and not trespass on the domain of another authority. 
2. Holding general parliamentary elections in accordance with 
the law. This is what we accomplished in November 1989, 
when the elections were held in an atmosphere of fairness, 
freedom, and honest competition. 
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^ The practice of national pohtics on the basis of pluralism in 
accordance with the principle of constructive dialogue 
which is the distinctive feature of democratic Ufe. Truth, in 
a democratic state, is not monopolised by an individual nor 
by a group. Truth, ultimately, is the product of a national 
dialogue leading to consensus.^ ^^ ^ 
The King stressed that the National Charter should be the guide for the future poUtical 
framework: "In order to allow for and protect political pluralism, and by extension, to 
protect democracy, it was necessary to lay down a National Charter which would be the 
national, conceptual and referential document for political action in J o r d a n " . I n a 
later speech, the King added: "Since the Constitution is the foundation of the state and 
the fence that safeguards it, so the National Charter is its conceptual reference in the 
process of nation building and the quest for progress". He made it quite clear that 
Jordan would, on the basis of the National Charter, be a multi-party democracy: 
The next natural step wiU be to complete the establishment of political 
pluraUsm, which will be done in two stages: 
1. To amend the law on the formation of the Political Parties in 
accordance with the rules of the Constitution, and under the 
guidance of the principle of the National Charter. 
2. To permit the formation of Political parties in accordance with 
the anticipated legislation on Political Parties.^ *^^  
The King, nonetheless, hoped to limit the number of existing political parties in the 
country, beheving that too many parties would delay the process of democratisation. 
He stated that: " I hope that our national political arena wiU not see a profusion of 
poUtical parties, because overcrowding impedes progress".^ '^^  
The National Charter thus laid down the regulations and defined the methods of 
national pubHc activity and represented a new base for relations between citizens and 
authority, and drew up new guidelines by which the democratic process would be 
carried out. 
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5.3. Political Parties Law. July, 1992 
On July 5, 1992, the Jordanian Chamber of Deputies passed a law legalising the 
existence of political parties in the Kingdom. The Political Parties Law [No. 32 for the 
year 1992] was enacted on August 31, 1992, by Royal Decree to replace the PoUtical 
Parties Law of 1955.^^°' The National Charter had paved the way for the new law 
through its emphasis on political pluralism and multi-party activity. 
The Jordanian Constitution of 1952 had conferred upon Jordanians the right to form 
political parties under certain conditions. These conditions stipulated that the objectives 
of political parties should be lawful, that they should adopt peaceful means and that 
their internal rules should not contradict the Jordanian Constitution (Article 16). The 
Political Parties Law of 1992 created the practical framework within which political 
parties could operate, laying down the requirements which needed to be satisfied for 
their registration. This law placed Jordan in a similar political and legal context to other 
multi-party democracies. The Political Parties Law consisted of twenty-eight 
a r t i c l e s . T h e most important articles are summarised in the points given below: [see 
Appendix 3] 
1. Each political party shall have at least fifty founding members 
and a five member leadership. 
2. Parties are expected to submit their objectives and platform in 
their application to the Ministry of the Interior for approval. 
3. Each party shall provide the authority with its financial 
resources, and its budget for each year must be submitted to the 
Ministry of the Interior. 
4. Parties are banned from being involved in the judiciary and 
educational institutions. 
5. Parties are banned from being active in the army, security 
forces, and Intelligence Service (mukhabarat). 
6. No party may form links with non-Jordanian or foreign groups, 
or receive financial aid from abroad. 
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For the purposes of the constitution, a poMtical party is a group of people who want to 
participate in political Ufe. They must do so only through ordinary legal processes with 
peaceful intent. Article [3] explains this as follows: 
A Party is every political organisation composed of Jordanians 
who, according to the Constitution and the provisions of the law, 
wish to participate in political life and wish to realise specific goals 
concerning political, economic and social matters by adopting 
legitimate and peaceful means to attain such principles. 
To guarantee this, the constitution demands not only that the founding members of a 
party should be free from criminal tendencies and military pressure, but that they 
express a commitment to the country with no membership of any other political party 
inside or outside the country. Article [5] states: 
The number of the founding members of any party shall not be less than 
fifty persons who meet the following conditions: 
A. To have completed 25 years of age. 
B. To have been a Jordanian for at least ten years. 
C. Not to have been finally convicted by a court of proper jurisdiction of 
a crime (except political crimes) unless he has been rehabilitated. 
D. To enjoy civil and legal competence. 
E. To reside in the Kingdom permanentiy. 
F. Not to claim the nationality of another country or foreign protection. 
G. Not to be a member of any other party, or any other non-Jordanian 
political partisan organisation.( For further information, see below) 
H. Not to be a member of the Jordanian Armed Forces, Security Forces 
or the Civil Defence. 
I . Not to be a judge. 
The procedure for establishing political parties involves an appUcation being submitted 
to the Minister of the Interior, signed by five of the founders. If the party establishment 
appHcation meets the conditions set out by the law, the Minister must armounce the 
estabhshment of the party within the specified time period of 60 days for all cases 
except those for which clarification is required. I f the Minister refrains from an 
announcement of the recognition of the party within this period, he must give a reason. 
Any one of the five signatories has the right to challenge the Minister's decision and to 
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bring the case before the Court of Justice. The ultimate decision as to the establishment 
of a party rests with the judiciary and not the legislature. As Article [11] states: 
A. Each of the founders has the right to challenge, before the Court of 
Justice the Minister's decision referred to in Article (10) Paragraph (B) 
of this Law within thirty days of the date of receipt of the decision. 
B. The Court shall issue its decision within sixty days of the date of 
registration of the contestation petition at the Court's Registry. 
C. I f the Court decides to revoke the Minister's decision, the Minister 
shall aimounce the establishment of the Party as of the date of the 
Court's decision, and the announcement shall be published in the 
Official Gazette. 
If, prior to the formal armouncement of the establishment of the party, the number of 
founders falls to less than 50, then the application is automatically nullified. Article [12] 
stipulates: 
If, for any reason whatsoever, the number of the founding members 
becomes less than fifty before the announcement of the 
establishment of the Party in accordance with the provisions of this 
Law, the establishment appUcation shall be considered as cancelled. 
Article [13] explains that no party can engage in any activities in the public domain until 
its establishment is formally ratified by the Minister or the Courts: "The Party may not 
announce itself or pursue its activities until the issuance of the Minister's order 
approving its establishment or the issuance of the Court's decision revoking the 
Minister's decision to reject the estabUshment". 
Political organisations are forbidden to use public buildings or charitable organisations 
for the purpose of spreading their party programme or gaining supporters. This is to 
ensure that no party can benefit unfairly through links with those holding political 
authority. Article [14] states this as follows, "The use of the premises, instrumentalities 
and assets of associations, charitable organisations and clubs for the benefit of any 
partisan organisation, shall be prohibited". 
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The law foresees the danger of manipulation of political purposes by financial 
interference from outside the country and from rich individuals. The law therefore, 
requires an open declaration of a party's investments and assets. Article [19] declares: 
A. (1) In its fmancial resources, the Party shall fully depend on Jordanian, 
local, known, declared and specified sources. 
(2) The Party may accept gifts and donations only from Jordanian 
citizens, provided that the amount given by any one person does 
not exceed five thousand Jordanian Dinars per year. 
(3) The Party may invest its assets and resources inside the Kingdom in 
the manner it sees fit, provided that such investments are declared 
and legitimate and that the objective therefore is not to achieve any 
personal gain or benefit to any of the members of the Party. 
B. The Party headquarters shall be exempted from all taxes and 
governmental duties imposed on immovable assets. 
C. For the purposes of applying the provisions of the Penalties Law, the 
Party's assets shall be considered public assets. The persons 
responsible for the Party's affairs and those working therein shall be 
considered, for the same purposes, public employees. Members of 
the leadership of the Party, shall be subject to the legal provisions 
governing illegal gain. 
The financial status and transactions of each party shall also be subject to the scrutiny of 
the Minister of the Interior. Article [20] states: 
The Party shall provide the Minister with a copy of its budget for 
each year during first quarter and a declaration of its financial 
means and sources and fmancial position. The Minister or 
whomever he authorised has the right to examine the Party's 
accounts and to audit its financial records. 
Each party must clearly state its commitment to the most basic principles of democracy 
including respect for the law and the constitution, behef in the principle of multi-party 
democracy, and the renunciation of all forms of manipulation of institutions in the 
public domain which would interfere with the neutrality of those institutions. Article 
[21] states: 
The Party shall be committed to the following principles and rules in 
pursuing its affairs and shall set out clearly in its Memorandum of 
Association: 
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A. Adherence to the provisions of the Constitution and respect for 
the supremacy of the Law. 
B. Adherence to the principle of poUtical pluralism in thought, 
opinion and organisation. 
C. Adherence to preservation of the independence and security of 
the Homeland, protection of national unity, renunciation of aU 
forms of violence and non-discrimination among citizens. 
D. Adherence to the achievement of equal opportunities for all 
citizens to assume responsibiUty and participation tUerein. 
E. Adherence to avoiding any organisational or financial [sic] with 
any non-Jordanian body, as weU as directing partisan activity 
upon the orders or directives of any foreign country or body. 
F. Abstention from partisan organisation and advocacy among the 
ranks of the Armed Forces, Security InstrumentaUties and Civil 
Defence and the Judiciary, or from establishing military or para-
military organisations of any form whatsoever. 
G. Avoiding the utilisation of the state's institutions, pubUc 
organisations and aU educational institutions for partisan 
organisation, and striving to preserve the neutraUty of these 
institutions towards everyone in performing their duties. 
This law also provides for penalties to be exacted in the case of those individuals who, 
on their own behalf or on behalf of their party, break the law by accepting funds from 
an external source, by participating in non-Ucensed parties, or by forming a nuUtary 
organisation. Article [24] states: 
A. Any one wUo receives, on beUaU of the Party, any money from 
any non-Jordanian source shaU be punished by imprisormient for 
a period not exceeding two years, or a fine not exceeding two 
thousand dinars, or with both penalties. Such money shaU be 
confiscated and added to the account of the Treasury. 
B. Any one who participates in a non-Ucensed Party, or one that 
does not declare itself in accordance with the provisions of this 
law, shall be punished by imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding six months, or with a fine not exceeding five hundred 
dinars, or with both penalties. 
C. Any one who forms a mUitary or para-miUtary organisation shaU 
be punished pursuant to the provisions of the Penalties Law. 
D. Any one who commits a violation of the provisions of this Law, 
for which no specified penalty has been stipulated therein shaU 
be punished by imprisonment for a period not exceeding three 
months, or a fine not exceeding two hundred dinars. The two 
penalties shaU be combined in case of repetition." 
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Although there are some elements (e.g. the banning of fmance coming from external 
sources) which make this law different from political party laws in western democratic 
countries, this position can be justified due to the lack of experience with multi-party 
democracy. 
5.3.1 The Parliamentary Debate over the Political Parties Law 
On July 5, 1992, the PoHtical Parties Law was approved by the Chamber of Deputies, 
by 43 of the 52 deputies present for the vote. The rest of Parliament's 80 members 
were either on vacation or absent from the house. The process leading up to the law's 
approval had been difficult due to the differences of political ideologies in the Chamber 
of Deputies and because of the nature of the political interests involved. 
The most crucial issue in the parliamentary debate was over clause [G] of Article [5], 
which proposed banning members of Jordanian parties from belonging to non-Jordanian 
organisations.^ ^^^ This clause was strongly opposed by many deputies who belonged to 
pan-Arab organisations, including the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party and the Communist 
P a r t y . I t implied, moreover, the disengagement of Jordanian parties from their 
Palestinian links and a f f i l i a t ions .Many Palestinian residents in Jordan are members 
of Palestinian organisations with branches in Jordan, including the Palestinian Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine [PFLP] and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine [DFLP], the Popular Union Party, the Democratic People Party, and the 
Jordanian Democratic Party.^ ^^ ^ The clause was eventually amended by the Chamber of 
Deputies to: "Not be a member of any other political party or non-Jordanian 
organisation".^ ^^^ 
As well as the conflicts within the Chamber of Deputies, the Political Parties Law was 
subject to a series of disputes between the majority of deputies in the lower house and 
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the majority of senators in the upper house. The Senate, whose members are appointed 
by the King, insisted on introducing some additional clauses into the law.^"^ According 
to the Jordanian Constitution, if one of the two Houses rejects a draft law or a bill and 
the other accepts it, both Houses must hold a joint meeting to discuss the matter, and 
the draft law must then be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the members of both 
Houses present. [Article 92] 
The first dispute between the two houses occurred over Clause [G] of Article [5] which 
the Senate wished to read "Not to be a member of any other poUtical party or 
organisation". The compromise reached was "Not to be a member in any other party or 
any other non-Jordanian poUtical partisan organisation". 
A further dispute occurred between the two Houses over Article [18] which sought to 
aUow the inspection of party offices by the central authorities and the punishment of 
violators of the regulations. A compromise solution was reached aUowing inspection 
on the direct orders of the prosecutor general and in his presence, along with a party 
representative.^ ^^^ 
Further problems arose over the introduction of clause [G] to Article [21] banning 
government employees in educational institutions from involvement in poUtical 
activities.^ '^^  The amended biU was referred back by the Senate to the Chamber of 
Deputies, but was rejected.^ '**'^  The law was finaUy passed with a minor amendment 
banning school teachers from involvement in poUtical activity inside schools and 
universities.^ ''^ ^ 
A difference of opinion also emerged over Article [24] which stipulated that any one 
who may receive, on behaU of the party, any money from non-Jordanian sources shaU 
be punished by imprisormient for a period not exceeding five years. The dispute centred 
around the time period of punishment. The Chamber of Deputies attempted to amend it 
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from five years to two years, whilst the Senate proposed to make the punishment 
according to the provisions of the Punishment Law No. 15, 1991. Agreement was 
finally reached on a time Umit of two years.^ '*^ ^ 
To avoid conflict between the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, a reconciliation 
meeting was held on August 20, 1992 between the various parliamentary blocs and the 
Senate to settle the problem by consensus. Among the parliamentary blocs were the 
Islamic movement, the independent Islamic movement, the national Constitutional bloc, 
the Democratic Coahtion; also present were members of the Legal Committee of the 
Senate.^ '*^ ^ Finally, the law was endorsed by a joint meeting of both Houses on August 
21. It was then endorsed by Crown Prince Hassan on August 31, who was acting as 
Regent during King Hussein's absence in the USA.^ **^  Not only did the law increase 
political liberty for Jordanian citizens, but the process of its passage showed the 
increasing centrality of democratic debate within Jordan politics. 
5.4. Press and Publication Law. September. 1993 
The new Press and Publication Law was passed by the Jordanian Chamber of Deputies 
in September 1993. This law replaced the Press and Publication Law No.[33] of 1973, 
and created a more Hberal legal framework for the press. The law may be considered as 
another step along the path of political hberaHsation. It should be stressed that freedom 
of opinion and expression had been guaranteed to Jordanian citizens ever since the 
acceptance of the Jordanian Constitution of 1952. Article [15-1] of the Constitution 
declared "The state shall guarantee freedom of opinion. Every Jordanian shall be free 
to express his opinion by speech, in writing, or by means of photographic representation 
and other forms of expression, provided that such does not violate the law". However, 
over the years, this freedom was not respected in practice, mainly because the country 
was under martial law for most of the period which followed. The Press and 
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PubUcation Law constituted an instrument making the freedom of opinion and 
expression operational in practice, as weU as in theory. 
Due to the significance of the UberaUsation of the press in Jordan's democratisation 
process, it is important to examine the content of the new law. The Press and 
PubUcation Law No. 1 of 1993 contains fifty-four articles deaUng with the issues of 
press and pubUcation.^ ''^ ^ [see Appendix 4] The main articles of the law cover the 
framework within which the press and other media can freely operate. Article [4] states 
this as foUows: 
The press shaU be free to exercise its function of providing news, 
information and commentary and shaU contribute to the 
dissemination of thought, culture and sciences within the limits of 
the Law and in the framework of safeguarding pubUc freedoms, 
rights and obUgations and respecting the freedom and sanctity of 
the private lives of others. 
The law mentions that the freedom of journalism includes the citizens' right to free 
thought, expression of views and the right to secure news, and that aU news agencies 
have the right to keep theU sources secret. Article [5] details the freedom of press as 
including the foUowing: 
A Informing citizens of events, thoughts, trends, and 
information in the fields that concern the community at the 
local, Arab, Islamic and international levels. 
B. Making room for citizens to express their opinions. 
C. The right of access to information, news and statistics 
from various sources that are of interest to the citizens and of 
analysing, deliberating, disseminating and commenting 
thereon within the limits of the Law. 
D. The right of the Press Publication, News Agencies, Editors 
and JournaUsts to keep the sources of information and news 
they gather secret, unless the Court decides otherwise when 
hearing cruninal cases involving the security of the state, 
prevention of crime or reaUzation of justice.[sic] 
E. The right of citizens, poUtical parties, cultural and social 
organisations and associations to own and pubUsh press 
publications in accordance with the provisions of this Law. 
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The law also states that all poUtical parties and individuals have the right to possess and 
publish newspapers. Article [6] states: "Any person, including poUtical parties, shall 
have the right to own and publish press pubUcations in accordance with the provisions 
of this Law". 
Although previous articles granted freedom of the press, Article [9] set constraints on 
this by determining that journalists and each person working in journalism should abide 
absolutely by the profession and its moraUties. Article [9] of this law describes these 
moralities as follows: 
A. Respecting the right and constitutional freedoms of 
individuals and not infringing upon the sanctity of their 
private lives. 
B. Presenting journalistic material in an objective, 
integrated and balanced way. 
C. Adhering to accuracy, honesty and impartiality in commenting 
on the news and events. 
D. Refraining from publishing anythmg that would sanction 
violence, fanaticism and hatred or call to racialism and 
sectarianism. 
E. Refraining from the utiUzation of journalistic materials to 
promote a commercial product or lessen its value. 
A further restriction was emphasised with the baiming of journalists from working for a 
foreign authority, which might otherwise aUow them to pass on or receive anti-
governmental information. The only legal form of relationship is based on the 
correspondence system for foreign media. Article [12] states, "Journalists and other 
workers in the press shall be prohibited from establishing any working relationship with 
any foreign Ordinance of Correspondents of Foreign Media issued in accordance with 
the provisions of this Law". 
Furthermore, the law restricted the publishing of certain types of material which could 
harm the country's stabiUty and lessen respect for the Jordanian state among other Arab 
and international countries or friends. Article [40] provides a Ust of materials on which 
restrictions were placed: 
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A. Publications shaU be prohibited from pubUshing the foUowmg: 
1. News which offend the Kmg or the Royal Family. 
2. Any information about the number, weapons, equipment, 
deployment or movement of the Jordanian armed forces, unless 
such pubUcation is sanctioned by a responsible authority of the 
Jordanian armed forces, or any news item, drawing or comment 
which offends the armed forces or the security organs. 
3. Articles or materials which contain contempt to any reUgion or 
sect whose freedom is guaranteed by the Constitution. 
4. Articles which damage national unity, instigate the commitment 
of crimes, or encourage rancor, or foment hatred, discord and 
disharmony among members of the society. 
5. Minutes of closed sessions of parUament. 
6. Articles or news which are intended to shake confidence in the 
national currency. 
7. Articles or information which contain a personal insult to the 
Heads of State of Arab, Islamic or friendly countries, or the 
chiefs and members of diplomatic missions accredited in the 
kingdom. 
8. Articles or information which may offend the dignity or 
personal freedoms of individuals or damage their reputation. 
9. News, reports, dispatches, articles and drawings which are 
contrary to public morals and ethics. 
10. Advertisements promoting medicines and medical products, 
unless such pubUcation is approved in advance by the Ministry 
of Health. 
B. Entry of pubUcations from abroad shaU be banned if such 
pubUcations contain material prohibited by virtue of the 
provisions of this Law. 
5.4.1 The Parliamentary Debate over the Press and Publication Law 
The most heated debate during the discussion was over the article of the law which 
bans the pubUcation of news on particular subjects. This article was passed by the 
Chamber of Deputies despite the legal committee of the Chamber recommending that it 
should not be passed. The legal committee argued that the article would be an obstacle 
to press freedom and would moreover cause confusion as the punishment law already 
covered some of the same concerns. • The legal committee's recommendation was 
foUowed by a parUamentary debate over the article. Members of the MusUm 
Brotherhood and leftist deputies supported the legal committee recommendation not to 
pass this article, unless it was amended to give greater freedom. However, the 
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conservative and traditionalist deputies supporting this article argued that the media 
should accept its responsibiUty to support national stability. The article was fmaUy 
passed by 37-29 votes.^ ^^ ^ 
Conclusion 
The series of poUtical reforms carried through foUowing the general parUamentary 
elections of November 1989, clearly transformed the parameters of the poUtical system. 
The aboUtion of martial law and the anti-Communist law were very important in paving 
the way for the democratic transition. The endorsement of the National Charter in 
1991, which has been described as complementary to the 1952 Constitution, drew the 
guidelines for the democratic process. The Charter laid the basis for the passage of the 
PoUtical Party Law adopted in 1992, which in turn paved the way for the resumption of 
legal multi-party poUtical activity. The promulgation of the Press and PubUcation Law 
of 1993 was another step in enhancing the democratic movement in the country, 
limiting the government's power to put pressure on the press (the government could 
not, for example, close down any newspaper without the approval of the courts). 
OveraU, the poUtical reforms in Jordan during this period played a significant role in 
changing the national political ethos. 
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Chapter Six 
The Operation of the Parliamentary Democratic System: 
The Function of the Legislature in Relation to the Executive Authority. 
1989-1993 
Introduction 
Although the Chamber of Deputies has the power to have the cabinet resign, holds 
votes of confidence in individual ministers, enacts legislation, passes the budget law and 
so on, the King still maintains various rights such as the power to appoint and dismiss 
the Prime Minister and his cabinet. Between November 1989 and November 1993, the 
Jordanian parhament was characterised by gradual democratic transformation. The 
fimctioning of parliament was transformed from being a rubber stamp during the 
previous period into a more active observer of the executive authorities. The 
relationship between the legislative and executive authorities was re-shaped within a 
framework of constructive dialogue. Parliament had an active, constructive role in 
legislation, which established the concept of public participation in the decision-making 
processes of the country. During this period there were three governments, those of 
Mudar Badran, Tahir al-Masri and Sharif Zaid Bin Shakir. 
6.1. Mudar Badran's Goyernment: December 4.1989-June 19.1991 
The first step in the King's answer to the demands for political HberaUsation in the 
Kingdom was the appointment of a new cabinet. On December 4, 1989, Mudar 
Badran, a conservative who had been prime minister twice previously, firstly from mid-
1976 to late 1979 and then from late 1980 to early 1984, was appointed prime 
minister.^'' Despite Badran's political background, this move was widely seen as one 
which would enable the process of political liberalisation to move forward. 
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The King's letter of appointment to Mr Badran was concerned with the promotion of 
democracy and emphasised popular participation in the parliamentary supervision of the 
government, and close co-operation between the two authorities within a framework of 
constructive dialogue and a feeling of national responsibility. The latter stated: 
"Democracy is a way of life and not solely confined to government. I therefore 
emphasise the importance of establishing and spreading democracy". The King 
requested the government to pay special attention to public liberty, but also emphasised 
the need for public order: 
Democracy also means freedom and responsibility within the 
framework of the law. Special attention should be paid to the 
question of public liberty, which is the essence of human rights. By 
the same token, as much attention and protection should be paid to 
public order. Harmony and equilibrium between public liberty and 
public order constitute an important pillar for our national security 
and a protective shield for democracy.'^ ^ 
6.1.1 Composition of the Mudar Badran Cabinet 
Previously, the appointment of a new prime minister by the King had been followed by 
the almost immediate formation of a new cabinet. This, however, was not the case 
now, as the cabinet now needed to obtain support from at least 51% (40+1) of the 
members of the Chamber of Deputies. In order to achieve the required parliamentary 
support, Badran had to appoint a number of deputies to guarantee the vote of 
confidence. Thus, he spent two days in intensive negotiations, particularly in parliament 
with the Muslim Brotherhood, the largest bloc in parliament, on the composition of the 
cabinet. These negotiations were broken off when the latter demanded that they run a 
number of ministries including those of Education, Information, Social Affairs and 
Islamic Affairs. Badran rejected these demands and as a result the Muslim Brotherhood 
did not participate in the government. Badran then persuaded three independent 
political Islamic figures in parliament, Abd al-Baqi Jammu, Ah al-Faqir and Yusif 
Mbaidin, to join the cabinet.^ ^^  The appointment of these independent Islamic deputies 
214 
caused acute embarrassment to the Muslim Brotherhood. Badran also managed to split 
the Democratic Assembly bloc. Despite the fact that the Democratic Assembly bloc 
had stated that its members would not join Badran's government, two of its number, 
Ibrahim al-Ghababshah and Abd al-Karim al-Dughmi, were appointed as ministers. 
Badran's cabinet was composed of 24 ministers, fourteen of whom were unelected, 
being either ex-ministers or having had a career in the civil service. Ten ministers were 
drawn from the Chamber of Deputies. Most of the latter were neither well known nor 
experienced administrators. Badran favoured continuity in terms of choosing his senior 
ministers. He retained SaUm Masa'adah and Marwan al-Qasim as Minister of the 
Interior and Foreign Minister respectively. They also served as his deputy premiers. 
6.1.2 Programme of Mudar Badran's Goyernment 
Under the Constitution, the prime minister must seek a vote of confidence from the 
Chamber of Deputies on the proposed government programme. The debate prior to the 
vote of confidence can produce some change in the government programme. Mudar 
Badran's programme announced his goverimient intention to reform the tripartite 
relationship between government, parliament, and Jordanian citizens. He stated that his 
government viewed: "the principle of consultation and democracy as the best formula to 
demonstrate freedom, human dignity, and equality". Freedom and authority, however, 
were not seen as contradictory. Indeed, Badran confirmed that there could be "no 
freedom without order".'''^  The ministerial statement which Mudar Badran's 
government presented to the Chamber of Deputies on December 19, emphasised the 
concept and meaning of democracy and paid special attention to public liberty through 
government decisions and policies. This was stated as follows: 
A. The government's political desire is to abolish martial law and 
liquidate its effects by: 
1. Returning confiscated passports. 
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2. Guaranteeing the freedom of work, travel and movement for all 
citizens. 
3. Releasing political prisoners (detainees). 
4. Reinstating the elected administrative boards of the three 
Jordanian newspapers (i.e. al-Sha'ab, al-Dustur, .al-Ra'i). 
5. Abolishing the decision which had dissolved the Jordanian 
Writers Association of 1987. 
B. The government desires the suspension of martial law, excluding 
cases presentiy under investigation in the courts. 
C. The government promises to abide by the provisions of the 
constitution literally and materially. 
D. The government emphasises that constitutional promotion is 
embodied in the maturity of public opinion and in the extent to 
which each citizen is committed to defending human rights in 
both knowledge and practice; his/her keenness in protecting 
national security; and respecting others' views in a climate of 
forgiveness and freedom. Constitutional promotion is also 
embodied in the citizens' resistance to corruption and rejection of 
any violation of other citizens' liberties, as well as each citizens' 
right to express him or herself through thought, speech or action. 
E. The government emphasises that the Shura "consultation" 
combined with the operation of democracy constitute the 
predominant features of the cultural (civilisational) experience 
which is based upon public liberty and human dignity. 
F. The government emphasises that freedom and authority are not 
contradictory but complementary. Thus, the government can 
allow public liberties such as equality before the law and 
judiciary, occupancy of public posts, equal opportunities, the 
right of the citizen in embracing a belief and their right to 
security, education, work, housing, and movement. Included in 
the citizens' rights is also that of being free to form associations 
and organisations, to have freedom of expression via the media, 
and not to suffer oppression for one's views or philosophical 
affiliations. 
G. The government emphasises that it will formulate a National 
Charter emanating from the provisions of the constitution and 
the constant principles upon which the Kingdom is based. The 
rules of the National Charter will be aimed principally at 
consolidating the basic local and national conceptions which 
guide the country's policies, and upon which the political 
organisations could co-operate with the legislative authority. 
In order to win the vote of confidence, the govenmient both made some immediate 
reforms and promised to initiate a range of political reforms reflecting the political 
mood of the country. Badran's government began procedures towards poMtical 
hberaUsation by gradually suspending the rule of martial law until such time as it could 
216 
be revoked altogether. He ended the restrictions on travel imposed in the past by the 
authorities as a penalty for undesirable political activity, which had included the practice 
of seizing passports. Some 8,700 people were believed to have been affected by the 
withdrawal of passports prior to this.*^ ^^  
Prior to the vote of confidence, the government withdrew a number of regulations 
against the press on December 24, 1989. Journalists banned from writing, including 
one of the new deputies, Fakhri Qawar, now had the proscription Mfted. The boards of 
directors of the three Arabic daily newspapers which had been replaced in August 1988 
by government appointees, were permitted to return to their journals; two of the three 
editors-in-chief also returned to resume day-to-day control.'^' 
6.1.2.1 Vote of Confidence in the Cabinet Programme 
It is important to stress that Badran's government faced many difficulties on the way to 
achieving the vote of confidence from parliament, which meant that he was often forced 
to compromise his agenda. There was considerable negotiation before the government 
programme was finally approved by parliament. In response to the ministerial statement 
of Badran's government, aU the parliamentary blocs demanded that the goveriraient 
complete the democratic process in the country as a condition for the vote of 
confidence. Most blocs concentrated on the importance of abolishing martial law, 
reinstating employees in university and government institutions who had previously 
been dismissed for security reasons, and preventing the security services from 
intervening in civil service appointments. The largest number of demands that the 
government had to deal with as a condition for the vote of confidence were those of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood's conditions for the vote of confidence 
included the 14 points which foUow: 
1. The application of Islamic laws in education, social affairs and 
the economy. 
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2. The reinstatement of those dismissed from their university and 
government posts for security reasons. 
3. Limitation of the influence of the Intelligence Service in the 
hiring and firing of citizens to goverrmient and university posts 
and curbing its interference in promotions in education (through 
scholarships), the granting of govenmient permissions or 
allowing charitable organisations. 
4. The lifting of martial law within six months. 
5. Continued support of the intifada. 
6. Support of all liberation movements against 'imperialism' 
especially the one in Afghanistan. 
7. Application of laws that would curb corruption. 
8. A demand that all Jordanian public and private holdings 
outside the country be returned to Jordan. 
9. Encouraged stringency in government spending. 
10. Abolishment of interests given on small loans in the 
agricultural sector and housing loans. 
11. Permit for teachers to create union which would protect their 
rights. 
12. Establishment of an Islamic law faculty at Yarmouk University. 
13. A ban on production and sale of alcohol by Muslims and that 
alcohol consumption be forbidden in government departments 
and on the national airliner-royal Jordanian. 
14. The establishment of a national Islamic university.^' 
Badran considered these demands as the basis for negotiation and therefore attempted 
to meet the conditions in part in an attempt to buUd support in the forthcoming vote of 
confidence. 
Badran did not escape criticism during the confidence debate. Deputies representing 
the Islamists, Leftists, and leading members of the previous government attacked him 
over the corruption and mismanagement which had occurred during his previous 
government. For example, Dhuqan al-Hindawi, a leading member of the Constitutional 
Bloc, accused Badran of incurring heavy foreign debt during his previous premiership at 
the end of 1988. Other deputies contended that mismanagement and corruption 
actually started during his last premiership.^"^ 
Shocked by such criticism, Mr Badran fought back at the end of the debate on the 
government programme and emotionally defended himself against the severe 
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accusations made by a numbers of deputies: "If it were left to me, by God, I would have 
left this place immediately but I have listened to accusation after accusation against me 
personally. Why? only to make this experience succeed" .He promised further 
political concessions designed to secure parliamentary approval. First, and perhaps his 
most popular concession, was his promise that martial law would be lifted in four to six 
months. Second, he committed himself to amending or revoking a number of laws, 
including the 1935 Defence Law, the 1953 anti-Communist law, the law banning 
political parties and the 1986 Electoral Law. Third, he mentioned a series of changes 
reducing the power of the domestic security forces. Fourth, he promised that the 
inteUigence service would no longer have a say in such matters as appointments in the 
state sector and the award of scholarships. Fifth, the university lecturers who had been 
dismissed from posts on security grounds would be reinstated. Sixth, he promised to 
go further in eradicating corruption. Seventh, he stipulated that a statement of total 
personal assets would be compulsory for all those holding high administrative or 
political office. Eighth, he promised that those who were proved to have accepted 
bribes, or who had exploited their posts or abused them, would be tried and that 
parHamentary immunity would be lifted from any deputy found to have been involved in 
corruption. 
Major reforms were put in the government programme as a result of the parliamentary 
debate. The wide range of reforms promised by Badran eventually persuaded most 
representatives in the National Assembly to give his progranmie their support. After 
three days of debate, on January 3, 1990, the government eventually received 
parliamentary approval. He won by 65 votes to 9, with six abstentions. His supporters 
included the Muslim Brotherhood bloc which backed him after he agreed to incorporate 
their demands gradually. Most of the 15 deputies who did not vote for the government 
were leftists.* '^'* 
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6.1.4. Cabinet Reshuffling 
During Mudar Badran's government the cabinet was reshuffled twice. The first change 
in the cabinet was conducted in mid-June 1990. Awni al-Masri, the minister holding the 
planning portfolio, asked the prime minister to accept his resignation in order to 
concentrate on running his own business, and was replaced by Dr KhaUd Amin 
Abdullah. A second addition to the cabinet was Hakmat al-Sakit, who became Minister 
of State for the Prime Minister's Affairs, a position which had not been filled the 
previous December. NabU Abu al-Huda and Ibrahim Ayyub exchanged positions, to 
become Minister of Transport and Communication, and Supply Minister respectively.*'^ ^ 
At the end of June, the National Bloc issued a statement criticising the government's 
achievements and calling for the formation of a national unity government with the 
participation of aU political trends in parliament.*'^ ' 
As a result of the Gulf crisis, a second comprehensive cabinet reshuffle was completed 
on January 1, 1991. Mudar Badran wanted to change the balance in order to improve 
the working relationship between the government and parliament, thus he dismissed the 
nationalists and independents from the cabinet and granted the MusUm Brotherhood 
five ministerial portfolios including the ministries of education and social development 
which the Islamists had previously sought. The Muslim Brotherhood were also granted 
the ministries of Islamic affairs. Justice, and Health. Two independent Islamists won the 
ministries of transport and communication, and agriculture.*'^' The participation of the 
Islamists in the government was considered necessary as large popular demonstrations 
against western intervention in the Gulf occurred throughout Jordan. This move 
reinforced the impression that the Islamists had become a strategic ally of the King, in 
linking the regime and the people. 
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6.1.5. IVIajor Legislation Initiated 
Legislation inevitably constitutes an important field of interaction between the executive 
and legislative authorities. According to Article [91] of the Jordanian Constitution, the 
cabinet should present all draft laws to the Chamber of Deputies whose representatives 
are authorised to accept, modify, or reject them. No law may be enacted or issued 
unless it has been endorsed by the two houses and ratified by the King. Moreover, the 
initiation of laws is not restricted to the executive alone: according to Article [95], any 
group of ten or more deputies and senators has the right to propose laws. Such 
proposals should be presented to the legal committee in the house for its opinion. If the 
House accepts the proposal, it is then referred to the cabinet to be formulated as a draft 
law and presented to the Chamber of Deputies for debate and endorsement. 
During the first year ordinary and extraordinary sessions of the eleventh parliament 
(November 27, 1989 to March 20, 1990), the government of Mudar Badran submitted 
to the National Assembly 26 laws and draft laws (some having been requested by 
individuals deputies) which were then endorsed by parliament, the most important of 
which was the 1990 budget law. 
During the second year ordinary and extraordinary sessions (November 17, 1990 to 
March 16, 1991), the government submitted 97 laws and draft laws to the Chamber of 
Deputies. By the end of the second session, 41 laws had been endorsed by the Chamber 
of Deputies in 33 parliamentary meetings.^ '^ ^ The passage of these laws represented the 
successful achievement of most of the government's objectives. The most important 
laws and draft laws endorsed by the Chamber of Deputies are covered below, with the 
exception of the 1990 and 1991 budget laws which are discussed in section 1.7 and 1.8 
respectively. 
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1. The Illegal Earnings Law (1990) 
This was initiated at the request of individual members of the Chamber of Deputies. 
According to this law, all members of the government in high positions had to submit a 
statement of their financial position (covering also that of their spouses and dependent 
children). Those whose fmancial position had to be revealed were not only the Prime 
Minister and ministers, the speaker of the National Assembly, and Deputies, but also 
directors of official public institutions, government high officials, the Municipality 
Governor of Amman, leaders of Professional Associations, Trade Union Chairmen, and 
aU company directors of those companies in which the government holds more than a 
40% share. 
2. Economic Crimes Law (1990) 
The economic Crimes Law, which could be applied retrospectively, was initiated at the 
request of individual members of the Chamber of Deputies. It reinforced the process of 
questioning and interrogating those accused of matters related to abusing the state's 
fmancial status, misuse of official positions, and further crimes such as bribery, 
misappropriation and misuse of authority. 
3. The Authors' Rights Law (1990) 
This law was issued to protect authors' rights to publish and to grant copyright so that 
nobody could have access to their publications without their consent.^ '^ ^ 
In addition to these important laws, for the first time in the parliamentary life of Jordan, 
an investigation committee was set up in mid-July 1990 to look into cases of fmancial 
and administrative corruption in government. A three-member investigation committee 
was formed to examine cases of reported corruption.^ *^^ ^ A failure to investigate 
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corruption would have led to popular disillusionment with the newly liberalised poUtical 
process. However, addressing the issue of corruption was problematic both because of 
the suspected extent of the practice in the past, and the seniority of those involved. Of 
the cases completed in this period, the most important were as follows: the secret sale 
of one third of Jordan's gold reserves in the autumn of 1988; the circumstances 
surrounding the importation of wheat, barley and animal feed; a range of construction 
contracts including the Abu Nusseir Housing project, the Jafr-Azraq road scheme, the 
Jubeiheh amusement park and the Swaqa prison.*^'' 
6.1.6. Interpellations and Questions 
Interpellations submitted in writing to the cabinet or to individual ministers requiring an 
official response, have a long tradition in parliamentary history, ensuring the 
responsibility of the government and individual ministers to parliament. Through 
interpellations as well as spoken questions, the executive can be controlled, whether by 
MPs criticising the government or by pointing out violations of the law and 
contravention of regulations. Interpellations and questions give parliament the 
opportunity to acquire necessary information concerning government policy and the 
activity of its central administration. 
The right of interpellation and questioning in the Jordanian parliament is the right of any 
individual representative. According to Article [96] of the Jordanian Constitution, any 
representative or senator has the right to address interpellations or questions to 
ministers on any public matter. During the Mudar Badran government, parliamentary 
representatives presented five interpellations and 150 questions. The most frequent 
themes in the questions were government policy towards the state debt; military service; 
the government's commitment to ending martial law; road construction; foreign affairs 
and employment. Of the five interpellations presented to the government, deputy 
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Ahmad al-Abbadi submitted the first four and Atif al-Batush the last. The interpellations 
were as follows: 
• Interpellation No. (1) was submitted on November 20, 1990, concerned the absence 
of diplomatic activity by the Minister of Foreign Affairs during the Gulf Crisis. The 
minister gave his response on the same day. 
• Interpellation No (2) was submitted to the information minister on November 20, 
1990. He was asked to reveal the ministry's programme and to reconsider the 
information ministry's role. He gave a response on the same day. 
• Interpellation No. (3), concerning the distribution of Incentive Awards to 
government employees, was submitted to the cabinet on December 1st 1990. The 
cabinet promised to review the case. 
• Interpellation No. (4) submitted to the cabinet on December 12, 1990 concerned the 
Awards of Merit to government employees. This was also promised to be reviewed 
by the cabinet. 
• Interpellation No. (5) was submitted on February 16, 1990 to the government and 
concerned corruption in the Labour of Land Transportation Union. There were no 
accounts of expenditure. The Transportation ministry promised to investigate the 
situation.*^^^ 
In theory, interpellations are an effective method of instigating political action. 
However, as Abdullah al-Nsur pointed out to the researcher, "the purpose of the 
interpellations submitted by representatives to the government was to bring about a 
poMtical storm inside the govemment".^ ^ '^ Interpellations principally serve to restrict 
unilateral actions by ministers and to make them accountable to parliament. Although 
participation in interpellations was in general unsuccessful, questions were a sign of 
strength for the democratic process simply because they allowed actions of the 
government to be questioned. 
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6.1.7. The Budget of 1990 
The budget law constitutes the most important opportunity for MPs to look at the 
country's finances in the public services. The parliamentary approval of the annual 
budget law is normally the most important act of legislation in any year. The budget is 
regarded as a leading indicator of economic and social development. The budget 
debate serves as a good opportunity for the evaluation of overall pohcy and for judging 
the activities of both the government and of individual portfolios. The approval of the 
budget law is regarded as a vote of confidence. 
It should be noted that the 1990 Jordanian budget law was adopted at a time when 
Jordan faced a great economic challenge. This had followed the economic crisis at the 
end of 1988, which led to the Jordanian government being bound for the next five years 
to the readjustment programme implemented by the IMF in April 1989. The 
programme laid down a prescription for the reduction of the budget deficit. 
The procedure for putting the proposed budget for the year 1990 into effect was 
interrupted by the convening of the newly-elected parliament and the need for the new 
government to obtain a vote of confidence under the terms of the provisions of the 
constitution. Whereas budgets had in the past simply been endorsed by the 
govermnent, the Constitutional system required that the budget be presented to the 
National Assembly. The Prime Minister sought to avoid complications in this matter by 
retaining Basil Jardanah as finance minister. The budget was duly submitted to the 
National Assembly for debate on January 6, 1990.* '^'' Before the budget debate in 
parliament, the house's finance committee took evidence from and carried out 
consultations with the country's leading economists as well as from government 
officials over a period of three weeks. As a result, the house's finance committee 
recommended that Jordan's semi-autonomous institutions such as the national carrier, 
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Royal Jordanian, the Jordan Investment Corporation and the Social Security 
Corporation should be included in the state budget and presented to the National 
Assembly for debate.*^ ^^  After 38 hours of parliamentary debate, the budget law was 
passed by 52 votes to 16, with the support of all but one Muslim Brotherhood MP, and 
with only the radical and leftist members of the Democratic Assembly bloc and a 
handful of others voting against it.^ ^^^ 
The state budget law was passed with only slight changes and so gave endorsement to 
the IMF readjustment programme. King Hussein had warned that any rejection of, or 
radical amendment to, the state budget law could cause a constitutional problem, and 
stated that Jordan had to meet its international obUgations. The main amendment by 
parhament to the budget was a reduction in the level of government expenditure by 
JD11.869mn to JDl,093.9nm, leaving an expected budget deficit of JD187.2mn. This 
included a reduced allocation for the Ministry of Information and cuts in government 
aid to the Jordan Cement Company by JD6mn.^ ^ '^ 
The parliamentary budget debate was characterised by deputies' demands to increase 
public sector services, raise the salary of civil servants and cancel interest on farmers' 
loans. In addition, deputies raised their own constituencies' concerns. For example, 
Jamal Haddad, a deputy from Ajloun district, demanded the following: 
1. The establishment of an agriculture coUege in Ajloun District. 
2. The building of a general hospital. 
3. The upgrading of Ajloun District to a Govemorate.^ ^^^ 
6.1.8. The Budget of 1991 
The 1991 state budget law was the first comprehensive official document which 
followed the economic difficulties experienced by the country as a result of the Gulf 
Crisis. The nature of the 1991 budget law highlighted the profound changes with which 
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the Jordanian economy had to cope. For the first time, Jordan could not hope to 
receive any Arab aid, although it could possibly compensate for this loss by attracting 
sufficient aid from the EC, individual EC member states and Japan. 
The state budget law was presented by the government to the Speaker of the Chamber 
of Deputies on December 2, 1990, who then gave it to the Finance Committee of the 
Chamber for consideration.*^ '^ After a review by the house's finance committee, the 
main changes recommended were a reduction in the level of expenditure from JD 
l,119.21mn to JDl,109.21mn and to reduce the budget deficit estimated at 
JD216.71mn, to JD206.71mn.*^°' 
Following the Finance Committee's review, the budget was re-submitted to the 
Chamber of Deputies members for debate. Deputies representing different poUtical 
trends were critical of various aspects of the budget. Some members, especially those 
belonging to the leftist Democratic Assembly bloc, took issue with the whole thrust of 
the budget. Bassam Haddadin, a member of this bloc, criticised the budget as having 
followed World Bank policy in prescribing reduced spending and increased revenue. 
He opposed the budget, and requested that the government form a joint committee of 
members from the Chamber of Deputies and the Ministry of Finance to draw a new 
budget law, giving the following reasons: 
1. The budget was a continuation of previous budgets. 
2. The budget was dependent on increasing import and tax revenues. 
3. The budget was dependent on national and international borrowing. 
4. The budget did not take into consideration the effects of the 
returnees as a result of the Gulf Crisis. 
5. The budget did not address the problem of rising unemployment.*^" 
Much criticism also came from the Muslim Brotherhood bloc. Ah al-Hawamdah, a 
Muslim Brother criticised the budget on the following grounds: 
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1. It involved the payment of interest to national and international 
lenders. 
2. It required borrowing JD390mn from the Jordanian Central Bank. 
3. It did not consider the zakat law as an important source for the 
country budget, which could bring in up to five or seven times more 
revenue than tax coUection.^ ^^ ^ 
Fu'ad al-Khalafat, a Muslim Brother, also disagreed with the budget proposal, giving 
the following points: 
There was a heavy expenditure by the state run media and television 
corporations. 
A. It involved the appointment of foreigners with high salaries. 
B. It allowed a budget of JD 180,000 a year to the Jordanian Information 
Bureau based in Washington which did not promote any useful 
publications. 
Dhuqan al-Hiadawi a member of the Constitutional Bloc also disagreed with the budget 
law, and criticised the budget for not solving problems in industry and agriculture, or 
tackling unemployment. Al-Hindawi stated that "the budget law proposal does not 
cover the political procedures and initiatives which could transform the economic 
situation into a real and viable condition".^ '^^ ^ 
Much criticism from different blocs was aimed at the semi-autonomous institutions 
which were not included in the state budget law. It was pointed out that the country 
was ultimately financially responsible for these institutions.^^ '^ 
Some deputies brought together both national and constituency concerns. For example, 
Muhammad al-Mu'arar, a deputy from a North Bedouin constituency made two sets of 
demands in his speech: 
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A. National Demands: 
1. To search for substitute markets for Jordanian goods. 
2. To limit the imports of luxury goods. 
3. To estabUsh light industries for the national market. 
4. To direct capital expenditure to development projects to absorb and 
limit the level of unemployment. 
5. To make use of and invest in the country's natural resources. 
6. To increase the salaries of civil and miHtary servants. 
B. The Constituency Demands: 
1. To increase the educational level in the Bedouin regions. 
2. To support farmers and establish agricultural projects. 
3. To provide aU Bedouin towns and villages with Electricity. 
4. To conduct health and social educational programmes in the Bedouin 
regions.^ ^ '^ 
In order to assist with the passage of the budget, before the vote of confidence, the 
prime minister promised a series of measures including the creation of 4,000 new jobs in 
the government sectors under the 1991 budget.^ ^ '^ The budget law was finally passed 
by the Chamber of Deputies by 50 votes to 25, with three abstentions and two deputies 
absent from the Chamber.^ ^^ ^ 
In addition to the ordinary budget, the finance minister unveiled an JD120mn 
emergency budget. This budget was aimed at deahng with the negative economic 
aspects arising from the Gulf Crisis, and was to be financed from international 
compensation funds in the form of bilateral and multi-lateral aid. The balance of 
pajanents deficit would be reduced by limiting imports to non-luxury items. This would 
offset the cost of absorbing the large numbers of Jordanian returnees from the Gulf 
states, and increase the country's capability in restoring basic and strategic 
commodities.^ ^^^ 
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6.2. Tahir al-Masri's Government: June 19.1991 to November 21.1991 
On June 17, 1991, King Hussein authorised Tahir al-Masri to form a new cabinet to 
replace the government of Mudar Badran. Al-Masri had been elected as the 
representative for Amman Third constituency in the general election of November 
1989, and had largely won on the Palestinian vote.^ '*''^  He had been a liberal foreign 
minister in Mudar Badran's government, before which he was the head of the Chamber's 
Foreign Affairs Committee. In his letter of appointment to the new prime minister, the 
King stressed the importance of amending laws which were relevant to the completion 
of the democratic process, taking further the establishment of a system of poUtical 
pluralism. He praised the country's progress towards democracy, expressing his hope 
that it would continue in the future. The King said that his aims for the new 
government involved: 
Working towards issuing or amending laws related to the 
completion of the democracy-building process, and Proceeding 
with the application of poHtical pluralism. Among these proposed 
laws are the press and publication law, the law permitting poUtical 
parties to exist in accordance with the provisions of the 
Constitution, the guidance of the National Charter's principles, our 
orientation speech at the national conference, and the higher 
interest of the state.^ '*'^  
The King also emphasised the importance of building a democratic state, stating that: 
Democracy is not only institutions but also a general approach and 
a way of Ufe. To consoUdate and deepen its conceptions, state and 
private institutions should themselves cope with democracy 
philosophically and behaviouraUy. It may be useful, therefore, to 
proceed in teaching courses about democracy, covering its rules, 
morals and responsibihties as reflected in the constitution, the 
national charter and its literature, in various institutes and 
appropriate educational and cultural establishments.^ '^ ^^  
In addition, the King's aims for the al-Masri government were that it should negotiate 
with Israel and at the same time help the government with its task of withstanding 
public pressure at home. 
230 
The appointment of al-Masri at this time was clearly a political move to repair the 
diplomatic damage which Jordan had sufl'ered in its relations with the Gulf states and 
with the West due to its position during the Gulf crisis. His appointment was viewed as 
a positive signal to the United States which had been exploring the possibility of 
Palestinian representation at a proposed peace conference through a joint Jordanian-
Palestinian delegation. Al-Masri was acceptable to both sides, those Jordanians of 
Palestinian origin and the PLO. 
6.2.1. Composition of the Tahir al-Masri Cabinet 
On June 19, 1991, al-Masri formed his new cabinet, consisting of 25 ministers. Eleven 
of these were members of the Chamber of Deputies, and fourteen were from outside 
parhament.*'*^ ^ Pohticians with Muslim Brotherhood affiliation were excluded from the 
new government, despite some having participated for six months in the previous 
government of Mudar Badran. It may be safely assumed that the decision to drop the 
five Brotherhood ministers had the endorsement of the King. The move completed a 
remarkable reversal of fortune for the Islamist organisation, which had 22 deputies in 
the Chamber of Deputies. It is, however, unlikely that the Muslim Brotherhood were 
too distressed at their exclusion from the cabinet, as they would have been 
uncomfortable serving a premier chosen to show the USA that Jordan was wiUing to 
negotiate with Israel under certain circumstances. On 18 June a statement was issued 
by the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, Majid Khalifah, to the effect that the 
organisation would not take part in any government wiUing to negotiate with Israel or 
its American partner.^ "^ ^ No doubt the Brotherhood welcomed the opportunity to 
return to the backbenches, where they could regroup, and re-estabHsh themselves as the 
principal opposition bloc, free from the constraints of government responsibility. 
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6.2.2. Programme of Tahir al-IVIasri's Government 
On July 11, 1991, al-Masri presented his ministerial programme to the Chamber of 
Deputies. He committed himself to a consultation process with all blocs within 
parHament and emphasised his government's dedication to Jordan's democratic process. 
The important objectives in his ministerial programme were the following: 
1. To consolidate national unity and enhance the democratic process 
in order to strengthen the concept, broaden its base, transcend 
political plurality and attain effective political participation in 
decision-making by respecting the views of others and not 
monopoHsing the "truth". 
2. To strengthen the pillars of the state law, at the same time 
respecting and observing citizen's rights, and ensuring the principle 
of legitimacy, separation of power, institutionahsation, and the 
superiority of the law. 
3. To enact laws concerning constitutional hberties such as the 
parties' law, and the press and publishing law. 
4. To put an end to martial law and to continue the process of 
reconsidering political prisoners' files. 
5. To provide a comfortable climate for the media in which it can be 
encouraged to protect the nation and citizens rights. 
6. To increase both pubUc and private investment, concentrating 
mainly on the public sector.^ '*^ ' 
6.2.3. Vote of Confidence in the Cabinet Programme 
An extraordinary session of parhament began on July 8, 1991, to discuss the policy 
statement of al-Masri's government. Rather than wait until October for the reconvening 
of parUament, al-Masri preferred to pursue an earher parliamentary vote of confidence 
for his cabinet during the July extraordinary session. 
In response to the ministerial programme, the various parhamentary blocs, as a 
condition for the vote of confidence, demanded that the government of al-Masri 
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complete the process of democracy, as well as meeting other requirements. The largest 
number of major demands that the government had to deal with as a condition for the 
vote of confidence were those of the Democratic Assembly bloc. These demands 
included the abolition of all relevant procedures related to martial law; developing and 
updating aU laws and regulations concerning citizens' rights and pubHc liberty; 
implementing democracy in order to cope with political, economic, and social 
development; safeguarding the right of aU social sectors to form their own professional 
organisations, trade unions, and other social organisations; guaranteeing the rights of aU 
the state employees, universities, and pubHc institutions to form their own 
organisations, and allowing young people to form a union.^ '"'^  The Constitutional Bloc 
wanted to know whether the government aimed to abolish the martial laws totally or 
whether it sought to replace them by administrative martial instructions. In addition to 
the democracy reforms, the Constitutional Bloc were concerned about the 
implementation of the government programme which would meet a great deal of the 
people's demands. 
The Muslim Brotherhood Bloc, having declared earlier that they would not vote for a 
government which was going to make peace with Israel, concentrated mostly on issues 
of national unity, abolishing martial law, improving education, and supporting youth. In 
response to the Chamber of Deputies demands, al-Masri picked up on some of the 
concerns raised by the deputies. He declared that the government would fuUy activate 
further political liberties in the country, in enhancing democracy in aU walks of 
Jordanian life especially through elections for trade unions and professional 
associations, and the establishment of student and youth organisations.^ '*'^  
As a result of this debate, on July 18 1991, al-Masri's government won the vote of 
confidence by 47 votes to 31, with one abstention and one deputy absent from the 
Chamber. Thirty-one of the favourable votes came from the conservative and 
traditionalist trends. While the independent Islamic bloc chose to vote for the 
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programme, the 22 Muslim Brotherhood deputies were opposed.^ ''*^  Despite this, al-
Masri's government was assured of its confidence vote when 10 of the 13 members of 
the Constitution Bloc decided to give their full support to the new government. Of the 
remaining 3, two voted against and one abstained.^ '''^  Two leftists also voted against the 
programme. 
6.2.4. Cabinet Reshuffling 
On October 3, 1991, the eve of the peace negotiations with Israel, al-Masri reshuffled 
his cabinet in order to eliminate any opposition to negotiations with Israel and to 
strengthen the position of the government. Al-Masri dropped those ministers who were 
uncomfortable with Jordan's participation in the peace process. These included 
Muhammad Paris al-Tarawnah, the pan-Arab nationalist minister of state for cabinet 
affairs, and the Islamist, Ra'af Najim, who had held the Awqaf and Islamic affairs post. 
A totally unexpected move was the resignation of al-Masri's influential foreign minister, 
Abdullah al-Nsur. Al-Nsur would probably have led the Jordanian delegation at the 
peace conference, and would therefore have been most closely identified with it. 
However, al-Nsur may have calculated that his association with the peace conference, 
the outcome of which clearly remained highly uncertain, was too great a pohtical 
gamble for him to take. Al-Nsur was replaced by Professor Kamil Abu Jaber.^ ^°^ 
The government reshuffle instigated a revolution among National Assembly deputies 
against al-Masri's government. On October 7, deputies belonging to the Democratic 
and Constitutional blocs, i.e. mainly leftist and establishment figures, participated with 
22 Muslim Brotherhood deputies and four independent Islamist deputies in submitting a 
petition demanding the resignation of the al-Masri government on the grounds that it 
was incapable of dealing with pressing domestic and international issues. The 
government was also accused of failing to repeal martial law, end the excesses of the 
security forces and resist the curbs on the political Uberalisation process. The petition 
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stated: "The government of Tahir Masri is unable to confront the requirements of the 
current phase, both on the local and international level, and therefore the undersigned 
announce that this government does not enjoy their confidence and are demanding its 
resignation".^^'' Altogether 50 members of Parliament out of a total of 80 supported the 
demands, effectively delivering a vote of no confidence in the govemment.^ ^ '^ The 
deputies signing the petition had different reasons for demanding that the government 
resign. The Muslim Brotherhood deputies and the four independent Islamist opposed 
the peace talks with Israel. The Constitutional Bloc of former ministers and pro-
goverament figures supported the peace process but argued that the government was 
too weak to handle the country. Tahir al-Masri appeared discouraged by this setback, 
and on November 16, 1991 decided to end his efforts, resigning after only five months 
in ofiice.^^^' In Jordan's new era of poUtical UberaUsation, parUament akeady had the 
power to force the resignation of the prime minister through a petition supported by a 
simple majority of MPs. The result in this case was that the moral authority of al-
Masri's government was seriously undermined. 
6.2.5. Major Legislation Initiated 
During the National Assembly's extraordinary session in the second parUamentary 
session, the government of Tahir al-Masri submitted to the National Assembly 13 laws 
and draftlaws which were then endorsed by the Chamber of Deputies. The foUowing 
were the most important laws passed. 
1. The Rescinding of Martial Law (1991) 
This law came into force with the Ufting of martial law. The law transferred aU cases 
before the martial law court to the civU courts, and granted immunity from any legal 
UabiUty arising from ordinary legislation to aU those who had been entrusted with 
implementing martial law directives. 
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2. State Security Court Law (1991) 
The former law was amended to allow the right of appeal against sentences passed by 
the state security court and obliging the court to refer to the Court of Appeal aU 
sentences involving either the death penalty or jail sentences of over ten years. The 
amendment was intended to contribute a civic quality to the Court that was formerly 
connected with the Military Court. It granted the prime minister the authority to 
establish one or more state security courts in special circumstances required by the 
public interest. Each such special court was to be composed of three civilian and 
military judges, appointed by the prime minister on the recommendation of the Minister 
of Justice. The court was to try both military and civilians and its jurisdiction includes 
offences against the external and internal security of the state as well as economic and 
drug related offences. However, under the terms of provision [3] Article [93] of the 
Constitution, the King rejected the law and referred it back to the Chamber of Deputies. 
Under the Constitution, he was able to reject a law within six months, provided that he 
produce a statement showing the reasons for withholding his ratification. The King 
considered that the amendment of this law would constitute an obstacle to the operation 
of the Security Services by limiting their activities, as it proposed to lengthen the period 
of time between the arrest and trial of suspects. The law was later endorsed for a 
second time during Bin Shakir's government by two thirds of the members of the 
National Assembly on January 30, 1992 and became law. This was the first time 
legislation had been rejected by the King only to be overruled by parliament. 
3. The High Court of Justice Law (1991) 
This law was amended to reinforce the independence of the judiciary and made it 
possible to appeal against administrative decisions already in effect.^ '^'^  
Although the al-Masri government, appointed during the summer, was short-Uved, and 
which only had an extra-ordinary session of less than four months, the three laws 
discussed above played a significant role in the process of political liberalisation. 
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6.3. Zaid Bin Shakir's Government: November 21.1991 to May 29. 
1993 
On November 21, 1991, ICing Hussein appointed Sharif Zaid Bin Shakir to form a new 
govemment.'^ ^ '^ In his letter of appointment, the King focused on the road to 
democracy and the creation of poUtical pluralism. A substantial part of the speech dealt 
with these issues, giving a fresh impetus to the process of democratisation. 
The government should pursue the process of democracy and 
achieve poUtical pluraUsm as provided for by the National Charter 
this means that the government should go ahead with legal 
procedures to achieve that, especiaUy the enactment of a law on 
Ucensing poUtical parties which should be truly Jordanian in form 
and in practice and loyalty, as well as the law on press and 
pubUcation in Une with the principles of the Constitution and the 
National Charter and a manner that would safeguard the higher 
national interests. There must also be a reaffirmation of the process 
of democracy as a way of Ufe that should be further promoted with 
members of the pubUc oriented on their responsibiUties through the 
information circles and the media as weU as the educational 
institutions. This is needed so that the roots of democracy can be 
embedded in a sound manner under the ceiUng of ParUament or 
outside. One can never serve justice to democracy unless the 
citizens have been freed of aU the elements of fear under the 
prevalence of the law and no one can claim to be committed to 
democracy if he works in the darkness or practices ideological 
terrorism through leaflets, letters and the phone, as weU as other 
means. Any such action is to be considered undemocratic and 
against the principles of the National Charter. Such elements must 
be exposed as working against the wUl of the people and their 
democratic process and they should be held accountable for these 
actions under the law.^ *^"' 
Regarding the national responsibUity of the media, the King indicated that the media's 
information should be based on true facts and the media should work for the national 
interest of the country. This was not an attempt to Umit media rights, but rather an 
injuction to the media to act responsibly in the cause of democracy. The King stated 
that: 
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Under democracy the national responsibiUties grow and increase 
for official information circles. Therefore, informational material 
should be based on reason and knowledge seeking to serve the 
national interest Uke aU other information circles where people can 
differentiate between anarchy resulting from irresponsible freedom 
and between freedom characterised with responsibility.^^'' 
The peace process was one of the important points in the King's letter of appointment 
to the new prime minister. He indicated that the main task for the new government was 
to continue with the peace talks. He stated: 
One of the major tasks of this government at this stage, is to 
continue the participation in the peace process (started by the 
previous governments) by mobiUsing aU efforts and resources to 
make this peace process successful. Success in this process means 
reaching a comprehensive, just and lasting peace based on the land 
for peace formula in accordance with United Nation Resolutions 
242 and 338 which apply to aU Arab occupied land, including 
Jerusalem. This requires solving the Palestinian problem with aU its 
dimensions based on the UN Resolutions. The resolution 
guarantee the Palestinian people their legitimate national rights in 
self determination in their own soil. On this occasion we reaffirm 
our support to the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation in the 
peace process, expressing our pride in its national noble duties and 
its distinguished achievement in the Madrid Conference.^ ^ '^ 
6.3.1 Composition of Zaid Bin Shakir's Cabinet 
Sharif Bin Shakir's cabinet consisted of 29 members, and was the largest in Jordan's 
history. Of the 29 ministers, 10 were drawn from the Chamber of Deputies, and the 
remaining members were establishment figures from outside parUament. This indicated 
a return to traditional conservative poUtics, as Sharif Bin Shakir gave himself extra 
patronage with which to gain support from a number of critical constituencies. In doing 
so he paid particular attention to the traditional forces in Jordanian society. He formed 
a traditionalist, albeit largely non-ideological government, in contrast to al-Masri's 
Uberal government. Four ministers from the Constitutional Bloc which had so bitterly 
opposed al-Masri were appointed, including Dhuqan al-Hindawi, head of the bloc, who 
was appointed as one of the two deputy premiers. He also appointed four ministers 
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from the National Bloc. Two of the other parHamentary deputies in the new cabinet 
were Yusif al-Mbaidin and Jamal al-Sarairah, both from the independent Islamist 
bloc.<^ '^ 
The main group excluded from the new cabinet were the Muslim Brotherhood. They 
had stated from the outset that they wished to remain a backbench opposition as they 
were against the current peace process. They did, however, state that they would judge 
the new government in terms of its performance over pubhc freedom, rather than the 
peace process. 
The cabinet was overwhelmingly East Bank in its structure, with only two Palestinian 
ministers, thus underlining the fact that the government of Jordan represented East 
Bank Jordanians. Moreover, the new cabinet seems to have been chosen with particular 
care, with a wide geographical range covering most parts of the East Bank and bringing 
in minority groups such as the Christians and Circassians. 
6.3.2 Programme of Zaid Bin Shakir's Government 
On December 1st 1992, King Hussein opened the parliamentary session in a speech 
from the throne as the policy statement of Bin Shakir's government. This was different 
from previous post-1989 governments, in so far as this time it was the King who framed 
the government policy and not the government. This procedure is not an anomaly since 
it is derived from article [54] Paragraph [3] of the Constitution, which states that if the 
appointment of a new government takes place when the Chamber of Deputies is not in 
session at the time of appointment, the Speech from the Throne shall be considered to 
be a statement of the government's policy. As a result, when the Chamber of Deputies 
reconvened, any vote against the government risked being understood as a vote against 
the poUcies favoured by King Hussein. To have rejected the government of Bin Shakir 
would therefore have sparked off a major poHtical crisis. 
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6.3.3. Vote of Confidence in the Cabinet Programme 
When parhament reconvened, the discussion prior to the vote of confidence on the 
government's poUcy statement focused mainly on enhancing the democratic movement 
in Jordan, especiaUy in terms of establishing close co-operation between the legislative 
and executive authorities with the aim of serving the public interest. 
A significant response to the vote of confidence was made by the Democratic Assembly 
bloc, who focused mainly on democratic issues. These MPs concentrated on civil 
rights; the right to establish trade unions, instructors unions, student unions, and a 
national union for Jordanian youth; national affiUation; and buUding and defending the 
homeland.^ '^' The independent bloc made the following points: 
1. Rational and calm dialogue between the government and people should 
be the effective approach to the democratic way of Ufe instead of threat 
(of fear) and terror. 
2. Practising the democratic way of Ufe needs officials who embrace 
democracy. 
3. Democracy should be practised with its advantages and disadvantages. 
4. Social justice should prevail and the relations between ruler and the 
ruled should be based on shura (consultation).^^ '^ 
The MusUm Brotherhood bloc, however, did not focus on enhancing democracy. 
Among the issues raised by the MusUm Brotherhood bloc were: the implementation of 
Islamic Sharia, supporting the cause of Palestine, pubUc Uberty for every citizen, 
national unity and rejecting normalisation with Israel. 
On December 16, 1992, Sharif Zaid obtained a clear vote of confidence from the 
Chamber of deputies with 46 votes to 27 endorsing the new cabinet. Three deputies 
abstained from the vote and four were absent from the Chamber.^ ^^ ' By including 
ministers from the constitutional, national and independent Islamic blocs, the prime 
minister ensured that he would receive at least half the votes in his favour. 
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The prime minister was ambitious in his attempt to minimise opposition to the 
confidence vote. He made two conciliatory gestures to the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Firstly, he reduced the punishment for members of the Prophet Muhammad's Army, 
who had been given lengthy jail sentences. Secondly, he was credited with arranging 
for a leading member of the Muslim Brotherhood, Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat, to remain in 
the post of assembly speaker. Despite this apparent goodwill, however, 18 of the 
Muslim Brotherhood deputies voted against Sharif Bin Shakir's government. Three 
members were absent, while Arabiyyat himself abstained.^ ^^ 
6.3.4. Maior Legislation Initiated 
During the third parHamentary session, the government of Sharif Zaid Bin Shakir 
presented to the Chamber of Deputies 33 draft laws, and in the fourth parliamentary 17 
draft laws, which were subsequently endorsed in the respective parUamentary sessions. 
The most important of these laws were the following four, with the exception of the 
1992 and 1993 budget laws which are discussed in section 3.6 and 3.7 respectively. 
1. The Anti-Communist Law (1990) 
This law, which allowed political organisations with communist affihations to practice 
their rights, constituted an important step towards enhancing pubUc freedom and 
democracy and show the government's commitment to answering deputies' demands. 
This law had been drafted during Mudar Badran's government and was endorsed by the 
parHament on January, 21,1992. 
2. The Defence Law (1990) 
This law was issued on March 7, 1992, to replace the earlier Defence Law of 1935. 
Before the Defence Law can be activated it requires a royal decree based on a decision 
of the Council of Ministers according to Article [124] of the Constitution. According 
to Article [2], the law can be used "if necessitated for the defence of the nation in the 
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event of an emergency threatening national security or public safety". According to the 
provisions of this law. Article [8] allows any persons arrested or put into custody the 
right of appeal to the High Court of Justice and to ask for compensation, which had not 
been previously possible. The right to appeal was a significant move towards pubhc 
Hberty. 
3. The Political Parties Law (1992) 
This law was endorsed by the Chamber of Deputies on July 5, 1992, and for the first 
time since 1957 allowed the registration of political parties, and a system of pohtical 
pluralism. 
4. The Press and Publication Law (1993) 
This law was endorsed by parhament on March 29, 1993, and was intended to ensure 
the freedom of the press to exercise its tasks within the hmits of responsible freedom.^ ^^ ^ 
6.3.5. Interpellations and Questions 
During the third and fourth parhamentary sessions, the government of Bin Shakir 
received 7 interpellations and 246 questions from the Chamber of Deputies concerning 
the tasks and functioning of the government. The following seven interpellations were 
raised. 
• Interpellation No. (1) was submitted by deputy Abd al-Karim al-Dughmi to the 
Finance Minister, and concerned the petrol refinery company's concession. After 
parliamentary discussion, a response came on February 29, 1992. 
• Interpellation No. (2) was submitted by deputy Mansur Murad to the Health 
Minister, and concerned the recognition of the medicinal specialisation certificates. 
This was discussed by the Chamber of Deputies, followed by an explanation by the 
Health Minister on March 29, 1992. 
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• InterpeUation No. (3) was submitted by deputy Ahmad al-Abbadi on March 21, 
1992 to the Finance Minister, and concerned the government's sale of Jordanian 
investment company shares. The Finance Minister gave an explanation the foUowing 
day. 
• InterpeUation No. (4) was submitted by deputy Hammam Sa'id on March 29, 1992 
to the Social Development Minister, and concerned the rejection of the estabUshment 
of charitable associations by the Social Development Ministry. The Minister 
concerned explained that four of these associations were not legal. 
• InterpeUation No. (5) was submitted by deputy Mansur Murad on June 6, 1992 to 
the Foreign Minister, and concerned the statement of Jordan's ambassador to the 
United Nations about the peace treaty and the situation of Jerusalem. This was 
promised to be reviewed by the cabinet. 
• InterpeUation No. (6) was submitted by deputy Bassam Haddadin to the Labour 
Minister, and concerned the draft of the new labour law. The Minister gave his 
response the same day. 
• InterpeUation No. (7) was submitted by deputy Hammam Sa'id to the Health 
Minister, and concerned the deposition of specialised medical doctors from the 
pubUc health sector. This was discussed by the Chamber of Deputies on March 29, 
1992 and followed by an explanation by the Health Minister.^^''' 
During the third session 150 questions, and during the fourth session 96 questions, were 
submitted to the government, the most important of which concerned the total of the 
Jordanian foreign debt and the government's poUcy toward this; the government's poUcy 
towards national service, and the manner in which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had 
chosen new diplomats for the year 1991. In general, these questions were considered 
seriously by the government who took corrective action where necessary. 
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6.3. 6. The Budget of 1992 
On December 8, 1991 the Chamber of Deputies referred the budget law proposal for 
the year 1992 to the house's finance committee for review. The committee gave 
approval to the proposed law three weeks later, stating that the budget proposal was 
both realistic and responsible. The 1992 budget proposal was characterised by the 
following key aspects promising an improvement in the Kingdom's economy. 
1. A real growth of Gross National Product of 3 per cent as opposed to 
199rs 1 percent. 
2. Revenue would cover approximately 94 per cent of the current 
spending. 
3. To stabilise the level of prises and decrease the cost of living. 
4. To deal with the unemployment problem, to provide civil servants 
with a pay increase, and create as many as 8,300 new jobs. 
5. To divert JD8mn to help offset poverty. 
The 1992 budget law was framed against the background of a second agreement 
between the Jordanian government and the IMF which had been concluded in October 
1991. This agreement contained a seven year economic reform progranmie which 
would start as of 1992, with that year's budget being the base year.^ ^^ ' The following 
points are the aims of the second seven year reform programme: 
1. To cut the budget deficit (before grants) from 18 per cent of GDP in 
1991 to 5 per cent in 1998; 
2. To decrease public expenditure from 44.4 per cent of GDP in 1991 to 5 
per cent in 1998; 
3. To increase domestic revenue of the Treasury from 26.5 per cent of 
GDP in 1991 to 30 per cent in 1998; 
4. To increase real economic growth from 1 per cent in 1991 to over 4 per 
cent in 1998; 
5. To cut consumption from 100.9 per cent of GDP in 1991 to 79.5 per 
cent in 1998; 
6. To cut inflation from 10 per cent in 1991 to 4.5 per cent in 1998; 
7. To reduce the need for foreign and domestic borrowing from 10.6 per 
cent of GDP in 1991 to 3.5 per cent in 1998; 
8. To reduce the current account deficit to 2 per cent of GDP in 1997 and 
zero a year later, from 24 per cent of GDP in 1991; 
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9. To accumulate foreign exchange reserves to cover three months' worth 
of imports, instead of the current situation in which reserves cover just 
over two months'/ '^-* 
The proposed budget law did not escape criticism by the Muslim Brotherhood deputies 
and others. Most of the Muslim Brotherhood deputies disagreed with the state budget 
and requested that the government pay more attention to equity in the distribution of 
public services, solving the unemployment problem, supporting the national army, and 
expanding national services. Fu'ad al-Khalafat, a Muslim Brotherhood member, 
opposed the budget proposal law on the grounds that there was corruption within some 
government institutions. He said he would withhold his support until this was put right. 
The institutions he referred to were the media and television corporations, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, the Civil Aviation Authority, and the Finance Ministry. In contrast, 
the Islamic independent bloc welcomed the proposed budget law, considering this to 
constitute a great improvement over the previous year's budget. ^ "^^^ 
Most deputies were concerned primarily with popular issues such as the building of new 
roads, support for smaller farmers, support for youth clubs, for a solution to the 
unemployment problem, improving the level of education, increasing the salaries of civil 
and military servants, and limiting the level of poverty rather than issues such as debt 
repayment. The 1992 budget law and economic reform programme was passed by the 
National Assembly on December 30, 1991 by 45 votes to 20, with 9 deputies absent 
from the house and 6 abstentions.^ '^^  
6.3.7. The Budget of 1993 
On December 13, 1992 the Chamber of Deputies referred the budget law proposal to 
the house's finance committee. In his budget statement to the Chamber of Deputies, the 
Finance Minister was able to offer the prospect of real growth of 7 per cent in 1993, 
while keeping the budget deficit down to JD48mn.*^ ^^  The 1993 budget was 
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characterised by many distinguishing features, with the main ones being summarised 
below. 
1. Improving the total national production to between 7 and 8 per cent 
during the 1993. 
2. Encouraging industrial investment, increasing exports and improving 
public sector services. 
3. Limiting the deficit on the current account to 10 per cent of the GNP. 
4. Attracting more Jordanian worker remittances from abroad. 
5. Controlling the inflation level to between 4 and 5 per cent. 
6. Controlling government expenditure and limiting the budget deficit by 8 
per cent. 
7. Keeping the Jordanian dinar stable. 
8. Neither increasing nor changing the level of state debt. 
9. Looking for a solution to the unemployment problem. 
10. To use savings to increase the budget by 20 per cent to improve the 
level of education, social development, youth, and health ministries.^ ^^^ 
The finance committee's chairman, the Muslim Brother deputy, Dr. Abdullah al-
Akaylah, was optimistic about the prospect of such initiatives in the budget proposal, as 
the government seemed to have managed the adoption of the budget fairly effectively. 
The house's fmance committee requested that the government respond to the following 
demands of the budget law as a condition of the vote of confidence: to increase the 
salaries of civil and military servants to not less than JD 20 dinar a month; to increase 
the retirement pension; and to raise the level of low income c i t i z e n s . I n response the 
government promised to review these issues. 
The 1993 budget law received some criticism from Leftists, the Muslim Brotherhood, 
and other deputies. Sahm al-Zu'bi, a Leftist deputy, personally opposed the budget 
proposal, on the grounds that its negative aspects outweighed the positive. He 
summarised the negative aspects as follows: 
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1. The budget law does not take into account the military armament 
programme, thereby giving an unclear insight into the financial status of 
the country. 
2. The budget law does not include the profits made on the sales of petrol 
bought from Iraq at low prices, which would save JD115mn for the 
country. 
3. Despite recognising the high figures for unemployment and poverty 
(unemployment is at 18 per cent of the population), the government 
does not come up with a suitable solution. 
4. The increase of about 24 per cent of the 1992 imports compared to the 
1991, which imports was 3 per cent less than the year 1990.^ "^ 
Bassam Haddadin, a Leftist deputy, also individually rejected the budget law and asked 
for a new proposed budget to be prepared by a joint committee from the Finance 
Ministry and the Chamber of Deputies. He criticised the govenmient's failure to find a 
suitable solution to the unemployment problem, and requested that the government 
increase the salaries of civil and military servants, reduce petrol prices, protect national 
industries, and maintain the prices of basic goods such as public services, electricity, 
water, telephones, and transportation.*^^^ 
The majority of the members of the Muslim Brotherhood bloc criticised the budget law. 
On behalf of the Muslim Brotherhood deputies as a whole, Hammam Sa'id stated: 
1. This budget does not take into account legal and illegal gains, nor does 
it try to reinvest interest made. 
2. The Muslim Brotherhood requests that the government amend the 
Social Security Law to increase the income of needy citizens. 
3. The Muslim Brotherhood requests that the government extend the 
benefits of health insurance to all citizens. 
4. The budget does not find a suitable solution for unemployment. 
5. Fairness should be a factor in the appointment of new jobs in all 
government institutions.^ ^^^ 
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Before the vote of confidence, most deputies in the budget debate focused their 
speeches on their constituency needs in order to gain support in the forthcoming 
elections. This demonstrated the parochial nature of Jordanian politics. For example, 
Abd al-Majid al-Shraidah, a deputy from Koura District demanded the following: 
1. To give priority to the poor and needy citizens in terms of 
employment in the area. 
2. The appointment of school teachers should be from the Koura. 
3. Woodland in the Koura District should be distributed to unemployed 
citizens. 
4. To establish a community college and industrial school in the Koura 
District. 
5. To support youth associations in the Koura District. 
6. To create a nursery school in the Koura District. 
7. To support charity organisations in the Koura District.'^^^ 
To answer the demands of deputies and to gain a vote of confidence, the fmance 
minister responded to the deputies' concerns and demands by stating that the 
government would create 6,000 new jobs in 1993, and these positions would be 
announced before the end of January, 1993. He also stated that improving the salaries 
of civil and military servants would be considered. In the light of these concessions, the 
budget law was passed by the Chamber of Deputies on January 6, 1993 by 58 votes to 
11. Eleven deputies were absent from the house. ^ '^^  
248 
Conclusion 
This chapter has followed the process of democratisation through three separate 
governments, from December 1989 to May 1993. Throughout this period the Chamber 
of Deputies was able to influence all major legislations proposed by the successive 
governments. Discussions carried out by the Chamber of Deputies covered aU matters 
concerning the country and its citizens in the fields of public liberty, the economy, 
administration, teaching, health, information and youth. The discussions occurred 
within the context of a series of laws and legislations which reinforced the democratic 
opening in the country. These laws included abolishing martial law, amending the State 
Security Court law, giving citizens the right to appeal to the Court of Appeal, and 
issuing the political parties law, the press and publication law, and the state budget laws 
for the years 1990-1993. 
The comparison between the policies and achievements of the three governments shows 
a gradual progression in putting democratisation into practical effect. The government 
of Mudar Badran emphasised to the principle of democratic choice, partly because 
without it, the government could not maintain its influence over the Chamber of 
Deputies. A start was made in preparing legislation for reform. Under al-Masri's 
government there was limited time for progress to be made on reform - especially since 
the government was having to concentrate on the peace process. However, al-Masri's 
government further promoted the process of democratisation through the amendment of 
the State Security Court Law. The government of Zaid Bin Shakir was able to 
consolidate the reform process, by passing the legislation which had been prepared 
under the previous government, such as the political parties law and the press and 
publication law. It is clear that parliamentary pressure during this period changed the 
course of government policy. This made the process of political liberalisation more 
likely to succeed by encouraging national dialogue. 
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Chapter Seven 
The Operation of the Parliamentary Democratic System: 
The Political Role of Clyil Society Institutions and the Existence of 
Official Political Parties. 1989-1993 
introduction 
This chapter examines the political role of civU society institutions in the political 
liberalisation process from 1989 to 1993 and mainly how the 1992 Political Parties Law 
altered their roles. The institutions are analysed in two categories: firstly, the trade 
union and professional associations and secondly, the political parties. 
7.1. Civil Society institutions and Poiitical Liberalisation 
The social and political structures in Jordan are very sensitive. The civil society 
institutions of the trade unions and professional associations do not have sufficient 
resources and facilities, and therefore maintain a remote role in the decision-making 
process. Prior to political liberalisation, the trade union and professional associations 
which existed constituted the main outlet for political debate. However, they were 
constrained in their actions by the legislation under which they operated. Following 
political HberaUsation, they were replaced by the official political parties as the main 
fora for political debate and action, but relaxation in legislation at the same time 
resulted in an increased role for them (for example through strike action). 
The 1952 Constitution laid the basis for Jordanian citizens to establish and join political 
and professional organisations and societies. Consequently, many labour and 
professional organisations for doctors, engineers, dentists, lawyers, journalists and 
writers were established and became well organised. Most of the trade union and 
professional associations were founded in the 1950s.^ '^  These organisations filled the 
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gap in articulation of political concern which had been created by the absence of legal 
political party activities and the suspension of parliament. 
The principal objectives of these organisations were defined by the law as being to 
protect, maintain, and develop the profession or trade union and defend the rights and 
interests of their members. The organisations held professional conferences and 
seminars, and arranged scientific meetings and visits with similar Arab and foreign 
professional organisations. In essence, the government allowed the organisations to 
express the interests of society as a whole and initiate political activities in the Jordanian 
political system. In addition, they were able to play a role in structuring political 
conflict in society. They could involve a significant part of the population in the 
national political process, integrate religious and ethnic minorities into society through 
their activities, and state the interests of various sectors of society.^ ^^  
The role of trade union and professional associations was increased following the 1967 
war with Israel. Following the defeat, a political body called the 'Professional 
Grouping', comprising labour and professional organisation representatives, was formed 
to fi l l the political gap which existed because of the unconvened parliament. The 
Professional Grouping continued to meet until 1971, at which point it was disbanded on 
the grounds that its work was political, not professional. This happened after banned 
political parties such as the Communist Party, the Ba'thists, and the Arab NationaUsts 
and even the officially accepted Muslim Brotherhood organisation were found to be 
involved in its functioning. This was followed by a government amendment of the 
Trade Union and Professional Associations Laws which gave the government the right 
to dissolve any organisation or union; the government could also deny any group the 
right to appeal to the courts.^ ^^  
The National Charter emphasised the constitutional rights and civil liberties of Jordanian 
citizens to found or join societies and political parties. It also protected the rights of 
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civil society institutions by subjecting any decision of the government to dissolve an 
organisation or union to an appeal in court.'•''^  
With political liberalisation, trade union and professional associations continued to 
function, but they no longer acted as replacements for parliament and political parties. 
They now campaigned hard to demand rights and privileges for their members, and in 
many cases used strike action to attain their goals. For example, the medical and 
engineering associations carried out a strike in 1991, calling for the reformation of the 
wage system and pay rises. This resulted in a positive response from the government. 
Another example was the threat of strike action by the general work force in the 
electricity company in 1992, to support demands for higher pay and more employees' 
rights. This forced the government to intervene and negotiate a compromise settlement 
one day before the strike was due to take place.^ ^^  In December 1989, the government 
permitted the Jordanian Writers Union to resume its activities following its dissolution 
in 1987 after accusations of political activity.^ ^^ It is interesting to note that before 
democracy, any person or organisation calling for strike action or talking about such a 
move in public, could face accusations of political crime if discovered by the 
government.^ ^^ 
It is evident that activities by trade union and professional associations before and 
during the democratic transition converged to enhance democratic thinking and 
behaviour in both their members and the general public. This further extended to other 
popular organisations e.g. clubs and urban and rural murucipaHties. Thus, it can be said 
that professional organisations, trade unions and the various popular organisations 
played a significant role, albeit with different degrees of effectiveness, in enhancing the 
democratic sense and direction, and further developing democratic behaviour in their 
organisations and in the general public. 
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7.2. Political Parties Status Following the 1992 Political Parties Law 
The endorsement of the Political Parties Law of 1992 paved the way for multi-party 
pohtics in Jordan, for the first time since the ban on political parties imposed in April 
1957, although the government had unofficially agreed to allow political groupings to 
establish their organisational structure, following the endorsement of the National 
Charter in 1991. On October 1, 1992, applications to register parties began to be filed 
at the Ministry of the Interior, where a political parties department had been opened 
giving the government a substantial say in determining the shape and content of parties 
to emerge.^ ^^  The Ministry of the Interior announced the acceptance or rejection of a 
party's application within one week after the passage of sixty days from the date of 
receiving the establishment application. [Article 10-1] Immediately after the 
endorsement of the parties law, about 60 political parties applied to the Ministry of the 
Interior for licences in order to formalise their status.^ '"^  By July 1993 the total number 
of registered political parties had reached twenty. The first party to be licensed was the 
Jordanian National Alliance Party, a coalition of bedouin tribes. The Pledge Party, the 
Islamic Action Front, the Future Party, the Progress and Justice Party, and two other 
pan-Arab centrist parties (the Unionist Democratic Party and the Popular Unity Party) 
were all legalised soon afterwards. 
The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party (ABSP) and the Communist Party (JCP) however, were 
initially denied legal status by the Ministry of the Interior. These political parties were 
accused by the Ministry of the Interior of calling for socialism and of having 
connections with other Marxist parties abroad. Several of their aims and ideas were 
considered unconstitutional or in contravention of the Political Parties Law. This move 
by the Ministry was criticised by Islamists, leftists, conservatives and even some high 
ranking Jordanian officials, such as Ibrahim 'Izz al-Din, minister of prime ministerial 
affairs. Furthermore, a series of statements by political figures in the country, including 
those from Islamic, traditional and conservative backgrounds, supported the cause of 
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these parties.^"' The parties were in due course given registration by the Higher Court 
of Justice in January 1993.^ *^ ^ The licensing of the JCP and ABSP encouraged the 
Ministry of the Interior's position not to oppose the licensing of the Jordanian People's 
Democratic Party (JPDP) and the Jordanian Democratic Popular Unity Party(JDPUP), 
which followed.^'^^ 
7.2.1 • Official Political Parties 
Although by 1993 political parties in Jordan were gaining in influence, they stiU lack 
real power. Most of these parties have similar constitutions, and almost all of them 
express official support for the Hashemite family and commitment to the Jordanian 
Constitution. The next section reviews the objectives and principles of the 20 licensed 
parties, in order of their registration. 
7.2.1.1. The Jordanian National Alliance Party fJNAP) 
The Jordanian National Alliance Party was licensed on December 1, 1992 and became 
Jordan's first poHtical party after the Pohtical Parties Law was passed. The Secretary 
General of this party was Mijhim al-Khraishah, a bedouin from the Bani Sakhir tribe. 
The JNAP is a coalition of central and southern bedouin tribes, with a pro-establishment 
alignment. This party describes itself as a "Jordanian political, popular, national 
organisation with national humanitarian objectives, goals and principles. It seeks to 
achieve these objectives through democratic means according to the Jordanian 
Constitution, the National Charter and Jordanian laws and regulations". Its objectives 
and principles were summarised to the researcher by its Secretary General as the 
following: 
1. Defending the integrity of Jordanian land, national sovereignty, the 
Jordanian identity, adhering to the Constitution, protecting the 
constitutional institutions including the Hashemite regime, and 
preserving Jordan's security and stability. 
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2. Emphasising and consolidating unity, harmony and brotherhood 
among all classes of Jordanian citizens, respecting human rights, and 
a commitment to democratic methods and poHtical pluralism. 
3. Regulating the manner of interaction between all Jordanian people for 
the sake of protecting the citizen's rights of freedom, equahty, and 
happiness. 
4. Supporting the Jordanian Armed Forces and the Security Forces. 
5. Supporting the Palestinian issue as a national and an Arab issue. 
6. Dealing with Arab nations issues according to Jordan's historical role 
and national commitment. 
^ Respecting individual rights to ownership, work, freedom of opinion 
and expression, and giving care to the youth and protecting the rights 
of women.^ '''-' 
7.2.1.2. The Jordanian Pledge Party 
The Jordanian Pledge Party was licensed on December 7, 1992 with Abd al-Hadi al-
Majali, an ex-government official, as its Secretary General. This party is considered a 
'Transjordanian party'. It has a relatively large membership and is regarded as pro-
establishment, with tribal aftiliations. Significantly, the party's constitution called for a 
definition of the Jordanian national entity to clarify the relationship between Jordan and 
Palestine. Whilst supporting the Palestinian cause, the party contends that this should 
not allow the Palestinian problem to destabilise the East Bank. The party's principles 
and objectives were outlined by Tsa al-Majali, the Administrative Director as the 
following: 
1. Commitment to the Jordanian Constitution. 
2. Adherence to Jordan's laws and regulations. 
3. Belief in the Jordanian national identity and entity. 
4. Recognition of the basic rights and freedom for the Jordanian people. 
5. Consolidating democracy through popular participation in the decision-
making process. 
6. Establishing a free national economy.^ '^ ^ 
7.2.1.3. Popular Unity Party 
The Popular Unity Party was legalised on December 7, 1992. Its Secretary General 
was Talal al-Ramhi. This party believes in 'the principles of the great Arab Revolt' and 
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is considered a conservative party with Palestinian sympathies. Its aims and objectives 
are Arab unity, establishing a democratic Arab state, supporting the Palestinian cause 
and increasing national awareness. Article [5] of the party's constitution states: "The 
party is committed to the principle of Arab unity, the great Arab Revolt and the Arab 
Uberation movement, which represent the aspiration of the majority of our people 
struggling for unity". '^^ ^ 
7.2.1.4. Islamic Action Front Party (lAF) 
The lAF party which is the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood was licensed on 
December 8, 1992. Its Secretary General was Dr. Ishaq al-Farhan. This party has an 
extensive programme and is the party with the broadest base of support within 
Jordanian society. The lAF aims at achieving general objectives, the most important of 
which were summarised to the researcher by its Secretary General as the following: 
1. Resuming Islamic life and applying Islamic i'/iana in all fields. 
2. Preparing the nation for armed conflict (jihad) against Zionist and 
Imperialist enemies. 
3. Achieving national unity and establishing a system based on democracy 
and shura. 
4. Reinforcing unity among citizens, and combating ethnic, regional, tribal 
and sectarian conflicts that threaten this unity. 
5. Establishing a Jordanian economy based on Islamic principles, which 
ensures social equality, protects individual property, provides equal 
opportunities, and combats corruption and unemployment. 
6. Fighting political, financial, and administrative corruption. 
7. Supporting women's rights and youths organisations. 
8. Opposing the peace treaty with Israel and calling for the liberation of 
Palestine.^"' 
7.2.1.5. Future party 
This party was Hcensed on December 8, 1992. The Secretary General was Sulaiman 
Arar, a conservative and ex-government official. The Future Party is a centrist party of 
politicians who often held government positions in the past and can be described as a 
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conservative. Its principles and objectives were summarised to the researcher by its 
Secretary General as the following: 
1. Protecting the Jordanian Constitution, showing a commitment to its 
principles and emphasising the sovereignty of the law. 
2. Building the homeland on the basis of democracy, social justice and 
the development of state institutions. 
3. Adhering to the principle of independent power of state authority. 
4. Supporting the Palestinian struggle and believing in unity between 
Jordan and Palestine.^ '^ -" 
7.2.1.6. Jordanian Democratic Progressive Party f JPDP) 
The JDPP was Hcensed on January 16, 1993. Its Secretary General was M Am'ir. It is 
neo-communist and pro-Palestinian. The JDPP aims and objectives as stated in its 
constitution are: 
1. To contribute to the development of the state's institutions and laws. 
2. To enhance the democratic process in the country. 
3. To guarantee the rights of aU Jordanian people and political 
participation. 
4. To build a national economy based on the efforts of Jordanian 
manpower. 
5. To support the struggle of the Palestinian people and enhance relations 
with the PLO. 
6. To defend workers' and peasants' rights. 
^ To defend the political, economic and social rights of women.^ "^ 
7.2.1.7. The Jordanian Communist Party (JCP) 
The JCP was licensed on January 17, 1993 and its Secretary General was Ya'qub 
Zayadin. This party draws its support mainly from the lower middle class and 
professional groups. It had originally been established in the 1950s, only to be banned 
under the anti-Communist law of 1953, although it continued to operate underground. 
The Communist party calls for Arab nationalism and democracy, with an adherence to 
Marxist ideology. It aims and objectives were summarised to the researcher by its 
Secretary General as: 
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1. Protecting and spreading democracy and poUtical pluralism. 
2. Enhancing Jordanian national independence. 
3. Defending the socio-economic situation of the popular classes, 
especially workers, peasants and low income earners. 
4. Enlarging the base of social progress and social justice. 
5. Improving the economic situation of labour. 
6. Fighting corruption.^ ^"^ 
7.2.1.8. Jordanian Arab Ba'th Socialist Party (JASBP) 
The JABSP was licensed on January 18, 1993 and its Secretary General was Taysir al-
Humsi. It is an Arab nationalist party with a socialist ideology. This party, which was 
formerly close to the Iraqi Ba'th Party, had originally been established in 1954 but along 
with all political parties, was banned in 1957. However, it continued to operate 
underground and resurfaced in 1992. Its aims and objectives were summarised to the 
researcher by Ahmad al-Najdawi, the JABSP spokesman, as the following: 
1. Arab nationalism is a firm reaHty and the relationship between the 
individual and Arab nation is sacred, and requires sacrifice and 
responsibihty. 
2. The authority of the state derives from the people, and the people are 
the source of power. 
3. The party aims to enhance equality of rights and duty among citizens, 
regardless of religion, colour or race. 
4. The party believes in popular struggle for reviving Arab nationalism and 
building an economic, socialist, humanitarian order which realises social 
justice and a fair distribution of wealth.^ '^^  
7.2.1.9. The Jordanian People's Democratic Party fJPDP) 
The Jordanian People's Democratic Party was licensed on January 24, 1993. The 
Secretary General was Taysir al-Zubri. This party has a Palestinian Unk, specifically 
with Nayif Hawatmah's Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). The 
party was organised following the 1967 war with Israel and operated underground. It 
is guided by Marxist-Leninist ideology, and is neo-communist. The more important 
objectives stated in its constitution are as follows: 
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1. Enhancing democracy and poHtical pluralism. 
2. Strengthening national unity and defending the independence and 
sovereignty of the country. 
3. Maintaining equality for women and protecting their rights. 
4. Protecting working class rights and interests. 
5. Supporting the struggle of the Palestinian people for the right to 
return to their homeland.^ ^^ ^ 
7.2.1.10. The Progress and Justice Party (PJP) 
The PJP was legally registered on January 27, 1993. The Secretary General was Ah 
Farid al-Sa'ad. This party has a moderate poUtical ideology and is a secular centrist 
party calling for a free market economy and western style of democracy. Its objectives 
stated in its constitution are as follows: 
1. To provide the best guarantees for exercising freedom and the 
deepening of democracy through poUtical pluralism. 
2. To support the Palestinian issue. 
3. To beUeve in a free economy based on respect for individual property, 
and freedom of investment. 
4. To protect the rights and freedom of the individual.^ ^^^ 
7.2.1.11. Jordanian Democratic Socialist Party (JDSP) 
The JDSP which had split from the Communist party, was legalised on January 27, 
1993. The Secretary General was Tsa Mdanat, who had been an active member of the 
Communist party and was considered as its representative in the eleventh Chamber of 
Deputies of 1989. This party's priorities and objectives were summarised to the 
researcher by its Secretary General as the following: 
1. Enhancing national unity and fighting all forms of bias. 
2. Consolidating democracy and its institutions. 
3. Separating government powers according to the Jordanian constitution. 
4. Consolidating the independence of the parhamentary authority and the 
judiciary. 
5. Protecting the political, economic and social rights of women. 
6. Protecting the rights of workers and improving their situation. 
7. Forming national economic poUcies based on extending the productive 
base in agricultural and industrial fields.'^'*' 
263 
7.2.1.12. The Reawakening Party 
The Reawakening Party was legalised on December 7, 1993. Its Secretary General was 
Abd al-Ra'uf al-Rawabdah, a conservative ex-government official. The party's 
objectives and aims were summarised to the researcher by its Secretary General as the 
following: 
1. To enhance democracy on the basis of political pluralism, freedom of 
opinion and tolerance. 
2. To respect citizens' rights, and freedoms, guaranteeing equality and 
fighting discrimination. 
3. To emphasise freedom of opinion and expression, and to search for 
truth, knowledge and information. 
4. To support the national struggle of the Palestinian people. 
5. To consolidate the national identity of the Jordanian people through a 
commitment to the Arab nation.^ ^^ ^ 
7.2.1.13. Jordanian Democratic Popular Unity Party f JDPUP) 
The JDPUP was granted legal status on February 9, 1993. Its Secretary General was 
Azmi al-Khawaja. This party was an offshoot of the Damascus-based Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) led by Yasir Abd Rabbuh. Again, this party had 
been established after the 1967 war and operated underground. Socialism and the 
liberation of Palestine were the strategic aims of the party. Its goals and objectives 
stated in its constitution are as follows: 
1. To enhance the democratic transition process, sovereignty and the 
independence of the country. 
2. To enhance national unity and end discrimination in Jordanian 
society. 
3. To support the Jordanian Armed Forces. 
4. To emphasise the Jordanian-Palestinian relationship. 
5. To achieve Arab unity through democratic means. 
6. To protect the Jordanian national economy. 
7. To protect the activity of civil society institutions.^ ^^^ 
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7.2.1.14. Freedom Party 
The Freedom party was Hcensed on February 10, 1993. Its Secretary General was 
Fawaz al-Zu'bi. This party attempts to combine Marxist ideology with Islamic tradition 
and nationalist. Its aims and objectives stated in its constitution are as follows: 
1. Commitment to the provisions of the Jordanian Constitution. 
2. Adherence to the principles of democracy and political plurahsm. 
3. Protecting national independence and maintaining national unity. 
4. Supporting strong Jordanian-Palestinian relations and the struggle of the 
Palestinian people to establish an independent state. 
5. Building a national economy and hberating it from dependency. 
^ Respecting human rights, and fighting racism, sectarianism and 
Fascism. 
7.2.1.15. The Unionist Arab Democratic Party (UADP) 
The UADP was licensed on February 17, 1993. Its Secretary General was Anis al-
Mua'shir. It is a centrist party with a pan-Arab tendency and its aim and objectives 
stated in its constitution are as follows: 
1. Commitment to the principles of the Jordanian Constitution. 
2. Recognition that Jordanians are equal before the law and have equal 
rights and responsibilities. 
3. Separation between the three powers: legislative, executive, and 
judiciary. 
4. Emphasis on respect for freedom of opinion, and the press and for 
human rights. 
5. Enhancement of the democratic system, respecting both majority 
opinion and minority rights, and stressing poHtical pluralism and citizens 
pubUc Hberty. 
6. Support for the struggle of the Palestinian people.^ ^*' 
7.2.1.16. The Arab Islamic Democratic Moyement Party (Du'aa) 
The Arab Islamic Democratic Movement party was Hcensed on April 12, 1993. The 
party's Secretary General was Yusif Abu Bakir. It is a Hberal Islamic party caUing for 
the implementation of Islamic sharia and democracy. It has been critical of the Islamic 
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Action Front, accusing the latter of a regressive interpretation of Islamic Law. Despite 
its Islamic identity, this party has included Christian founders and members. The party 
emphasised the importance of this: "Arab Christianity is a fundamental part of the 
Islamic Arab civilisation and is its partner in structure and development". It is an 
independent Islamic party and its priorities as stated in its constitution are achieving the 
following objectives: 
1. To make the Koran and the sunna constitute the basic principles of 
the party's general orientation. 
2. To support the Palestinian struggle and achieve fuU liberation of 
Palestine. 
3. To participate in the Jordanian parliament and government. 
4. To guarantee freedom, equality and justice for the Jordanian 
people.(^ ^> 
7.2.1.17. The Arab Ba'th Progressive Party (ABPP) 
This party was legalised on April 13, 1993 and was formerly close to the Syrian Ba'th 
party. Its Secretary General was Mahmud al-Maitah. Similar to the Arab Ba'th 
Socialist Party, the Arab Ba'th Progressive Party spent 25 years underground. It is a 
nationalist party and struggles for the achievement of unity within the Arab nation, 
politically and economically, based on socialist ideology. Its beliefs and objectives were 
summarised to the researcher by Fu'ad Dabbur, the deputy secretary general, as the 
following: 
1. Believing that the Arab homeland is for all Arabs, and only the Arabs 
have the right to manage its affairs and wealth. 
2. Believing that the people are the source of power and leadership. 
3. Being committed to the Jordanian constitutional parliamentary 
system. 
4. Emphasising the importance of democracy which would guarantee 
citizens rights. 
5. Supporting and consolidating the Jordanian Armed Forces. 
6. Supporting the Palestinian struggle and rights of the Palestinian 
people to return to their homeland. 
7. Believing in socialism and a social system of justice. 
8. Structuring the Jordanian economy according to the socialist 
orientation leading to the unified Arab socialist society.^ "^^  
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7.2.1.18. The Jordanian Arab Popular Party (JAPP) 
The JAPP was legalised on May 27, 1993. This was a new party with a nationaHst 
ideology and leftist orientation. Its Secretary General was Abd al-KhaHq Shatat. The 
party's objective and principles as stated in its constitution are the following: 
1. To enhance Jordan's democratic experiment and its poHtical 
reaUsation. 
2. To protect the Jordanian people's freedom from aU forms of 
economic, political and cultural dependency. 
3. To support and consolidate Arab unity in real terms. 
4. To support the Palestinian cause and to enhance the Jordanian-
Palestinian relationship.'^'^ 
7.2.1.19. The Homeland Party 
The Homeland party was Hcensed on June 14, 1993 and led by Akif al-Fayiz, a bedouin 
and ex-government official. The party has a conservative ideology, with strong tribal-
affiHations. Most of its members were drawn from the East Bank of Jordan. Its 
objectives as stated in its constitution are the following: 
1. National unity, as a necessity for security and national survival. 
2. Support for the Palestinian people in the occupied lands, and the 
defence of their legitimate rights to their lands. 
3. The establishment of a future generation with an Arab heritage, and 
moral vision. 
4. The promotion of the spirit of thought and democratic dialogue in 
homes, pubUc places and political fora. 
5. The promotion of national pride and the strengthening of national 
loyalty within an Arab context. 
6. The raising of children with an awareness of the importance of work. 
7. The enhancement of social justice and equal opportunities. 
The promotion of the role of women in society, ensuring equal 
participation between the sexes.'•'^ ^ 
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7.2.1.20. Jordanian Arab Democratic Party (JADP) 
This newly formed party was licensed on July 12, 1993. The JADP is liberal and pan-
Arab with leftist orientation. Its Secretary General was Mu'nis al-Razzaz. The party 
objectives and principles as stated in its constitution are the following: 
1. Protecting Jordanian national unity. 
2. Supporting the Arab nation's right to unity and its right to eradicate 
dependency. 
3. Adhering to democracy as a constant and basic principle. 
4. Protecting the national economy and supporting its independence.^ ^^ ^ 
From the aims and objectives of the twenty political parties, it is possible to place them 
into three categories: centrist (conservatives and traditionalists), leftists and pan-Arab 
nationalists, and Islamists. The conservative and traditionalist political parties tend to 
have a local and tribal basis and conservative views. They are mostly not well 
organised and by the 1993 elections most of them still lacked shape, partly due to 
divisions among their leaders. Most of these parties derive their main support from the 
East Bank, are generally pro-establishment and subscribe to broadly the same 
progranraie. The conservatives and traditionalists parties include the Jordanian 
National ALiance Party, the Jordanian Pledge Party, the Popular Unity Party, the Future 
Party, the Progress and Justice Party, the Reawakening Party, the Unionist Arab 
Democratic Party, and the Homeland Party. 
The leftist and pan-Arab nationalist parties are strongly represented in Jordanian 
political circles. These parties operated underground during earlier periods; some of 
them were in existence from the 1950s and others were established following the 1967 
war. The parties were generally more organised than the conservative and traditionalist 
parties in the 1993 election. This trend concentrated mainly on four issues: Arab unity, 
socialism, the Palestinian issue and labour rights. The leftist and nationalist trend 
consisted of ten parties: the Jordanian Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, the Arab Ba'th 
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Progressive Party, the Jordanian Arab Democratic Party, the Jordanian Arab Popular 
Party, the Jordanian Communist Party, the Jordanian Democratic Socialist Party, the 
Freedom Party, the Jordanian Democratic Popular Unity Party, the Jordanian People's 
Democratic Party, and the Jordan Progressive Democratic Party. 
The Islamic parties have a strong foundation in Jordanian society, and are represented 
by fewer, but larger, parties those in the other trends. There are only two Islamic 
parties, the lAF and the Arab Islamic Democratic Movement Party. 
7.2.2. Influence of the Official parties 
Whilst twenty parties were registered at this stage (1992-1993), it was difficult to judge 
or estimate their influence. After only one year since their establishment, their 
behaviour in pubHc indicates that most were Hmited in their effect and not totally in 
touch with the masses. However, table no. 7.1 shows the number of each party's 
founders. This may not be an accurate representation of the support for the parties in 
late 1992 to early 1993, but it is the only source of information available. From table 
7.1, the strength of the Islamic Action Front is apparent, with 312 founders, 107 more 
than the second party, the Jordanian Pledge Party, a conservative and traditionaHst 
party. 
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Table 7.1 Political Parties Number of Founders and Political Stance 
No Party Name 
No. of Founders 
Political Stance 
1 Islamic Action Front Party 312 Islamist 
2 Jordanian Pledge Party 205 Centrist 
3 Reawakening Party 174 Centrist 
4 The Unionist Arab Democratic Party 166 Centrist 
5 Progress and Justice Party 164 Centrist 
6 Future Party 158 Centrist 
7 Homeland Party 152 Centrist 
8 Jordanian Arab Democratic Party 124 Nationalist 
9 Jordan People's Democratic Party 100 Leftist 
10 Jordanian Democratic Popular Unity Party 94 Leftist 
11 Jordanian National AlUance Party 93 Centrist 
12 Jordanian Democratic Progressive Party 88 Leftist 
13 Arab Ba'th Progressive Party 78 Pan-Arabs 
14 Jordanian Arab Ba'th SociaKst Party 75 Pan-Arabs 
15 Arab Islamic Democratic Party 72 Islamist 
16 Jordanian Communist Party 71 Leftist 
17 Jordanian Democratic Socialist Party 61 Leftist 
18 Freedom Party 59 Leftist 
19 Jordanian Arab Popular Party 56 Pan-Arabs 
20 Popular Unity Party 55 Centrist 
Source: The Mmistry of the Interior Publications, 1993. 
Support for poHtical parties tends to be primarily from educated groups. A survey 
conducted by the Centre for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan, in April 
1993, indicated that people joining poHtical parties were only about 1.4 per cent of the 
total population.'^ '*^ This was attributed to the previous experience of poHtical parties 
which ended in 1957 with the harassment of political activists in the country. 
After the enactment of the 1992 PoHtical Parties Law, thirty-two of the eighty deputies 
in parHament became officially affiHated to poHtical groupings. The leftist parties had 
three representatives in the Chamber of Deputies. The Jordanian Democratic Socialist 
Party was represented by Tsa Mdanat; the Jordanian Democratic Popular Unity Party 
by Dhib Marji; and the Jordanian People's Democratic Party by Bassam Haddadin. 
These parties' representatives were elected through the Christian seats in Karak, Irbid 
and Zarqa respectively. The Muslim Brotherhood, with 22, had the largest number of 
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representatives in parliament. The remaining seven deputies were from conservative 
and traditionalist parties. The Reawakening Party was represented by its Secretary 
General, Abd al-Ra'uf al-Rawabdah. The Jordanian National Alliance party was 
represented by three deputies, Faisal al-Jazi, Nayif Abu Tayih, and Jamal al-Khraishah. 
The Future party was also represented by three deputies, its Secretary General Sulaiman 
Arar, Salamah al-Ghuwari, and Abd al-Salam al-Fraihat. Table 7.2 shows the number 
of political parties participating in the eleventh parliament and the political affiliation of 
these parties following the 1992 Parties Law. This highlights the fact that of twenty 
registered parties, only seven were represented in parliament. 
Table 7.2 Political Parties Members in the Chamber of Deputies Following the 
Political Parties Law of 1992, 
Political Parties No. of Representative Percentage 
The Islamic Action Front 22 27.50 
Jordanian People's Democratic Party 1 1.25 
Jordanian Democratic Popular Unity Party 1 1.25 
Jordanian Democratic Socialist Party 1 1.25 
Reawakening Party 1 1.25 
Jordanian National AlUance Party 3 3.75 
Future Party 3 3.75 
Total 32 40.00 
Source: The Map of Jordan's PoHtical Parties Preceding the 1993 General election, Al-
Urdun Al-Jadid Research Centre, [New Jordan], Amman, 1993, p. 17. 
Of the eighty representatives in Parliament, the Islamic Action Front had 27.5 per cent, 
parties in traditionalist and conservative trend had 9 per cent of the seats, whilst the 
leftists parties secured 4 per cent. The remaining forty-eight deputies were nominally 
independent but of these 10 were considered supporters of the pan-Arab nationalists 
and leftists, twelve were independent Islamists, and the remaining 26 were considered 
conservative and traditionaUst supporters. 
271 
7.2.3. Parliamentary Blocs: 1989-1993 
From the initial convening of parHament in 1989, deputies had begun to form 
parHamentary blocs, and these acted as pressure groups. Most of the parUamentary 
blocs at this stage were bound much more by personal affiHation than by ideology, and 
had no mass following. 
Although there were three main trends, the members of the Chamber of Deputies in fact 
divided into six blocs. The leftist and pan-Arab nationalist trend was represented by the 
Democratic Assembly bloc, with 9 deputies; the conservative and traditionalist trend 
was represented by the NationaHst bloc (with 16 deputies), and the Constitutional bloc 
(with 16 deputies). The Islamist trend was represented by the Islamic Independent bloc 
(with 6 deputies) and the Muslim Brotherhood bloc - later, the Islamic Action Front 
(with 22 deputies). The sixth bloc was formed by eleven independents representing 
various poHtical o p i n i o n s . T h e MusHm Brotherhood and the Democratic Assembly 
blocs had the most coherent ideology and thoughts, whilst the other blocs lacked a 
well-defined poUtical vision. 
In November 1990, the emergence of a coaHtion of several blocs took place. The 
ParHamentary Unionist AUiance appeared as one of the strongest blocs. It consisted of 
the MusHm Brotherhood, several Islamic independents, seven Conservatives members, 
and five Nationalists members. The initial aim of the AUiance was to ensure the election 
of a MusHm Brotherhood member, Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat, as speaker of the Chamber 
of Deputies. This was achieved and Arabiyyat remained speaker of the Chamber until 
the end of 1991, at which point he was re-elected for a further two years.'^ ^^  
The establishment of parHamentary blocs was due to the weakness of the party system 
within the Chamber of Deputies. By the formation of the various blocs, deputies were 
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able to influence the executive in decisions such as the votes of confidence and 
budgetary matters. 
Conclusion 
From 1957 to 1989 trade union and professional associations attempted to fiU the role 
of political parties, but were constrained in their actions by the legislation under which 
they operated. However, the parties banned in 1957 unofficially penetrated these 
institutions. The role of the civil society institution was enhanced by the 1989 
parliamentary elections which presented the first true chance for political parties to be 
publicly, although unofficially, active rather than engaged in secret activities, with the 
exception of the Mushm Brotherhood, who had been openly active as a charity all the 
time. This unofficial change allowed parties to have some representation in parliament. 
However, no political parties, with the exception of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
participated to any great extent in the 1989 election. Candidates were viewed more in 
terms of political orientation than in term of party representation. The Political Parties 
Law of 1992, created the opening for twenty political parties to be registered. Thirty-
two deputies took the chance to become official party members. The general weakness 
of the party system led to the creation of parliamentary blocs. These blocs were not 
static and lasted only briefly and therefore lacked stability. The bloc situation was 
based on personal meetings between independent deputies for discussion and debate. 
Of aU the blocs in parliament, the Muslim Brotherhood maintained the greatest unity 
and was represented by the largest number of deputies. Moreover, the absence of a 
political programme gave the executive authority the opportunity to manoeuvre and co-
exist with the Chamber of Deputies in dealing with parliament 
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Chapter Eight 
The 1993 Elections: The Emergence of Formal Political Pluralism 
Introduction 
The November 1993 parliamentary elections were the first multi-party elections in 
Jordan since 1956. These elections were held with the official participation of groups 
from across the political spectrum, including Islamist, leftist, nationalist, and 
conservative and traditionalist groupings. The 1993 elections were only the most recent 
step in a political liberalisation process that had begun following the April riots of 1989. 
The most significant difference between the 1993 election and that of 1989 was that 
poMtical parties were now able to compete openly, on the basis of the 1992 Political 
Parties Law. A new variable of political pluralism was therefore present, allowing 20 
political parties to participate and nominate candidates. Moreover, the 1993 elections 
took place in a different political atmosphere to that of the 1989 elections. This was a 
result of the change in regional and international relations affecting Jordan, including 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the United States led war against Iraq, the convening of 
the Madrid Peace Conference, and the PLO-Israel Accord. The electoral law had, 
moreover, been amended to impose a one-person, one-vote formula, replacing the 
former system of multiple votes. 
This chapter wiU examine the operation of the different political parties in Jordan and 
the development of a political consciousness among the Jordanian people in response to 
the contemporary political context. The chapter wiU analyse the political change that 
affected Jordan prior to the election, as well as the conduct of political parties and the 
results of political trends in the 1993 elections. 
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8.1. The Lead-up to the 1993 Elections 
8.1.1. Changes in the Regional and International Environment Affecting 
Jordan 
The 1993 elections were held under diiferent political circumstances to those prior to 
the 1989 elections, and included a different political and economic context as well as 
changes in both the Arab world and the world in general. These were reflected in the 
behaviour of the government and the people during the election. 
The elections took place in an atmosphere that reflected the influence of both the 
regional and the international environment. At the international level, the coUapse of 
the socialist camp and the end of the cold war had left the United States, as the sole 
international leader, declaring that a new world order should be established. This had 
two effects on the regional situation. Firstly, it provided the background to the United 
States intervention in the Gulf War, and secondly it allowed the United States to restart 
the peace process in Madrid, which ended with the signing of a peace treaty between 
the Palestinians and the Israelis.^'' This was followed by the establishment of an agenda 
for a peace treaty between Jordan and Israel. 
The signing of the PLO-Israel accord on August 28, 1993, increased political tension 
and created a challenge to the holding of the 1993 elections. Campaigning was weD 
underway when the FLO and Israel announced their accord. Its reference to the 
possible return to Palestine of those forced out of the West Bank in 1967 led some East 
Bank nationalists to take the position that the Palestinians who might thereby return to 
Palestine should not be permitted to vote in the forthcoming elections. Some sources 
predicted that the elections would be postponed in the light of the new demographic 
and political uncertainties created by the PLO-Israel accord.^ ^^  
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The possibUity of postponement brought about political debate among Jordanian 
political groupings. Most of the centrist parties called for the postponement of the 
elections because of the potential demographic change in Jordan. The leftist and pan-
Arab Nationalist groupings were against postponement, as was the Islamic Action 
Front, while the Arab Islamic Democratic Movement, which targets liberal Islamists, 
preferred the postponement of the elections. 
However, on September 28, 1993, the Jordanian prime minister announced that the 
elections would take place on November 8, 1993 as originally scheduled.''*' This 
decision, rather than seeking postponement because of the PLO-Israel accord, was 
viewed positively in the institutionalisation of the political process in the Kingdom. 
The impact of the Second Gulf War also affected the elections. The forced return of 
around four hundred thousand Jordanian citizens working in the Gulf states, increased 
Jordan's population by 10 per cent, and in turn increased unemployment by 2 
percentage points from 16.8 per cent of the population in 1990 to 18.8 per cent by the 
end of 1991.'^' The return from the Gulf also added a new variable to Jordan's electoral 
equation, as most returnees were businessmen, professionals and technicians who 
preferred to vote for liberal and moderate candidates. 
The majority of returnees took up residence in three main areas, Amman Govemorate 
(57.1%), Zarqa (24.2%), and Irbid (13.3%), which were already under-represented in 
the Chamber of Deputies. This helped to increase the number of registered voters 
between 1989 and 1993, from 1,020,446 to 1,501,280; about 100,000 of the newly 
registered voters were returnees.^ ''^  
In addition, the cancellation of Western and Arab aid to Jordan because of its support 
for solving the crisis peacefully within the framework of the Arab League, and its 
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condemnation of Western intervention in the area, had adversely affected the internal 
economic situation in the country.^ '^ 
However, the Gulf crisis did improve political co-operation between the leadership and 
parHament, and led to greater national unity, with the political parties appearing to 
conclude that unity was essential i f the country was to survive at all.'^^ 
8.1.2. Domestic Political Context of the Election 
8.1.2.1. The Appointment of the Transitional Government 
The first step towards the preparation of the election was on May 29, 1993, when King 
Hussein appointed a new transitional government headed by Abd al-Salam al-MajaU, 
designed to lead the country into its first multi-party general election, due to take place 
on November 8. The appointment of al-MajaU, the head of the Jordanian delegation to 
the Middle East talks, indicated the King's commitment to the peace process with Israel. 
In his letter of appointment to al-Majali, the King emphasised the importance of 
continuing with the peace process. The King stated: 
We have chosen, in a comprehensive Jordanian meeting, to go 
ahead on the path of just and comprehensive peace which can be 
accepted and protected by successive generations. Peace which 
returns to the Palestinian Arab people its legitimate rights to 
national soil and returns to the Arabs and Muslims their rights to 
the holy sacred places (i.e. Jerusalem).* '^ 
The King stated that the new government should conduct the general election fairly and 
that voters should elect the candidates who would best serve their interests: 
As I lay on your shoulder and on the shoulders of the new 
government this great national task, I am absolutely sure that you 
wiU be as keen as me that the next council will be for the homeland 
and for all members of the one Jordanian family without any 
discrimination. You wiU also be eager to firmly take all possible, 
appropriate and required measures in order to lead the electoral 
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process on the basis of the constitution, which guarantees for all 
members of this family, males and females, complete equality of 
rights and obligations and to make available to all people their right 
to participate in electing the coming council. The elections should 
be free, fair and impartial, involving all the people and remind each 
elector (male or female) to realise his or her responsibilities towards 
their country and nation. Their vote should be granted to the best, 
candidate whose aims and ends are to serve the homeland.*'"' 
On July 30, 1993, 15 political parties including the Islamic Action Front, the Arab Ba'th 
Socialist Party, the Jordanian Arab Democratic Popular Party, the Jordanian 
Progressive Democratic Party, the Jordanian Socialist Democratic Party, the Jordan 
People's Democratic Party, and a number of parliamentary deputies and well-known 
personahties, sent a letter to Abd al-Salam al-Majali, the Jordanian prime minister, 
demanding that the government lower the voting age from 19 to 18, increase the 
number of seats in the Chamber of Deputies, cancel the reservation of seats for 
minorities, and alter the electoral boundaries to guarantee equal access to all voters.'"' 
However, these demands were not acted upon. 
8.1.2.2. Debate Concerning the Dissolution of the National Assembly 
On August 4, 1993, King Hussein issued a royal decree dissolving the 80-member 
Chamber of Deputies, the country's 11th parliament, which had been elected in late 
1989 on a non-party basis. The decree read, "We, Hussein the First, King of the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, in accordance with Article [34] Provision [3] of the 
Constitution, order the Lower House of Parliament dissolved as of August 4, 1993". 
The King announced that the country's lirst multi-party elections to the Chamber after 
some 37 years would take place on November 8.''^' The decision to dissolve parliament 
was seen by observers as a preliminary step towards changing the electoral law and for 
this reason, was widely criticised by the Islamic Action Front, the Jordanian Arab 
Democratic Party, the Jordanian Ba'th Arab Socialist Party, the Progressive Democratic 
Nationalists and a large number of parliamentary deputies, ex-deputies and well-known 
political personalities. They indicated that the decision to dissolve parliament 
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contravened the democratic process in the Kingdom. These political forces signed a 
statement on August 8, 1993, expressing their opposition to the government's decision 
to dissolve parliament three months before its mandate ended. The text of the 
statement read: 
The coalition of political forces aligned against surrender and 
capitulation is following with deep concern the implication behind 
the government's decision to dissolve parliament three months 
before its mandate is due to end according to provisions of the 
Jordanian Constitution. The decision to dissolve the Lower House 
of Parliament coincided with a wide scale campaign aimed at 
paving the ground for a new Election Law and were coupled with 
signs of satisfaction over these developments displayed in certain 
American circles. 
In light of this situation, many people are haunted by increasing 
fears that the measures are being carried out to fulfil the desires of 
foreign and other Arab circles which have made no secret of their 
fears from the Jordanian democratisation process. Acting from our 
deep conviction that the Constitution should remain the only source 
of all powers, we hereby join the majority of Jordanians in voicing 
our opposition to the dissolution of Parliament for the following 
reasons: 
First: There should not be any vacuum of authority. Should the 
Executive Authority resign or be relieved of duty, it is normally 
requested to continue in office until a new government has been 
formed to take its place so that no vacuum is created. Should the 
post of the head of state become vacant for any reason, it is 
normally filled immediately because state authority accepts no 
vacuum by nature. The Legislative Authority should remain in 
office until the results of the following parliamentary elections have 
appeared. 
Second: According to norms, the Lower house is dissolved when it 
becomes impossible for it to cooperate with the Executive 
Authority and this is done for the sake of averting any paralysis in 
the state function. In this case, parliament and the government are 
dissolved to pave the ground for a provisional government to 
supervise the next parliamentary elections. Never should parliament 
be dissolved before its mandate has been completed unless there 
was a stalemate between the executive and the legislative 
authorities and there was no room for them to work on a common 
understanding. 
Third: The remaining period in the life of the Lower House of 
Parliament was not a short one especially in view of the critical 
stage our region is going through and in the light of circumstances 
whose results no one is able to predict. It would have been better 
for a country to confront future eventualities with a Lower House 
of Parliament which can help deal with any development. We 
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would like to recall a move by the government in 1984 when it had 
to seek a royal decree to call the dissolved parliament to convene to 
endorse a constitutional amendment following which the House 
was dissolved again.''^' 
These political forces expressed their opposition to any future change of the election 
law, arguing that: 
We had hoped that the government would take steps towards 
preparing for the parliamentary elections and not to pounce on the 
democratic process, which had effectively contributed towards 
reflecting the cultural image of Jordan in the Arab region, causing it 
to regress. Since the government has failed to listen to advice, it is 
now called upon to conduct parliamentary elections in accordance 
with the existing Election Law and not according to a temporary 
law which is not backed by any provision in the Constitution which 
the government had vowed to uphold and respect."'*' 
The dissolution of the National Assembly four months before it was due to come to the 
end of its term does indeed seem to have been undemocratic, insofar as it pre-empted 
parliament from determining the content of the election law. 
8.1.2.3. The Electoral Law Legal Changes (One-Person. One-Vote 
Formula) 
From the time of the announcement of the date of the election, while many politicians 
were convinced that a change in the election law was imminent, there was also growing 
speculation in the local press. It was also expected that the amendment was likely to be 
in the form of the introduction of a one-person, one-vote formula, without changes to 
the electoral constituencies in the country. This was confirmed in King Hussein's 
speech at the Brookings Institution in Washington, in June 1993, when he spoke about 
the amendment of the election law, saying: 
In Jordan we are about to embark on further steps towards 
democratisation. We are preparing for general elections. On our 
return we shall discuss with all the elements and the schools of 
political thought that put together the National Charter the 
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possibility of modifying or improving the election law on the basis 
of the Constitution that stipulates that all Jordanians are equal in 
terms of their rights and their responsibilities, and the area of 
discussion wiU probably centre around the one-person, one-vote 
system. And of course we are entering a new phase since these last 
few years have seen the return of hundreds of thousands of 
Jordanians to their homeland, and many of them wiU be partaking in 
these elections that are scheduled for a time towards the end of this 
year.('^ ) 
On August 17, 1993 King Hussein made a televised speech, in which he announced a 
number of 'temporary changes' to the country's voting laws. The November elections, 
he announced, would be based on a system of one-person, one vote formula. He 
declared: 
We have endorsed a new temporary law stipulating an amendment 
to the election law submitted by my government, which is charged 
with holding free elections in this country under my guidance and 
supervision. The new temporary law entitles the electorate to cast 
one vote for one candidate in the new Lower House of 
Parliament.^ '*^ ^ 
Under the previous system, electors had been permitted to cast as many votes as there 
were members in the constituency. Article [46] Paragraph [B] and Article [52] were 
amended such that voters had the right to vote for one candidate only.^ ^^ ^ Paragraph 
[B] of Article [46] was amended to read: 
The Voter shall write the name of the Candidate he wishes to elect 
on the Ballot Paper given to him by the Chairman of the balloting 
Panel and shall return to the Ballot Box to deposit the Ballot Paper 
therein. An iUiterate Voter may ask the Chairman of the Balloting 
Panel to write the name of the Candidate the Elector wishes to 
elect; after having written down the name, the Chairman shall read 
the name out within earshot of the Balloting Panel. 
The text of Article [52] of the 1986 Election Law was also repealed and the following 
text was substituted: 
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A. If any Ballot Paper contains more than one of the names of the 
Candidates, only the first name shall be taken and the other 
names therein shall be omitted. 
B. I f the name of the Candidate in the Ballot Paper is not clearly 
readable, but the paper contains enough presumptions to 
indicate it and prevent any confusion, then the name shall be 
considered as that of that Candidate. 
The move to 'assist democracy' was, however, being made in an undemocratic manner, 
with the King, backed by the transitional government, announcing important changes in 
the electoral law, without parUamentary discussion. 
8.1.2.4. The Debate Concerning the Legal Changes (One-Person. One-
Vote Formula) 
The new change in the election law received considerable criticism in meetings, 
seminars and in the media from Jordanian political parties. Most of the criticism came 
from the Islamists, the leftists and the pan-Arab nationalists, who believed that the 
amendment of the election law by introducing a one-person, one-vote formula would 
reduce their chances in the coming elections, and would favour candidates who came 
from large tribal and traditional groups.'**' The fear arose because the electorate was 
now hkely to vote according to their tribal/family affJiations rather than on an 
ideological basis. The parties who were critical of the move threatened to take legal 
action against the government for introducing the changes without parliamentary 
consultation. They also condemned the King's decision to dissolve parliament before 
the change was announced, claiming that this was a dehberate move to prevent 
parliament debating the new electoral rules. 
The response of the Islamist opposition to the change in the electoral law was to review 
its participation in the general election. The Muslim Brotherhood initially threatened to 
boycott the election, believing that the strategy was deliberately designed to scale down 
their representation in the Chamber of Deputies.'*" However, on August 28, 1993, 85 
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per cent of the lAF's Consultative Council voted in favour of participation in the 
coming elections.^^°^ Dr Ishaq al-Farhan, Secretary General of the Islamic Action Front, 
emphasised that "the one-person, one-vote formula was designed to reduce the strength 
of the Islamic Action Front party in the election, and argued that non-participation in 
the election would mean isolation and poUtical death".^ ^^ ^ 
The SociaUst Ba'th Party's opposition to the change in the election law was emphasised 
by Ahmad al-Najdawi, the party spokesman, who stated, "this change would increase 
the individual, personal, and tribal affiliations which wiU not enhance democracy and the 
change must be submitted to the Chamber of Deputies for approval".^ ^^^ Azmi 
Khawaja, Secretary General of the Jordanian Democratic Popular Unity Party, also 
criticised the change and stated, "the change of the election law does not allow equality 
between citizens in different constituencies. It wiU strengthen the role of tribalism and 
sectarianism, and prevent parties from forming an electoral coalition".^ ^^^ 
Despite their objections, all political parties nonetheless agreed to participate in the 
elections. However, debate over the change was extensive and lively in both the press 
and in pubhc fora. The amendment affected the manner in which the election campaign 
was conducted in two ways. Firstly, by lowering the level of candidate participation, 
less well-connected candidates felt they had less chance of being elected because voters 
would tend to vote for members of more influential families. Secondly, it prevented 
candidates making informal coalitions which, in the 1989 election, had allowed voters 
to vote for a list of candidates. 
8.2. Preparation for the 1993 Elections 
On September 28, 1993, the Jordanian Prime Minister, Abd al-Salam al-MajaH 
announced that parliamentary elections would be held on November 8, 1993 as 
originally scheduled. He confirmed this by stating, "There are no extraordinary 
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circumstances that warrant postponing the elections". He added, "We are keen to 
continue with our democratic process and parliamentary life."'^'*' This announcement 
came only ten days before the dead-Une for government officials who were plamung to 
contest the poUs to submit their resignation (30 days before the actual day for 
election).'^^' The government started receiving applications for candidacy from 
October 14. 
8.2.1. Voter Registration 
At the end of June 1993, the Ministry of the Interior began making arrangements for the 
registration of voters for the forthcoming elections. Those who had been registered for 
the 1989 elections were not required to register again as their registration remained 
valid. However, those citizens who had been outside the country and were unable to 
register and vote during the 1989 elections, voters who had changed their residence, or 
citizens who had just come of voting age (19 years or older) were required to register 
during the July registration period.'^''' As registration cards contained a photograph of 
the individual concerned, and the card had in due course to be presented to the electoral 
officer, the possibility of a dead person's card being misused was discounted. 
According to the Ministry of the Interior's Official Electoral Report, the estimated 
population of Jordan in July 1993 was around 4,284,770 (51 per cent male, 49 per cent 
female), and the total number of voters who registered in the country over the age of 
nineteen was 1,501,280 out of an estimated 1,800,000 eligible voters.(see table 8.3) 
This excluded members of the armed forces, the police, and the security services who 
are not allowed to vote under the election law. 
On October 16, 1993, registered voters started to collect their cards. The deadline for 
this was extended from 30 October to 3 November. Of the total registered, 1,203,429 
collected the necessary voting cards.'"' According to the Ministry of the Interior, 
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12,069 voters applied to change their voting districts. In 1989, the number of 
registered voters was 1,020,446 out of a population of around 3,280,244. 
Table 8.1 illustrates the actual seats allocated to each constituency compared with the 
number which ought to have been designated if the seats had been allocated in relation 
to the size of population. These figures are based on an 80 seat assembly with a total 
population of 4,284,770 giving a ratio of one seat per 53,559 citizens. 
Table 8.1: The Populations, Voters, Seat ;s, and Seats Allocated Proportionally 
Electoral district 1993 
Population 
Registered 
Voters 
Actual Seats Proportional 
Seat 
Amman (1) 325070 95002 3 6.2 
Amman (2) 535430 110490 3 10.3 
Anunan (3) 305000 103672 5 3.6 
Amman (4) 149075 81466 2 2.8 
Amman (5) 340020 95718 5 6.5 
Amman (6) 97400 43212 3 1.8 
Balqa 255000 126440 8 4.9 
Karak 168385 83996 9 3.2 
Tafileh 67000 26910 3 1.1 
Ma'an 95000 36516 5 2.1 
Zarqa 639035 204686 6 12.3 
Mafraq 100000 33304 3 1.4 
Irbid 485200 168078 9 9.3 
A.jloun 100575 47456 3 1.9 
Jerash 124425 40633 2 2.3 
Ramtha and Bani Kinanah 152400 59249 3 2.9 
Kom'a and North Ghor 152400 61695 2 2.9 
Northern Bedouin 81940 33146 2 1.5 
Central Bedouin 51465 25323 2 1.2 
Southern Bedouin 59950 24288 2 1.1 
Total 4284770 1501280 80 *80 
Source: Ministry of the Interior, Official Electoral Report, 1993. 
*The Researcher has corrected the overall total given, as these were incorrect in the 
Official Report. 
*Figures do not tally to 80 due to rounding. 
The election law of 1986, with its amendment of 1989, designated a disproportionate 
number of seats to rural areas and minority groups. Despite changes in the size of the 
population in constituencies between 1989 and 1993, no alteration was made to the 
number of seats allocated. From the above table it is clear that a number of major 
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constituencies in the Kingdom were underrepresented in terms of electoral seats 
according to the population. For example, the second district of Amman with over 
110,490 registered voters had an allocation of a mere three seats, whereas the 
Govemorate of Ma'an, with only 36,516 registered voters, received five seats. 
8.2.2. Candidates Nomination 
In spite of the amendment of the electoral law to a one-person, one-vote formula, and 
the consequent reduction in the number of candidates from 647 in 1989 to 534 in 1993, 
there was stiU a significant number of candidates registered in the various electoral 
constituencies. Nomination of candidates for the November 1993 elections officially 
began during a 3-day period starting 14 October 1993. By 17 October 1993, 559 men 
and women had registered themselves as candidates. No candidate was rejected on 
pohtical grounds. According to the election law, the Administrative Governor has three 
days in which to accept or reject the applications. The Ministry of the Interior used the 
electoral law to reject the applications of a number of candidates in more than one 
constituency. The most important of these was the apphcation from Dr. Bassam al-
'Umush, the Islamic Action Front candidate in Zarqa constituency, who failed to resign 
from Jordan University within the specified time. Another was the journalist, Hammad 
Faranah, as he was an active member in the Palestinian National Council. The third was 
Dr Nimr Sirhan, as he had not held Jordanian citizenship for at least ten years. The 
rejected candidates appealed to the courts, which then allowed Dr. al-'Umush and 
Faranah to run for election but approved the rejection of Dr. Sirhan's application.'^*' 
Twenty-five candidates withdrew their candidacy before the actual date of the polls. A 
final list of nominees to contest the poUs totalled 534 candidates (of which only three 
were women), a ratio of over 6.7 candidates per seat. Candidates' names were 
announced at the end of October after the appeal courts had ruled on the contested 
applications.'^^' 
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8.2.3. The 1993 Elections Campaign 
Officially, campaigning was to begin 25 days before polling day. In practice, it began 
after the Ministry of the Interior had approved the candidates' nominations. Despite the 
government's promise not to interfere in the election campaign, at the beginning it 
announced a ban on public political meetings. Therefore, from 16 October 1993 official 
campaigning took place mainly through baimers hung from electricity poles and shops, 
posters, leaflets, newspaper advertisements, private visits and meetings until the ban on 
pubMc raUies was overturned by the Higher Court of Justice on October 28, only ten 
days before voting day. This made for a fairly low-key campaign, although 
campaigning became more active after permission was granted for the holding of rallies. 
Independent leftist and Islamist candidates invited their followers to public meetings 
that injected some life into the campaign.'^ "^ The election campaign lasted until 7 
November 1993. 
The method of campaigning differed from one electoral constituency to another and 
reflected each constituency's social background. For example, the first and second 
districts of Amman are dominated by Palestinian refugees in two large camps, who are 
traditionally largely apathetic to election campaigns, due to their low expectations and 
feeling of alienation from the political process. In these districts the major theme which 
most candidates emphasised was the PLO-IsraeH accord, despite the majority of voters 
being more concerned with public services and the hardships of daily Hfe.^ '^^  
In the three bedouin electoral districts many candidates sought tribal support and 
emphasised common concerns and tribal values, in addition to national issues. The 
bedouin candidates contested the poUs through the old traditions of the tribes. Guest 
houses (rmdhafah) were used for meetings, while other public gatherings took place in 
offices, private homes and social centres. Candidates emphasised the personal levels of 
communication with their constituents through home visits. The madhafah were 
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considered by bedouin candidates as the main channel for dialogue between candidates 
and voters.'^^' 
Banners were scarce or non-existent in the bedouin districts as campaigning was based 
almost exclusively on tribal affiliations and traditional relations among the tribes, rather 
than on ideological sloganeering. In contrast, outside the bedouin constituencies, 
banners were used by the majority of candidates and numerous advertisements were 
apparent in the urban centres. The lAF had the most concerted advertisement 
campaign, which included strategically located banners.'^ '^ 
The 1993 election campaign did not have the mass fervour that the 1989 election race 
had, because there was more cynicism among the Jordanian population as to what could 
be gained through the electoral process. Despite this, reliable estimates indicate that 
more than JD40 miUion (£38 miUion) was spent by the candidates in their attempt to 
win the hearts and minds of the people through massive advertising, leaflets, posters, 
lavish campaign rallies and paying support staff'^'*' 
8.2.3.1. Campaigning Issues 
The major effort of the electoral campaign began unofficially in the summer of 1993. 
The most important issues in the candidates' platforms seen on the street banners, 
related to poMtical and economic events, the peace process, national unity, womens' 
rights and equality, strengthening democracy and institutional reforms, and fighting 
corruption and unemployment. These issues can be organised into two categories. 
First, there were issues which related to the local concerns of the constituency. For 
example, bedouin candidates stressed the need for building roads, schools and hospitals 
locally and creating jobs in their constituency.'^ '^ The second category reflected 
national issues. Thus, Islamists focused mostly on the peace process, national unity, 
and the rejection of the 'Jordanian option'. Former MPs reminded the electorate of their 
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record of public service and focused on freedom of speech, social justice and equal 
opportunity. Candidates focused on the interests of the working class, as well as 
economic development, pubUc services, and women's rights.^^^^ 
A significant feature of the election campaign was the dominance of tribal and centrist 
forces and the concomitant strength of local identification over ideological or political 
affiliation. This was revealed not only by the result of the election, but also by the style 
of campaigning. The one-person one-vote formula made the election campaign less 
focused on pohtical issues and resulted in the candidates concentrating on the 
traditional bases of power. The success of the campaign came to depend on local 
demands and the family and tribal dimensions, in addition to the influential power of 
wealth and economic and social status, rather than on those issues which affected the 
run up to the elections, such as the peace process. 
8.2.4. Candidates Platforms 
An electoral platform is one of the most important forms of communication between 
candidates and voters. Through this, candidates outline their policies, future ambitions, 
and preferences in future parliament. The electoral platforms of candidates in the 1993 
election can be divided between those of independent candidates and those put forward 
by parties platforms. They are discussed separately below. 
8.2.4.1. Platforms of Independent Candidates 
Independent candidates competed in the election without a formal affJiation to any 
political party. They were generally centrist in political inclination and relied primarily 
on tribal support. Most independent candidates' platforms were concerned mainly with 
public services and the hardships of daily Ufe, and focused on enhancing democracy, 
national unity, stability, social justice, administrative reforms, protecting farmers, the 
rights of workers and a better level of allowances. For example. Ah Abu al-Raghib, a 
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former minister and MP, focused his electoral platform on democracy, productivity, 
freedom of speech, social justice, equal opportunity, and a better future for children. 
To win the Palestinian vote, Abu al-Raghib who competed in the mainly Palestinian 
third constituency of Amman, also focused his electoral platform on the Palestinian 
issue and the right of Palestinians to return to their homeland/^ '^ Tahir al-Masri, a 
former prime minister and MP, concentrated his electoral platform on the development 
of national economic legislation, the right to work and the protection of the rights of 
the labour force, administrative reforms and pubhc services/^ ^^ 
Candidates who appealed to Palestinian voters focused mainly on the PLO-Israel 
Accord, which became the main election issue for candidates in Palestinian-dominated 
constituencies. In these areas, pro PLO candidates tried to attract voters from Palestine 
who favoured the accord, while others, who rejected the PLO-Israeli accord, appealed 
to 'nationalist forces'. In the event, the majority voted for candidates who opposed the 
accord. Candidates in constituencies other than those composed of Palestinians tried to 
encourage more people to vote for them by focusing on issues related to the voters' 
direct needs and concems.^ '^ ^^  Despite their independence, voters generally recognised 
that candidates identified with one of three trends: Islamist, conservative and 
traditionalist, leftist and pan-Arab NationaUst. 
8.2.4.2. Political Parties Platforms 
Political parties, as noted above, were officially allowed to participate in the elections 
for the first time since 1956. However, most of the party candidates tended to stress 
tribal, ethnic and family affiliations rather than their party platforms. Some parties 
issued a list of official candidates, whilst other party candidates contested the election as 
independents, albeit with the formal backing of a party. The latter were known as 
affiliated independent candidates. Thus, only six of the 20 licensed political parties 
contested the poUs with an official platform. The other 14 parties while fielding 
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candidates did not contest the elections with an official platform. The reason for this 
position was an attempt to overcome lingering pubhc fears about political affiliation 
dating back to 1957 when parties were banned and their members were subject to 
subsequent poUtical repression. Thus, the candidates produced individual manifestos 
and sought support on a tribal and family basis rather than on an ideological basis. The 
six official parties manifestos are discussed below. 
8.2.4.2.1. The Islamic Action Front Party 
The Islamic Action Front Party, the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, fielded 
thirty six official candidates in seventeen of the Kingdom's twenty electoral 
constituencies. The lAF party ran the election with a national platform which had three 
major focuses; internal issues, the Palestinian problem, and Arab and Islamic issues. 
These were quoted in the manifesto as follows: 
• The internal issue 
1. Consolidating the role of parliament and enabling it to achieve its 
objectives as the legitimate authority and representative of the 
people. 
2. Improving the controlling role of the executive authority. 
3. Establishing a national comprehensive civH service system which 
could be appHed to all government employees. 
4. Resisting any tendency or policy calling for developing relationships 
with Israel. 
5. Ensuring and consolidating national unity according to the heritage of 
Islamic values by giving equity and fair treatment to all citizens in all 
aspects of l i f e . 
6. Ensuring the right of expression of faith and beliefs. 
7. Aiding and encouraging self-reUance schemes and establishing 
charitable organisations, social societies, cultural and sports clubs 
and youth organisations. 
8. Improving security and fighting crime and criminals. 
9. Fostering a comprehensive agricultural poUcy in order to bridge the 
gap between production and consumption. 
10. Solving the problem of farmers' accumulated debts and safeguarding 
their rights. 
11. Reviewing and re-implementing the sales tax and the law of the 
Chamber of Commerce. 
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12. Improving the worker law and safeguarding the freedom of trade 
unions and their independence. 
13. Continuing to establish student unions in Jordanian educational 
institutions and youth institutions. 
14. Improving legislation concerning the rights of women and their 
employment. 
15. Consolidating and improving the armed forces and their training, and 
introducing compulsory military service. 
16. Consohdating and improving the civil defence bureau and its training, 
and providing the necessary equipment. 
17. Improving the work of the accounts bureau and its controlling 
role . 
18. Establishing an information policy on freedom of thought and the 
right of expression. 
19. Improving the national curriculum and school text books to meet the 
objectives of education. 
20. Implementing the principle of equal opportunity and fair competition 
to all employees. 
21. Working towards bringing a teachers' union into existence . 
22. Continuing to subsidise food and the basic needs of the citizens. 
The Palestinian problem 
1. Supporting the Palestinian people and standing with them in their 
struggle. 
2. Safeguarding the Islamic and the Arabic dimension in the 
Palestinian problem. 
» Arabic and Islamic issues 
1. Consohdatiag the cultural, economic and legislative ties between 
Arab countries, establishing Arab institutions in the field of 
education and economics and solving border problems between 
Arab and Islamic countries in a friendly fraternal way. 
2. ConsoHdating cultural, political and economic relations with the 
independent Islamic countries which were formerly part of the old 
Soviet Union. 
3. Helping and supporting Islamic minorities in achieving and 
obtaining their rights 
4. Implementing Islamic law and regulations. '''"^  
Furthermore, in addition to the party platform, all Islamic Action Front candidates were 
responsible for designing an individual platform based on the local situation for his own 
constituency, but without deviation from the national platform. For example, Abd al-
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Mun'im Abu Zanat, standing in the mainly Palestinian second district of Amman, 
stressed the importance of supporting the establishment of a Palestinian state (saying 
that Jordan could not be a substitute home for the occupied land).^ '"^ 
While the lAF national and local platforms stressed many of the issues which also 
concerned other parties, it was able to differentiate itself with its emphasis on Islamic 
issues, such as Islamic law and regulations. 
8.2.4.2.2. The Jordanian Communist Party 
The Jordanian Communist Party fielded three candidates, in Amman Third constituency, 
in Irbid, and in Amman Sixth constituency. The electoral platform of the Communist 
party was differentiated from other platforms in stressing the need for a complete 
national programme for economic, political, cultural and social development and also 
calling for the rejection of the IMF intervention. The manifesto supported the following 
issues. 
1. National unity and consolidating national independence and 
democracy. 
2. Improving the national curriculum and developing national 
awareness. 
3. Widening the scope of the organisations of teachers, students, 
workers and farmers. 
4. Solving the problems of poverty, unemployment, and the 
increase in the cost of living, fighting corruption and ending 
favouritism. 
5. A complete national programme for economic, poUtical, 
cultural and social development. 
6. Consolidating Arab solidarity, rejecting any external 
intervention, and disengaging from the IMF 
7. Rejection of any relationship with Israel before solving the 
Palestinian problem. 
8. Supporting the Palestinian people in restoring their rights. 
9. A new outlook in eradicating backwardness in all aspects of 
social Ufe, especially as regards women's, youth, and students' 
affairs.^"'^  
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8.2.4.2.3. The Jordanian Democratic Socialist Party 
This party fielded three candidates, one of them, the Secretary General of the Party, 'Isa 
Mdanat, in Karak constituency, and two others in Balqa and Amman Third 
constituency. The distinctive element in the electoral platform of the party was the call 
to achieve social justice. No other party raised this particular issue. The rest of the 
manifesto sought: 
1. To protect the independence of Jordan. 
2. To support the Palestinian people struggle towards building 
their state. 
3. To safeguard and enhance democracy.^ '* '^ 
8.2.4.2.4. The Jordanian Ba'th Arab Socialist Party 
The Jordanian Ba'th Arab Socialist Party fielded four candidates in the twenty electoral 
constituencies. Two were in Amman third and sixth constituencies, and one each in 
Tafileh and Karak districts. The Ba'thist electoral platform concentrated on the social 
and national development of the Kingdom. It called for: 
1. Investment in national industry, and helping national industry to 
decrease the rate of unemployment. 
2. A national development programme to decrease the rate of 
poverty. 
3. Participation of women in building the new Jordan. 
4. The implementation of an improved working law to safeguard the 
rights of the workers. 
8.2.4.2.5. The Jordanian People's Democratic Party (HASHD) 
The Jordanian People's Democratic party fielded three candidates, one each in the 
Zarqa, Madaba, and Irbid constituencies. Its electoral platform focused on both 
regional issues, such as Iraq and Palestine, and national issues, as follows: 
1. Supporting national unity and standing against any external political 
or economic intervention. 
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2. Supporting the Palestinian question and the continuation of the 
intifada in order to establish an independent Palestinian State. 
3. Increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the Chamber of 
Deputies in controlling government policies and legislating modem 
democratic rules and laws. 
4. Increasing the range of participation in the poUtical decision-making 
process. 
5. Calling for an effective national economy, which would solve the 
problems of unemployment and ensure the rights of the people to a 
decent standard of living. 
6. Supporting Iraq and the unity of its lands and working towards 
Ufting the injustice of the embargo.^ '*^ ^ 
8.2.4.2.6. Jordanian Democratic Popular Unity Party (UNITY) 
The Jordanian Democratic Popular Unity Party fielded three candidates, one each in 
Amman first, Balqa, and Zarqa constituencies. Its electoral platform also concentrated 
on regional and national issues. It called for: 
1. Resisting and denying the Jordanian-Israeli peace agenda and the 
Palestinian-IsraeU treaty. 
2. Establishing an independent Palestinian state and the right of self-
determination for the Palestinian people. 
3. Establishing a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation according to the 
wishes of the people of the two countries (after estabUshing an 
independent Palestinian state). 
4. Ensuring equity between citizens in practical terms. 
5. Consolidating democracy, freedom, human rights and sovereignty of 
the law. 
6. Fighting corruption. 
7. Curing poverty and the unemployment problems. 
8. Supporting youth and women's rights. 
9. Resisting the interference of the IMF in the Jordanian economy. 
10. Enhancing democracy, social advancement and Arab unity. 
11. Lifting the unjust embargo on Iraq.^ '*^ ^ 
The Jordanian People's Democratic Party (HASHD) and the Jordanian Democratic 
Popular Unity Party (UNITY) were unified shortly before the election under the name 
of "The Unified Advanced Bloc". Following the merger, a united platform was framed 
in which the bloc called for: 
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1. Consolidating national unity and the co-operative relations 
between the people of Jordan and Palestine, for the sake of 
complete equity in rights and obligations. 
2. Resisting political, cultural and economic intervention. 
3. Insisting on the right of Palestinians people to return to a 
unified homeland and establish an independent country with 
Jerusalem as its capital. 
4. Working towards the rights of women in all aspects, especially 
economically and politically. 
5. Ensuring provision of freedom, democracy and social justice. 
6. Realising the right of expression within the limits of the 
constitution. '^'^ ^ 
8.2.4.2.7. Qyeryiew of the Political Platforms 
It was clear that the platforms of the parties were based on a number of similar 
concerns including the need to ensure equity and justice; the future of young people; the 
rights to expression and freedom; to buUd a strong national economy; to support 
women's and workers' rights; and to support the establishment of a Palestinian state. In 
general, there was considerable consensus between the platforms, and this helped to 
contribute to the peaceful character of the election. 
The majority of Jordanians chose to vote for candidates who would serve society's 
needs in terms of infrastructure and services rather than those who raised 'lofty slogans' 
and made promises they could not fulfil. The hardships of daily life in a country, with a 
foreign debt representing 140 per cent of the gross domestic product and the resulting 
unemployment and poverty, were clearly the preoccupation of a majority of the 
voters.^ '^ ^ 
8.2.5. The 1993 Election: Level of Competition 
The election law of 1986 had allocated 80 seats to Jordan's 20 electoral constituencies, 
distributing them between Muslims (68), Christians(9), Circassians and Chechens (3). 
The 534 candidates consisted of 478 Muslims, 46 Christians, and 10 Circassians or 
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Chechens. With regard to the number of candidates in different constituencies, Irbid 
with 60 candidates had the most, followed by Karak with 56 candidates, and Zarqa with 
53 candidates, while the northern bedouin constituency had the smallest number with 10 
candidates. Table 8.2 shows the level of competition between candidates and the 
distribution of seats. 
Table 8.2: Candidates Level of Competition, and Seats Distribution 
constituencies distributions distributions of total total level of competition 
of seats candidates of of 
seats candi-
dates 
M C CI M C CI M C CI General 
Amman (1) 3 - - 21 - - 3 21 7.0 - - 7.0 
Amman (2) 3 - - 22 - - 3 22 7.3 - - 7.3 
Amman (3) 3 1 1 15 10 3 5 28 5.0 10 3 5.6 
Amman (4) 2 - - 20 - - 2 20 10.0 - - 10.0 
Amman (5) 4 - 1 36 - 4 5 40 9.0 - 4 8.0 
Amman (6) 2 1 - 15 7 - 3 22 7.5 7 - 7.3 
Balqa 6 2 43 4 - 8 47 7.1 2 - 5.9 
Karak 7 2 - 48 8 - 9 56 6.8 4 - 6.2 
Tafileh 3 - - 17 - - 3 17 5.7 - - 5.7 
Ma'an 5 - - 18 - - 5 18 3.6 - - 3.6 
Zarqa 4 1 1 45 5 3 6 53 11.3 5 3 8.8 
Mafraq 3 - - 17 - - 3 17 5.7 - - 5.7 
Irbid 8 1 - 56 4 - 9 60 7.0 4 - 6.7 
A.iloun 2 1 - 18 8 - 3 26 9.0 8 - 8.7 
Jerash 2 - - 13 - - 2 13 6.5 - - 6.5 
Ramtha & 3 - - 18 - - 3 18 6.0 - - 6.0 
Bani Kinanah 
Koura and 2 - - 19 - - 2 19 9.5 - - 9.5 
North Ghor 
North 2 - - 10 - - 2 10 5.0 - - 5.0 
Bedouin 
Central 2 - - 14 - - 2 14 7.0 - - 7.0 
Bedouin 
South 2 - - 13 - - 2 13 6.5 - - 6.5 
Bedouin 
Total 68 9 3 478 46 10 80 534 7.2 5.1 3.3 6.7 
M. Muslim, C. Christian, CI . Circassian and Chechen 
Source: Jordan's 1993 Election, Al-Urdun al-Jadid Research Centre, Amman, Jordan, 
1993, p. 23. 
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According to the above table, the average competition level in all constituencies was 
6.7 candidates per seat. The greatest competition for a Muslim seat was 11.3 
candidates per seat in Zarqa constituency, whereas in Ma'an there were only 3.6 
candidates per seat. The highest competition level for the Christian seats was 10 
candidates per seat in Amman third constituency and the lowest was 2 candidates per 
seat in Balqa constituency. The highest competition level for the Circassian and 
Chechen seats, was 4 candidates in Amman fourth constituency and the lowest was 3 
candidates per seat in both Amman third constituency and Zarqa constituency. 
Although 534 candidates stood in the 1993 election, this was substantially less than the 
647 candidates who stood in the 1989 election. One reason for this can be found in the 
change in the electoral system to a one-person, one-vote formula. The potential 
candidates beheved that this change would encourage voters to support tribal 
candidates rather than ideological positions, thus reducing their chances of success. 
8.2.6. The 1993 Elections: Participation 
Of the 1,501,280 registered voters, 1,203,429 collected the necessary voting cards. 
The number of those who actually voted on the election day was 822,306, representing 
68 per cent of those who collected their voting cards.^ '^ '^  Table 8.3 shows the 
percentage of participation in the 1993 elections. 
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Table 8.3; The Percentage of Participation in the Election of 1993 
Population of Jordan at the end of 1993 4,284,770 
Number of Eligible Voters 1,800,000 
Number of Registered Voters 1,501,280 
Number of People Carrying Voting cards 1,203,429 
Number of Actual Voters 822,306 
Proportion of Voters to Voting Cards Holder 68.0% 
Proportion of Voters to Registered Voters 54.7% 
Proportion of Actual Voters to Eligible Voters 45.6% 
Proportion of Registered Voters to Eligible Voters 77.0% 
Proportion Voting Cards Holder to Eligible Voters 62.0% 
Proportion Voting Cards Holder to Registered Voters 80.0% 
Source: Ministry of the Interior, Official Electoral Report, 1993. 
According to table 8.3, the proportion of registered voters was 77 per cent of the total 
number of eligible voters in the Kingdom. About 80 per cent of registered voters 
actually collected the necessary voting cards, and voter turnout ran at approximately 
45.6 per cent of all ehgible voters, compared with 40 per cent in the 1989 election, with 
suffiage in both elections based on all Jordanians over 19 years of age.^^°' The turnout 
in the 1989 election was 62 per cent of card holders, which increased in the 1993 
election by 6 per cent. 
The distribution of seats to electoral constituencies was determined by the Electoral 
Law of 1986 and its amendments of 1989. Table 8.4 shows the number of eligible 
voters, registered voters, voting card holders, and actual voters in each constituency. 
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Table 8.4: Number of Participants in the 1993 Elections 
Electoral district EUgible Registered Voting Card Actual 
Voters Voters Holder Voters 
Amman (1) 157330 95002 59000 35844 
Amman (2) 259150 110490 65152 43111 
Amman (3) 92680 103672 76402 47572 
Amman (4) 72155 81466 73539 41278 
Amman (5) 164572 95718 73093 49668 
Amman (6) 47140 43212 40869 28804 
Balqa 119085 126440 113186 73061 
Karak 75260 83996 80353 59093 
Tafileh 30930 26910 24366 19931 
Ma'an 47090 36516 33907 26625 
Zarqa 304180 204686 135710 91453 
Mafraq 33520 33304 28397 23160 
Irbid 216380 168078 134666 94661 
A.iloun 44860 47456 43480 29325 
Jerash 55500 40633 35476 27433 
Ramtha and Bani Kinanah 67990 59249 55925 39811 
Koura and North Ghor 67975 61695 52939 37039 
N. Bedouin 34570 33146 30340 21659 
C. Bedouin 34293 25323 24503 16046 
S. Bedouin 25000 24288 22126 16732 
Total 1949660 1501280 1203429 822306 
Source: Ministry of the Interior, Official Elections Report, November 10, 1993. 
*The researcher has corrected the overall total given, as these were incorrect in the 
Official Report. 
The average turnout in the Kingdom was 68 per cent. As shown in table 8.4, there was 
a high level of voter registration. In several constituencies, registration exceeded 100 
per cent of eligible voters (Amman third and fourth, Balqa, Karak, and Ajloun). This 
could be attributed to the transfer of registration from the voters' place of residence to 
the constituencies where the families originated, thus creating a situation where the 
number of registered voters exceeded that of eligible voters. This followed the change 
in the election law to a one-person, one-vote formula, which as discussed previously, 
increased the tendency to vote along tribal rather than ideological lines. The highest 
turnout was in Tafileh and Ma'an, with 74 per cent and 72.9 per cent of registered 
voters respectively, whereas the lowest turnout was in Amman first constituency with 
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37.7 per cent. The Jordan Times claimed three reasons for the high overall turnout. 
First, many voters realised that the move towards democracy was irreversible and votes 
should not be wasted. Second, most families and clans realised that the one-person, 
one-vote formula would increase the importance of a vote as a candidate would be 
elected to parliament on a smaller number of votes than in 1989. These people voted 
because of close clan and family links or social ties with the candidates. Third, on 
November 7, the King issued a call to all voters to exercise their right to vote as an 
unshirkable national duty.^ '^^  The King stated: 
Let our proud people come out and appear in this day of 
democracy [the election day] and let us serve as an example and a 
model of conduct in protecting the achievement of the homeland 
which we have built with patience, toil and sacrifice. Let us live up 
to the expectations of our march with hope and admiration of 
which we are worthy.^"^ 
Although the overall voters turnout could be considered high, according to the Jordan 
Times a number of reasons contributed to the abstentions from voting. First, many 
families registered their names and collected the necessary voting cards but some of the 
voters were abroad at the time of the election. Second, many famiUes despite having 
registered and collected the necessary voting cards, were not interested in voting due to 
the absence of a famUiar candidate. Third, there was a deliberate 'disappearance' of 
voting cards arranged by some candidates who sought to prevent their rivals wiiming 
votes.^ "^ 
Finally, only 30 per cent of the Palestinians voted in the 1993 election, which resulted 
in only 14 deputies out of the 80 elected being of Palestinian origin. Eleven of them 
were from the Islamic Action Front. The low level of Palestinian participation in 
Jordanian politics was attributable to a number of factors. Among these were general. 
political alienation, and the unrepresentative constituency boundaries which were 
perceived to favour East Bankers.^ '^'^  
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8.3. The 1993 Elections Result 
On November 8, 1993, 822,306 Jordanians cast their votes at the 2,906 polling stations 
throughout the Kingdom's 20 electoral districts. Of the 80 candidates in the 1989 
Chamber of Deputies, only 26 were re-elected to office, while 34 previous deputies 
failed in their attempt. The remaining 20 did not stand for re-election. 
The results of the election, which were announced by the Minister of the Interior at a 
news conference on November 9, 1993, revealed an overwhelming victory of a pro-
government forces. Table 8.5 Shows the electoral constituencies, the winners and the 
latter affiliation. 
Table 8.5: Electoral Districts, Winners and Political Affiliations 
Constituencies Deputies winners No. of Votes Pohtical Affiliation 
Amman (1) Abd al-Aziz Jabr 8,002 lAF 
Hammad Abu Jamus 4,078 Future Party 
Dhib AbduUah 3,469 Ind. Islam 
Amman (2) Abd al-Mun'im Abu Zanat 9,336 lAF 
Hamzah Mansur 8,880 lAF 
Muhammad Dhuwaib 5,257 Homeland Party 
Amman (3) Ibrahim al-Kilani 9,134 lAF 
Tahir al-Masri 8,789 Centrist 
Al i Abu Raghib 8,162 Centrist 
KhaUl Haddadin (Christian) 1,582 JBASP 
Tujan Faisal (Circassian) 1,885 Nationalist 
Amman (4) Anwar al-Hadid 6,329 Centrist 
Muhammad al-Hunaiti 6,310 Centrist 
Amman (5) Hammam Sa'id 3,690 lAF 
KhaUd al-Ajarmah 3,308 Centrist 
Abd Musa al-Bakhit 3,237 Centrist 
Muflih al-Lawzi 2,963 Centrist 
Munir Subar (Circassian) 2,302 Centrist 
Amman (6) Abd al-Hafiz al-Shakhanbah 3,823 Nationalist 
Abd al-Majid al-Aqtash 3,626 Ind. Islam 
Samih al-Farah (Christian) 1,969 JNA 
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Balqa Ali al-Shatti 5,354 
Muhammad 'Uwaidah 4,788 
Mustafa Shnaikat 4,770 
Ibrahim Shihdah 4,714 
Hashim al-Dabbas 3,107 
AbduUah al-Nsur 3,050 
Samir Qawar (Christian) 2,621 
Fawzi Tuaimah (Christian) 2,038 
Centrist 
lAF 
JDSP 
Centrist 
Centrist 
Centrist 
Centrist 
Centrist 
Karak Abd al-Hadi al-Majali 3,871 
Mahmud Hwaimil 3,791 
Mansur Bin Tarif 2,988 
Ahmad al-Kasasbah 2,892 
Jamal al-Hushush 2,721 
Samir Habashnah 2,616 
Jamal al-Sarayrah 2,440 
Nazih Ammarin (Christian) 1,073 
Hani Hijazin (Christian) 1,024 
Pledge Party 
Ind. Islam 
Centrist 
lAF 
Nationalist 
JADP 
Ind. Islam 
Centrist 
Nationalist 
Tafileh Muhammad Dawudiyyah 2,568 
AbduUah al-Akaylah 2,398 
Ratib al-Sa'ud 1,931 
Nationalist 
lAF 
Pledge Party 
Ma'an Awad Khlaifat 3,988 
Abd al-Karim al-Kabariti 3,418 
Tawfiq Kraishan 3,190 
Taha al-Habahbah 3,137 
Badr al-Riyati 2,436 
Centrist 
Centrist 
Centrist 
Centrist 
lAF 
Zarqa Bassam al-'Umush 
Muhammad al-Hajj 
Dhib Anis 
Fayyad Jarrar 
Bassam Haddadin 
(Christian) 
Abd al-Baqi Jammu 
(Chechen) 
9,316 
8,970 
7,090 
4,512 
1,840 
1,235 
lAF 
lAF 
lAF 
Homeland Party 
Hashd 
Ind. Islam 
Mafraq Abd al-Karim al-Dughmi 3,672 
Abdullah Akhu Irshaidah 3,186 
Muhammad Abu 'Ulaim 2,644 
Nationalist 
Centrist 
Centrist 
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Irbid 
Ajloun 
Jerash 
Ahmad al-Kufahi 4,260 
Abd al-Majid al-Azzam 4,248 
Salih Shi'watah 4,221 
Abd al-Ra'uf Rawabdah 4,175 
Arif al-Batainah 3,741 
Salih Irshaidat 3,686 
Abd al-Razzaq Tubaishat 3,382 
Abd al-Rahim al-'Ukur 3,168 
Nadir Abu al-Sha'ar 2,227 
(Christian) 
Ahmad al-Qudah 3,128 
Daif AUah al-Mumini 2,761 
Farah al-Rabadi (Christian) 850 
Muflih al-Ruhaimi 4,893 
Sulaiman al-Sa'ad 3,513 
lAF 
Centrist 
Centrist 
Awakening Party 
Centrist 
Centrist 
Centrist 
lAF 
Centrist 
Centrist 
lAF 
Centrist 
Pledge Party 
lAF 
Ramtha 
Kinanah 
& Bani Fawaz al-Zu'bi 
Talal 'Ubaidat 
Ibrahim Samarah 
5,544 
4,671 
4,297 
Centrist 
Centrist 
Awakening Party 
Koura 
Ghor 
and North Hatim al-Ghizawi 
Nadir Zuhairat 
5,151 
3,811 
Centrist 
Centrist 
North Bedouin Sa'ad al-Surur 
Nawwaf al-Qadi 
6,582 
5,039 
Centrist 
JNA 
Central Bedouin Jamal al-Khraishah 
Muhammad al-Zaban 
3,263 
2,200 
JNA 
Centrist 
South Bedouin SaUm Furaij al-Zawaidah 3,717 
Muhammad Nijadat 2,453 
Centrist 
JNA 
Sources: Jordan Times. November 9-11, 1993 
lAF: Islamic Action Front Party 
Ind. Islam: Independent Islamist 
JNA: Jordan National Alliance 
Hashd: Jordanian people's Democratic Party 
JADP: Jordanian Arab Democratic Party 
JBASP: Jordanian Ba'th Arab socialist Party 
JDSP: Jordanian Democratic Socialist Party 
According to table 8.5, the members-elect secured a total of 320,501 votes. The highest 
number of winning votes was obtained by conservative and traditionalist (Centrist) 
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forces with 188,805 votes, representing 59 per cent of the total votes cast for winning 
candidates. The successful Islamist candidates polled 105,195 votes representing 33 
per cent of the total votes cast for winning candidates. The winning leftist and pan-
Arab Nationalist candidates polled 26,501 votes representing 8 per cent of the total 
votes cast for winning candidates. 
Although conservative and traditionalist candidates won the greatest percentage of 
winning votes, the largest number of votes for individuals was gained by Islamist 
candidates in the large urban constituencies. The largest number of votes was obtained 
by Abd al-Mun'im Abu Zanat, who scored 9,336 votes in Amman second constituency 
as against the 19,343 votes he gained in the 1989 elections, followed by Bassam al-
'Umush with 9,316 in Zarqa constituency, Ibrahim al-KHani with 9,134 from Amman 
Third constituency, Muhammad al-Hati with 8,970 in Zarqa constituency, and Hamzah 
Mansur with 8880 in Amman Second constituency. These wiimers were all members of 
the Islamic Action Front (lAF). The highest votes for non-Islamists were for Tahir al-
Masri and Ali Abu Raghib, both conservative candidates scoring 8,789 and 8,162 
respectively. Mustafa Shnaikat, a member of the Jordanian Democratic Socialist Party, 
polled the highest number of votes among leftist and nationalist candidates, with 4,770 
votes. 
Tujan Faisal a minority Circassian candidate won with 1885 votes in the Amman third 
constituency. This was the first election of a woman to the Chamber of Deputies in the 
history of Jordan. The victory of Tujan Faisal marked a milestone in the political life of 
the Kingdom. It should be noted that she had run for election in 1989 but was not 
successful. Faisal projected herself not predominantly as a women's candidate but as an 
independent, thus managing to gain the confidence of both Uberal women and men. She 
saw the need to work towards the institutionaUsation of democracy through progressive 
legislation. Her concerns were for human rights and justice.^ ^^^ 
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The position of the minority candidates was highlighted in Ajloun constituency where 
Farah al-Rabadi, a Christian candidate, polled the lowest vote for a winning candidate 
with 850 votes. Ahmad Annab, from the same constituency, who had won the 1989 
election with 5,280 votes, was now unsuccessful with 2,573 votes. 
The result of the election showed a significant change among political grouping from 
1989, with pro-government deputies increasing from 33 to 49, whilst the Islamists fell 
from 34 to 21 seats, leftist and pan-Arab nationalist also fell from 13 to 10 seats. The 
outcome was a conservative pro-government majority, with the opposition led by the 
lAF being considerably reduced. 
The reduced strength of the Islamist trend in the 12th parliament could be attributed to 
four factors. First, the reduction was due to the implementation of the one-person, one-
vote formula which altered the voting intentions of the public. Second, was the general 
desire among Jordanian voters to elect deputies who were known for their connections 
with the government, in the hope they could provide them with improved local services. 
Third, more than one (sometimes five) Islamist candidates came forward in some 
constituencies, such as Balqa, Karak, Ma'an, Koura, North Ghor, and Madaba, which 
resulted in a splitting of their votes, and thus weakened their chances of being elected. 
For example, the lAF had officially nominated three candidates in Balqa constituency, 
Muhammad 'Uwaidah from the Baqa'a camp, Abd al-Latif Arabiyyat (a former 
Chamber of Deputies Speaker), and NayU Massalha. However, Ibrahim Khraysat (a 
former Muslim Brotherhood spokesman) and Abdullah Riyalat, an independent Islamist, 
also insisted on contesting the election. This led to outright competition between the 
Islamist candidates and hurt Arabiyyat's chance in the election. AU of them failed with 
the exception of Mr. 'Uwaidah. Fourth, there were internal divisions and power 
struggles within the lAF itself.^ *^^ ' 
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8.3.1 • Official Reaction to the Election Results 
The election result was described by official government sources as free and fair, 
indicating the success of Jordanian political pluralism. Salamah Hammad, the Interior 
Minister, said at the end of the election day, that the election had gone smoothly and in 
an orderly fashion/^^^ 
The King's reactions to the election results were presented in a news conference held on 
November 9, 1993. He welcomed the results as evidence of the strength of democracy, 
pluralism and rights in the Kingdom, stating: 
We are committed to democracy, to pluralism, to respect for 
human rights and to making our country an example, hopefully to 
others, near and far, respecting our constitution and the great 
achievement of formulating a National Charter ... through the 
contributions of every school of political thought in the country.^ ^^ ^ 
The election results also gave support to King Hussein's efforts to further the peace 
process. He was clearly convinced from the outcome of the elections that the peace 
process should continue under the new parliament. The King stated that, "The peace 
process started with the last parliament and will continue with this parhament, here in a 
democratic country, and we will cooperate to achieve the best result".^ ^^ ^ 
Looking to the future, the King envisaged an expanding role for the political parties. He 
hoped that the number of parties would be reduced over the next few years and, 
interestingly, predicted that parties would offer suitable programmes to the voters. He 
declared that: 
[concerning] the poUtical scene, in term of parties ... I do not think 
or believe that we have reached our goal as yet. We may reach it in 
four years, we may reach it in eight years ... inevitably pohtical 
parties will be given the same chances with passage of time to 
express themselves more coherently and the numbers, I am sure, 
win dwindle from 20 to far less with programmes that can convince 
people, then we are looking at a different scene.^ "^^  
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Furthermore, he stressed that this first multi-party election for nearly four decades 
would consolidate the democratisation process, reflecting the irreversible course of 
democracy that Jordan had adopted. The King also expressed his confidence that 
Jordan was following the right path. He added, "we are on the road to more 
democracy, more freedom and more respect for human rights". '^''^  
The King welcomed the success of a woman in the election, by stating that; "[This is a] 
very, very important step in public hfe at this level". He added, " I don't see why in the 
future there could not be more of the same... I hope that as a pioneer she will do 
whatever she can to ensure that this is the beginning of a road that will be followed by 
others in the future".^ ^^^ 
Overall, the King's speech highhghted his acceptance of the democratisation process to 
date. His statements on the future course of Jordanian politics indicated a support for 
greater democratisation. 
8.3.2. The Political Trend Reflected in the Elections 
The elections resulted in an overwhekning victory for the pro-government traditionalist 
and conservative forces.(see table 8.5). The majority of those elected had been able to 
secure the backing of their family and tribal allies. 
The Islamist deputies who had achieved 42.5 per cent of the total seats in the 1989 
election, won only 21 seats in the 1993 election and were down to 26 per cent. The 
Islamic Action Front fielded 36 candidates but only won 16 seats, representing 20 per 
cent of the total seats, and out of the 15 independent Islamic candidates who stood in 
the election, only 5 were elected. Two of the independent Islamist members-elect, Dhib 
Abdullah and Abd al-Majid al-Aqtash were likely to support the political and socio-
economic programme of the lAF. The other three Islamist independents, Abd al-Baqi 
Jammu, Jamal Sarairah, and Mahmud Hwaiirul were likely to support the lAF only on 
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social issues.^ ''^ ^ Both the former Islamist Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies Abd al-
Latif Arabiyyat and the former Muslim Brotherhood spokesman Ibrahim Khraysat 
failed to be re-elected. Despite their lack of success compared with 1989, the Islamic 
Action Front was stih the largest party in the Chamber of Deputies. Ishaq al-Farhan, 
lAF Secretary General, declared that "the decrease in seats for the lAF was not a 
setback, as the total votes obtained by the lAF were more than in the 1989 election".^^^ 
The leftists and pan-Arab nationalists were represented by 10 deputies. Three were 
party representatives: Mustafa Shnaikat of the Jordan Democratic Socialist Party, 
Bassam Haddadin of the Jordan People's Democratic party, and KhaUl Haddadin of the 
Jordanian Ba'thist party. The remaining seven were independents. Previously they had 
held 13 seats in parUament representing 16.2 per cent of the total seats. This fell to 
12.5 per cent of the total seats. 
The remaining forty-nine seats were won by centrist (conservative and traditionalist) 
forces representing 61.2 per cent of the total seats, an increase from the 33 seats in the 
1989 elections which had represented 42.5 per cent of the total. The elected members 
included former government officials, rural community and tribal leaders. The election 
results thus changed the balance of power in the Jordanian parUament and severely 
weakened the influence of the Islamic bloc. Table 8.6 shows the political forces in the 
Chamber of Deputies following the 1993 election. 
Table 8.6: Political Forces in the 1993 Jordanian Parliament 
Affihation No. of Seats 
Islamist 21 
Leftist and Pan-Arab NationaUst 10 
Conservative and Traditionalist 49 
Total 80 
Source: Jordan Times. November 9-11, 1993. 
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8.3.3. Political Parties Showing in the 1993 Election 
Overall, political parties showed limited success in the election, winning only 32 of the 
80 seats contested. Many poUtical parties neither nominated candidates, prepared an 
electoral slate nor drew up a poUtical programme. However, they instead supported 
party members, who were running as independents, for two reasons. Firstly, they were 
stiU young and consequently faced many internal conflicts, and furthermore their 
programmes were vague and generaUy unknown to the electorate. Secondly, the voters 
had a lingering distrust of poMtical parties. Therefore, twelve parties decided to 
nominate their candidates as independents, depending on their social, tribal, or previous 
official job positions to gain votes. Indeed two of the registered parties did not even 
nominate affiUated candidates. These were the Popular Unity Party and the Unionist 
Arab Democratic Party. 
The poUtical parties had fielded 87 out of the 534 candidates. Fifty-two of these 
contested the elections as official party representatives, while the remaining 35 
contested the poUs as independent candidates with party affiUation.^ ^^^ It should be 
noted that the secretary generals of eight parties were among the candidates. Three of 
them ran as official poUtical party candidates: Dr. Ya'qub Zayadin for The Jordanian 
Communist Party, Azmi Al-Khawaja for the Jordanian Democratic Popular Unity Party 
(Unity), and Tsa Mdanat for the Jordanian Democratic SociaUst Party. However, none 
of these were elected. Significantly, the other five candidates contested the elections 
independently beUeving they would attract stronger support due to their previous 
official post in the goverrmient without the ideological baggage of a party, in what was 
effectively only an emerging democratic country. These included Yusif Abu Bakir for 
the Arab Islamic Democratic Party (Du'aa), Muhammad Al-Awran for the Jordanian 
Arab Democratic Party, Abd al-KhaUq Shatat for the Jordanian Arab Popular Party, 
Abd al-Hadi Al-MajaU for the Al-Ahad Party (Pledge), and Abd al-Ra'uf Al-Rawabdah 
for the Yakatha Party (Reawakening). The first three did not succeed, whereas the 
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other two won seats in parHament.^ *^'' Table 8.7 shows the political parties which 
returned in the 1993 elections. 
Table 8.7: Party Returns of Jordan's 1993 Parliamentary E ections: 
Political Parties Candidates Winners Political 
Affiliation 
Islamic Action Front* 36 16 Islamist 
Jordan Arab Ba'th Socialist Party* 4 1 Nationalists 
Jordanian People Democratic Party* 3 1 Leftist 
Jordanian Democratic Socialist Party* 3 1 Leftist 
Jordanian Communist Party* 3 0 Leftist 
Jordanian Democratic Popular Unity Party* 3 0 Leftist 
Freedom Party 1 0 Leftist 
Jordan Arab Popular Party 1 0 Pan-Arabist 
Jordanian Arab Ba'th Progressive Party 1 0 Pan-Arabist 
Jordanian Arab Democratic Party 3 1 Centrist 
Arab Islamic Democratic Party 2 0 Islamist 
Jordanian Democratic Progress Party 1 0 Leftist 
The Progress and Justice Party 1 0 Centrist 
Jordan National Alliance Party 8 4 Centrist 
Jordanian Pledge Party 7 3 Centrist 
The Reawakening Party 4 2 Centrist 
The Future Party 4 1 Centrist 
The Homeland Party 2 2 Centrist 
Total 87 32 
Source: Jordan's 1993 Election, Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Centre, [New Jordan], 
November, 1993, pp. 28-30. 
* These parties nominated their candidates for the election. 
The largest party representation in the Chamber of Deputies following the 1993 
elections was the Islamic Action Front with 16 deputies. This was followed by the 
Jordanian National Alhance Party with 4 seats, the Pledge Party with 3 seats, the 
Reawakening Party and the Homeland Party with 2 seats, and a single seat for each of 
the Jordanian Arab Democratic Party and the Future Party making a total of 13 seats 
for conservative and traditionalist parties. 
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The third type of party, represented by leftist and pan-Arab nationalist parties included 
the deputies of the Jordanian People's Democratic Party (HASHD), the Democratic 
Socialists Party, and the Arab Ba'th Socialists Party, which were represented by one 
deputy each. The achievement of political parties in the election was limited, and 
reflected their strength in Jordanian society. The majority of voters voted for 
candidates considered capable of providing services and addressing the infrastructural 
needs of their constituencies rather than those standing for national platforms. 
Conclusion 
The four year period between the country's two elections witnessed major watersheds in 
Arab politics: the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the US-led war against Iraq, the convening 
of the Madrid peace conference, the signing of the PLO-Israel Accord, and the poUtical 
liberalisation in Jordan which gave civil society a larger role in the state, with the advent 
of formal pohtical parties. The result of the election saw an overwhelming victory for 
the conservative and traditionalist forces. The election underscored the predominance 
of non-ideological tribalism over political ideologies. 
In the run up to the first multi-party election since 1956, a number of undemocratic 
moves were taken, such as the dissolution of parliament and the changes in the electoral 
law, and saw the introduction of a one-person, one-vote formula which had three 
effects on the election. These were firstly, the reduced number of candidates, secondly, 
the removal of informal coalitions which had dominated the 1989 election, and thirdly, 
the reinforcement of tribal/family affiliation rather than the encouragement of political 
ideologies, thus reducing the chances of success of the opposition forces, in particular 
the lAF. 
Despite the influence of the changed electoral law, this was the first multi-party election 
in Jordan since 1956. The Islamist and leftist participation in the electoral process gave 
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credibiUty to the poUtical system in the country, enabling a significant step to be taken 
through the multi-party elections, towards poUtical UberaUsation in Jordan. The 
election also resulted in an important watershed in the role of women in Jordanian 
poUtics, with the first woman elected to parliament. 
The presence of poUtical parties in the 1993 election was less significant than 
anticipated for a number of reasons. These were the absence of a poUtical programme, 
a structuraUy weak system, and new parties mostly unfarmUar to the pubUc. However, 
their participation in poUtical Ufe formed an important stepping stone on the road to 
poUtical pluraUsm in Jordan. 
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Chapter Nine 
Conclusion 
This research has analysed the process of political liberalisation in Jordan, in particular 
by examining parUament's role in the transition towards democracy in Jordan. 
Democracy has been much discussed since the concept was first used in conjunction 
with the Greek city states. Its importance has grown throughout the 20th century with 
both the decline of colonialism and the collapse of communism. In its 1995 survey. 
Freedom House identified 114 (out of a total 192 countries as democracies - a figure 
higher than at any other time in history. '^^  Of these democracies, Huntington classified 
37 (or one-third) as only "partly free", due to their restriction of basic political liberties 
and human rights.^ ^^ 
Since its establishment in 1921, the Jordanian monarchy has attempted to effect and 
maintain a framework of legitimacy through a constitutional parliamentary system of 
government. The gradual process of democratisation peaked in 1956 following the 
promulgation of the 1952 Constitution, the licensing of political parties under the 1955 
Parties Law, and the 1956 election which saw the establishment of the first (and only) 
openly pro-Arab unity cabinet led by the leader of the opposition party (the National-
Socialist Party), Sulaiman al-Nabulsi. 
From 1956 a series of internal and external crises influenced the political and 
parliamentary situation in the country. These included attempted military coups by 
some sections of the army; the challenge by the Arab Nationalism of Nasir and Syria 
and their supporters; the loss of the West Bank to Israel in the 1967 war; and the PLO 
being recognised as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people at the Rabat 
Conference in 1974. These crises led to the banning of political parties in 1957; 
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frequent dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies by the cabinet between 1957 and 1974; 
the absence of a general election from 1967 to 1989 (although by-elections were held in 
1984) and the prorogation of the Chamber of Deputies from 1974 to 1984. 
Several factors sparked off the poUtical UberaUsation process which began in Jordan in 
1989. These were the disengagement from the West Bank in 1988 and the recognition 
of the Palestinian identity in the area; the severe economic crises which resulted in the 
imposition of IMF austerity measures; and nation-wide popular disturbances. The riots 
were the culmination of a number of problems including lack of poUtical freedom, price 
hikes, modernisation of society and popular desire for participation in the poUtical 
process. As a result, the Jordanian government was forced into a position of trying to 
strike a deUcate balance between conforming to the terms of the IMF agreement on the 
one hand, and satisfying an increasingly critical public opinion on the other. 
The 1989 general election was deemed by both internal and external observers to have 
been fair and honest, despite it having taken place before the issuance of the law 
aUowing poUtical parties. Although poUtical parties were not yet legal, the election 
confirmed the existence of poUtical pluraUsm in the country, with candidates of aU 
poUtical affiUations standing individuaUy for election. Despite some confusion over 
candidates' positions, it was generally understood that this was simply the first step in a 
transitional process and that it was only a matter of time before poUtical parties with 
their own identities would be permitted and legalised. The 1989 election stiU left 
certain matters to be desired, but more important was the fact that the process of 
democratisation had taken hold m Jordan, and further political reforms were inevitable. 
The 1989 elections marked the real beginning of the Jordanian democratisation 
experiment. The significance of the elections was fivefold: 
1. The elections took place at a time of rapid change in the world. 
2. These were the first general elections in over twenty-two years. 
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3. The elections were fair and free. 
4. Al l political forces participated. 
5. Credibility was assigned to the political process through the success of Islamists and 
other figures in opposition. 
These elections, which constituted a significant transition towards democracy, were the 
culmination of Jordan's internal drama and were aimed at fulfilling three main 
objectives. The first was to broaden the process of democracy, the second aimed to 
confirm that Jordan had relinquished any claim to the West Bank, and the final objective 
addressed public grievances in order to gain pubUc's support. 
Following the 1989 election, parliament became the centre of political development. A 
number of further steps on the road to democracy followed, including the endorsement 
of the National Charter in 1991; the abolition of both martial law and the anti-
Communist law; the adoption of the 1992 Political Parties Law which resulted in the 
establishment of twenty parties; and the promulgation of the 1993 Press and Publication 
Law allowing the media greater legal protection from government repression. 
In the period up to 1993, the Chamber of Deputies endorsed 130 laws, and submitted 
12 interpellations and 396 questions to the government, most of which were acted 
upon. It also discussed in depth the budget laws for each of the years 1990-1993. 
During this period, parliament constituted the main element in national dialogue and its 
achievement in changing the course of government policy boosted the chances for the 
successful adoption of the process of poUtical UberaUsation. 
The central element in the new state-society relationship supporting the process of 
liberalisation was a new social contract, the National Charter. The role of civil society 
was enhanced by the 1989 election, as was the process of political liberalisation which 
followed. Civil society gained political ground after the state incorporated the 
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principles of pluraUsm, tolerance, and civil duty into the National Charter as bases for 
interaction in Jordanian society and poUtics. This resulted in greater respect for human 
rights; freedom of expression; the development of poUtical satire and criticism; greater 
freedom to hold conferences, lectures, panel discussions, and meetings on a variety of 
political topics; and the emergence of poUtical parties and pluraUsm. 
This created the first opportunity since the 1957 ban for parties to operate both legaUy 
and openly in terms of their poUtical activities. From 1957, trade unions and 
professional associations had attempted to fiU the role of poUtical parties, despite being 
heavily constrained by legislation. The PoUtical Parties Law therefore enabled a de-
poUticisation of the trade unions and professional associations by formaUy re-
introducing political parties into the country. 
In the period before the 1993 elections, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait adversely affected 
the Jordanian economy. The economic crisis had the potential to cause a major poUtical 
crisis which would have destabilised the Jordanian regime and chaUenged the 
democratic process. Despite such turmoil, the crisis resulted in improved poUtical co-
operation between parliament and the leadership, promoting greater national unity. 
Other major pre-election watersheds in Arab poUtics occurred with the US-led war 
against Iraq, the convening of the Madrid Peace Conference, and the signing of the 
PLO-Israel accord. Domestically, there were three significant events which occurred in 
the same period. Firstly, the electoral law was changed to one-person, one-vote 
formula, which led to a reduced number of candidates; the removal of formal coaUtions 
which had dominated the 1989 elections; and a reinforcement of tribal and family 
affiUations rather than encouragement of poUtical ideologies. Secondly, the Ministry of 
the Interior's attempt to prevent poUtical parties from holding ralUes on pubUc property 
was quickly overturned by the High Court of Justice. FinaUy, the most serious 
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challenge was speculation over possible delay in the holding of the elections after the 
PLO-Israel Accord was signed in mid-September. 
Despite these occurrences, the run up to the 1993 elections illustrates the strength of 
the process of liberalisation in Jordan, during which there was broad discussion in the 
press about such concerns as the one-person, one-vote formula. This, together with the 
High Court decision on political rallies, must be seen as a positive sign that the right to 
freedom of expression was being exercised by the public and respected by the state. 
The decision to hold the elections on the originally scheduled date is also a positive 
indicator of the institutionaHsation of the political process in the Kingdom. 
The 1993 elections represent a significant development in Jordanian politics. Four 
factors account for this significance. The first is the new legal environment in which the 
elections were held. The second relates to the way the democratic experiment 
transformed campaigning and political behaviour. The third is the fact that they were 
the first multi-party elections to be held since the start of the democratisation process in 
1989. The fourth factor concerns the election of the first woman to parliament in 
Jordan since they were first granted the right to vote in 1974. 
Today Jordan has emerged as the most democratically open country in the Arab world, 
in the sense that all political groups and tendencies, including the Islamists, can 
participate in the political process. The only significant setback in the democratisation 
process was the change in the electoral law in the absence of parliament, in an effort to 
reduce the power of oppositional forces. Overall, the Jordanian case can be 
characterised as democracy without a fiiU transfer of power. The present predicament 
of political parties is that they are socially relatively weak. Within the parliamentary 
system, the parties seek to encourage more stable and broad-based decision-making 
procedures. Despite these obstacles, the country has bom witness to its first multi-
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party election in Jordan since 1956 as well as the participation of all political forces in 
the political process. 
The lessons learnt from this study of the path from an undemocratic regime to 
democracy in Jordan are discussed next. In the theoretical discussion, a number of 
concepts were proposed. First, Rustow's four stage analysis of the evolution of 
democracy has not been proved in the study as there has been no second stage or "hot 
family feud", although the third stage, "the decision phase", describes the situation in 
Jordan at present. 
Second, O'DonneU and Schmitter's analysis states that the process of democratisation is 
initiated by a split between hard liners and soft liners. However, in the case of Jordan, 
the position of the Hashemite monarchy, built on the foundations of Amir Abdullah's 
rule and re-inforced following the 1957 crackdown by King Hussein, has enabled the 
King to control the political process. Thus, the process was not initiated by a split in 
the ruling coalition, but resulted from the flexibility of the King in responding to internal 
and external events. This is shown by the process in which the 1993 electoral law was 
invoked and the decision to hold elections on the originally scheduled date. It also 
demonstrates that the continuation of the process of liberalisation and further 
development of civil society remain dependent upon the will of the monarch. 
Third, although no evidence can be found for a split in the ruling eUte, O'DonneU and 
Schmitter's argument that the parameters of the process of liberalisation are defined by 
'the calculation' and 'the pact', are supported in the case of Jordan. The King has 
managed democratisation through a series of calculated moves. An unwritten pact 
seems to exist between the monarchy and the Islamists, resulting in what could be 
described as the major potential opposition following the rules of the liberalisation 
process. 
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Fourth, authors such as Almond and Verba emphasise the primary importance of 
political culture in shaping democracy, which would include factors such as education. 
Since this is regarded as an important element in political participation, the high level of 
education in Jordan should be recognised as contributing to the country's 
democratisation process. Fifth, Huntington argues that economic change can promote 
the establishment of democracy. This has been made evident in this study where the 
economic downturn at the end of the 1980s was highlighted as one of the factors which 
helped launch the process of political liberalisation. 
Sixth, in relation to Huntington's three paradoxes of democracy, the case of Jordan 
supports the thesis that increasing democracy has led to political appeals to the tribal 
aspects of Jordanian society. This was highhghted in the 1993 elections when voting 
was along tribal rather than ideological lines. However, although Huntington argues 
that the rise in tribalism can lead to conflict, in the case of Jordan the structure of the 
relationship between the monarchy and the tribes, and also between the tribes 
themselves is unlikely to result in this scenario. 
Seventh, Przeworski and others stress the significance of political institutions. Political 
institutionaUsation is encouraged by the creation of sound parliamentarian processes. In 
Jordan, parliament represents to the public a means to monitor the performance, 
corruption and mistakes of the government. The relationship between parUament and 
government has taken the form of a balance between the two authorities, and this has 
helped to achieve political stability in the country. 
Eight, the conclusion of Milton-Edwards that a facade democracy exists in Jordan can 
not be substantiated by the evidence of this study. Whilst democracy in Jordan has not 
yet attained the fuU liberal democracy practised by western countries, in that the King 
still maintains considerable power, the institutionalisation of democratic practices has 
evolved relatively quickly over a short space of time. To use the phrase 'facade 
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democracy' gives a misleading picture because it impUes a static rather than changing 
situation. Jordan is in a phase of democratic development which can be termed partial 
democracy, not a facade democracy. Partial democracy emphasises the passage from 
authoritarian rule to institutionalised democracy. Whilst it may take time to reach this 
stage, the process of democratic transition in Jordan wiU - the researcher believes - lead 
to institutionalised democracy. 
The transition to democracy in Jordan was facilitated by the combination of five major 
factors. Socio-economic factors first provided Jordan with the literacy, urbanisation, 
and civic expectations necessary to preparing its citizens for democracy. Second, the 
1989 riots provided immediate motivation for political participation among the masses. 
The third factor supports Rustow's theory that national unity constitutes the basis for 
the transition to democracy. Thus, Jordanian national unity became consolidated in a 
form acceptable to nearly all political players. Fourth, the country has a moderate 
Islamic movement which is unlikely to threaten democracy in the maimer assumed by 
Huntington's "three types of threat to democracy" as it is willing to work within the 
political process. Lastly, a poHticaUy moderate King has managed to survive at a low 
repressive cost. These factors support Huntington's theory that no one factor can be 
responsible for the transition to democracy. 
As a whole, the study has highlighted the importance of the desire of the Jordanian 
Monarchy to establish political institutions from the outset of its rule. Although the 
attempts made were relatively unsuccessful in creating a coherent democratic system, 
they laid the basis for the success of the post-1989 liberalisation of the political system. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Denis Derbyshire and Ian Derbyshire, PoUtical Systems of the World, (HeUcon 
Publication Ltd, Oxford, 1996), p. 7. 
2. Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy for the Long Haul", in Journal of Democracy, 
Vol. 7, No. 2, April 1996, p. 10. 
327 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Bibliography 
1. Primary Sources 
1.1. Official Documentation 
Al-Hussein Ibn Talal, (Collection of King Hussein's Speeches to the Nation), 1989-
1993. 
Al-Hussein Ibn Talal, Letter of Appointment to Jordanian Prime Ministers, 1989-1993. 
Al-Hussein Ibn Talal, Address to The National Charter Royal Commission, April 10, 
1990. 
Al-Hussein Ibn Talal, Address at the opening of the National Charter Conference, June 
9, 1991. 
Al-Hussein Ibn Talal, Address to the Jordanian National Congress after the 
Endorsement of the National Charter, June 9, 1991. 
Al-Hussein Ibn Talal Speech from the Throne Address to the two Chambers of 
Parliament at the Opening of the Regular sessions, 1989-1993. 
Al-Kitab al-Ibiad: Al-Urdun wa Izmat al-Khalii [White Paper: Jordan and the Gulf 
Crisis], Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, August 1990-March 
1991, 1991. 
Al-Jaridah al-Rasmiyyah. [Jordanian Official Gazettes]. 
Al-Sharq al-Arabi, [East Arabia], "The Transjordan Government's Official Gazette", 
(No. 188, April 19, 1928). 
Al-Taqrir al-Sanawi li'am 1991, [Annual Report, 1991], Ministry of Labour, Amman, 
Jordan, 1991. 
Britain, House of Commons. Parliamentary Debates. Volume 348, (June 7, 1939). 
By-Law of the Lower House of Parliament. Parliament PubUcation Department, 
Amman, Jordan, 1990. 
By-Law of the Upper House of Parliament. (Forth Edition), Parhament Pubhcation 
Department, Amman, Jordan, 1990. 
Candidates Platforms and Manifesto. 1989 and 1993. 
328 
Jordanian Prime Ministers' Government Poficv Statement, 1989-1993. 
Ministry of the Interior, Official Electoral Report, Amman-Jordan, 1989. 
Ministry of the Interior, Official Electoral Report, Amman, Jordan, 1993. 
ParUamentarv Blocs Speak in Response to the Government Policy Statement, 1989-
1993. 
Political Parties Law, No. (32) for the Year 1992, Amman, Jordan, 1992. 
Political Parties Law, No. (15) for the year 1955, Amman, Jordan 1955. 
Political Parties' Constitutions. 1992-1993. 
Press and Publication Law. No. (1), of 1993, Amman Jordan. 
Proceedings of the Chamber of Deputies. 1989-1993. 
Public Record Office, FO. 371/6371. "from H. Samuel to the Secretary of State for 
Colonies", March 12, 1921. 
Public Record Office, FO. 371/6371. "from the Secretary of State for the Colonies, to 
the Colonies Office", March 28,1921. 
Pubhc Record Office, FO 371/6371. "from H. Samuel to John Tilley", December 19, 
1920. 
Public Record Office, FO 371/6372. "some Notes Concerning the Emir Abdullah", June 
7, 1921. 
The 1923 Transiordan Electoral Law. 
The 1924 Transiordan Basic Law. 
The 1928 Electoral Law to the Legislative Council. 
The 1928 Transiordan Organic Law. 
The 1947 Electoral Law No. 9, to the Chamber of Deputies, 1947. 
The 1947 Jordanian Constitution. 
The 1952 Jordanian Constitution. 
The 1960 Electoral Law No. 24, to the Chamber of Deputies, 1960. 
The 1986 Electoral Law to the Chamber of Deputies. No. 22, and its Amendment, 
Amman, Jordan, 1993. 
329 
The Anglo-Transiordanian Treaty of 1928. 
The Anglo-Transiordanian Treaty of 1946. 
The Jordanian National Charter, Amman, June, 1991. 
The National Consultative Council Law. 1978. 
The Transiordanian National Charter. Amman, 1928. 
Tribal Council Law. 1971. 
1.2. Newspapers 
Al-Ra'i Daily Newspaper. 
Jordan Times Daily Newspaper. 
Al-Dustur daily Newspaper. 
Sawt al-Sha'b Daily Newspaper. 
Akhir Khabar Daily Newspaper. 
Shihan, Weekly Political and social News. 
2. Secondary Sources 
2.1. English Sources 
Abboushi, W. F., Political Systems of the Middle East in the 20th Century. (New York: 
Dodd, Meed and Company, 1970). 
Abidi, Aqil H., Jordan: A Pohtical Study: 1948-1957. (London: Asia Pubhshing House, 
1965). 
Abu Jaber, Kamel S., "The Jordanian ParUament", in Jacob M. Landau (ed.), Man. 
State and Society in the Contemporary Middle East. (London: Pali Mali Press, 
1972). 
Abu Jaber, Kamel S., and Fawzi A Gharaibeh, "Bedouin Settlement: Organizational, 
Legal, and Administrative Structure in Jordan", The Future of Pastoral People: 
Proceedings of the Nairobi Conference. Kenya. (IDRC Series Vol. 175E, 1980). 
330 
Abu Jaber, Kamel S., and Fithi, Schirin H., "The 1989 Jordanian Parliamentary 
Elections" in Orient, Vol. 31, March 1990, pp. 67-86. 
Abu Nowar, Ma'an, The History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: The Creation 
and Development of Transiordan: 1920-1929. (Oxford: Ithaca Press, 1989). 
AI-Hourani, Hani, Hamed Dabbas, and Mark Power-Stevens, Who's who in the 
Jordanian Parliament. 1993-1997, Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Centre, [New 
Jordan], (Amman: National Library, 1995). 
Al-Marayati, Abid A., The Middle East: Its Governments and Politics, (California: 
Duxbury Press, 1972). 
Al-Zuraigat, Fayez, "Interest Groups in Jordan", Mu'tah Journal For Research and 
Humanities Studies and Social Sciences Series. Vol. 8, No. 3, November 1993, pp. 
149-186. 
Almond, Gabriel A., and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and 
Democracy in Five Nations, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963). 
Amawi, Abla M. , "Democracy Dilemmas in Jordan", in Middle East Report. January-
February, 1992, pp. 26-29. 
Amawi, Abla M. , "The 1993 Elections in Jordan", in Arab Studies Ouarterly. Vol. 16, 
No. 3, Summer 1994, pp. 15-27. 
Anderson, Lisa, The Prospects for Democracy in the Arab World, in Middle Eastern 
Lectures Number One. (The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African 
Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1995), pp. 59-71. 
Andoni, Lamis, "The Five Days That Shook Jordan", Middle East International. April 
28, 1989, pp. 3-4. 
Andoni, Lamis, "Mixed Signals", in Middle East International. October 20, 1989, pp. 
11-12. 
Andoni, Lamis, "Lifting the Lid", in Middle East International. November 3, 1989, pp. 
8-10. 
Andoni, Lamis, "King Hussein Leads Jordan into a new Era", in Middle East 
International, 17 November, 1989, pp. 3-4. 
Antonius, George, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement, 
(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1938). 
Arblaster, Anthony, Democracy, Second Edition, (Buckingham: Open University Press, 
1994). 
331 
Aruri, Naseer H. Jordan: A Study in Political Development: 1921-1965. (Martinus 
Nijhoff, The Hague, 1972). 
Asher, Susser, "Jordan: Al-Mamalaka al-Urdunniyah al-Hashimiyyah" in Ayalon, Ami 
(ed.). Middle East Contemporary Survey. Vol. XI I I , (Oxford, Westview Press, 
1989), pp. 446-477. 
Ayubi, Nazih N., PoUtical Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World. (London: 
Routledge, 1991). 
Ayubi, Nazih N., Over-Stating the Arab State: PoUtics and Society in the Middle East. 
(London: I.B. Tauris publishers, 1995). 
Baradat, Leon P., Political Ideologies: Their Origins and Impact. Fourth Edition, 
(London: Prentice HaU, Inc., 1991). 
Brand, Laurie A., "LiberaUzation and Changing PoUtical CoaUtion, the Bases of 
Jordan's: 1990-1991, Gulf Crisis poUcy", in Jerusalem Journal of International 
Relations. Vol. 13, No. 4, December 1991, pp. 1-46. 
Brand, Laurie, A. Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations: The PoUtical Economy of AUiance 
Making. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994). 
Brand, Laurie A., "In The Beginning Was The State....The Quest For CivU Society In 
Jordan", in Augustus Richard Norton, (ed.) 'CivU Society in the Middle East'. 
(Danvers: E.J BriU, 1995). 
Bryce, James Modem Democracies, (London: Macmillan and Co. Limited, 1921). 
Brynen, Rex, "Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab world: 
The Case of Jordan", Canadian Journal of PoUtical Science. Vol. I l l , March 1992, 
pp. 69-97. 
Brynen, Rex, Bahgat Korany and Paul Noble, (ed.), PoUtical LiberaUzation and 
Democratization in the Arab World: Theoretical Perspectives. Volume 1, 
(Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1995). 
Carter, M. Gwendolen and John H. Herz, Government and PoUtics in the Twentieth 
Century , Revised Edition, (London: Thames and Hudson, 1965). 
Chizik, I . , "The PoUtical Parties in Transjordan" in Journal of the Royal Central Asian 
Society. Vol. X X I I , 1935, pp. 96-99.' 
Chuan Hsiao, Kung, PoUtical PluraUsm: A Study in Contemporary PoUtical Theory. 
(London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co. Ltd.,1927). 
Cicourel, Aaron V. Method and Measurement in Sociology. (London: CoUer 
Macmillan PubUshers, 1964). 
332 
Cohen, Louis and Lawrence Manion, Research Methods in Education. Fourth Edition, 
(London: Routledge, 1994). 
Cooper, John P. and Julie Till, "The Road to Democracy in Jordan, 1952-1993", in Gulf 
Centre for Strategic Studies, London, March 1994. 
Copp, David, Jean Hampton, and John E. Roemer, The Idea of Democracy, (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
Dahl, A. Robert, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1971). 
Dahl, Robert A., Democracy. Liberty, and Equality. (London: Norwegian University 
Press, 1986). 
Dahl, Robert A., Democracy and Its Critics. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1989). 
Dann, Uriel, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism: Jordan. 1955-1967. 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1989). 
Dann, Uriel, Studies in the History of Transiordan: 1920-1949: The Making of A State. 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1984). 
Davis, Helen, Constitutions. Electoral Laws. Treaties of States in the Near and Middle 
East, (Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 1947). 
Day, Arthur R. East Bank/West Bank: Jordan and the Prospect for Peace. (Council on 
Foreign Relations, USA, 1986). 
Deegan, Heather, The Middle East and Problems of Democracy. (Buckingham: Open 
University Press, 1993). 
Deegan, Heather, "Democratisation in the Middle East", in the Middle East in the New 
World Order. (London: St. Martin's Press, 1994). 
Dunn, Michael Collins, "Islamist Parties in Democratization State: A Look at Jordan 
and Yemen", in Middle East Pohcy. Vol. 1, part 2, 1993, pp. 16-27. 
Derbyshire, J. Denis and Ian Derbyshire, Political Systems of the World, (Oxford: 
HeUcon Publishing Ltd, 1996). 
Dowse, Robert E. and John A. Hughes, Political Sociology, (London: John WiUey and 
Sons, 1972). 
Esposito, L. John, Islam and Politics Third Edition, (New York: Syracuse University 
Press, 1991). 
333 
FilaU-Ansary, Abdou, "Islam and Liberal Democracy: The Challenge of Secularization" 
in Journal of Democracy. Vol. 7, No. 2, April 1996, pp. 76-80. 
Ghazwi, Mohammad, " One Man, One Vote: the Process of Registration of Voters", in 
Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Amman, and National Democratic Institute for International 
affairs, Washington, September, 1994. 
Good, Nancy, "Jordan Today", in New Outlook. May, 1981, pp. 12-19. 
Gubser, Peter, Jordan: Cross-roads of Middle Eastern Events. (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1983). 
Hamdi, Mohammed E. "Islam and Liberal Democracy: The Limits of the Western 
Model" in Journal of Democracy. Vol. 7, No. 2, April 1996, pp. 81-85. 
Harris, George L. Jordan: Its People, Its Society. Its Culture. (New Haven: Hraf Press, 
1958). 
Hawatmeh, George, "On the Brink of a Crisis", in Middle East International. October 
11, 1991, pp. 7-8. 
Hawatmeh, George, "A Change at the Top", in Middle East International. November 
22, 1991, p. 8. 
Hawatmeh, George, "Now for Liberalisation", in Middle East International. August 7, 
1992, pp. 11-12. 
Hawatmeh, George, 'The Off-and-on Election", in Middle East International. October 
8, 1993, pp. 8-9. 
Hawatmeh, George, "King Trumps the Polls", in Middle East International, November 
19, 1993, pp. 9-10. 
Held, David, (ed.), "Prospects for Democracy: North, South. East. West". (Cambridge: 
PoUty Press, 1993). 
Held, David Models of Democracy. (Cambridge: PoUty Press, 1987). 
Heywood, Andrew, PoUtical Ideologies: An Introduction, (London: MacmiUam 
Education Ltd, 1992). 
Hogga, Mustafa, "Islam and Democracy", in Polyglot, Durham Student Union 
Publication, (DSU), 1996, pp. 6-11. 
Hudson, Michael C , "Democratization and the Problem of Legitimacy in the Middle 
East PoUtics". in Middle East Association BuUetin. Vol. 22, No. 2, December 1988, 
pp. 157-171. 
334 
Hudson, Michael C , "After the Gulf War: Prospects for Democratization in the Arab 
World", in Middle East Journal. Vol. 45, No. 3, 1991, pp. 405-426. 
Huntington, Samuel, P., Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1968). 
Huntington, Samuel P., "WiU More Countries Become Democratic", in Political Science 
Ouarteriy. Vol. 99, No. 2, Summer 1984, pp. 193-210. 
Huntington, Samuel P., The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth 
Century. (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). 
Huntington, Samuel P., "Democracy for the Long Haul", in Journal of Democracy. Vol. 
7, No. 2, April 1996, pp. 3-13. 
Ibrahim, Saad Eddin, "Crises, Elites, and Democratisation in the Arab World", in 
Middle East Journal. Vol. 47, No. 2, Spring 1993, pp. 292-305. 
Ibrahim, Saad Eddin, "Civil Society and Prospects of Democratization in the Arab 
World", in Augustus Richard Norton, (ed.) Civil Society in the Middle East. Vol. 
l,(Danvers: E.J. Brill, 1995). 
Johnston, Charles, The Brink of Jordan, (London: Hamish Hanailton, 1972). 
KabuH, Niaz Faizi, "Democracy According to Islam". (Pittsburgh: Dorrance Publishing 
Co., Inc., 1994). 
Kedourie, EHe, Democracy and Arab Political Culture. (London: Frank Cass and Co. 
Ltd., 1994). 
Kerhnger, Fred N., Foundation of Behavioural Research: Education and Psychological 
Inquiry, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1964). 
Khair, Hani, Brief Survey of ParUamentary Life in Jordan: 1920-1987. (Amman: 
National Library, 1987). 
KhalQ, Muhammad, The Arab State and the Arab League: Constitutional Developments. 
(Beirut: Khayats, 1962). 
Khoury, Nabeel A., "The National Consultative Council of Jordan: A Study in 
Legislative Development", in International Journal of Middle East Studies. 1981, 
pp. 427-439. 
Kirkbride, Sir Alec, A Crackle of Thorns: Experiences in the Middle East, (London: 
John Murray, 1956). 
Kramer, Gudrun, "Liberalisation and Democracy in the Arab World", in Middle East 
Report. January-February, 1992, pp. 22-25. 
335 
Kronman, Anthony T., Max Weber, (London: Edward Arnold Publishers Ltd, 1983). 
Kubba, Laith, "Islam and Liberal Democracy: Recognizing PluraUsm" in Journal of 
Democracy. Vol. 7, No. 2, April 1996, pp. 87-89. 
Layne, Linda L., (ed.), "Elections in the Middle East: ImpUcations of Recent Trends, 
Tribesman as Citizens: "Primordial Ties" And Democracy in Rural Jordan, (Boulder 
and London: Westview Press, 1987). 
Layne, Linda L., "The Dialogics of Tribal Self-Representation in Jordan", in Journal of 
the American Ethnologist Society. Vol. 16, No. 1, February, 1989, pp. 24-39. 
Lenczowski, George, The Middle East in World Affairs. (London: CorneU University 
Press, 1980). 
Lewis, Bernad, "Islam and Liberal Democracy: A Historical Overview" in Journal of 
Democracy. Vol. 7, No. 2, April 1996, pp. 52-63. 
Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan, "Toward ConsoUdated Democracies", in Journal of 
Democracy. Vol. 7, No. 2, April 1996, pp. 14-33. 
Lipset, Seymour Martin, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic 
Development and PoUtical Legitimacy", in American PoUtical Science Review, Vol. 
53, 1959, pp. 69-105. 
Lipset, Seymour Martin, (ed.). The Encyclopaedia of Democracy Vol. 1, (London: 
Roultedge, 1995). 
Mazur, Michael P., Economic Growth and Development in Jordan. (London: Croom 
Helm, 1979). 
Lucas, J. R., Democracy and Participation. (Canada: Penguin Books Publishers, 1976). 
Mayo, H. B., An Introduction to Democratic Theory, (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1960). 
Mernissi, Fatima, Islam and Democracy: Fear of the Modem World. (London: Virago 
Press Limited, 1993). 
MUton-Edwards, Beverley, "Facade Democracy in Jordan", in British Journal of Middle 
Eastern Studies. Vol. 20. No. 2, 1993, pp. 191-203. 
Mousa, Suleiman, "Hashemite Rule and the Emergence of the State", in Patrick Scale 
(ed.). The Shaping of an Arab Statesman, (London: Quartet Books, 1983). 
MoussaUi, Ahmad S., "Hasan al-Turabi's Islamist Discourse on Democracy and Shura", 
in Middle Eastern Studies. Vol. 30, No 1, January 1994, pp. 52-63. 
336 
Mutawi, Samir A., Jordan in the 1967 War. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987). 
Nasr, S.U., "Democracy and Islamic Revivalism", in Political Science Ouarterly. 
Vol.110, No. 2, Summer 1995, pp. 261-285. 
Nehru, B. K., "Western Democracy and the Third World", in Third World Ouarteriy. 
Vol. l ,No . 2,1979, pp. 53-70. 
Neubauer, Deane E., "Some Conditions of Democracy" in American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 61, No. 4, 1967, pp. 1002-1009. 
Niblock, Tim, "Democratisation and Economic Liberalisation in the Arab World: 
Mutually Reinforcing or Incompatible?", Paper presented at the Annual Conference 
of the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies, 8-10 July 1992, (University of St 
Andrews, Scotiand, 1992). 
Niblock, Tim and Emma Murphy, (eds.), Economic and Political Liberalization in the 
Middle East. (London: British Academic Press, 1993). 
Norman, Wayne J., "A Democratic Theory for a Democratizing World? A Re-
Assessment of Popper's Political Realism", in PoUtical Studies, Vol. XLI , No. 2, 
1993, pp.252-268. 
Norton, Augustus, Richard, (ed.). Civil Society in the Middle East, Volume 1, 
(Danvers: E.J. Brill, 1995). 
Nyrop, Richard F., et, al. (eds.) Area Handbook for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 
(the American University, Washington, D.C, Foreign Area Studies, 1974). 
Nyrop, Richard F., Jordan a Country Study. (The American University, Washington, 
1980). 
O'Doimell, GuiUermo A. Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in 
South American Politics. (Institute of International studies. University of 
CaUfomian, Berkeley, 1973). 
O'DonneU, GuUlermo, Philippe C, Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, (eds.) Transition 
From Authoritarian Rule: Latin America. Vol. 1, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1986). 
O'DoimeU, GuiUermo, PhUippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, (eds.) Transition 
From Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe. Vol. 2, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1986). 
O'DonneU, GuiUermo, PhUippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, (eds.) 
Transition From Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives Vol. 3, 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). 
337 
O'Donnell, GuiUermo and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transition From Authoritarian Rule: 
Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain democracies. Vol. 4, (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1986). 
O'Donnell, Guillermo "Illusions about Consolidation", in Joumal of Democracy. Vol. 7, 
No. 2, April 1996, pp. 34-51. 
Oppenheim, A. N. Questionnaire Design. Interviewing and Attitude Measurement. New 
Edition, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1992). 
Owen, Roger, State, Power and Politics in the Making of Modem Middle East. 
(London: Routledge, 1992). 
Patai, Raphael, The Kingdom of Jordan. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958). 
Permock, J. Roland, and John W. Chapman (eds.). Liberal Democracy. (New York: 
New York University Press, 1993). 
Peretz, Don, "The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan", in The Middle East Today. (New 
York: Praeger, 1988). 
Perry, Glenn E. "Democracy and Human Rights in the Shadow of the West", in Arab 
Studies Quarterly. Vol. 14, No. 4, FaU 1992, pp. 1-16. 
Pinkney, Robert, Democracy in the third World. (Bukingham: Open University Press, 
1993). 
Piro, Timothy J., "Parliament, Politics, and Pluralism in Jordan: Democratic Trends At 
A Difficult Time", in Middle East Insight. Vol. 1, Part 8, 1992, pp. 39-44. 
Piro, Timothy J., "Jordan's 1993 Parliamentary Elections: Authoritarianism Revisited or 
CivU Society Emergent"?, Paper presented at the Middle East Studies 
Association of North America, 28th Aimual Meeting, November 19-22, 1994, 
Phoenix, Arizona. 
Pool, David, "The Links Between Economic and Political Liberalisation" in Tim 
Niblock and Emma Murphy (ed.). Economic and Political Liberalisation in the 
Middle East. (London: British Academic Press, 1993). 
Potter, David, David Goldblatt, Margaret Kiloh and Paul Lewis, (ed ), Democratisation, 
(The Open University: Polity Press, 1997). 
Przeworski, Adam, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy" in 
GuiUermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, (ed.) 
Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives. (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). 
Rath, Kathrine, "The Process of Democratization in Jordan", in Middle Eastern Studies. 
Vol. 30, No. 3, July 1994, pp. 530-557. 
338 
Reed, Stanley, "Jordan and the Gulf Crisis", in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 5, Winter 
1990-91, pp. 21-35. 
Roberts, M. John, "Prospects for Democracy in Jordan", In Arab Studies Quarterly. 
Vol. 13, No. 3 & 4 Summer/Fall 1991, pp. 119-138. 
Robertson, David, A Dictionary of Modern Politics. Second Edition, (Europa 
Publication Limited, 1993). 
Robins, Philip J., "Shedding Half A Kingdom: Jordan's Dismantling of Ties with the 
West Bank", in British Society for Middle Eastern Studies Bulletin. Vol. 16, No. 
2, 1989, pp. 162-175. 
Robins, Philip J., "Jordan's Election: A New Era"?, in Middle East Report. Vol. 20, 
Nos. 3&4, 1990, 55-57. 
Robins, Philip J., "Politics and the 1986 Electoral Law in Jordan", in Rodney Wilson, 
(eds.), Politics and Economy in Jordan. (London: Routledge, 1991). 
Roy, Olivier The Failure of Political Islam. (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1994). 
Rustow, Dankwart A., "Transition To Democracy" in Comparative Politics. Part 2, 
1970, pp. 337-363. 
Salame, Ghassan (ed.). Democracy Without Democrats. (London: I.B Tauris and Co. 
Ltd, 1994). 
Salibi, Kamal, The Modern History of Jordan. (London: I . B Tauris Publishers, 1993). 
Satloff, Robert B., "Jordan's Great Gamble: Economic Crisis and Political Reform", in 
Barkey, Henri (ed.). The Politics of Economic Reform in the Middle East. (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1992). 
Satloff, Robert B., From Abdullah to Hussein: Jordan in Transition. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994). 
Seale, Patrick, (ed.), The Shaping of an Arab Statesman: Abdul Hamid Sharaf and the 
Modern Arab Worid. (London: Quartet Books, 1983). 
Shahin, Mariam, "Set-Back for the King's Vision", in Middle East International. 
December 18, 1992, pp. 10-11. 
Shaikh, Farzana, Islam and Islamic Groups. (London: Current Affairs, 1992). 
Sharabi, H. B. Government and Politics of the Middle East in the Twentieth Century. 
( Princeton: D. VanNostrand Company Inc., 1962). 
Shwadran, Benjamin, Jordan: A state of Tension. (New York: Council For Middle 
Eastern Affairs Press, 1959). 
339 
Sinai, Anne and Allen Pollack, (eds.), The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the West 
Bank. (New York: American Academic Association for Peace in the Middle 
East, 1977). 
Sparrow, Gerald, Modem Jordan, (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1961). 
Stavin, Robert E. Research Methods in Education: A Practical Guide, (London: Johns 
Hopkins University, 1984). 
Stephens, Robert, "Jordan and the Powers", in Patrick Scale, (ed.), The Shaping of an 
Arab Statesman, (London: Quartet Books Limited, 1983). 
Toynbee, Arnold J. Survey of International Affairs. 1925. (Oxford: Oxford University, 
1927), Volume 1. 
Vatikiotis, P. J. Politics and Militarv in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Ixgion. 1921-
1957. (London: Frank Cass, 1967). 
Vincent, Andrew, Modem Political Ideologies (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1992). 
Wedeman, Ben, "Democracy in Jordan" Election Results Send Mixed Signals on Peace 
Process and Islamists, in Middle East Insight, November-December, 1993, Vol. 
X, No. 1, pp. 9-13. 
Wilson, Mary C. King AbduUah. Britain and the Making of Jordan. (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
Wilson, Mary C. "A Passage to Independence: King Abdullah and Transjordan; 1920-
1951", in Edward Ingram,(ed.), National and International Politics in the Middle 
East, (London: Frank Cass, 1986). 
Wilson, Rodney, (ed.), Pohtics and the Economy in Jordan. (London: Routledge, 
1991). 
Wright, Robin, "Islam and Liberal Democracy: Two Visions of Reformation" in Journal 
of Democracy. Vol. 7, No. 2, April 1996, pp. 64-75. 
Yorke, Valerie, Domestic PoUtics and Regional Security: Jordan. Syria and Israel: the 
End of An Era?. (Aldershot, Gower, 1988). 
340 
2.2. Arabic Sources 
Abu al-Basal, Abd al-Nasir Musa, "Al-Wad' al-Tashri'i H al-Urf al-Asha'iri f i al-Urdun" 
[Legislation Situation for Tribal Traditions in Jordan], in Adnan Al-Bakhit, et. al. 
(eds.). Nadwat al-'Urf al-'Asha'iri bayn al-Sharia'ah wa al-Oanun [Seminar on the 
Tribal traditions within the Islamic Law and the Jordanian Civil Law], (the Islamic 
Cultural Centre, University of Jordan, Amman, 1990). 
Abu Diyyah, Sa'ad, Al-Fikr al-Sivasi al-Urduni. [Jordanian Political Thoughts], 
(Amman: Dar Al-Bashir, 1988). 
Al-Abdullat, Marwan, Kharitah al-Ahzab al-Urduniwah. [The Map of the Jordanian 
Parties; 1992], (Amman: National Library, 1992). 
Al-Ansari, Abd al-Hamid, Al-Shura wa-Atharah f i al-Dimuqratiyyah. [Al-Shura 
(Consultation): and Its Influence in democracy], (Beirut: Modem Library, 1980). 
Al-Ayid, Hassan Athar wa In'ikasat Harb al-Khahi ala al-Insan al-Urduni. [The Effect 
and Reflection of the Gulf War on the Jordanian People], (Amman: Al-Hakmah 
Publishers, 1992). 
Al-Ayid, Hassan and Muhammad Tmad al-Din, Al-Khitab al-Siyasi al-Urduni Taht 
Oubbat MaiUs al-Ummah al-Hadi Ashar: 1989-1993. [The Jordanian PoUtical 
Speech under the Dome of the Eleventh Chamber of Deputies], Department of 
Research and Information Studies, (Amman: National Assembly, Publication, July 
1993). 
Al-Ayid, Hassan, Musahmat al-Mar'ah al-Urduniwah fi al-Hayat al-Siyasiwah. [The 
Jordanian Women's Participation in the Political Life], Department of Research and 
Studies, (Amman: National Assembly Publication, October, 1994). 
Al-Ayid, Arshaid, "Waqi' al-Hayat al-Hizbiyyah fi al-Urdun; 1921-1994", [The Role of 
Parties Life in Jordan], (Unpubhshed Paper, Jordan University, Amman, 1994). 
Al-Dajani, Mundhir and Muhammad al-Dajani, Al-Madkhal ila al-Nizam al-Siyasi al-
Urduni. [Introduction to the Jordanian PoUtical System], (Amman: National 
Library, 1993). 
Al-Fanak, Fahad, "Al-Intikhabat al-'Ammah fi al-Urdun" [General Elections in Jordan], 
in Muntada al-Fikr al-Arabi. [Arab Thought Forum], No. 50, November, 1989, p. 
4. 
Al-Hatjaj, Khalil, Al-Tatawwar al-Tarikhi l i al-Havat al-Tashri'iyah wa-al-Niyabiyyah al-
Urduniyyah: 1920-1952. [Historical Development of Legislative ParUamentary Life 
in Jordan], (Amman: Arab Centre for Student Services, 1994). 
Al-Hurani, Hani, Al-Havat al-Niyabiwah fi al-Urdun: 1929-1957. [The History of 
Parliamentary Life in Jordan] , (Amman: Sharq Press Ltd, 1989). 
341 
Al-Hurani, Hani, "Intikhabat 1993 al-Urduniyyah": Qira'at f i KhaMyyatiha, Zurufiha wa 
Nata'ijiha", [The 1993 Jordanian Elections: Their Background, Circumstances, and 
Results], in Qira'at Siyasiyyah, [Political Readings] Vol. 4 No. 2, Spring 1994, pp. 
7-31. 
Al-Madi, Munib and Sulaiman al-Musa, Tarikh al-Urdun Fi al-Qarn al-Ishrin 1900-
1959; [The History of Jordan in the Twentieth Century], (Amman, al-Muhtsib 
Library, 1959). 
Al-Masri, Tahir, "Al-Saltah al-Tashri'iyah wa-Mustaqbal al-'Qtisad al-Urduni", 
[Legislative Power and the future of the Jordanian Economy], Unpublished paper, 
Amman, April 25,1994. 
Al-Masri, Tahir, "AI-Dimuqratiyyah f i al-Urdun, Nazarat MastaqbaMyyah", [Democracy 
in Jordan: Future Outlook], Unpublished Paper, July 10,1994, Amman. 
Al-Musa, Sulaiman, "Imarat Sharq al-Urdun", [Transjordan Emirate; 1921-1946], 
(Amman: National Library, 1990). 
Al-Mu'aytah, Nasir, Nashat al-Ahzab al-Siyasiyyah: Dirasah al-Ahzab al-Urduni, [The 
Emergence of PoHtical Parties: A Study of Jordanian Parties: 1921-1993], (Amman: 
Al-Balsam Foundation, 1994). 
Al-Rabi', Ahmad, "Al-Suluk al-Dimuqrati f i Daw' al-Tajribah al-Urduniyyah" 
[Democratic Behaviour in the Shadow of the Jordanian Experience], (Amman: 
National Library, 1992). 
Al-Rashdan, Abd al-Fatah, Al-Tatawwar al-Dimuqrati f i al-Urdun; 1952-1989. [The 
Democracy Development in Jordan], in Qira'at Siyasiyyah [PoUtical Readings], Vol. 
4. No. 2. Spring 1994, pp. 81-113. 
Ghadbian, Najib, "Al-Tajribah al-Dimuqratiyyah al-Urduniyyah: Nazrah Tahlihyyah", 
[Jordanian Democratic Experience: Analysis Point of View], in Oira'at Siyasiyyah. 
[Political readings]. Vol. 4. No. 2. Spring 1994, pp. 61-80. 
Ghazwi, Muhammad SaUm, "Al-Wajiz f i al-Tanzim al-Siyasi wa-Dusturi f i al-Mamlaka 
al-Urduniyyah al-Hashimiyyah", [A Brief of Constitutional and Pohtical Order ui 
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan], (Amman: Dar al-Thaqafah Library, 1992). 
Ghazwi, Muhammad SaUm, Nazarat Hawl al-MaiUs al-Watani al-Astashary al-Urduni. 
[Views on the National Consultative Council], (Amman: Jordan University, 1979). 
Haddad, Tiriz, Milaf al-Ahzab al-Sivasiwah fi al-Urdun. [PoMtical Parties Files in 
Jordan; 1919-1994], (Amman: National Library, 1994). 
Hamzah, Zaid, "Al-Infitah al-Siyasi wa-Ada al-Mundhamat al-Naqabiyyah wa al-
Mahniyyah" [Political Opening and the Performance of Labour and Professional 
Organisations], in Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Centre. [New Jordan], Al-Suluk al-
Dimuqrati al-Urduni" [the Jordanian Democratic Process], June 1994. 
342 
Huwaidi, Fahmi, "Al 'Islam wa al-Dimuqratiyyah", [Islam and Democracy], in al^  
Mastagbal al-Arabi. [Arabic Future], Centre for Arab Unity Studies, Vol. 166, 
No. 12, 1992, pp. 4-37. 
Ibn Bakir, Hikmat Al-Nizam al-Dusturi al-Urduni. [The Jordanian Constitutional 
System; 1921-1991], (Amman: Bakir Foundation, 1992). 
Khair, Hani, Al-Havat al-Niyabiyyah Fi al-Urdun; 1920-1993, [Parliamentary Life in 
Jordan], (Amman: National Library, 1993). 
Mansur, Hamzah, "Nazarat Fi Ada Harakat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin Fi al-Majlis al-
Niyabi al-Hadi Ashr", [Point of Views on the Performance of the Muslim 
Brotherhood Movement in the Eleventh Chamber of Deputies, 1989-1993], Issue 
No. 4. (Amman: National Library, 1993). 
Muhafazah, Ali, Al-Alaqat al-Urduniwah al-Britaniyyah; 1921-1957. [Jordanian- British 
Relations], (Beirut, Dar al-Nahar, 1973). 
Muhafazah, Ali, Tarikh al-Urdun al-Mu'assir; 1921-1946. [The Modern History of 
Jordan], (Amman: National Library, 1989). 
Nusaibah, Hazim, Tarikh al-Urdun al-Siyasi al-Mus'assir; 1952-1967. [The Modern 
Political History of Jordan], (Amman: National Library, 1992). 
Robinson, Leonard, "Al-Dawlah wa-al-Islamiyun wa-al-Infitah al-Siyasi Fi al-Urdun" 
[State, Islamists and the Political Opening in Jordan], in Qira'at Siyasiyyah. 
[Political Readings], Vol. 4, No. 2, Spring 1994, pp. 33-60. 
Shalabi, Thab, Hamad Dabbas, "Intikhabat 1989: Haqa'q wa Arqam" [1989 Elections: 
Facts & Figures], in Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Centre. [New Jordan], Amman, 
October 1993. 
Shalabi, Thab, Hamad Dabbas, and Talab Awad, (eds ), "Intikhabat 1993 al-
Urduniyyah: Dirasah Tahliliyyah Raqamiyyah", [Jordan's 1993 Elections: An Analytic 
Study], Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Centre. (New Jordan), September 1994, 
Amman-Jordan. 
2.3. Doctoral Thesis and MA Dissertation 
Al-Hawamdeh, Nidal, "Political Development in Jordan From 1988 Until the Present", 
Doctoral Dissertation, (Temple University, 1994). 
Al-Lisasmah, Ihmud, "Al-Hayat al-Niyabiyyah f i al-Mamlaka al-Urduniyyah al-
Hashimiyyah: Dirasah Tarikhiyyah", [Parliamentary Life in the Hashemite Kingdom 
of Jordan; 1929-1967], MA Dissertation, (Jordan University, Amman, 1987). 
343 
Ghadbian, Najib, "Democratisation and the Islamist Challenge in the Arab Worlds", 
Doctoral Dissertation, (City University of New York, 1995). 
Muhanna, Amin Awwad, "Modernization: Political Stability and Instability; The 
Jordanian Case", Doctoral Dissertation, (University of Southern California, 1986). 
Robins, Phihp J. "The ConsoHdation of Hashemite Power in Jordan; 1921-1946", 
Doctoral Thesis, (Exeter University, 1988) 
Ruth, Kathrine, "The Process of Democratisation in Jordan", MA Dissertation, 
(University of Exeter, 1992). 
2.4. English and Arabic Sources (with only Title) 
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, "Al-Hayat al-Siyasiyyah f i al-Urdun: Tashri'at wa-
Qwanin", [Political Life in Jordan: Laws and Legislations], (Amman: Press and 
Publication Department, 1993). 
Al-Kital al-Niyabiyyah" [Parliamentary Blocs], The Eleventh Chamber of Deputies, 
Department of Research and Information Studies, (Amman: National Assembly 
PubUcation, Amman, 1993). 
Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Centre, "Al-Intikhabat al-Niyabiyyah al-Takmiliyyah" [The 
1984 By-Election], No. l,July 1984,(Nicosia, 1984). 
Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Centre, "Marahil Tatawwar al-Harakat al-Naqabiyyah fi 
Al-Urdun", [Stages of the Development of the Trade Union in Jordan], No. 1, July 
1984, (Nicosia, 1984). 
Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Centre, "Al-Hayat al-Niyabiyyah f i l al-Urdun" 
[Parliamentary Life in Jordan], No. 1, July 1984, (Nicosia, 1984). 
Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Centre, "Kharitah al-Ahzab al-Siyasi al-Urduniyyah 
Ashiyat al-Intikhabat al-'Ammah al-Maqbalah", [The Map of Jordan's Political 
Parties Preceding the 1993 General Election], Amman, 1993. 
Anjazat Majlis al-Nuwwab al-Hadi Ashar, [The Eleventh Chamber of Deputies' 
Achievements], 1989-1993, A Survey made by the Department of Research and 
Information Studies, (Amman: National Assembly Publication, Amman, Jordan, 
1993). 
Government In Jordan, Ministry of Information, The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 
1978. 
Jordan "Law Legalizing Parties Revives Political Life in Jordan", Middle East Reporter. 
Vol. 70, October 1992, pp. 11-14. 
344 
Jordan Media Group, "Jordan's Parhamentary Elections", 8 November, 1993. 
Jordan" Keessing's Record of World Events. 
King Abdullah of Jordan, "My Memoirs Completed "Al-Takmilah", Translated from the 
Arabic by Harold, Glidden, (London: Longman Group Ltd, 1978). 
Middle East Contemporary Survey. 1989. 
Middle East Economic Digest, "Jordan". 
Political Handbook of the World 1991: government and Intergovernmental 
Organisation, as of July, 1991. 
Qira'at fi Nata'ij Intikhabat Majlis al-Nuwwab al-Thani 'Ashar" in [Readings of the 
Twelve Chamber of Deputies Elections Result], Department of Information and 
Studies, (Amman: National Assembly Publication, November 1993). 
Risalat Majlis al-Ummah al-Urduni, [House of ParUament Bulletin], (Amman: Jordanian 
National Assembly, 1989-1993). 
Survey of Intemational Affairs. 
The Economist. 
The Economic Intelligence Unit, Jordan Country Report. 
The Middle East and North Africa.1984-1993. 
345 
List of Interviews 
Ahmad 'Ubaidat, Former Prime Minister and the Head of the Royal Commission of the 
National Charter, Amman, April 30, 1995, and telephone conversation, June 6 and 
June 10, 1996. 
Tahir al-Masri,(MP), Former Prime Minister, May 20, 1995, Amman, and August 12, 
1995 Oxford, and telephone conversation on July 10, 1996. 
Zaid al-Rifa'i, Former Prime Minister, April 20,1995. 
Abd al-Ra'uf al-Rawabdah,(MP), Jordanian Deputy Prime Minister, and Secretary 
General of the Reawakening Party, Amman, April 22, 1995. 
Abd al-Majid al-Azzam,(MP), Minister of State for Parhamentary Affairs, Amman April 
20, 1995. 
Abdullah al-Nsur, Jordanian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Higher Education, 
Durham, April 29,1996. 
Sulaiman Arar, Future Party's Secretary General, Amman, April 17,1995. 
Ishaq al-Farhan, Secretary General of the Islamic Action Front Party (lAF), Amman, 
April 20,1995. 
Miihim al-Khraishah, Jordanian National Alliance Party's Secretary General, Amman, 
• April 19,1995. 
'Isa al-MajaU, Jordanian Pledge Party's Administrative Director, Amman, April 16, 
1995. • 
'Isa Mdanat, Jordanian Democratic Socialist Party's Secretary General, Amman, May 
1, 1995. 
Ya'qub Zayadin, Jordanian Communist Party's Secretary General, Amman, April 19, 
1995. 
Fu'ad Dabbur, Arab Ba'th Progressive Party, Amman, May, 14, 1995. 
Ahmad al-Najdawi, The Jordanian Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, Amman, April 22, 1995. 
Azmi al-Khawaja, Secretary General of the Jordanian Democratic Popular Unity party, 
Amman, April, 26,1995. 
Hammad Abu Jamus, MP, Democratic Parhamentary AUiance Bloc Spokesman, May 
27, 1995. 
Abd al-Baqi Jammu, MP, Independent National Action Bloc, April 26,1995. 
Hamzah Mansur, MP, Islamic Action Front Spokesman, April, 26, 1995. 
Ahmad al-Qudah, MP, Constitutional Bloc Spokesman, May 17,1995. 
Tawfiq Kraishan, MP, Parhamentary Brethren Bloc, May 20,1995. 
Jamal al-Khraishah, MP and Minister of State, May 2,1995 
346 
APPENDICES 
1. Tlie Constitution Of the Hasliemite Kingdom of Jordan 
CHAPTER ONE: The State and System of Government 
Article 1. 
Article 2 
Article 3. 
Article 4. 
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is an independent sovereign Arab State. 
It is indivisible and inahenable and no part of it may be ceded. The people 
of Jordan form a part of the Arab Nation, and its system of government is 
parliamentary with a hereditary monarchy. 
Islam is the religion of the State and Arabic is its official language. 
The city of Amman is the capital of the Kingdom, but it may be transferred 
to another place by a special law. 
The Jordanian flag shall be of the following form and dimensions: "The 
length of the flag shall be twice its width. It. shall be divided horizontally 
into three parallel and equal stripes, the uppermost of which shall be black, 
the centre, white, and the lowest, green. At the end of the flag-staff the 
flag shall have a red triangle, the base of which shall be equal to its width. 
In the triangle there shall be a white seven pointed star of such a size that 
it may be one-fourteenth part of its length. The star shall be so placed that 
its centre shall be at the intersection of the lines bisecting the angles of the 
triangle, and the axis running through one of its points shall be parallel to 
the base of the triangle". 
CHAPTER TWO: Rights and Duties of Jordanians 
Article 5 . Jordanian Nationality shall be defined by law. 
Article 6. (i) Jordanians shall be equal before the law. There shall be no discrimination 
between them as regards their rights and duties on grounds of race, 
language or rehgion. 
(ii) The Government shall ensure work and education within the limits of its 
possibilities, and it shall ensure a state of tranquillity and equal 
opportunities to all Jordanians. 
Article 7 . Personal freedom shall be guaranteed. 
Article 8. No person may be detained or imprisoned except in accordance with the 
provisions of the law. 
Article 9 . (i) No Jordanian may be deported from the territory of the Kingdom. 
(ii) No Jordanian may be prevented from residing at any place, or be 
compelled to reside in any specified place, except in the circumstances 
prescribed by law. 
Dwelling houses shall be inviolable and shall not be entered except in the 
circumstances and in the manner prescribed by law. 
No properties of any person may be expropriated except for purposes of 
pubHc utihty and in consideration of a just compensation, as may be 
prescribed by law. 
Article 12. No loans may be forcibly imposed and no property, movable or 
immovable, may be confiscated except in accordance with the law. 
Article 
Article 
10 
11 
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Article 13. Compulsory labour may not be imposed on any person, but any person 
may be required to do any work or to render any service in 
circumstances prescribed by law, as stated hereunder: 
(i) In a state of necessity, such as a state of war, the occurrence of a pubhc 
danger, or fire, flood, famine, earthquake, serious epidemic among 
human beings or animals or animal diseases, insects or pests or any other 
similar events, or in any other circumstances which might endanger the 
safety of the population, in whole or in part. 
(ii) As a result of the conviction of the person concerned by a court of law, 
provided that the work is done and the service rendered under the 
supervision of an official authority and provided further that no 
convicted person shall be hired to, or be placed at the disposal of, any 
persons, companies, societies or public bodies. 
Article 14. The State shall safeguard the free exercise of all forms for worship and 
rehgious rites in accordance with the customs observed in the Kingdom, 
unless such is inconsistent with public order or morality. 
Article 15. (i). The State shall guarantee freedom of opinion. Every Jordanian shall be 
free to express his opinion by speech, in writing, or by means of 
photographic representation and other forms of expression, provided 
that such does not violate the law. 
(ii). Freedom of the press and publications shah be ensured within the limits 
of the law. 
(iii) . Newspapers shall not be suspended from pubhcation nor shall their 
permits be revoked except in accordance with the provisions of the law. 
(iv) . In the event of the declaration of martial law or a state of emergency, a 
limited censorship on newspapers, pubHcations, books and broadcasts in 
matters affect pubMc safety and national defence may be imposed by 
law. 
(v) . Control of the resources of newspaper shall regulated by law. 
Article 16. (i) Jordanians shall have the right to hold meetings within the hmits of the 
law. 
(ii) Jordanians are entitled to estabhsh societies and pohtical parties provided 
that the objects of such societies and parties are lawful, their methods 
peaceful, and their bye-laws not contrary to the provisions of the 
Constitution. 
(hi) The establishment of societies and poMtical parties and the control of their 
resources shall be regulated by law. 
Article 17. Jordanians are entitled to address the pubhc authorities on any personal 
matters affecting them, or on any matter relative to pubhc affairs, in such 
a manner and under such conditions as may be prescribed by law. 
Article 18. AH postal, telegraphic and telephonic communications shall be treated as 
secret and as such shaU not be subject to censorship or suspension 
except in circumstances prescribed by law. 
Article 19. Congregations shall have the right to establish and maintain their own 
schools for the education of their own members provided that they 
comply with the general provisions of the law and be subject to the 
control of Government in matters relating to their curricula and 
orientation. 
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Article 20. Elementary education shall be compulsory for Jordanians and free of 
charge in Government schools. 
Article 21. (i) Political refugees shall not be extradited on account of their poUtical 
beliefs or for their defence of Uberty. 
(ii) Extradition of ordinary criminals shall be regulated by international 
agreements and laws. 
Article 22. (i) Every Jordanian shall be entitled to be appointed to pubUc offices under 
such conditions as are prescribed by law or regulations, 
(ii) Appointment to any government office or to any establishment attached 
to the Government, or to any municipal office, whether such 
appointment is permanent or temporary, shall be made on the basis of 
merit and qualifications. 
Article 23. (i). Work is the right of every citizen, and the State shall provide 
opportunities for work to all citizens by directing the national economy 
and raising its standards, 
(ii). The State shall protect labour and enact a legislation therefor based on 
the following principles: 
(a) . Every worker shall receive wages commensurate with the quantity and 
quaUty of his work. 
(b) . The number of hours of work per week shall be defined. Workers shall 
be given weekly and annual days of paid rest. 
(c) . Special compensation shall be given to workers supporting families and 
on dismissal, illness, old age and emergencies arising out of the nature of 
their work. 
(d) . Special conditions shall be made for the employment of women and 
juveniles. 
(e) . Factories and workshops shall be subject to health safeguards. 
(f) . Free trade unions may be formed within the limits of the law 
CHAPTER THREE: Powers: General Provisions 
Article 24. (i) The Nation is the source of all powers. 
(ii) The Nation shall exercise its powers in the manner prescribed by the 
present Constitution. 
Article 25. The Legislative Power shall be vested in the National Assembly and the 
King. The National Assembly shall consist of a Senate and a Chamber of 
Deputies. 
Article 26. The Executive Power shall be vested in the King, who shall exercise His 
powers through His Ministers in accordance with the provisions of the 
present Constitution. 
Article 27. The Judicial Power shall be exercised by the courts of law in their varying 
types and degrees. AH judgements shall be given in accordance with the law 
and pronounced in the name of the King. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: The Executive Power 
PART I: The King and his Prerogatives 
Article 28. The Throne of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is hereditary to the 
dynasty of King Abdullah Ibn Al-Hussein in a direct hne through his 
male heirs as provided hereinafter: 
(a) The Royal title shall pass from the holder of the Throne to his eldest 
son, and to the eldest son of that son and in linear succession by a 
similar process thereafter. Should the eldest son die before the Throne 
devolves upon him, his eldest son shall inherit the Throne despite the 
existence of brothers to the deceased son. The King may, however, 
select one of his brothers as heir apparent. In this event, title to the 
Throne shall pass to him from the holder of the Throne 
(b) Should the person entitled to the Throne die without a male heir, the 
Throne shall pass to his eldest brother. In the event that the holder of 
the Throne has no brothers, the Throne shah pass to the eldest son of 
his eldest brother. Should his eldest brother have no son, the Throne 
shaU pass to the eldest son of his other brothers according to their 
seniority in age 
(c) In the absence of any brothers or nephews, the Throne shall pass to 
the uncles and their descendants, according to the order prescribed in 
paragraph (b) above. 
(d) Should the last King die without any heir in the manner prescribed 
above, the Throne shall devolve upon the person whom the National 
Assembly shall select from amongst the descendants of the founder of 
the Arab Revolt, the late King Hussein Ibn Ali . 
(e) No person shall ascend the Throne unless he is a Moslem, mentally 
sound and bom by a legitimate wife and of Moslem parents. 
(f) No person shaU ascend the Throne who has been excluded from 
succession by a Royal Decree on the ground of unsuitabihty. Such 
exclusion shaU not of itself include the descendants of such person. 
The Royal Decree of exclusion shall be countersigned by the Prime 
Minister and by four Ministers, at least two of whom shall be the 
Minister of Interior and the Minister of Justice, 
(g) The King attains his majority upon the completion of his eighteenth 
year according to the lunar calendar. I f the Throne devolves upon a 
person who is below this age, the powers of the King shall be exercised 
by a Regent or Council of Regency, who shall have been appointed by 
a Royal Decree by the reigning King. I f the King dies without making 
such nomination, the Council of Ministers shall appoint the Regent or 
Council of Regency. 
(h) Should the King become unable to exercise his powers on account 
of iUness, his powers shaU be exercised by a vicegerent or Council of 
Vicegerents. The Vicegerent or Council of Vicegerents shall be 
appointed by Royal Decree. Should the King be unable to make such 
appointment, such shall be made by the Council of Ministers. 
(i) Should the King wish to leave the country, He shall, before his 
departure and by a Royal Decree, appoint a Vicegerent or a Council of 
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Vicegerents to exercise His powers during His absence. The 
Vicegerent or Council of Vicegerents shall observe any conditions 
which may be prescribed in the Royal Decree. I f the absence of the 
King is extended to more than four months and the National Assembly 
is not in session, the Assembly shall be summoned immediately to 
consider the matter. 
(j) Before the Regent or Vicegerent or any member of the Council of 
Regency or of the Council of Vicegerents assumes his office he shall 
take an oath, as prescribed in Article 29 hereof, before the Council of 
Ministers. 
(k) In the event of the death of the Regent or Vicegerent or member of 
the Council of Regency or of the Council of Vicegerents, or should he 
become incapable of performing his duties, the Council of Ministers 
shall appoint a suitable person to replace him. 
(1) A Regent or Vicegerent or member of the Council of Regency or of 
the Council of Vicegerents shall not be less than thirty years according 
to the lunar calendar. However, any male relative of the King who has 
completed his eighteenth year of age according to the lunar calendar 
may he appointed to any such office, 
(m) In the event of the King being incapacitated by any mental illness, the 
Council of Ministers, on confirmation of his illness, shall immediately 
convene the National Assembly .Should the illness be definitely 
confirmed, the National Assembly shall by resolution depose the King, 
whereupon title to the Throne shall devolve upon the person entitled 
thereto after him according to the provisions of this Constitution. If the 
Chamber of Deputies stands dissolved at the time or if its term had 
expired and no new Chamber had been elected, the former Chamber of 
Deputies shall be convened for the purpose. 
Article 29. The King shall upon his succession to the Throne take an oath before the 
National Assembly, which shall be convened under the chairmanship of 
the Speaker of the Senate, to respect and observe the Constitution and 
be loyal to the Nation. 
The King is the Head of the State and is immune from any Mabihty and 
responsibility. 
The King ratifies the laws and promulgates them. He shall direct the 
enactment of such regulations as may be necessary for their 
implementation, provided that such regulations are not inconsistent with 
the provisions thereof. 
The King is the Supreme Commander of the Land. Naval and Air Forces. 
(i) The King declares war, concludes peace and treaties and agreements. 
(ii) Treaties and agreements which involve financial commitments to th 
Treasury or affect the pubUc or private rights of Jordanians shall not 
be valid unless approved by the National Assembly. In no 
circumstances shall any secret terms contained in any treaty or 
agreement be contrary to their overt terms. 
Article 34. (i) The King issues orders for the holding of elections to the Chamber of 
Deputies in accordance with the provisions of the law, 
(ii) The King convenes the National Assembly, inaugurates, adjourns, and 
prorogues it in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. 
Article 30. 
Article 31. 
Article 32. 
Article 33. 
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(iii) The King may dissolve the Chamber of Deputies. 
(iv) The King may dissolve the Senate or relieve any Senator of his 
membership. 
Article 35. The King appoints the Prime Minister and may dismiss him or accept his 
resignation. He appoints the Ministers; He also dismisses them or 
accepts their resignation, upon the recommendation of the Prime 
Minister. 
Article 36. The King appoints members of the Senate and appoints the Speaker from 
amongst them and accepts their resignation. 
Article 37. (i) The King creates, confers and withdraws civil and mihtary ranks, medals 
and honorific titles. He may delegate this authority to any other person 
by special law. 
(u) Currency shall be minted in the name of the King in pursuance of the law. 
Article 38. The King has the right to grant a special pardon or remit any sentence, but 
any general pardon shall be determined by special law. 
Article 39. No death sentence shaU be executed except after confirmation by the King. 
Every such sentence shall be placed before the King by the Council of 
Ministers accompanied by their opinion thereon. 
Article 40. The King shall exercise the powers vested in him by Royal Decree. Every 
such Decree shaU be countersigned by the Prime Minister and the 
Minister or Ministers concerned. The King expresses his concurrence by 
placing His signature above the said signatures. 
PART TWO: MINISTERS 
Article 41. The Council of Ministers shall consist of the Prime Minister, who shall be 
the President and of such number of Ministers as may be needed and as 
pubhc interest may require. 
Article 42. No reason shall be appointed a Minister unless he is a Jordanian. 
Article 43. The Prime Minister and Ministers shah, before assuming their duties, take 
the foUowing oath before the King: " I swear by Almighty God to be loyal to 
the King, uphold the Constitution, serve the Nation and conscientiously 
perform the duties entrusted to me". 
Article 44. No Minister may purchase or lease any Government property even if the 
sale or lease thereof has been offered in pubhc auction. He shall not, while 
holding his Ministerial office, become a member of the board of directors of 
any company or take part in any commercial or financial transaction or 
receive a salary from any company. 
Article 45. (i) The Council of Ministers shaU be entrusted with the responsibOity of 
administering aU affairs of the State, internal and external, with the 
exception of such matters as are or may be entrusted by the present 
Constitution(**) or by any other legislation to any other person or body, 
(ii) The duties of the Prime Minister, the Ministers and the Council of Ministers 
shall be defmed by regulations made by the Council of Ministers and 
ratified by the King. 
Article 46. Any Minister may be entrusted with the responsibihty of one or more 
Ministries, as may be stated in the Decree of appointment. 
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Article 47. (i) Every Minister shall be responsible for the conduct of all matters 
pertaining to his Ministry. He shall refer to the Prime Minister any 
matter not falHng within his competence. 
(ii) The Prime Minister shall dispose of aU matters within his powers and 
competence and shall refer other matters to the Council of Ministers for 
such decision as may be necessary. 
Article 48. The Prime Minister and Ministers shall sign the decisions taken by the 
Council of Ministers, which shall be submitted to the King for 
ratification in all cases required under the present Constitution or any 
law or regulations enacted thereunder. Such decisions shall be 
implemented by the Prime Minister and Ministers, each within the limits 
of his competence. 
Article 49. Verbal or written orders of the King shall not release the Ministers from 
their responsibilities. 
Article 50. In the event of the resignation or dismissal of the Prime Minister from his 
office, aU Ministers shall be considered as having automatically resigned 
or been dismissed from their offices. 
Article 51. The Prime Minister and Ministers shall be collectively responsible before 
the Chamber of Deputies in respect of the public poUcy of the State. In 
addition, each Minister shall be responsible before the Chamber of 
Deputies in respect of the affairs of his Ministry. 
Article 52. The Prime Minister, or the Minister who is a member of either the 
Chamber of Deputies or the Senate, shall be entitled to vote in the 
House to which he belongs and to speak in both Houses. However, 
Ministers who are not members of either House may speak in both 
Houses without the right to vote. 
Article 53. (I) A motion of no confidence in the Council of Ministers or in any Minister 
may be raised by the Chamber of Deputies, 
(ii) I f the Chamber of Deputies casts a vote of no confidence in the Council 
of Ministers by an absolute majority of all its members, the Council of 
Ministers shall resign. 
(ui) I f the vote of no confidence concerns an individual Minister, he shall 
resign his office. 
Article 54. (i) A session to consider a vote of no confidence in the Council of Ministers 
or in any individual Minister shall be held either at the request of the 
Prime Minister or at a request signed by not less than ten Deputies, 
(ii) A vote of no confidence in the Council of Ministers or in any individual 
Minister may be postponed only for one period, which shall not exceed 
ten days, either upon the request of the Minister concerned or of the 
Council of Ministers. The Chamber shall not be dissolved during this 
period. 
(ui) Every newly formed Council of Ministers shall within one month of its 
formation, in cases where the Chamber of deputies is in session, place 
before the Chamber of Deputies a statement of its policy and request a 
vote of confidence on the basis of the said statement. I f the Chamber of 
Deputies is not in session at the time, or stands dissolved, the Speech 
from the Throne shall be considered to be a statement of its poHcy for 
the purposes of this Article. 
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Article 55. 
Article 56. 
Article 57. 
Article 58. 
Article 59. 
votes. 
Article 60. 
Article 61. 
Ministers shall be tried by a High Tribunal for offences which may be 
attributed to them in the course of the performance of their duties. 
The Chamber of Deputies is entitled to impeach Ministers, but a biU of 
impeachment shall not be passed except by a majority of two-thirds of 
the members of the Chamber. The Chamber of Deputies shall appoint, 
f rom among its members, deputies who shall present the impeachment 
to, and proceed before, the High Tribunal. 
The High Tribunal shall consist of the Speaker of the Senate as President 
and eight members.* three of whom shall be selected by ballot by the 
Senate f rom amongst its members and five members to be selected from 
amongst the judges of the highest Civil Court in order of seniority. In 
case of necessity, the number shall be completed from the presidents of 
the lower courts, also in order of seniority. 
The High Tribunal shall apply the provisions of the Penal Code in force in 
respect of offences specified therein. A special law shall specify the 
offences for which Ministers shall be responsible In cases where such 
offences are not covered by the Penal Code. 
Judgements shall be given by the High Tribunal by a majority of six 
The High Tribunal shall make its own Rules of Procedure for the trial of 
Ministers, pending the enactment of a special law for this purpose. 
A Minister who is impeached by the Chamber of Deputies shall be 
suspended from office until his case is determined by the High Tribunal. 
His resignation shall not prevent the institution of criminal proceedings 
against him, or the continuance of his trial. 
CHAPTER FIVE: The Legislative Power 
The National Assembly 
Article 62. The National Assembly shall consist of two Houses: 
The Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. 
PART I: THE S E N A T E 
Article 63. The Senate, including the Speaker, shall consist of not more than one-half 
of the number of the members of the Chamber of Deputies. 
Article 64. In addition to the requirements prescribed in Article 75 of the present 
Constitution, a Senator must have completed forty calendar years of age 
and must belong to one of the following classes: Present and former 
Prime Ministers and Ministers, persons who had previously held the 
office of Ambassador, Minister Plenipotentiary, Speaker of the Chamber 
of Deputies, President and judges of the Court of Cessation and of the 
Civil and Shari Courts of Appeal, retired rmlitary officers of the rank of 
Lt . General and above, former Deputies who were elected at least twice 
as deputies, and other similar personalities who enjoy the confidence of 
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the people in view of the services rendered by them to the Nation and 
the Country. 
Article 65. (i) The term of office of Senators shall be four years. The appointment of 
members shall be renewed every four years. Senators whose term of 
office had expired may be reappointed for a further term, 
(ii) The term of office of the Speaker of the Senate shall be two years but 
he may be reappointed. 
Article 66. (i) The Senate shall meet simultaneously with the Chamber of Deputies 
and the sessions shall be the same for both Houses. 
(ii) I f the Chamber of Deputies is dissolved, the sessions of the Senate shall 
be suspended. 
PART II: THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 
Article 67. The Chamber of Deputies shall consist of members elected by secret ballot 
in a general direct election and in accordance with the provisions of an 
Electoral Law which shall ensure the following principles: 
(i) The integrity of the election. 
(ii) The right of candidates to supervise the process of election. 
(iii) The punishment of any person who may adversely influence the wiU of 
voters. 
Article 68. (i) The term of office of the Chamber of Deputies shall be four calendar 
years commencing from the date of the announcement of the results of 
the general elections in the Official Gazette. The King may, by a Royal 
Decree, Prolong the term of the Chamber for a period of not less than 
one year and not more than two years, 
(u) A general election shaU take place during the four months preceding the 
end of the term of the Chamber. I f the election has not taken place by 
the end of the term of the Chamber or i f such election is delayed for any 
reason, the Chamber shall remain in office until the election of a new 
Chamber. 
Article 69. (i) The Chamber of Deputies shall elect its Speaker at the beginning of each 
ordinary session for a period of one calendar year, but he may he re-
elected. 
(ii) I f the Chamber of Deputies meets in an extraordinary session and has no 
Speaker, the Chamber shall elect a Speaker for a term of office which 
shall terminate at the beginning of the ordinary session. 
Article 70. In addition to the requirements prescribed in Article 75 of the present 
Constitution, a deputy must have completed thirty calendar years of his 
age. 
Article 71. The Chamber of Deputies shiU have the right to determine the validity of 
the election of its members. Any voter shall have the right to present a 
petition to the Secretariat of the Chamber within 15 days of the 
announcement of the results of the election in his constituency setting 
out the legal grounds for invalidating the election of any deputy. No 
election may be considered invalid unless it has been declared as such by 
a majority of two-thirds of the members of the Chamber. 
Article 72. Any deputy may resign his seat by notifying the Speaker of the Chamber 
of Deputies in writing, and the Speaker shall place the resignation before 
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the Chamber for a decision as to whether the resignation should be 
accepted or rejected. 
Article 73. (i) I f the Chamber of Deputies is dissolved, a general election shall be held, 
and the new Chamber shall convene in an extraordinary session not later 
than four months from the date of dissolution. Such session shall be 
deemed to be an ordinary session in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 78 of the present Constitution and shall be subject to the 
conditions prescribed therein in respect of prolongation or adjournment. 
(ii) I f no elections have taken place by the end of the four months, the 
dissolved Chamber shall assume its fuU constitutional powers and 
assemble forthwith as i f its dissolution had not taken place. It shall 
remain in office until the election of a new Chamber. 
(ii i) Such extraordinary session shall not in any event continue after the 
30th day of September and shall be prorogued on that date so that the 
Chamber may be able to hold its first ordinary session on the first day of 
October. I f such extraordinary session happens to be held during 
October and November, it shall be considered as the first ordinary 
session of the Chamber of Deputies. 
(iv) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs (i) and (ii) of this 
Article, the King may postpone the holding of the general elections i f a 
force majeure has occurred which the Council of Ministers considers as 
rendering the holding of elections impossible. 
(v) Should the force majeure provided for in paragraph (iv) hereof 
persist, the King may, upon a decision taken by the Council of Ministers, 
reinstate and convene the dissolved Chamber. Such Chamber shall be 
deemed as having been in existence in all respects from the date of the 
issue of the Royal Decree effecting its reinstatement. It shall exercise its 
fuU constitutional powers and be subject to the provisions of this 
Constitution, including those pertaining to the term of the Chamber and 
its dissolution. The session which it holds in such case shall be deemed 
to be its first ordinary session regardless of the date when it takes place, 
(vi) Should the Council of Ministers consider that the holding of general 
elections in at least one half of the constituencies is possible inspire of 
the persistence of the force majeure referred to in this Article, the King 
may order the holding of elections in such constituencies. The successful 
numbers shall elect not more than one half of the number of the members 
for the other constituencies in which it was impossible to hold elections, 
provided that they can hold a (vahd) meeting only by a majority of 
three-quarters of their number, and provided also that the elections shall 
be by at least a two-thirds majority and shall be in accordance with the 
provisions and in the manner provided for in Article 88 of the 
Constitution. 
The successful members and the members elected in accordance with 
this paragraph shall elect the remaining members for the said 
constituencies in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph. 
Article 74. I f the Chamber of Deputies is dissolved for any reason, the new Chamber 
shall not be dissolved for the same reason. A Minister who intends to 
nominate himself for election shaU resign fifteen days at least before the 
beginning of nomination. 
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PART II: Provisions Governing both Houses 
Article 75. (i) No person shall become a Senator or Deputy: 
(a) Who is not a Jordanian. 
(b) Who claims foreign nationality or protection. 
(c) Who was adjudged bankrupt and has not been legally discharged. 
(d) Who was interdicted and the Interdiction has not been removed. 
(e) Who was sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding one year for a 
non-political offence and has not been pardoned. 
(f) Who has a material interest in any contract, other than a contract or lease 
of land and property, with any Department of Government, provided 
that this provision shall not apply to any shareholder in a company of 
more than ten members. 
(g) Who is insane or an imbecile. 
(h) Who is related to the King within a degree of consanguinity to be 
prescribed by special law. 
(ii) Should any Senator or Deputy become disqualified during his term of 
office or should it appear after his election that he lacks one or more of 
the qualifications provided for in the preceding paragraph, his 
membership shall, by a resolution of two-thirds of the members of the 
House to which he belongs, be considered inexistent and vacant, 
provided that such a resolution, i f passed by the Senate, is submitted to 
the King for ratification. 
Article 76. Subject to the provisions of Article 52 of the present Constitution, no 
person shall be allowed to be a member of either the Chamber of 
Deputies or the Senate and a holder of a public office at the same time. 
PubMc office means every office whose holder receives his salary from 
public funds; it includes municipal offices. Similarly, no person shall be 
allowed to be a member of both the Chamber of Deputies and the 
Senate. 
Article 77. Subject to the provisions of the present Constitution relating to the 
dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies, the National Assembly shall 
hold one ordinary session during each year of its term. 
Article 78. (i) The King shall summon the National Assembly to an ordinary session on 
the first day of October of each year or, i f that day is an official holiday, 
on the first day following the official hoUday, provided that the King 
may, by Royal Decree published in the Official Gazette, postpone for a 
period not exceeding two months the meeting of the Assembly to a date 
to be fixed by the Royal Decree, 
(ii) I f the National Assembly is not summoned in accordance with the 
preceding paragraph, it shall meet of its own motion as i f it was so 
summoned. 
(iii) The ordinary session of the National Assembly shall begin on the date 
upon which it was summoned to meet in accordance with the two 
preceding paragraphs, and shall last for four months unless the Chamber 
of Deputies is dissolved by the King before the expiration of that period. 
The session may be prolonged by the King for a further period not 
exceeding three months to allow for the despatch of pending matters. At 
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the expiration of the four months or any such prolongation thereof, the 
King shall prorogue the Assembly. 
Article 79. The King shall inaugurate the ordinary session of the National Assembly 
by a Speech from the Throne addressed to a joint meeting of the Senate 
and the Chamber of Deputies. He may depute the Prime Minister or any 
of the Ministers to perform the inauguration ceremony and deliver the 
Speech f rom the Throne. Each of the two Houses shall submit a petition 
which shall contain its Reply thereto. 
Article 80. Every Senator, and Deputy shall, before taking his seat, take an oath 
before his House in the following terms: " I swear by Almighty God to be 
loyal to the King and to the Country and to uphold the Constitution, 
serve the Nation and duly perform the duties entrusted to me". 
Article 81. (i) The King may by Royal Decree adjourn the session of the National 
Assembly for not more than three times, or two times only i f He had 
postponed the meeting of the National Assembly under paragraph (i) of 
Article (78), provided that during any one session the period of such 
postponement shall not exceed two months in the aggregate, including 
the period of postponement. In computing the term of the session, the 
periods covered by any such adjournment shall not be taken into 
account. 
(ii) The Senate and the Chamber of Deputies may adjourn their session 
from time to time in conformity with their own Internal Regulations. 
Article 82. (i) The King may whenever necessary summon the National Assembly to 
meet in an extraordinary session for an unspecified period for the 
purpose of deciding matters to be specified in the Royal Decree when 
the summons are issued. An extraordinary session shall be prorogued by 
a Royal Decree. 
(ii) The King may summon the National Assembly to meet in an 
extraordinary session at the request of an absolute majority of the 
deputies. Such request shall be contained in a petition specifying the 
matters which i t is desired to discuss, 
(ui) The National Assembly shall not discuss in any extraordinary session 
except such matters as are specified in the Royal Decree convening the 
session. 
Article 83. The Senate and the Chamber of Deputies shall each make its Internal 
Regulations for the control and organisation of its own proceedings and 
shall submit such Orders to the King for ratification. 
Article 84. (i) No meeting of either House shall be considered duly constituted unless 
attended by two-thirds of the members of either House, and shall 
continue to be valid as long as an absolute majority of the members of 
either House is present, 
(ii) Resolutions by each of the two Houses shall be taken by a majority of 
votes of the members present, excluding the Speaker, who shall not vote 
except where it is otherwise provided in the present Constitution. In the 
case of equality of votes the Speaker shall have a casting vote, 
( i i i ) I f the voting is related to the Constitution or to a motion of no confidence 
in the Council of Ministers or in a particular Minister, the votes shall be 
taken by calling the names of members in a loud voice. 
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Article 85. The meetings of both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies shall be 
public. Secret meetings may, however, be convened at the request of the 
Government or of five Senators or Deputies. I f such a request is made, 
the Senate or Chamber of Deputies shall decide whether it should be 
accepted or rejected. 
Article 86. (i) No Senator or Deputy may be detained or tried during the currency of 
the sessions of the National Assembly unless the House to which he 
belongs decides by an absolute majority that there is sufficient reason for 
his detention or trial or unless he was arrested flagrant delicto. In the 
event of his arrest in this manner, the House to which he belongs, shall 
be notified immediately. 
(ii) I f a member is detained for any reason while the National Assembly is 
not sitting, the Prime Minister shall notify the Senate or the Chamber of 
Deputies when it reassembles of the proceedings which were taken 
against him, coupled with the necessary explanation. 
Article 87. Every Senator or Deputy shall have complete freedom of speech and 
expression of opinion within the hmits of the Internal Regulations of the 
Senate or Chamber of Deputies, as the case may be, and shall not be 
answerable in respect of any vote which he had cast or opinion 
expressed or speech made by him during the meetings of the House. 
Article 88. When a seat becomes vacant in the Senate or in the Chamber of Deputies 
by death or resignation or for any other reason, it shall be filled by 
appointment in the case of a Senator and by the holding of a by-election 
in the case of a deputy within a period of two months from the date on 
which the Government is notified of the vacancy by the House. The term 
of the new member shall be for the remaining part of the term of his 
predecessors. 
However, i f a seat in the Chamber of Deputies becomes vacant for any 
constituency for any reason and should there be force majeure on 
account of which the Council of Ministers considers that rendering a by-
election to fiU that seat is impossible, the Chamber of Deputies, by the 
absolute majority of its members and within one month of its being 
notified thereof, shall elect a member to fill the said seat from amongst 
the inhabitants of the said constituency to whom the provisions of the 
Constitution are applicable and in the manner the Chamber deems 
appropriate. 
Article 89. (i) In addition to the circumstances under which the Senate and the 
Chamber of Deputies may hold a Joint meeting as prescribed in Articles 
34, 79 and 92 of the present Constitution, both Houses shall hold a joint 
meeting at the request of the Prime Minister. 
(ii) When the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies hold a joint meeting, 
the meeting shall be presided over by the Speaker of the Senate. 
(iii) A joint meeting of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies shall not 
be considered properly constituted unless an absolute majority of the 
members of each House is present. Resolutions at such a meeting shall 
be taken by a majority of the Senators and Deputies present, exclusive of 
the Speaker who, in case of equality of votes, shall have a casting vote. 
Article 90. No Senator or Deputy may be removed from his office except by a 
resolution of the House to which he belongs, provided that, other than 
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the case of disqualification and combination of offices as prescribed in 
this Constitution and in the Electoral Law, the resolution to remove a 
Senator or Deputy must be taken by a two-thirds majority of the House. 
I f the resolution of removal concerns a Senator, the resolution must be 
submitted to the King for ratification. 
Article 91 . The Prime Minister shall refer to the Chamber of Deputies any draft taw, 
and the Chamber shall be entitled to accept, amend, or reject the draft 
law, but in all cases the Chamber shall refer the draft law to the Senate. 
No law may be promulgated unless passed by both the Senate and the 
Chamber of Deputies and ratified by the King. 
Article 92. Should either House twice reject any draft law and the other accept it, 
whether or not amended, both the Senate and the Chamber shall hold a 
joint meeting under the chairmanship of the Speaker of the Senate to 
discuss the matters in dispute. Acceptance of the draft law shall be 
conditional upon the passing of a resolution by a two-thirds majority of 
the members of both Houses present. I f the draft law is rejected as 
described above, it shall not be placed again before the House during 
the same session. 
Article 93. (i) Every draft law passed by the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies shall 
be submitted to the King for ratification, 
(ii) A law shall come into force after its promulgation by the King and the 
lapse of thirty days from the date of its publication in the official Gazette 
unless it is specifically provided in that law that it shall come into force 
on any other date. 
(ui) I f the King does not see fit to ratify a law. He may, within six months 
f rom the date on which the law was submitted to him, refer it back to the 
House coupled with a statement showing the reasons for withholding 
His ratification. 
(iv) I f any draft law (other than the Constitution) is referred back within the 
period specified in the preceding paragraph and is passed for the second 
time by two-thirds of the members of each of the Senate and the 
Chamber of Deputies, it shall be promulgated. I f the law is not returned 
with the Royal ratification within the period prescribed in paragraph (ui) 
above, it shall be considered as promulgated and effective. I f any draft 
law fails to obtain the two thirds majority of votes, it cannot be 
reconsidered during the same session, provided that the National 
Assembly may reconsider the draft during its next ordinary session. 
Article 94. (i) In cases where the National Assembly is not sitting or is dissolved, the 
Council of Ministers has, with the approval of the King, the power to 
issue provisional laws covering matters which require necessary 
measures which admit of no delay or which necessitate expenditures 
incapable of postponement. Such provisional laws, which shall not be 
contrary to the provisions of the Constitution, shall have the force of 
law, provided that they are placed before the Assembly at the beginning 
of its next session, and the Assembly may approve or amend such laws. 
In the event of the rejection of such provisional law, the Council of 
Ministers shall, with the approval of the King, immediately declare their 
nullity, and f rom the date of such declaration these provisional laws shall 
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cease to have force provided that such nuUity shall not affect any 
contracts or acquired rights, 
(ii) Provisional laws shall have the same force and effect as laws enacted in 
accordance with paragraph (ii) of Article (93) of this Constitution. 
Article 95. (i) Any ten or more Senators or Deputies may propose any law. Such 
proposal shall be referred to the committee concerned in the House for 
its views. I f the House is of the opinion that the proposal be accepted it 
shall refer it to the Government for drafting it in the form of draft law, 
and to submit it to the House either during the same session or at the 
following session. 
(ii) Any law proposed by Senators or Deputies in accordance with the 
preceding paragraph and rejected by either House shall not be presented 
for a second time during the same session. 
Article 96. Any Senator or Deputy may address questions or interpellations to the 
Ministers concerning any public matters, in accordance with the 
provisions of the Internal Regulations of the Senate or the House (as the 
case may be). No interpellation may be debated before the lapse of eight 
days f rom the date of its receipt by the Minister, unless the case is of an 
urgent nature and the Minister agrees to shorten this period. 
CHAPTER SIX: The Judiciary 
Article 97. Judges are independent, and in the exercise of their judicial functions they 
are subject to no authority other than that of the law. 
Article 98. Judges of the Civil and Sharia Courts shall be appointed and dismissed by 
a Royal Decree in accordance with the provisions of the law. 
Article 99. The courts shall be divided into three categories: 
(i) C iv i l Courts (u) ReHgious Courts (ni) Special Courts. 
Article 100. The establishment of the various courts, their categories, their divisions, 
their jurisdiction and their administration shall be by virtue of a special 
law, provided that such law provides for the establishment of a High 
Court of Justice. 
Article 101. (i) The courts shall be open to all and shall be free from any interference 
in their affairs 
(ii) The sittings of the courts shall be pubHc unless the court considers that 
i t should sit in camera in the interest of pubUc order or morals. 
Article 102. The Civil Courts in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan shall have 
jurisdiction over all persons in aU matters, civil and criminal, including 
cases brought by or against the Government; except those matters in 
respect of which jurisdiction is vested in Religious or Special Courts in 
accordance with the provisions of the present Constitution or any other 
legislation in force. 
Article 103. (i) The Civil Courts shall exercise their jurisdiction in respect to civil and 
criminal matters in accordance with the law for the time being in force in 
the Kingdom, provided that in matters affecting the personal status of 
foreigners or in matters of a civil or commercial nature which in 
accordance with international usage are governed by the law of another 
country, such law shall be applied in the manner designated by the law. 
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(ii) Matters of personal status are those which are defmed by law and in 
accordance therewith fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sharia 
Courts where the parties are Moslems. 
Article 104. The Religious Courts shall be divided into: 
(i) The Sharia Courts 
(ii) The Tribunals of other Religious Communities. 
Article 105. The Sharia Courts shall in accordance with their own laws have exclusive 
jurisdiction in respect of the following matters: 
(i) Matters of personal status of Moslems. 
(ii) Cases concerning blood money (diya) where the two parties are 
Moslems or where one of the parties is not a Moslem and the two 
parties consent to the jurisdiction of the Sharia Courts. 
(i i i) Matters pertaining to Islamic wakfs. 
Article 106. The Sharia Courts shall in the exercise of their Jurisdiction apply the 
provisions of the Sharia law. 
Article 107. The organisation of the affairs of Moslem (walcfs) and the administration 
of their financial matters, among other matters, shall be regulated by a 
special law. 
Article 108. The Tribunals of Religious Communities are those for the non-Moslem 
reMgious communities which have been or wiU be recognised by the 
government as established in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. 
Article 109. (i) Tribunals of Religious Communities shall be established in conformity 
with the provisions of laws pertaining thereto. Such laws shall define the 
jurisdiction of such Tribunals in matters of personal status and wakfs 
constituted for the benefit of the Community concerned. Matters of 
personal status of any such community shall be the same matters as are, 
in the case of Moslems, within the jurisdiction of the Sharia Courts, 
(ii) Such laws shall determine the procedure to be followed by the Tribunals 
of the Religious Communities. 
Article 110. Special Courts shall exercise their jurisdiction in accordance with the 
provisions of the laws constituting them . 
CHAPTER SEVEN: Financial Matters 
Article 111. No tax or duty may be imposed except by law. Taxes and duties shall not 
include the various kinds of fees which the Treasury charges in respect 
of services rendered to members of the public by Government 
Departments or in consideration of benefits accruing to them from the 
State Domain. In imposing taxes, the Government shall be guided by the 
principles of progressive taxation, coupled with the attainment of 
equality and social Justice, provided that taxation shall not exceed the 
capacity of tax-payers or the State's requirements for funds. 
Article 112. (i) The draft law covering the General Budget shall be submitted to the 
National Assembly for consideration in accordance with the provisions 
of the Constitution at least one month before the beginning of the 
financial year. 
(ii) Voting in respect of the budget shall take place on each chapter 
separately. 
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(iii) No sum falling within the expenditure section of the General Budget 
may be transferred f rom one chapter to another except by law. 
(iv) The National Assembly, when debating the General Budget draft law 
or the provisional laws relating thereto, may reduce the expenditures 
under the various chapters in accordance with what it considers to be in 
the public interest, but it shall not increase such expenditures either by 
amendment or by the submission of a separate proposal. However, the 
Assembly may after the close of the debate propose laws for the creation 
of new expenditures. 
(v) During the debate of the General Budget, no proposal shall be accepted 
for the abrogation of an existing tax or the creation of a new one or the 
amendment, whether by increase or reduction, of existing taxes which 
are prescribed by financial laws in force, and no proposal shall be 
accepted for amending expenditures or revenues fixed by contract. 
(vi) The national revenues and expenditures estimated for each financial year 
shall be approved by the General Budget Law, provided that said Law 
may provide for the allocation of any special sums for a period 
exceeding one year. 
Article 113. I f it is not possible to enact the General Budget Law prior to the 
beginning of the new financial year, expenditures shall continue by 
monthly appropriations at the rate of 1/12th for each month of the 
previous year's budget. 
Article 114. The Council of Ministers may, with the approval of the King, issue 
regulations for the control of appropriations and expenditures of the 
public funds and the organisation of Government stores. 
Article 115. A l l receipts f rom taxes and other sources of Government revenue shall be 
paid into the Treasury and shall be included in the Government budget 
save where otherwise provided by law. No part of the funds of the 
Treasury may be appropriated or expended for any purpose whatever 
except under the law. 
Article 116. The CivH List of the King shall be paid from the General Revenue and 
shall be fixed in the General Budget Law. 
Article 117. Any concession granting a right for the exploitation of mines, minerals or 
public utilities shall be sanctioned by law. 
Article 118. No person shall be exempt f rom the payment of taxes or duties in 
circumstances other than those prescribed by law. 
Article 119. An Audit office shall be set up by law for controlling the State's revenues, 
its expenses and the manner of expenditure: 
(i) The Audit Office shall submit to the Chamber of Deputies at the beginning 
of each ordinary session, or whenever the Chamber demands, a general 
report embodying its views and comments and indicating any 
irregularities committed and the responsibiUty arising therefrom. 
(ii) The law shall provide for the immunity of the Head of the Audit Office. 
CHAPTER EIGHT: General Provisions 
Article 120. The administrative divisions of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the 
establishment of the Government Departments, their classification. 
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designations, the plan of operations and the manner of the appointment 
of civil servants, their dismissal, their discipline, supervision and the 
limits of their competence and powers shall be determined by regulations 
issued by the Council of Ministers with the approval of the King. 
Article 121. Municipal and local council affairs shall be administered by municipal or 
local councils in accordance with special laws. 
Article 122. The High Tribunal provided for in Article (57) shall have the right to 
interpret the provisions of the Constitution i f so requested either by 
virtue of a decision of the Council of Ministers or by a resolution taken 
by the Senate or the Chamber of Deputies passed by absolute majority. 
Such interpretation shall be implemented upon its publication in the 
Official Gazette. 
Article 123. (i) The Special Tribunal (Diwan Khass) may interpret the provisions of any 
law which have not been interpreted by the courts i f so requested by the 
Prime Minister. 
(ii) The Special Tribunal shall consist of the President of the highest Civil 
Court as chairman, two of its Judges and one senior administrative 
official, who shall be appointed by the Council of Ministers, as members. 
I t shall also include a member delegated by the Minister concerned from 
among the senior officials of the Ministry which is involved in the 
needed interpretation. 
(ii i) The Special Tribunal shall give its decisions by a majority of votes. 
(iv) Decisions given by the Special Tribunal and pubUshed in the Official 
Gazette shall have the force of law. 
(v) AU other matters concerning the interpretation of laws shall be decided 
as they arise by the courts of law in the usual course. 
Article 124. In the event of an emergency necessitating the defence of the Kingdom, a 
law, which shall be known as the Defence Law, shall be enacted giving 
power to the person specified therein to take such actions and measures 
as may be necessary, including the suspension of the operation of the 
ordinary laws of the State, with a view to ensuring the defence of the 
Kingdom. The Defence Law shall come into force upon its 
proclamation by a Royal Decree to be issued on the basis of a decision 
of the Council of Ministers. 
Article 125. (i) In the event of an emergency of such a serious nature that action under 
the preceding Article of the present Constitution wil l be considered 
insufficient for the defence of the Kingdom, the King may by a Royal 
Decree, based on a decision of the Council of Ministers, declare martial 
law in the whole or any part of the Kingdom, 
(ii) When martial law is declared, the King may by a decree issue such 
orders as may be necessary for the defence of the Kingdom, 
notwithstanding the provisions of any law in force. Persons charged with 
the implementation of such orders shall continue to be subject to legal 
liability for aU acts committed by them under the provisions of any such 
laws until they are relieved of such responsibility by a special law to be 
enacted for the purpose. 
Article 126. (i) The procedure prescribed in the present Constitution with regard to 
draft laws shall apply to any draft law for the amendment of this 
Constitution, provided that any such amendment is passed by a two-
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thirds majority of the members of each of the Senate and the Chamber of 
Deputies. In the event of a joint meeting of the Senate and the Chamber 
of Deputies in accordance with Article (92) of this Constitution, the 
amendment shall be passed by a two-thirds majority of the members of 
both Houses, provided that in both cases the amendment shall not come 
into force unless ratified by the King, 
(ii) No amendment of the Constitution affecting the rights of the King and 
the succession to the Throne may be passed during the period of 
Regency. 
Article 127. The duties of the Army shall be confined to the defence of the Kingdom 
and its safety. 
(i) Recruitment to the army, its organisation and the rights and duties of its 
personnel shall be defined by law. 
(ii) The organisation of the police and gendarmerie, including their powers, 
shall be defined by law. 
CHAPTER NINE: Enforcement and Repeal of Laws 
Article 128. AH laws, regulations and other legislative acts in force in the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan on the date on which this Constitution comes into 
force shall continue to be in force until they are repealed or amended by 
the legislation issued thereunder. 
Article 129. (i) The Constitution of Jordan issued on the 7th December, 1946, together 
with all amendments thereto, are hereby repealed. 
(ii) The Palestine Order-in-Council for the Year 1922 and the amendments 
thereto are hereby repealed. 
(iii) The repeals referred to in the preceding two paragraphs shall not affect 
the validity or any law or regulation made or act done thereunder prior 
to the coming into force of the provisions of the present Constitution. 
Article 130. The provisions of the present Constitution shall come into force on the 
date of its publication in the Official Gazette. 
Article 131. The Council of Ministers shall be charged with the execution of the 
provisions of the present Constitution. 
365 
2. The Jordanian National Charter. 1991 
CHAPTER ONE: THE CHARTER: RATIONALE AND AIMS 
To complete and strengthen the process of Jordanian reconstruction, His Majesty the 
King ordered the estabhshment of a Royal Commission and charged it with the task of 
drawing up a National Charter which would lay the foundations and define the methods 
of national public activity. The Charter would also point out the way for the future, 
establishing general guidelines on the exercise of pohtical pluralism in so far as it 
constitutes the second component of democracy. This would be accomplished on the 
basis of the constant tenets of the Constitution as well as of political and national 
tradition. I t would take cognisance of existing reaHties in Jordanian society in such a 
manner as would guarantee continued national progress and democratic change and 
protect them f rom taking an adverse course. 
The Jordanian Constitution contains a range of constant general principles which 
regulate the form of governance in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as well as the 
manner of interaction by the public with these principles. This has been in force since 
the inception and establishment of the Jordanian State. The Jordanian pubhc views these 
principles as axiomatic and non-controvertible because they emanate from conviction, 
deeply-held behefs and self-interest. These principles reflect the pride of all Jordanians 
in their national identity as part and parcel of the Arab nation and their faith in Islam as 
both the religion of the state and a defining civilisation for the people. 
*Since a commitment to these constant principles would sake the relentless 
Jordanian and national struggle for a better future a fundamental task entrusted to the 
government and people to an equal degree, 
*And, since continued solidarity between the leadership and the peoples is a most 
important guarantee for securing Jordanian and national objectives, and, since the 
historical phase through which Jordan and the Arab World are currently passing is 
replete with challenges and dangers threatening the nation's destiny, foreshadowing a 
possible hegemony over its wiU and its freedom and testing its abihty to keep up with 
scientific and cultural progress, to utilise its resources for the benefit of its citizenry or 
to share with other nations in the building of a better future for mankind as a whole, 
*And, since the Jordanian Arab citizens look for progress and for acquiring the 
necessary means to defend their homeland and to ensure the security of their society, 
and since they enjoy a high sense of responsibility and a deep appreciation of the 
importance of their participation in securing their own and their children's future within 
an established and stable framework of democracy and. institutional principles, 
*And, since democracy can only be enhanced through emphasis on the universally 
recognised rights of the individual and through a guarantee of the rights of citizenship 
as secured by the Jordanian Constitution, and since these rights are enshrined in our 
great Arab and Islamic traditions and are given a place of honour therein, including the 
people's right to hold varying opinions as well as the right of the citizens, be they male 
or female, to change their circumstances and improve their lot by legal means, express 
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their views, and resort to whatever they deem necessary for the benefit of the whole by 
legitimate methods, and participate in the decision-making process, 
*For aU these reasons, therefore, the democratic option is the most efficient and 
appropriate means of fulfilling the aspirations of the Jordanian people and their hopes at 
the national, Arab and universal levels. Agreement on these approaches by all segments 
and by popular and official bodies at all levels has been achieved with regard to a sum 
of concepts, values and basic principles as well as with regard to Jordanian and Arab 
objectives enunciated by the Charter. These should regulate public life and organise the 
state of relations among aU official and popular bodies in society . Such agreement can 
only be regarded as an advanced form of cultural achievement and a comprehensive 
platform for the future. Its salient features and fundamental concepts are defined 
through the following set of facts, principles and constants: 
First: The system of government in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is parliamentary, 
monarchic and hereditary. Adherence by all to legitimacy and to respect of the 
letter and spirit of the Constitution shaU enhance the union between the people 
and their leadership. 
Second: The Jordanian people are part of the Arab nation. Arab unity is the only option 
that would achieve national security for Jordan and the Arab nation in all Arab 
countries, guarantee economic and psychological stability and ensure 
preservation, progress and continuity. 
Third: Faith in God, respect for spiritual values, adherence to higher principles and 
acceptance of the right of every individual to a Ufe of freedom and decency are 
fundamental concepts in the building of the state and the achievement of 
progress by Jordanian society. 
Fourth: Islam is the religion of the state, and Islamic law is the principal source of 
legislation. 
Fifth: Arab Islamic civilisation, open to world civilisation, is the defining aspect of the 
national identity of the Jordanian people. It constitutes one of the bases of its 
unity, independence and progress in the face of division, dependence and 
cultural intrusion in all its forms. I t is also a well head of innate values which 
Jordanian society seeks to strengthen, through science, learning, education and 
good example. 
Sixth: The Arabic language is the official language of the state. It is the language of the 
Holy Qur'an which has preserved for the Arab nation its true essence. It is 
imperative that the supremacy of Arabic be stressed by Jordanian society at all 
levels. Arabic should be used in all stages of education. Attention must be given 
to translation and Arabization to keep abreast of accelerating scientific progress, 
and to the learning and teaching of other hving languages. 
Seventh: Respect for the mind, beUef in dialogue, recognition of the right of others to 
disagree, respect for the opinion of others, tolerance, and rejection of political 
and social violence are basic characteristics of Jordanian society. Pursuant to 
this, there is no compulsion in religion or recourse to fanaticism, sectarianism or 
regional bias. 
Eighth: Jordanian men and women are equal under the law. There shall be no distinction 
between them in rights and obligations regardless of difference in race, language 
or religion. They shall exercise their constitutional rights and uphold the higher 
interest of the state and the national ethic in such a manner as to ensure that the 
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material and spiritual resources of Jordanian society are freed and directed 
towards achieving the national objectives of unity, progress and building a better 
future. 
Ninth: Strengthening the foundations of a state governed by the supremacy of the law 
and firming up the democratic process based on political pluralism are an 
obligation of the state's institutions, of individual members of Jordanian society 
and all its other bodies. 
Tenth: PoHtical, party and intellectual pluralist is the means of strengthening democracy 
and ensuring participation by the Jordanian people in administering the affairs of 
the state. It serves to guarantee national unity and build a balanced civil society. 
Eleventh: To be nationally committed is to respect the freedom of all citizens and to 
protect the country's security, independence and progress. National commitment 
contributes to the preservation of unity, the strengthening of the Jordanian 
peoples sovereignty on their national soil and the protection of the people's 
integrity under conditions removed from aU forms of discrimination, fanaticism 
or introversion. 
Twelfth: National independence requires a liberation of the national wi l l f rom all manner 
of external pressure or hegemony. I t is achieved and preserved through the 
constant and effective exercise of a national poUtical wiH at all levels. This 
requires the development of institutions and systems and the acquisition of 
appropriate means and methods to effect modernisation and progress in order to 
meet the challenges of the future, while at the same time preserving the noble 
mores of Jordanian Arab society and taken pride in its innate traditions. 
Thirteenth: The Jordanian Armed Forces are the country's protective shield and the 
guarantors of its security and independence. The Arab Legion is in the forefront 
of the forces entrusted with the task of liberation and the defence of Arab 
integrity. The Legion's strength and effectiveness are enhanced through active 
support by the people and the popular army for strengthening Jordanian national 
security. I t is the responsibihty of the state and society as a whole to support the 
Armed Forces' capacity and preparedness and to provide the best possible 
conditions for their development. 
Fourteenth: An independent national economy is a true support of national 
independence, security and progress. It is best achieved through self-reliance, 
development of latent national capacities, rational use of national wealth and 
resources, as well as through strengthening all components of the productive 
base, providing capable management, and moving towards a stabilisation and 
integration of basic economic legislation, within a framework of social justice. 
Fifteenth: Social justice for aU Jordanians requires a range of social insurance schemes, 
an updating of labour laws and a narrowing of income disparities in such a 
manner as to ensure balance and social harmony and to provide security and 
stabiUty for Society as a whole. 
Sixteenth: Respect for human rights, strengthening of democratic practices, 
guaranteeing a continued balance in development and achieving administrative 
efficiency in the Kingdom are fundamental national goals. They require a 
constant effort to promote a unified administrative system for the Jordanian 
state and to ensure that local councils become answerable to central authority 
for supervision and guidance purposes, they also require a strengthening of the 
social, political and economic structures of the state through supporting the 
concept of local administration in the various districts and governorates in such 
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a marmer as to provide practical opportunities for the people to exercise self-
government, enable continued close co-ordination between governmental and 
popular bodies and lead to better democratic practices through responsible 
participation within a framework of balanced rights and obligations. 
Seventeenth: Jordanian universities are an important part of the country's fabric. They 
ought to function as beacons of intellectual enlightenment and scientific 
progress. To achieve this, the universities must be provided with the requisites 
and guarantees of academic freedom, They must be provided with the means to 
develop their curricula, keep abreast of knowledge, develop their capacity for 
scientific research and enhance their role in developing Jordanian society and 
meeting its needs. They must have the capacity to help build the country's 
institutions, provide good instruction and qualify the country's youth to solve 
problems and meet the challenges of the future. 
Eighteenth: the decade of the nineties is a decisive period for Jordan and the Arab 
World. I t is imperative that our nation must acquire the means to preserve its 
current state of awakening and bring together the various components of its 
strength and solidarity in order to meet the needs of the present as well as the 
challenges of the twenty-first century as reflected in the democratic revolution, 
the emphasis on human rights, the establishment of large economic blocs, and 
the explosive impact of technology and informatics. 
Chapter Two 
STATE GOVERNED BY LAW AND POLITICAL PLURALISM 
First: The state of Law and Political Pluralism 
1. The State of Law is a democratic state committed to the principle of the supremacy 
of the law and derives its legitimacy, authority and effectiveness from the free wiU 
of the people and aU authorities within it are committed to providing legal, judicial 
and administrative guarantees to protect the rights, integrity and basic freedoms of 
the individual which rules were laid down by Islam and confirmed by the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and all other international covenants and treaties 
promulgated by the United Nations in this regard. 
2. The Jordanian State is a State of Law in the modern sense of a democratic state. It is 
a state for aU citizens regardless of any differences of opinion or any pluralism of 
approach. I t derives its strength f rom an actual and declared application of the 
principles of equality. Justice and equal opportunities and f rom the provision of 
practical means enabling the Jordanian people to participate in the decisions 
affecting their Hves and their affairs in such a manner as to achieve peace of mind, 
security, faith in the future, genuine concern for the institutions of the state and 
pride in belonging therein. 
Second: Basic Pillars of a State of Law 
1. Adherence to the letter and spirit of the Constitution by the legislative, executive and 
judiciary authorities in all their actions, within a framework of priority of the right. 
2. Adherence to the principle of the supremacy of the law, within a frame work of 
comprehensive review by an independent judiciary. 
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3. Adherence, in the exercise of democracy, to the principles and requisites of social 
justice. 
4. Ensuring that laws in general and laws pertaining to political parties, elections and 
publications in particular are dedicated to safeguarding the citizens' basic rights and 
public freedoms. 
5. Adoption of the democratic dialogue as the basis of expressing the views, free from 
any form of coercion or intellectual terrorism, at all official and public levels. 
6. Adherence by all government institutions, in the exercise of their duties and services 
to the public and entities to the principle of complete equality. Said institutions, 
whether civil or military, should not be exploited by any group, party or faction for 
political or party purposes, without prejudice to the rights of citizens to organise 
themselves politically, provided that all of the above is considered as a basic 
condition for the success of the democratic system. 
In order to strengthen the above pillars and to bolster the democratic structure of 
the Jordanian state and society, it is imperative to work on ensuring the 
following: 
1. Establish, through a special law, an autonomous body to be called the Complaints 
Bureau to exercise administrative inspection and review the performance of the 
administration and the actions of individuals therein. The Bureau shall report to 
Parliament and the Council of Ministers in accordance with the applicable 
provisions of the Constitution, laws and decrees without prejudice to the 
independence or jurisdiction of the judiciary. 
2. Establish, through a special law, an autonomous body to update and develop 
legislation based on studies and research conducted for that purpose. This body 
shall report to Parliament and the Council of Ministers. 
3. Establish a Constitutional Court with the following jurisdiction: 
a. Interpret the provisions of the Jordanian Constitution in matters referred to it by the 
Council of Ministers. 
b. Decide on matters referred to it by the courts with regard to constitutional issues 
arising from cases entertained before these courts. 
c. Decide on disputes and challenges pertaining to the constitutionality of laws and 
decrees which are brought before it by interested parties. 
In all of the aforementioned instances, the Jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court 
shall be limited to deciding on the constitutional aspect. Decisions by the Court shall be 
final and binding on all state bodies and individuals. 
4. Amalgamate legislation pertaining to state of emergency and state of extreme 
emergency sanctioned by the Constitution into one law which would make decisions 
by the Council of Ministers declaring either state of emergency or specifying its 
duration subject to approval by Parliament and would in all cases place all 
administrative decisions taken by virtue of this legislation subject to review by the 
High Court of Justice. 
5. Restore to Parliament the legislative powers of the Council of Ministers stipulated in 
Articles 114 and 120 of the Constitution in connection with decrees of pubUc 
works, pubHc purchases and civil service. 
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6. Subject the budgets of public corporations to parliamentary approval. The budget of 
mixed companies where public equity amounts to fifty percent or more shall be 
subject to subsequent parliamentary review. 
7. Take steps to introduce constitutional amendments deemed necessary to meet 
development needs and to repeal provisions in the Constitution which have lost their 
raison d'etre. 
Third: Guarantees of the Democratic Approach 
The most important guarantees of the democratic approach and achievement of political 
pluralism are the adherence to the following principles: 
1. Respecting the fundamentals of democratic action by organised political groups and 
parties in their general conduct since it constitutes a guarantee to justice and 
stability. 
2. Strengthening the traits of tolerance and objectivity, respect for the beliefs of others 
and groups in the exercise of political and party affairs, avoiding narrow personal 
conflicts and the slander of individuals and entities. 
3. Guaranteeing the basic freedoms of all citizens in such a manner as to protect the 
structure of a democratic society, preserve the rights of individuals and ensure full 
freedom of expression and its declaration with complete liberty within the limits of 
the Constitution. 
4. Attaining equality, justice and equal opportunities for all citizens, male and female, 
without discrimination. 
5. Preserving the civihan and democratic character of the state, and regarding any 
attempt to abolish or undermine this character as invaUd ab initio as it would 
constitute a violation of the constitution and the pluralist principle and its 
perception. 
Fourth: Principles and Limitations Governing the Establishment of 
Parties 
1. Jordanians enjoy the right to establish and belong to political parties and groupings 
provided that their objectives are legitimate, their methods are peaceful and their 
statutes do not violate the provisions of the Constitution. Laws regulating the 
operation of parties should not include any provisions which overtly or impliciUy 
call for abrogating the constitutional right to estabUsh political parties. 
2. Political and party work in Jordan is based on the principle of pluralism of thought, 
opinion and organisation and on securing the requisites of democratic competition 
and its legitimate means. 
3. A party must announce and declare its statutes and internal regulations which specify 
its aims, financial resources and political, economic, social and cultural platforms. 
4. The judiciary is solely empowered to decide on any infringement pertaining to the 
application of the Parties Law. 
5. Political parties shall, in their internal workings as well as in their programmes, 
approaches, actions and public and party activities, adhere to the following 
principles: 
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a. Parties must employ democratic methods in their internal workings, choice of 
leadership and in the exercise of their activities within a framework of democratic 
dialogue and free competition among the political parties. The same shall apply to 
relations and dealings by any party with other political parties and groupings as well 
as with popular and constitutional institutions in a spirit of mutual respect for 
opposing views. 
b. There shall be no structural or financial affiliation by the leadership or members of 
any party with any non-Jordanian. Also, no activities by any party or grouping shall 
be conducted upon instructions or directions from any foreign state or body. 
Taking into consideration what is stated in this paragraph and all principles and 
limitations governing the organisation of parties, any provisions in the statute, 
internal regulations or programmes of any licensed Jordanian party serving 
Palestine, Arab unity or Islamic solidarity shall be regarded as a national Jordanian 
undertaking. 
c. Any party in government or participating therein shall adhere to the principles of 
equaHty and equal opportunities for all citizens and must regard ability and 
qualifications as basic criteria for any appointment to public office. 
d. In the matter of financial revenues, all parties shall rely on local, recognised, declared 
and specified Jordanian resources. These shall be subject to financial audit and legal 
review in the manner prescribed by law. 
e. In matters of organisation, activities and orientation, all parties shall refrain from 
organising or recruiting for party purposes within the ranks of the Jordanian Armed 
Forces and security departments or establishing military or paramilitary (militia) 
groups of any description whatsoever. 
f. All parties whatever their form of organisation shall maintain premises with known 
and declared addresses. Parties shall not use state, public, charitable or religious 
institutions or bodies for the benefit of any party or grouping. Nor shall they 
involve any such instimtions in any political or factional conflicts. 
CHAPTER THREE: JORDAN'S NATIONAL SECURITY 
Jordan's national security depends to a very large extent on the resolve and inner 
strength of Jordanian society to ensure the defence and independent will of the country, 
guarantee the safety and freedom of the Jordanian people and provide the citizens, 
wherever they may reside, with the means of a decent living, personal and financial 
security and psychological and social stability. Jordan's physical location and political 
stance, which place it in the front lane of confrontation with the Zionist threat, require it 
to harness its resources, efforts and capabilities in order to meet the challenge by 
defending its existence and protecting its national security by all available means. 
This being the case, Jordan's national security shaU be based on the following 
considerations: 
1. Jordan's security is part of Arab national security. In good times and bad, each has a 
direct bearing on the other. This makes Jordan's steadfastness and strength 
indivisible from those of the Arab nation, and emphasises the Arab dimension with 
regard to Jordan's strength, security and stability. 
2. In its approach to national security, Jordanian policy springs from a recognition of 
the dangers of division and dependency which threaten the political, economic and 
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social security of Jordan and the Arab World. This calls for a national policy 
emphasising independence in aU fields, strengthening Jordanian society from within, 
increasing commitment to the homeland, instilling in the youth a spirit of sacrifice 
and faith in the justice of the nation's great causes and informing them of the nature, 
aims and alliances of the enemy and the danger they pose to the future of the Arab 
nation and its holy places. It also requires emphasis on the duty of Arabs and 
Muslims to support Jordan's efforts to preserve its security and protect Arab and 
Muslim holy places. 
3. Jordanian national security is also dependent on inculcating the concept of 
professionalism in the armed forces, broadening their base, developing their 
capabilities and rallying the resources of the country and people to their support, to 
enable them to perform their duty of protecting the country and contributing to its 
growth and development. This would achieve greater cohesion among the various 
segments of society and a greater commitment to the preservation of the country's 
security and achievements. 
4. Increased attention must be given to developing the various arms of national security 
to enable them to carry out their duties in the best manner possible, and in 
accordance with their respective functions with regard to external and internal 
security. This must be done within a framework of respect for the dignity, freedom 
and constitutional rights of the citizenry coupled with a moral responsibility of 
promoting an atmosphere of social peace and mutual confidence between the 
security forces and the people an all walks of life. 
5. Economic and social security for all segments of the Jordanian people is an essential 
component of national security. To achieve this, greater reliance must be placed on 
Jordan's own resources to enable the country to meet the people's basic needs in a 
manner that would accord due respect to the dignity of the individual and contribute 
to his material and psychological weU-being as well as to his means of hvelihood. 
6. Strengthening democracy is an essential component contributing to a deeper 
commitment to the homeland and greater confidence in its institutions. It also 
contributes to solidifying the union of the Jordanian people and further protecting 
their national security. This must be achieved through providing the conditions for 
real participation by aU citizens in an atmosphere of social justice, equal opportunity 
and a proper balance between rights and obligations. 
CHAPTER FOUR: T H E ECONOMY 
The Jordanian economy is constrained by several factors which impede its growth 
and development. Most prominent of these are: scarce mineral, energy and water 
resources, limited area of arable land, high rates of population growth, small local 
market (in the absence of a workable concept of Arab economic integration), political 
instability in the region and an increasing national defence burden. 
These constraints have led to a heavy dependence on external assistance and loans. 
However, the economy has achieved high rates of growth which have left a mark in 
varying degrees on many aspects of Jordanian life. 
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With the growth of the role of government in economic activities, it was natural for 
it to take on the responsibility of providing the infrastructure in the various regions of 
the Kingdom. However, in the absence of a comprehensive economic policy, proper 
management and effective oversight of public performance, economic sectors have 
shown uneven growth. The resultant income disparity has led to a contraction of the 
middle classes. At the same time, there has .been a noticeable rise in prestige projects, 
conspicuous consumption by the public and private sectors, extravagant use of 
resources, a large increase in the public debt and a drop in economic growth rates. 
In light of the above, the future outlook for economic growth and social 
development must be guided by the foUowings: 
1. The Jordanian economy must be based on respect for private ownership and 
encouragement of private enterprise. On the other hand, natural resources and 
strategic projects must be the property of the state, with a fuU right to their 
management and supervision in the public interest. The state must also retain the 
prerogative of regulating the economy and allocating resources in accordance with 
national priorities. 
2. There must be a clear and well-defmed developmental strategy based on the concept 
of self-reliance, release of the iimovative spirit in society, a high degree of respect 
for work and productivity, reconstitution and development of the rural economy, 
harnessing and rational use of natural and human resources, development of the 
national productive base, improvement of services, upgrading of public 
administration and strengthening of financial and quality control. 
3. Optimal use must be made of aU available resources, coupled with the utilisation of 
appropriate scientific and technological means for improving productivity in a 
manner that would meet the needs of the citizens, provide employment 
opportunities, improve and diversify income and raise the standard of Uviug. 
4. Economic decisions must be declared, legal, objectives institutionally-based and free 
of any personal interest or individual consideration. 
5. Reliance must be placed on up-to-date and accurate data in the formulation of socio-
economic policy and in the decision-making process. To that end, prompt data 
collection, documentation and pubUcation must be emphasised. 
6. Emphasis must be placed on the right of establishing trade unions in all economic 
sectors, including agriculture, and the regular updating of labour and trade union 
legislation to ensure a minimum wage and continuous training of the labour force, 
and to regulate relations between employers, workers and government within a 
balanced framework of rights, obUgations and roles. 
7. Employment opportunities must be provided to all citizens. Policies and measures 
must be adopted to achieve this objective, particularly through national plans 
encouraging labour-intensive economic activities, better working conditions, an 
improved educational system geared towards the needs of society and a greater 
social value attached to work of any kind. 
8. Combating poverty and its effects must be made a strategic goal of the Jordanian 
state and a national responsibility requiring the provision of employment 
opportunities to all who can and want to work, with first priority to be given to 
Jordanians. Also, there must be a just regional and social distribution of services and 
development projects with the objective of meeting basic needs, marginalising 
poverty and reducing its impact on the individual and society. 
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9. Expatriate Jordanians must be regarded as part of the social and economic structure 
of the state and, hence, measures must be taken to ensure a better knowledge of 
their conditions, more effective communication with them and closer links with their 
home base. This must be achieved through watching over their interests in the 
workplace, ensuring a proper exercise of their citizen's rights and facilitating the 
fulfilment of their obligations and commitments to the state. 
10. Water must be regarded as a basic factor on which the future of development in 
Jordan very heavily depends. This requires a clear exercise by the state over 
ownership, sovereignty, preservation, development, management, storage, 
transportation and use of water resources within a set of clear national policies and 
priorities. 
11. The roles of all economic sectors — private, public, mixed and cooperative must be 
integrated, and objective conditions must be provided for their growth, with due 
recognition to the role of each sector. Performance must be evaluated according to 
defined economic and social considerations. Financial exemptions enjoyed by public 
companies and institutions which operate on a commercial basis must be eliminated, 
while ensuring that no conflict arises with the provisions or objectives of the 
Encouragement of Investment Law. 
12. The centrality to the national economy of the agricultural sector in Jordan must be 
recognised and accorded the priority and attention it deserves. Also, the roles of 
agricultural institutions must be activated and integrated in the areas of combating 
desertification and urban encroachment, and developing and disseminating 
agricultural research and extension. Agro-industries, productivity, marketing, and 
livestock development must be regarded as an essential element of national policies 
aimed at achieving food security. 
13. Stress must be placed on industries with a high value-added element arising from 
the use of local materials and other components, and favourable conditions and 
incentives must be provided for their growth and development. Competition must 
be promoted among the various national industries. 
14. Services utilising domestic expertise must be developed and marketed as they 
constitute a basic component of the national economy. Also, in so far as tourism is 
a major source of national income, the tourist potential must be developed to the 
full through marketing, development of tourist and archaeological sites, 
encouraging domestic tourism, cultural activities and Jordanian folklore, and 
supporting traditional trades in all regions of the Kingdom. 
15. Economic and financial legislation must be unambiguous and complementary in 
nature. It must be updated in line with evolving domestic and external variables. 
Savings must be encouraged and a favourable investment climate provided. 
Procedures must be streamlined. 
16. Financial and tax legislation must be regularly updated while ensuring a measure of 
flexibility to meet the evolving economic and social needs of Jordanian society 
because such legislation is an important means of developing and regulating the 
national economy and a basic requirement for balanced national development which 
leads to reducing income disparity and achieving social justice. 
17. Public borrowing by the state and its various institutions must be regulated in 
accordance with the Kingdom's priorities and basic needs. Domestic and external 
loans and any other loans guaranteed by the government must be made subject to 
parliamentary approval. 
375 
18. There must be close cooperation and coordination between government bodies and 
specialised social institutions in the ecological field, as aU citizens have a right to a 
clean and balanced environment. Protection of the environment from pollution is a 
national responsibility towards present and future generations. Awareness must be 
disseminated to ensure an environmentally sensitive public outlook and a high level 
of public understanding of pollution problems. Measures must be taken to achieve a 
balance between environmental needs and the development imperative. Criteria 
must be set and legislation enacted to deal with the negative ecological impact of 
certain types of development projects. 
CHAPTER FIVE: THE SOCIAL ASPECT 
1. Jordanian society derives its mores and values from the Arab and Islamic system of 
values as well as from the universal human ethic. Relationships among its people are 
based on the bond of citizenship. Societal development rests on participation by a l l 
segments and institutions in the process of construction and production, with the 
common objective of achieving integrated social growth under conditions of 
freedom, equality and social Justice. 
2. The system is also based on respect for the individual as pointed out in the Almighty's 
dictum: "We have bestowed blessings on Adam's children". State institutions must, 
therefore, ensure the dignity and rights of all citizens, as guaranteed by the 
Constitution and affirmed by international conventions. Individuals and groups must 
play their part in protecting these rights and observing the principles of justice, 
equality and equal opportunity for all. 
3. The family is the principal block of society. It is the natural environment for the 
rearing, education and personality growth of the individual. The official and popular 
institutions of the state must provide for the formations cohesion and well-being of 
the family. They must assist it in the task of providing future generations with a 
sound upbringing. 
4. Good motherhood is the basis of good childhood, to which every child has a natural 
right. State and society must provide special care for mothers and children, ensuring 
working mothers' rights to maternity leave and chUd-care facilities, including health 
and social guarantees, good working conditions and appropriate support amenities. 
5. Children have the right to expect the best possible level of care and protection from 
parents as well as from the state. This must be geared towards the development of 
their independent and co-operative personalities, without any discrimination 
between males and females. 
6. Women are men's partners and equals in contributing to the growth and development 
of Jordanian society. This requires an affirmation of women's constitutional and 
legal right to equality, education, guidance, training and employment as a means of 
enabhng them to play their proper role in the growth and development of society. 
7. Youth constitute both the future of society and its renewable human wealth. The 
state must draw up pohcies and national programmes aimed at harnessing the 
resources of the country's youth, qualifying them for responsibility productive work, 
innovation and creativity, protecting them from delinquency and directing their 
creative energies towards constructive development. 
8. The handicapped have a right to special care, education, training, rehabilitation and 
employment, thus enabling them to overcome their difficulties and become 
productive members of Jordanian society. 
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9. Attention must be paid to the concept of social partnership in Jordanian society 
through expanding social benefits and developing the Zakah (Aims) Law with the 
aim of regulating it, unifying and upgrading collection and ensuring the achievement 
of its basic objectives. 
10. Voluntary work must be based on the concept of national commitment and social 
partnership. Attention must be paid to the establishment of voluntary societies and 
clubs and providing them with incentives conducive to effective participation, to 
strengthening the positive values of Jordanian society and to rejuvenating the Arab 
and Islamic traditions of partnership, amity and altruism. 
CHAPTER SIX: CULTURE. EDUCATION. SCIENCE AND INFORMATION 
First: Culture 
In its intellectual, artistic and creative aspects, Arab and Islamic culture is the 
fountainhead of Jordanian national culture through which the quality of Jordanian life is 
enhanced. It is a symbol of the Arab nation's sturdiness, the source of its material and 
moral strength and the epitome of its unity and steadfastness in the face of foreign 
cultural incursions. Jordanian culture is also part of the aspirations, issues and 
challenges of contemporary Arab culture. This predicates the following: 
1. The Arabic language is the nation's tongue and its means of expressing its cultural 
identity. It is the repository of the nation's thought, learning and values and the 
vehicle of knowledge transfer. It must be preserved and developed. Translation 
from and into Arabic must be activated. Scientific and academic institutions must be 
urged to participate in the process of Arabization and publication in Arabic in aU 
literary and technical fields. 
2. Care must be extended to preserving, expounding and documenting the nationals 
heritage through sound scientific methods. It must be published and disseminated 
within the means available and in cooperation with Arab, Islamic and international 
organisations concerned with the nationals heritage and contemporary culture. 
3. Pride in Arab and Islamic history must be strengthened, recaUing the Positive 
contribution of the Arab nation at the global level. Jordan's history must be 
documented, its archaeology preserved and its facts studied, taught and expounded. 
The role of the national wiQ of the Jordanian people in shaping its present and its 
future must be highlighted. 
4. Attention must be paid to enhancing the cultural attainments of Jordanian citizens in 
aU regions of the Kingdom through promoting and developing national culture by all 
available means, enabling meaningful participation in the process of comprehensive 
cultural growth. 
5. Due care must be extended to the instruments of disseminating national culture, 
including libraries, data bases, theatres, exhibitions and museums, and projecting the 
cultural achievements of the Jordanian people. 
6. Care must be extended to all forms of Jordanian folklore as they constitute a creative 
and enriching part of national culture. They must be brought abreast of the modem 
age in a manner that would serve to integrate the nation's cultural fabric. 
7. The right of Jordanian thinkers, men of letters, artists and poets to ready access to 
various cultures must be ensured as a means of enriching and invigorating the 
national culture without detriment to Arab and Islamic values. 
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8. Copyright must be respected. Legislation protecting copyright and patents must be 
updated. 
Second: Education 
Jordanian education is an evolving and integrated system. Its philosophical 
underpiiming is expressive of the nation's thought and values. It is based on the 
enduring tenets of the Islamic faith, the supreme values of the Arab nation and the 
Jordanian national experience. From this grows the following: 
1. The educational policy in Jordan must ensure an integrated spiritual, physical, 
psychological, mental and social growth of an individual who is aware of his rights, 
cognisant of his obligations, committed to his country, proud of his nation, imbued 
with the scientific spirit and democratic values, believing in human rights and in the 
principles of justice, goodness and equality, and capable of being usefully 
productive and creatively enterprising. 
2. Education of the young must be based on faith in God, in the authentic character of 
the Arab nation and in its amenability to renewal and creativity in all walks of Ufe. 
3. The educational system must endeavour to promote independent and creative 
thinking through activating incentives for work, seriousness of purpose, precision 
and distinction as well as through directing education towards equipping the 
individual for the future. To achieve this, attention must be paid to the upgrading of 
intellectual processes and psychological stamina to meet future challenges and 
dangers. Sound methodologies of scientific and critical thought must be developed 
by upgrading the skills of extrapolation, comprehension and rational interaction 
with knowledge. 
4. The educational system must be linked with the requirements of production. The 
educational process must produce the quaMed manpower that the country heeds 
now and in the future. 
5. The educational system must be both comprehensive and flexible. It must make 
special provisions for the gifted, who must be given opportunities commensurate 
with their capabilities and aptitudes to ensure that society reaps the benefit of their 
potential contribution. Similarly, care must be extended to educating the 
handicapped, integrating them into the system at an early age and providing them 
with productive skills. 
6. Arabic must be the language of instruction at aU levels and in all fields. To this end, 
methods of teaching Arabic must be developed, as must the approach of teaching it 
to speakers of other languages. Also, the learning of other living languages must be 
stressed to enable the youth to familiarise themselves with literary, scientific and 
other output in those languages and to maintain contact with other peoples. 
7. The teaching profession must be accorded the attention it deserves in order for it to 
occupy a suitable place among the other professions. Teachers should receive 
proper training. They must be given the opportunity to participate in the decision-
making process. Their educational attainments and standard of living must be 
proved 
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Third: Science and Technology 
Science and technology have a central role in the development of society as weU as 
in solving social and economic problems, strengthening Jordanian and Arab security, 
enabling society to deal with changing conditions and contributing to world civihsation. 
There are several requisites for an effective contribution by science and technology: 
1. A clear political decision and national will must exist to acquire, transfer, develop and 
utilise technology to meet the country's needs on the basis of careful planning which 
relies on indigenous institutions and on an advanced system of education. 
2. The scientific method must govern the people's way of thinking. It must be utilised 
for solving problems and enhancing the ability of Jordanian society to transform raw 
data into a system of knowledge which can be applied in various fields. National 
data banks must be established for this purpose. 
3. Special emphasis must be placed on the teaching of science and mathematics, with 
due attention to their application, at aU levels and in all types of educational 
institutions. 
4. Society as a whole must acquire the culture of science and technology in order to be 
able to interact in an effective and rational manner with advanced technological 
processes 
5. A climate of academic freedom must be provided, together with the resources for 
advanced scientific research. Also, research must be geared towards fleeting the 
developmental needs of Jordan in all areas. Arabic must be the medium of research 
and development activities as well as a vehicle for innovation and pubhcation. 
6. Jordan's natural resources must be developed, whilst guarding against the negative 
effects of technology, preserving the ecological balance and protecting the living 
environment from pollution. 
Fourth: Information and Communications 
Rapidly accelerating advances in science and technology, coupled with the effects of 
the communications revolution, have given communications and the mass media a 
principal role in shaping knowledge, convictions and attitudes. The mass media also 
play an important role in strengthening the democratic process. The following are 
requisites in this field: 
1. Jordan's information philosophy must be based on the principles of freedom, national 
responsibility, respect for the truth and regard for the values of the Arab and Islamic 
nation. 
2. Freedom of thought and expression, and access to information, must be viewed as a 
right of every citizen as well as of the press and other mass media. It is a right 
enshrined in the Constitution and should under no circumstances be abridged or 
violated. 
3. Official and popular institutions must contribute to the training of personnel in the 
information field with a view to enabling them to perform their tasks objectively and 
impartially. 
4. Citizens must have access to facts and information from legitimate transmission and 
pubHcation sources within Jordan and abroad. Censorship of classified material 
should not prevent the citizens from exercising this right. 
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5. Jordanian citizens and political groups must have the right to use the national mass 
media to state their opinions and give expression to their cultural, intellectual, 
technical and scientific creativity. The state must draw up policies to ensure the 
exercise of this right. 
6. Information and communications media must serve as channels of conveying the 
country's image, culture and achievements to the world and as a means of 
transferring new knowledge and cultural and scientific advances to the citizens. This 
requires an enhancement of national capabilities and recourse to expert services. 
7. Information media must have a formative role in shaping citizen attitudes of 
commitment to their country and nation and pride in their Arab and Islamic heritage. 
This function must be exercised in a manner that would integrate the roles of the 
family, schools and places of worship in developing citizens' awareness, knowledge 
and attitudes and would contribute to preserving social harmony and national unity 
while countering the harmful effects of hostile propaganda. 
8. AH information media must strive to provide a climate of freedom conducive to the 
growth of Jordanian society through enlightened knowledge and honest reporting. 
They must shun any encroachment on the freedom of individuals or their personal 
Uves. 
9. General policies of the information media in Jordan must strengthen respect for the 
human mind and intelligence and for the individual's right to freedom of expression. 
They must provide an appropriate cUmate to encourage creativity and innovation. 
10. The state must guarantee the right and freedom of Jordanian individuals, groups and 
institutions to own and publish newspapers in accordance with the provisions of the 
Constitution. Legislation must be enacted to regulate the financing of newspapers 
with the aim of protecting them from external influence. 
11. The circulation of news and data must be regarded as an indivisible part of the 
freedom of the press and information. The state must guarantee free access to 
information to the extent that it does not jeopardise national security or the national 
interest. It must enact legislation to protect journalists and other information 
personnel in the fulfilment of their duties and to provide them with material and 
psychological security. 
12. The mass media must be committed to the service of the country as a whole. They 
must not be used to propagate the particular philosophy of any political party or 
group or to give publicity to the work of individuals in any government in power. 
Citizens must be given the opportunity to participate in drawing up mass-media 
policies through special boards to be established for this purpose. 
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE JORDANIAN PALESTINIAN RELATIONSHIP 
The facts of the close historical and geographic relationship between Jordan and 
Palestine over the ages, together with the nature of the national affiliation and culture 
position of Jordanians and Palestinians in the present and the future, have endowed this 
relationship with a special and distinctive character. It is bolstered by the strong ties and 
deep common interests that exist between them. It is imperative, therefore, that this 
relationship be preserved and strengthened in the face of the racist, Zionist and 
imperialist threat which endangers the existence, civilisation and sacred heritage of the 
Arab nation and marks Jordan out as a target as it had previously targeted Palestine. 
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In the light of these facts, the Jordanian Palestinian relationship must be based on 
the following principles: 
First: The Palestinian Arab identity is a political identity forged by struggle. It is not and 
must not be contradictory to the Arab Jordanian identity . The only contradiction 
Mes with the Zionist settler programme. Just as the national Palestinian identity is 
the antithesis of the Zionist programme and hence struggles to dismantle it, the 
Jordanian national identity, viewed from this perspective, is also an antithesis of 
the Zionist programme and hence fortifies Jordan against Zionist designs and 
claims. In this light, Jordan and Palestine are one Arab coin struck by their shared 
struggle to stand up to the expansionist Zionist programme and firmly reject the 
alternative homeland conspiracy. 
Second: Political variables at the Arab and international levels, together with 
developments in the Jordanian Palestinian arena, resulted in the severing of 
administrative and legal ties with the West Bank, with which the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation agreed. They also led to the declaration of an independent 
Palestinian state under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organisation and 
to recognition by Jordan of the Palestinian state. This has given rise to a new 
reality which emphasises the special and distinctive nature of the Jordanian 
Palestinian relationship and establishes the conditions for placing it on a right 
footing and basing it on a clear set of principles. 
Third: On this basis, the Jordanian-Palestinian relationship must not be understood or 
exploited under any conditions whatsoever to imply any curtailment of the rights 
of citizenship or to lead to a weakening of the Jordanian state from the inside or 
to create conditions leading to the realisation of Zionist designs to make Jordan an 
alternative to the Palestinian homeland. From this perspective, a commitment to 
Jordan's national security becomes the responsibility of aH citizens and serves to 
emphasise their continued struggle and sacrifice for the liberation of Palestine and 
the preservation of Jordan and its identity. 
Fourth: Since the unity-infused relationship between the states of Jordan and Palestine 
is a matter of future inevitability, the maintenance of this relationship requires 
respect for the choices to be made by Jordanians and Palestinians in achieving the 
best formulations for union between then as a model for comprehensive Arab 
unity. 
On the basis of the above, national Jordanian unity is the solid base on which close 
relations must exist among the citizens in the Jordanian state. In addition, because it is 
impossible to distinguish on the ground between the Jordanian Arab people regardless 
of their origins, this unity must be protected and strengthened in such a manner as to 
bolster Jordan's sturdiness, preserve its national security, defend the domestic front, 
guarantee equal opportunities for all citizens without discrimination and safeguard their 
legitimate rights and interests as enshrined in the Constitution. 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
JORDANIAN. ARAB. ISLAMIC AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
Jordan is an indivisible part of the Arab and Islamic nation. Hence, its national 
identity is Arab just as Islam is the faith of the nation, the fountainhead of its civilization 
and the source of values which govern its conduct. 
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In the light of these facts, the people, leadership and democratic institutions of 
Jordan firmly believe in the inevitability of union among the Arab states and aspire to 
achieve union by all legitimate means. They also aspire to establishing effective Arab-
Islamic solidarity and contributing to the formulation of a new and balanced world 
order in which international relations are buUt on equivalent interests, respect for the 
win of the peoples and their right to independence, freedom and security, and a sharing 
in the achievement of progress and protection of human rights — free from hegemony or 
the usurpation of political decisions. 
To achieve these aims, Jordan is guided by its own experience as part of the Arab 
nation as well as by its reaHstic and future view of the importance of the Arab and 
Islamic dimensions of the world scene. Jordan believes that the achievement of its 
national Arab objectives requires a unity-based Arab programme in accordance with the 
following principles: 
First: The Arab homeland, in its historical, geographic, material and cultural aspects, is 
the natural home of the Arab nation. Arab unity is the fundamental base. It is also 
the real response to the current state of disarray. It is the objective solution to the 
economic and social problems and issues arising from this disarray. It is the path 
of transcending division, backwardness and dependency and the best means for a 
better future for the Arab nation. 
Second: The nature or the challenges imposed on Jordan and the Arab nation and the 
magnitude of the threat confronting the Arab homeland demand a positive 
response to the national sentiment which permeates all regions of the Arab 
homeland. They further require a will to achieve Arab unity in order to defend 
Arab existence and identity and protect the common national interests of the Arab 
nation in all Arab states. 
Third: The Arab society to which Jordan aspires is one that is informed by the 
democratic principle, believes in Arab unity and subscribes to the conviction that 
the strategic resources of the Arab homeland belong to the entire Arab nation and 
must be placed in the service of Arab society to buUd its economy find strengthen 
its national security. 
Achieving these ends requires the following: 
1. The democratic principle must be upheld, preserved, promoted and disseminated. 
Arab national security must be strengthened in aU its dimensions and at all levels 
through a proper understanding of the requirements and conditions of this 
objective. 
2. There must be a commitment to the great causes and national priorities of the Arab 
people. Every Arab country must clarify its position in this regard. The degree of 
clarity and sincerity of these positions is the only objective measure of state 
policies and national intentions. 
3. A form of unity must be sought among those Arab states believing in unity, in 
accordance with objective state and national criteria and in such a manner as to 
protect the interests of the citizens of each state in the light of its own specific 
character. 
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4. Disarray among states must be transcended in all its forms. Resort must be sought in 
comprehensive economic and social development within a national Arab 
framework. Economic complementarities must be established to ensure collective 
self-sufficiency through the upgrading of human resources, development of 
natural resources and strengthening of joint Arab action. 
5. Pan-Arab plans and policies must be drawn up to prepare the Arab nation in aU Arab 
countries for the task of liberating Arab territories, with Palestine at the top of the 
agenda. Also, resources and capabilities of the Arab homeland must be harnessed 
and organised to achieve a unity of purpose, preserve the dignity of the Arab 
citizens and make possible the restoration of usurped Arab rights. 
6. Arab culture, together with national and Islamic feeling and commitment, must be 
nurtured and promoted by Jordanian society. Inspiration must be sought from the 
pioneering legacy of the Arab nation as a means of reinvigorating the Arab 
cultural role on the world stage. 
7. A clear and stable foundation must be established for closer Jordanian-Arab-Islamic 
relations on the basis of the nation's faith, values and common history. The great 
causes of the Arab and Islamic worlds must be brought to the fore in the face of 
the challenges and dangers which threaten the interests of the Arab and Islamic 
nations to an equal degree. 
8. Jordan's international relations in aU fields must be based on the principles of equality, 
mutual respect and balanced interests, and also on the basis of the attitudes of 
individual states to Arab causes, foremost of which is the Palestinian issue. 
9. Jordan must contribute to the formulation of international relations in accordance 
with fixed criteria based on respect for the freedom, independence and right of 
peoples to self-determination, in addition to principles of right, justice, equality, a 
just peace among nations, a respect for human rights and a rejection of 
discrimination and international hegemony in all its forms. 
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3. POLITICAL PARTIES LAW No. 32 FOR THE YEAR 1992 
Article 1. This law shall be called the Political Parties Law for the year 1992, and shall 
be effective 30 days from the date of its publication in the Official 
Gazette. 
Article 2. The following words and phrases, wherever they appear in this Law, shall 
have the meanings assigned to them herein below, unless the context 
otherwise indicates: 
The Ministry: Ministry of Interior. 
The Minister: The Minister of Interior. 
The Court: The High Court of Justice. 
Article 3. A Party is every political organisation which is formed by a group of 
Jordanians in accordance with the Constitution and the provisions of the 
law, for the purpose of participating in political life and achieving 
specific goals concerning political, economic and social affairs, which 
works through legitimate and peaceful means. 
Article 4. Jordanians have the right to form political parties and to voluntarily, join 
them according to the provisions of the Law. 
Article 5. The number of the founding members of any Party shall not be less than fifty 
persons who meet the following conditions: 
A. to have completed 25 years of age. 
B. to have been a Jordanian for at least ten years. 
C. not to have been fmaUy convicted by a court of proper jurisdiction of a 
crime (except poUtical crimes) unless he has been rehabilitated. 
D. to enjoy ful l civil and legal competence. 
E. to reside in the Kingdom permanently. 
F. not to claim the nationality of another country or foreign protection. 
G. not to be a member in any other Party, or any other non-Jordanian 
political partisan organisation. 
H. not to be a member of the Jordanian Armed Forces, Security 
InstrumentaUty's or the Civil Defence. 
I . not to be a judge. 
Article 6. The Memorandum of Association of the Party shall contain the following: 
A. Its name and its motto, provided that its name and motto are not similar 
to any other party's name and motto. 
B. The address of the main headquarters of the Party and the addresses of 
its branch offices, if any, provided that aU such offices are located within 
the Kingdom and that none of them is located within the premises of any 
public, private, charitable, religious, productive or educational 
institution. 
C. The principles for which the Party exist and the goals it seeks, and the 
means to achieve them. 
D. Membership conditions and the procedures for joining the party in 
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. 
E. The procedures for forming the Party's echelons, choosing its leaders, 
regulating its relationship with its members, conducting its activities, 
specifying the political, organizational, financial and administrative 
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competences for any of these echelons, provided it is done on a 
democratic basis. 
F. Specification of the financial resources of the party and the rules for 
managing its financial affairs, including the procedures for disbursing its 
funds preparing and approving its budget. 
G. The procedures for the voluntary dissolution of the Party or its merger 
with other Parties, and for regulating the liquidation of its assets and 
specifying the authority to which these assets will revert. 
H. Adherence to the principles and rules provided for in this Law. 
Article 7. A. The application for establishing the Party shall be submitted to the 
Minister signed by the founders with the following information and 
documents attached thereto: 
I . Three copies of the Party's Memorandum of Association signed by the 
founders. 
2. A list of the names of the founders in four parties, and the place and date 
of birth, occupation, work and address of each founder. 
3. A certified copy of the Birth Certificated of each of the founders, or a 
certified copy of the Family Book or of the Personal Identification Card. 
4. A non-conviction certificate for each of the founders. 
5. A certificate signed by five of the founders before the employee designated 
by the Minister testifying to the authenticity of the signatures of all the 
founders and the information concerning them. Each one of these five 
founders shaU specify, in this certificate, his address or chosen residence 
where documents, notices and letters issued by the Ministry can be 
delivered to him. 
B. The designated employee shall issue a notice of receipt of the establishment 
appMcation indicating therein the date of submitting the application and 
the information and documents attached thereto. 
Article 8. A. Each one of the five founders referred to in Article (7) Paragraph (A) 
Item (5) of this Law, shall be considered authorised to submit 
information and documents and to receive documents, notices and letters 
on behalf of all the founders. 
B. Notification shall be effected through one of the Ministry's Employees by 
handing a copy of the documents to the person to be notified, who shall 
sign, on another copy of such documents, notice of the effectuation of 
the notification. Whoever effects the notification shall make an entry of 
the date and manner of notification followed by his name and signature. 
Article 9. A. The founders have the right to withdraw any documents or statements 
submitted with the Establishments Application and to replace same with 
others within a period which commences on the date of submission of 
the Establishment Application and expires with the passage of fifteen 
days from the date of delivery of the notice of receipt of the 
EstabUshment Apphcation. 
B. The Minister may, by means of a letter issued within thirty days of the date 
of delivery of the notice of receipt of the Establishment Application, 
request the founders to submit any clarifications, documents or 
statements necessary for the implementation of the provisions of this 
Law. 
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C. Any one of the five founders, mentioned in Article (7), Paragraph (A) Item 
(5) of this Law, may submit the requested clarifications, documents and 
statements within fourteen days of the date of dehvery of the Minister's 
letter. Upon the request of the founders, the Minister may extend this 
period for similar period. 
D. The designated employee shall issue a notice of receipt of these clarifications, 
documents and statements noting therein the name of the founder who 
submitted them and the date of their receipt. 
Article 10. A. I f the party's Establishment Application meets the conditions set out in 
this Law, the Minister shall announce the establishment of the party 
within seven days of the passage of sixty days from the date of 
notification of receipt of the Establishment AppUcation, or within fifteen 
days of the date of notification of receipt of the clarifications, documents 
and statements referred to in Article (9) of this Law. The announcement 
shall be pubUshed in the Official Gazette. 
B. I f the Minister refrains from the announcement of the establishment of 
the party within the period provided for in paragraph (A) of this Article, 
then he shall have to state the reasons therefore and to inform the 
founders thereof in accordance with the procedures provided for in this 
Law. The Minister may not bring up any other reasons before the 
Court. 
Article 11. A. Each of the founders has the right to challenge, before the Court of 
Justice the Minister's decision referred to in Article (10) Paragraph (B) 
of this Law within thirty days of the date of receipt of decision. 
B. The Court shall issue its decision within sixty days of the date of 
registration of the contestation petition at the Court's Registry. 
C. If the Court decides to revoke the Minister's decision, the Minister shall 
announce the establishment of the Party as of the date of the Court's 
decision, and the announcement shall be published in the Official 
Gazette. 
Article 12. If, for any reason whatsoever, the number of the founding members 
becomes less than fifty before the announcement of the establishment of 
the party in accordance with the provisions of this Law, the 
Establishment AppUcation shall be cancelled. 
Article 13. The Party may not announce itself or pursue its activities until the issuance 
of the Minister's order approving its establishment, or the issuance of the 
Court's decision revoking the Minister's decision to reject the 
establishment. The Minister shall announce the party's estabhshment in 
accordance with the provisions of this Law. 
Article 14. The use of the premises, instrumentahties and assets of associations, 
charitable organisations and clubs for the benefit of any partisan 
organisation, shall be prohibited. 
Article 15. A. Following the announcement of its estabhshment, the party shall enjoy 
legal personaHty and shall not be dissolved or its leadership dissolved 
except in accordance with its Memo-randum of Association or by a 
decision of the Court. 
B. The party's affairs shall be managed by a leadership formed in accordance 
with the provisions of its Memorandum of Association and it shall be 
represented by its President before others, including judicial and 
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administrative authorities. I f the memorandum of Association does not 
provide for the position of Party President, then its General Secretary 
shall assume those representative duties. The President of the General 
Secretary, as the case may be, may deputize, in writing, one or more of 
the members of the party to enjoy aU or any of his powers, and may 
retain counsel in judicial and legal proceeding relating to the Party. 
Article 16. Any person who wishes to join the Party after the announcement of its 
estabhshment must have completed eighteen years of age, and must also 
meet the other conditions provided for in Article (5) Paragraph (B 
through I) of this Law. 
Article 17. The Party may issue one or more periodic pubUcations to express its 
principles and views in accordance with the conditions provided for in 
the applicable Press and Publications Law. 
Article 18. A. The Party's headquarters, correspondence and communication means 
shall be inviolable and shaU not be censored, raided or confiscated 
except with a judicial order. 
B. With the exception of cases of being caught in the act and flagrant 
violations, the party's headquarters may only be searched with a warrant 
of the Attorney and in his presence and that of a party representative. If 
the latter refuses recorded in the minutes of the search which shall be 
made in the presence of two witnesses. 
C. Violation of the previous paragraph shaU result in the invalidity of the 
search and the results thereof. The violator shall be subject to civil and 
criminal responsibilities. 
Article 19. A. (1) In its financial resources, the Party shall fully depend on Jordanian, 
local known, declared and specified sources. 
(2) The Party may accept gifts and donations only from Jordanian citizens, 
provided that the amount given by any one person does not exceed five 
thousand Jordanian Dinars per year. 
(3) The Party may invest its assets and resources inside the Kingdom in the 
manner it sees fit, provided that such investments are declared and 
legitimate and that the objective therefore is not to achieve any personal 
gain or benefit to any of the members of the Party. 
B. The Party's headquarters shall be exempted from all taxes and 
governmental duties imposed on immovable assets. 
C. For the purposes of applying the provisions of the Penalties Law, the 
Party's assets shall be considered public assets. The persons responsible 
for the Party's affairs and those working therein shall be considered, for 
the same purposes, public employees. Members of the leadership of the 
Party, shall be subject to the legal provisions governing illegal gain. 
Article 20. The Party shall provide the Minister with a copy of its budget for each year 
during first quarter and a declaration of its financial means and sources 
and financial position. The Minister or whoever he authorises has the 
right to examine the Party's accounts and to audit its financial records. 
Article 21. The Party shall be committed to the following principles and rules in 
pursuing its affairs and shall set out clearly in its Memorandum of 
Association: 
A. Adherence to the provisions of the Constitution and respect for the 
supremacy of the Law. 
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B. Adherence to the principle of political pluralism in thought, opinion and 
organisation. 
C. Adherence to the preservation of the independence and security of the 
Homeland, protection of national unity, renunciation of all forms of 
violence and non-discrimination among citizens. 
D. Adherence to the achievement of equal opportunities for all citizens to 
assume responsibility and Participation therein. 
E. Adherence to avoiding any organisational or financial with any non-
Jordanian body, as well as directing partisan activity upon the orders or 
directives of any foreign country or body. 
F. Abstention from partisan organisation and advocacy among the ranks 
of the Armed Forces, Security Instrumentalities and Civil Defence and 
the Judiciary, or from establishing military or para-mQitary organisations 
of any form whatsoever. 
G. Avoiding the utihsation of the state's institutions, pubUc organisations 
and aU educational institutions for partisan organisation, and striving to 
preserve the neutraUty of these institutions towards everyone in 
performing their duties. 
Article 22. The Party shall keep the following records and statements at its main 
headquarters: 
(a) The Party's Memorandum of Association, 
(b) The names, addresses and residences of the Party's members, founding 
members and leadership members. 
(c) A record of the decisions of the leadership. 
(d) A detailed record of the revenues and expenditures of the Party. 
Article 23. The leadership of the party shall inform the Minister, by means of a letter 
submitted to the Ministry's Registry against a notice of receipt, of any 
resolution adopted by the Party to dissolve or merge itself, or change its 
leadership or amend its Memo-randum of Association, within ten days of 
the date of issuance of such resolution or of making the amendment or 
change. 
Article 24. A. Any one who receives, on behalf of the party, any money from any non-
Jordanian source shall be punished by imprisonment for a period not 
exceeding two years, or a fine not exceeding two thousand Dinars, or 
with both penalties. Such money shall be confiscated and added to the 
account of the Treasury. 
B. Any one who participates in a non-licensed Party, or one that does not 
declare itself in accordance with the provisions of this Law, shaU be 
punished by imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months, or 
with a fine not exceeding five hundred dinars, or with both penalties. 
C. Any one who forms a raUitary or para-nuHtary organisation shall be 
punished pursuant to the provisions of the Penalties Law. 
D. Any one who commits a violation of the provisions of this Law, for 
which no specified penalty had been stipulated therein shall be punished 
by imprisonment for a period not exceeding three months, or a fine not 
exceeding two hundred dinars. The two penalties shall be combined in 
case of repetition. 
Article 25. A. The Party may be dissolved by decision of the Court upon a case filed 
by the Minister, if the Party violates any of the provisions of paragraphs 
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(2) and (3) of Article (16) of the Constitution, or violates any material 
provision of this Law. The Court may decide to suspend the Party if the 
Minister submits a request therefore. The decision to suspend the Party 
shall be considered cancelled if, within a period of eight days from the 
date of service of that decision, the Minister does not file a case 
requesting the dissolution of the Party. 
B. The Court shall issue its fmal decision in any case filed pursuant to this 
Article within a period not exceeding sixty days of fihng the case before 
it. 
C. The Minister may deputize in writing the Chief of the Administrative 
Public Prosecutor, or one of his assistants, to file any case pursuant to 
this Article and to submit any application or defence necessitated by the 
case, or to request and make all necessary procedures including the 
presentation of evidence and arguments and services of notification. 
Article 26. The Counsel of Ministers may issue regulations necessary for the 
implementation of the provisions of this Law. 
Article 27. Political Parties Law No. (15) for the year 1955 is repealed. 
Article 28. The Prime Minister and the Ministers are charged with the implementation 
of the provisions of this Law. 
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4. P R E S S AND PUBLICATIONS LAW. No. 10.1993 
Article 1: This law shall be called "The Press and Publications Law for the year 1993", 
and shall come into force after the expiry of thirty days from the date of its 
pubUcation in the Official Gazette. 
Article 2: The following words and expressions wherever they occur in this Law, shall 
have the meanings designated thereto hereunder, unless the context indicates 
otherwise; 
Ministry: The Ministiy of Information 
Minister: The Minister of Information 
Director: The Director General of the Press and Publications Department. 
Association: The Jordanian Journalists Association. 
Person: Any natural or judicial person. 
Publication: Any medium of pubhcation in which words and figures are recorded by 
letters, pictures, drawings, stamping or engraving. 
Periodical Publication: A specialised Press PubUcation of any kind issued at regular 
intervals, including the following: 
A. Press Publication, including the following: 
1. Daily PubMcation: Any Publication issued daily and continuously under a specific 
name, in consecutive numbers and is prepared for distribution to 
the pubUc. 
2. Non-daily PubUcation: Any PubUcation issued regularly once a week or at longer 
intervals and is prepared for distribution to the public. 
B. Specialised PubUcation: Any PubUcation specialising in one or more subjects in 
specificaUy designated fields and prepared for distribution to 
those concerned therein or to the pubUc as provided under the 
Ucense to publish. 
C. News Agency BuUetin: Any PubUcation prepared to provide press establishments 
with news, features, pictures and drawings, whether issued daily, 
weekly or monthly. 
Journalism: The profession of editing and issuing press pubUcations. 
Journalist: Any person who meets the conditions provided for in the operative 
Jordanian JournaUsts Association Law and adopts Journalism as his/her 
profession in accordance with the provisions of said Law. 
Printing Press: The machinery used in producing pubUcations of different types and 
forms. This definition, however, does not include printers, typewriters, 
duplicators, and photo-copiers. 
Book shop: Any commercial shop Ucensed to seU books, writing devices, newspapers, 
magazines and other pubUcations. 
Publishing House: Any establishment that undertakes the preparation, production and 
seUing of publications. 
Distribution House: Any establishment that undertakes the distribution or sale of 
publications. 
Publicity and Advertising Office: Any office engaged in commercial advertising and 
pubUcity, the production, publishing or broadcasting of materials in the 
information media. 
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Studies and Research House: Any establishment that conducts studies and researches 
and offers consultancies in the social, cultural, economic, humanitarian 
and other fields. 
Public Opinion Measurement House: Any establishment that conducts field studies 
with the view of exploring public opinion trends regarding a specific 
subject through questionnaires or lawful means of investigation. 
Translation House: Any establishment undertaking translation from one language to 
another, including simultaneous translation. 
Article 3: 
Article 4: 
Article 5: 
Article 6: 
Article 7: 
Article 8: 
Article 9: 
The press and printing professions shall be free and freedom of opinion shall 
be guaranteed for every Jordanian, who may express his/her opinion 
freely, in speech, writing, pictures and drawings in the media of 
expression and information. 
The press shall be free in exercising its function of providing news, 
information and commentary and shall contribute to the dissemination of 
thought, culture and sciences within the limits of the Law and in the 
framework of safeguarding public freedoms, rights and obligations and 
respecting the freedom and sanctity of the private lives of others. 
Freedom of press includes the following: 
A. Informing citizens of events, thoughts, trends and information in the 
fields that concern the community at the local, Arab, Islamic and 
international levels. 
B. Making room for citizens to express their opinions. 
C. The right of access to information, news and statistics from various 
sources that are of interest to the citizens and of analysing, deliberating, 
disseminating and commenting thereon within the limits of the Law. 
D. The right of the Press Publication, News Agencies, Editors and 
Journalists to keep the sources of information and news they gather 
secret, unless the Court decides otherwise when hearing criminal cases 
involving the security of the State, prevention of crime or realisation of 
justice. 
E. The right of citizens, political parties, cultural and social organisations, 
and associations to own and publish press pubHcations in accordance 
with the provisions of this Law. 
Any person, including political parties, shall have the right to own and 
publish press pubhcations in accordance with the provisions of this Law. 
The official authorities shall facilitate the task of journalists and researchers 
of getting apprised of the programs and projects thereof. 
PubUcations shall refrain from publishing anj^hing that contradicts the 
principles of freedom, national obhgation, human rights, and respect of truth 
and values of the Arab-Islamic Ummah (Nation) and shall regard the freedom 
of thought, opinion, expression and access to information as a right for aU 
citizens as much as it is a right for themselves. 
Journalists and other workers in the press shall fuUy adhere to the morals and 
ethics of the profession, including the following: 
A. Respecting the rights and constitutional freedoms of individuals and not 
infringing upon the sanctity of their private lives. 
B. Presenting journalistic material in an objective, integrated and balanced 
way. 
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C. Adhering to accuracy, honesty and impartiaUty in commenting on news 
and events. 
D. Refraining from pubUshing anything that would sanction violence, 
fanaticism and hatred or call to racialism and sectarianism. 
E. Refraining from the utilisation of journalistic material to promote a 
commercial product or lessen its value. 
Article 10: A periodical PubUcation shaU depend for its resources on lawful, declared 
and specified sources and shaU be prohibited from receiving any 
material support or directives from any foreign state or external 
authority. 
Article 11: The publisher of any Periodical PubUcation shaU provide the Director with a 
copy of its annual budget, together with the statements relevant to its 
resources, sources of financmg and financial position. 
Article 12: Journalists and other workers in the press shaU be prohibited from 
estabhshing any working relationship with any foreign body, unless such 
relationship if established under the Ordinance of Correspondents of 
Foreign Media issued in accordance with the provisions of this Law. 
Article 13: 1. Every journalistic pubUcation shaU have a responsible Chief Editor, who 
shall meet the following conditions: 
A. to be a Journalist 
B. to be proficient in reading and writing the language of the Periodical 
PubUcation for which he/she shaU work as responsible Chief Editor. I f 
the PubUcation is published in more than one language, he/she shaU be 
proficient to the same degree in the main language of the Periodical and 
be sufficientiy knowledgeable in the other languages. 
C. not to be a responsible Chief Editor for more than one Periodical 
Publication. 
D. not to assume any other function in the Press PubUcation in which he/she 
works as a Chief Editor or in any other Publication. 
E. not to have been convicted of a felony or misdemeanour against honour 
or public morals. 
F. to be an actual resident of the Kingdom. 
2. With the exception of the provisions of Items (B), (E) and (F) of this 
Article, the provisions of the items of the previous paragraph do not 
apply to the Chief Editor of a Publication issued by a political party. 
Article 14: The Chief Editor of any PubUcation shaU be responsible for aU that is 
published therein and the owner of the PubUcation and the writer of the 
article shaU be responsible for the contents thereof. 
Article 15: A. Every SpeciaUsed Publication shall have a Chief Editor, who shaU be 
responsible for whatever is published therein and who shaU meet the 
following conditions: 
1. to be a Jordanian. 
2. not to have been convicted of a felony or misdemeanour against honour 
or public morals. 
3. to have acquired an educational qualification related to the subject of the 
speciaUsation of the Publication, or to have had accumulated such 
experience in the subject thereof that qualifies him/her to work in the 
Publication. 
B. A non-Journalist may become a responsible Chief Editor of a Specialised 
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Publication, the subjects of which are among the fields of his/her 
specialisation. 
Article 16: A Publishing House, Studies and Research House, PubHc Opinion 
Measurement House, Translation House, Publicity and Advertising 
Office, Printing Press, Distribution House and Bookshop shall each have 
a responsible manager who shall meet the following conditions: 
1. to be a Jordanian. 
2. not to have been convicted of a felony or misdemeanour against 
honour or public morals. 
3. to have acquired accumulated the following educational qualifications 
and practical experiences: 
A. be a holder of at least a first university degree and have suitable 
experience, to be assessed by the Minister, in the field in which he/she 
win be working after acquiring the said academic qualification if he/she 
is to be appointed as a responsible manager of a Research and Studies 
House, or a Public Opinion Measurement House. 
B. be a holder of the General Secondary School Certificate at least, and 
have suitable experience, to be assessed by the Minister, in the field in 
which he/she wiU be working after acquiring the said academic 
qualification if he/she is to be appointed as a responsible manager of a 
Publishing House, Distribution House, Printing Press, Bookshop, 
Translation House or Publicity and Advertising Office. 
Article 17: No person shall be a responsible manager of more than one of the 
establishments mentioned in Article 16 of this Law. 
Article 18. The owner of a Periodical Publication shall meet the following conditions: 
A. be of Jordanian nationality and resident in the Kingdom. 
B. not to be convicted of a felony or misdemeanour against honour of 
public 
morals. 
Article 19: A. A license to issue a Press PubHcation shall be granted to the following 
bodies: 
1. A Journalist as defined in this Law who shall also meet the conditions 
provided for therein. 
2. A press company established and registered for the purposes of issuing 
press publications. Non-Jordanians may not be partners or hold shares 
in a press company. 
3. A political party. 
B. The Council of Ministers may, upon the recommendation of the Minister, 
grant a Hcense to issue bulletins to the following bodies: 
1. A Jordanian News Agency. 
2. A foreign News Agency provided subject to reciprocity and provided the 
bulletin's responsible Chief Editor is a (Jordanian) JoumaUst. 
C. The Government or any official public institution may not be hcensed to 
issue any political Press Publication, daily or otherwise. 
D. As of the coming into force of the provisions of this Law, the total 
participation or equity held by the Government and official pubUc 
institutions and their funds may not exceed 30 percent of the capital of 
any press company or establishment; if the total of their said 
participation or equity exceeds the said percentage when the provisions 
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of this Law shaU come into force, the said bodies shall reconcile their 
position with the provisions of this paragraph by redistributing the 30 
percent among those bodies, each according to the ratio of its 
participation or share holding in the capital of the press company or 
establishment. The surplus shall be offered for pubUc subscription by the 
controUer of Companies in the Ministry of Trade & Industry for the 
period he/she deems appropriate. 
E. The provisions of Paragraph (D) of this Article shaU apply to any of the 
bodies mentioned therein if such body is the only partner or shareholder 
in the press company or establishment and the percentage of its 
participation or share holding exceeds 30 percent when this Law comes 
into force. 
F. The Council of Ministers may extend the period stated in paragraph (D) 
of this Article by not more than an equal period or by periods which 
total does not exceed the said period. 
Article 20: AppUcation for a Ucense to issue a Press PubUcation shaU be submitted to 
the Minister, the Council of Ministers, upon the recommendation of the 
Minister, shaU decide on the appUcation within a period not exceeding 
thirty days from the date of submission thereof. The Council's decision 
to reject the appUcation shaU be substantiated and subject to appeal 
before the High Court of Justice. 
Article 21. Application for a license to issue a Press Publication shall include the 
following: 
A. The name, place of domicile and address of the applicant. 
B. The name and place of issuance and printing of the Publication. 
C. The dates of issuance and whether it is a daily, weekly, bi-monthly or 
quarterly, etc. 
D. The specialisation and whether it is political, Uterary, economic etc. 
E. The language in which it shall be issued. 
F. The name, age, place of domicile, address and academic qualification and 
experiences of the responsible Chief Editor. 
Article 22: AppUcation for a Ucense to issue a SpeciaUsed PubUcation shaU be 
submitted to the Director. The Minister, upon the recommendation of 
the Director, shaU decide on the appUcation within a period not 
exceeding thirty days from the date of submission thereof The 
Minister's decision to reject the appUcation shaU be substantiated and 
subject to appeal before the JJigh Court of Justice. 
Article 23: A. AppUcation for a Ucense to establish a Printing Press, Publishing House, 
Distribution House, Studies and Research House, PubUc Opinion 
Measurement House, Translation House, or PubUcity and Advertising 
Office, shaU be submitted to the Director on the form especiaUy prepared 
for this purpose and the Minister, upon the recommendation of the 
Director, shall decide on the appUcation within a period not exceeding 
thirty days from the date of submission thereof. The Minister's decision 
to reject the appUcation shaU be substantiated and subject to appeal 
before the High Court of Justice. 
B. Statements and procedures pertaining to applying for the Ucense 
mentioned in Paragraph (A) of this Article, including effecting any 
change or amendment to the content of the Ucense and procedures for 
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assignment thereof shall be determined by virtue of an ordinance issued 
in accordance with this Law. 
Article 24: A. To be granted a Ucense, a daily Press Publication shall be subject to the 
proviso that its registered capital shall not be less than (50,000) fifty 
thousand dinars and its paid-up amount shall not be less than 50 percent 
thereof. 
B. To be granted a license, a non-daily Press PubUcation shall be subject to 
the proviso that its registered capital shall not be less than (15,000) 
fifteen thousands dinars and its paid-up amount shall not be less than 50 
percent thereof. 
C. Daily or non-daily press pubUcations which a poUtical party wishes to 
issue shall be exempted from the minimum capital requirement provided 
for in paragraphs (A) and (B) of this Article. 
Article 25: The owner of the Press PubUcation shall print prominently and clearly 
therein his/her name, the name of the responsible Chief Editor, the place 
and date of issuance thereof, the subscription rate thereto and the name 
of the Printing Press in which it is printed; furthermore, he/she shaU 
notify the Director of any change in, or amendment to the contents of 
the Ucense within (30) days of the date of occurrence of the said change 
or amendment. 
Article 26: Except for press pubUcations issued by poUtical parties, the Ucense for 
issuing a PubUcation shaU be revoked by force of Law in any of the 
following cases: 
A. I f the Press PubUcation is not issued within six months of the date of 
obtaining the Ucense. 
B. I f the press pubUcation ceases to appear for the period indicated 
hereunder without a lawful excuse acceptable to the Minister: 
1. The Daily PubUcation: for a period of three consecutive months. 
2. The non-daily pubUcations issued regularly once a week: for twelve 
consecutive issues. 
3. The non-Daily PubUcation issued regularly at intervals longer than one 
week: for four consecutive issues. 
Article 27: Subject to the conditions prescribed in this Law, the Ucense for issuing a 
Press PubUcation shaU be granted to the owner of the Press PubUcation, 
who may assign aU or part of the title thereof to others, provided to 
consider the following conditions: 
A. That thirty days before the date designated for the assignment, the 
assignor notifies the Director of his/her wish to so assign. 
B. That the assignee meets the conditions prescribed in this Law 
permitting him/her to own the Publication or any part thereof. 
C. That within (30) days prior to the date designated for the assignment, 
the assignee submits an appUcation to the Director expressing his/her 
wish to accept the assignment. 
D. That the assignment be conducted at the Ministry in accordance with 
the procedures designated by the Minister in special regulations which 
he/she shall issue for this purpose. 
Article 28: I f the Press PubUcation publishes an inaccurate news item or article 
containing incorrect information, the person concerned with the news 
item or article shaU be entitled to reply to the news item or article or to 
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request that such be corrected; the responsible Chief Editor shaU pubUsh 
the reply or correction free of charge in the issue foUowing the date of 
receipt of the reply and in the same place and letter fount with which the 
news item or article was published in the Press Publication. 
Article 29: I f the Press PubUcation publishes an inaccurate news item or article 
containing incorrect information related to the pubUc interest, the 
responsible Chief Editor shaU publish free of charge the written reply or 
correction which he/she receives from the authority or from the Director 
in the issue foUowing the date of receipt of said reply or correction and 
in the same place, and letter fount in which the news item or article was 
pubUshed in the Press PubUcation. 
Article 30: The provisions of Articles (28) and (29) of this Law shaU apply to any 
Press Publication issued abroad and distributed within the Kingdom. 
Article 31: The responsible Chief Editor of a Press PubUcation may decline from 
publishing the reply or correction he/she receives by virtue of Articles 
(28) and (29) of this Law in any of the following cases: 
A. If, before receipt of the reply or correction, the Press Publication 
corrects the news item or article scrupulously and adequately. 
B. I f the reply or correction is signed by a false name or is written in a 
language other than that used in writing the said news item or article. 
C. I f the content of the reply or correction violates the Law or pubUc order 
or is contrary to pubUc morals. 
D. I f the reply is received after the expiry of at least two months from the 
Publication of the news item or article to which it responds. 
Article 32: I f the body responsible for any PubUcation issued abroad and distributed 
within the Kingdom declines from publishing the reply or correction in 
accordance with the provisions of Articles (30) of this law, the Director 
may ban the entry of the PubUcation into the Kingdom permanently or 
for any period of time he deems fit. 
Article 33: Every PubUcation shaU contain the name and address of both its author and 
publisher, the name of the Printing Press in which was printed, and the 
date of printing. 
Article 34: The responsible Chief Editor shaU not pubUsh any article to anyone under a 
false name unless the writer provides him/her with his/her (the writer's) 
real name. 
Article 35: The name of any Press PubUcation previously issued and subsequently 
ceased to appear shaU not be used for a new Press PubUcation until the 
elapse of a period of at least five years of discontinuance or unless those 
concerned or their heirs assign that name to others before the expiry of 
the said period. 
Article 36: The owner of a Press PubUcation shaU keep regular accounts in accordance 
with proper auditing principles and the Director may at any time inspect 
and audit aU the statements and accounts related to the PubUcation and 
verily the compUance of the owner with the fmancial restraints provided 
for in this Law. 
Article 37: The owner of a printing house or the responsible manager thereof shaU 
comply with the foUowing: 
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A: Keeping a register in which he/she shaU record serially the titles, authors 
and number of copies printed of every PubUcation and producing the 
said register to the Director or whomever he/she authorises therewith. 
B. Depositing with the Press and PubUcations department two copies of 
every non-Periodical PubUcation printed in his/her Printing Press before 
distribution thereof. 
Article 38: Anyone wishing to print a book in the Kingdom shaU submit two copies of 
his manuscript to the Press and PubUcations Department before 
commencing the printing. The Director may permit the printing or deny 
it if the PubUcation contains material prohibited by law, in which case 
he/she shaU notify the author of the denial decision within fourteen days 
of the date of submission and the author may object to the said decision 
before the High Court of Justice. 
Article 39: The owner of each of the Bookshop, Publishing House, or Distribution 
House, shaU submit to the Director a copy of each PubUcation he 
imports before its distribution or sale thereof and the Director may 
refuse to issue the permit and ban the entry of the PubUcation into the 
Kingdom if he thinks that its circulation wUl harm the pubUc interest. 
The owner of the concerned Bookshop, Distribution House or 
Publishing House, may object against the Director's decision before the 
High Court of Justice. 
Article 40: A. Publications shall be prohibited from publishing the following: 
1. News which offends the King or the Royal Family. 
2. Any information about the number, weapons, equipment, deployment or 
movements of the Jordanian Armed Forces, unless such pubUcation is 
sanctioned by a responsible authority of the Jordanian Armed Forces, or 
any news item, drawing or comment which olfends the Armed Forces or 
the security organs 
3. Articles or materials which contain contempt to any religion or sect 
whose freedom is guaranteed by the Constitution. 
4. Articles which damage national unity, instigate the commitment of 
crimes, or encourage rancor, or ferment hatred, discord and disharmony 
among members of the society. 
5. Minutes of closed sessions of Parliament. 
6. Articles or news which are intended to shake confidence in the national 
currency. 
7. Articles or information which contain a personal insult to the Heads of 
State of Arab, Islamic or friendly countries, or the chiefs and members of 
diplomatic missions accredited in the Kingdom. 
8. Articles or news which may offend the dignity or personal freedoms of 
individuals or damage their reputation. 
9. News, reports, dispatches articles and drawings which are contrary to 
pubUc morals and ethics. 
10. Advertisements promoting medicines and medical products, unless such 
pubUcation is approved in advance by the Ministry of Health. 
B. Entry of pubUcations from abroad shaU be banned if such pubUcations 
contain material prohibited by virtue of the provisions of this Law. 
Article 41: The provisions of this Law related to pubUcations whose import is 
prohibited shaU not apply to the imports thereof by Government 
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institutions, universities and centres of scientific research, provided that 
the Director's approval of such imports is obtained in advance. 
Article 42. The pubUcation of the proceedings of any case pending before the Courts 
prior to the pronouncement of a fmal ruUngs shaU be prohibited, unless 
the Court sanctions publication. 
Article 43. I f any PubUcation pubUshed journaUstic investigations or news items 
related to any person or body for which charges have been paid, the 
PubUcation shaU be bound to clearly and expUcitly indicate that such 
material is advertising material. 
Article 44: Any owner. Chief Editor, Managing Editor, Editor, correspondent of any 
Press PubUcation, as weU as writers who usuaUy write therein, shaU be 
prohibited from receiving or accepting any assistance or fmancial gift 
from any local or foreign body by virtue of his/her ownership of the 
PubUcation or function therein, or profession, or because of such 
considerations, or in the context of exercising these functions or his/her 
Unks with the PubUcation, or for its own sake, except with the Minister's 
approval. 
Article 45: The owner of any printing house and its responsible manager shaU be 
prohibited from printing any PubUcation whose printing, pubUshing, 
distribution, circulation or sale has been banned, or printing any 
PubUcation whose issuance has not been Ucensed, or whose publishing 
has been forbidden. 
Article 46: A. The Court of First Instance shaU have jurisdiction to hear aU crimes 
committed contrary to the provisions of this Law, and the PubUc 
Prosecutor shaU undertake the investigation thereof and issue the 
appropriate decisions thereon in accordance with the powers and 
procedures provided for in the appUcable Law of Criminal Court 
Procedures and the Panel Law. 
B. The pubUc right action at law in respect of crimes provided for in this 
Law and related to periodical pubUcations shaU be instituted against the 
PubUcation's responsible Chief Editor and the writer of the article as 
original offenders; the owner of the press pubUcations shaU be jointly 
Uable with them for the personal rights arising from such crimes and for 
the trial costs and he/she shaU not be subject to criminal UabiUty unless 
his/her actual participation or involvement in the crime has been 
established. 
C. The pubUc right action at law in respect of crimes provided for in this 
Law and related to non-periodical pubUcations shaU be instituted against 
the author as original offender and the publisher as his/her accompUce; if 
the PubUcation's author or publisher is unknown, the owner and manager 
of the Printing Press shall both be tried in the criminal case. 
D. Owners of printing presses, bookshops, publishing houses and 
distribution houses shaU be jointly Uable for the personal rights and trial 
costs ordered against their employees in cases related to pubUcations to 
which the provisions of this law apply. 
Article 47: A. The Court which pronounces the judgement may order the person 
adjudged guUty to pubUsh the complete fmal judgement or a summary 
thereof free of charge in the first issue of the Periodical PubUcation 
issued after the judgement is served and in the same place and letter 
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fount in which the article subject to the complaint has been published; 
the Court may, i f it deems it necessary, order the pubUcation of the 
judgement or its summary in two other newspapers at the expense of the 
person adjudged guilty. 
B. I f the person adjudged guilty violates the provisions of Paragraph (A) 
of this Article, he/she shall be punished with a fine of not less than (500) 
five hundred dinars and not more than (1500) one thousand five hundred 
dinars, and the pubUcation at his/her expense of the judgement which 
he/she refrained from publishing. 
Article 48: I f the responsible Chief Editor of a Press PubUcation violates the 
provisions of either of Articles (28) and (29) of this Law, he/she shaU be 
punished with a fine of not less than (500) five hundred dinars and not 
more than (1500) one thousand five hundred dinars, in pursuance of a 
complaint by the harmed person. 
Article 49: A. I f any of those mentioned in Article (44) of this Law violates any of its 
provisions, he/she shall be punished with imprisonment for a period of 
not less than four months and not more than six months, or with a fme of 
not less than (4000) four thousand dinars and not more than (6000) six 
thousand dinars, or with both penalties. If, however, the owner of the 
PubUcation is a corporate body, it shaU be punished with a fme of (6000) 
six thousand dinars. 
B. The Court shall decide to regain any amount paid to the person 
adjudged guilty or others for the benefit of the State Treasury. 
Article 50: I f the owner of the printing house violates the provisions of Article (45) of 
this Law, he/she shaU be punished with a fine of not less than (500) five 
hundred dinars and not more than (2000) two thousand dinars. If, 
however, the owner of Printing Press is a corporate body, it shaU be 
punished with a fine of not less than (2000) two thousand dinars 
I f any party commits any other violation of the provisions of this Law not 
aforementioned, shaU be punished with a fine not exceeding (1000) one 
thousands dinars. 
The CouncU of Ministers may issue regulations necessary for the 
implementation of the provisions of this Law, including regulations 
related to reconciling with the provisions of this Law the positions of 
printing houses, bookshops, publishing houses, distribution houses, 
advertising and pubUcity offices, studies and research houses, pubUc 
opinion measurement houses, and translation bureaus, as weU as the 
positions of correspondents of foreign information media, the revenues 
and tariffs of external and internal advertisements in the press and 
specialised pubUcations and the ratio of the space therein aUocated for 
advertisements. 
Article 53: The Press and PubUcations Law Number (33) for the Year 1973 and its 
amendments shall be repealed. 
Article 54: The Prime Minister and the Ministers shaU be adhered to execute the 
provisions of this Law. 
Article 51: 
Article 52: 
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5. THE 1986 ELECTION LAW No. 22. TO THE HOUSE OF DEPUTIES 
Chapter One: Definitions 
Article 1: This law shaU be caUed "Law of Election to the House of Deputies for the 
Year 1986", and shaU become effective as of the date of its pubUcation 
in the Official Gazette. 
Article 2: The following words and expressions, wherever they appear in this Law, 
shaU have the meanings ascribed to them hereunder, unless the context 
indicates otherwise: 
Jordanian: Every person, male of female, who has acquired Jordaruan nationaUty in 
accordance with the provisions of the Law of Jordanian NationaUty. 
Elector: Every Jordanian who has the right to elect members to the House of 
Deputies. 
Voter: Every Elector who exercises his right to elect. 
Candidate: Every Jordanian whose appUcation for candidature in parUamentary 
elections has been accepted in accordance with this Law. 
Deputy: Every Jordanian who has been elected to membership of the House of 
Deputies. 
Administrative Governor: The Governor of the relevant Governorate, the Mutasarref 
of the relevant District, and the Administrative Director of the relevant 
District, and the Administrative Director of the relevant Sub-district, 
each within the area of his competence. 
Constituency: Every part of the Kingdom for which a seat or more in the House of 
Deputies has been designated in accordance with the provisions of this 
Law. 
Electoral Sub-district: Every part of the Constituency for which one or more Ballot 
Centres has been designated. 
Polling Centre: The location designated by the Administrative Governor within his 
Constituency for conducting the voting process. 
Revision Committee: The committee formed in every Constituency, headed by the 
Administrative Governor, with the membership of a judge and a registrar 
in the Department of Civil Status. 
Central Committee: The committee formed in every Constituency in accordance with 
the provisions of this Law. 
Personal Election Card: The Personal Election Card of the Elector which is issued by 
the Minister of the Interior in accordance with the provisions of this 
Law. 
Chapter Two: The Right to Vote 
Article 3: A. Every Jordanian, who has completed 19 Solar years of his age has the 
right to elect members of the House of Deputies if his name is registered 
in one of the final Electoral Lists. 
B. The right to vote shall be denied to: 
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1. Anyone who has been sentenced to a prison term exceeding one year for 
a non-poUtical crime and has not been pardoned. 
2. Anyone who has been declared bankrupt and has not been rehabilitated 
3. Anyone who has been interdicted for his person and the interdiction has 
not been lifted, or for any other reason and the interdiction has not been 
Ufted. 
Article 4: An Elector may not exercise his right to vote in a Polling Centre other than 
the one in which his name is registered; furthermore, he may not exercise 
this right more than once in any one election. 
Article 5: The right to vote is denied to members of the Jordanian Armed Forces, PubUc 
Security and Civil Defence throughout their actual service. 
Chapter Three: Electoral Lists 
Article 6: Electoral Lists shaU be compiled for every Constituency, in which are 
included names of Electors, who belong to that Constituency or reside 
habituaUy therein, no Elector may register in more than one Electoral 
List. 
Article 7: A. The Electoral Lists shaU be compiled by one or more committees 
appointed by the Administrative Governor for every city, town, village 
or neighbourhood in his Constituency; this Committee shaU be caUed the 
"Committee for the CompUation of Electoral Lists" and shaU be formed 
of a Chairman and two members, aU of whom shaU be Government 
employees. 
B. The Committee or Committees provided for in Paragraph (A) of this 
Article shaU compile Electoral Lists of Electors in accordance with the 
regulations, procedures and dates designated by the Minister of the 
Interior within the provisions of this Law. 
Article 8: The Family Book, issued by the Department of CivU Status, and nothing else, 
shaU be used to register whomever has the right to vote in the Electoral 
Lists; a mark shaU be inscribed in the Family Book containing an 
indication of the registration of the Elector in the List designated for the 
Constituency in which he resides. 
Article 9: A. The Electoral List shaU contain the complete identity of the Elector as it is 
entered in the Family Book, including his name, place and date of birth, 
reUgion, occupation, place of residence, and the number and the place 
and date of issue of the Family Book. 
B. The Committee for the Compilation of Electoral Lists shaU prepare the 
Electoral List in three copies, which it shaU submit duly signed by it to 
the Administrative Governor within fifteen days of the date of the 
formation of the Committee. The Administrative Governor shaU sign the 
afore-mentioned copies and shaU keep one of them. None of these 
copies may be modified, except as related to correction in accordance 
with the provisions issued therefore in accordance with the provisions of 
this Law. The two other copies shaU be displayed within three days 
from the date of submission of the copies of Electoral Lists to him, one 
in a prominent place at the Administrative Governor's Office, and the 
other in a prominent place in the relevant neighbourhood or viUage to be 
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designated by the Administrative Governor. The display shall continue 
for ten days. The Mukhtar, or the authority entrusted with the display, 
shall present a record duly signed by him and by the Optional Panel 
proving that the List has been displayed in the described manner. 
C. Anyone whose name was unjustly excluded from the Electoral List, or in 
whose record data an error occurred, may request that his name be 
included or that his data be corrected; furthermore, he may object to the 
inclusion of someone else who does not have the right to vote, or to the 
omission of the names of those who have such right. The objection shall 
be submitted in writing, exempt from stamps, to the Revision 
Committee, formed in accordance with this Law, within seven days of 
the date of the announcement of the Lists. 
D. The Revision Committee shall consider the objections submitted to it 
within three days of the date of submission of the objection; and its 
decisions shaU be subject to review, exempt from any fees, by the 
district's Court of First Instance within five days of the date of service. 
The Court shall finally consider the matter within five days. The Court 
of First Instance shall notify the Revision Committee within three days 
with all the decisions it has issued. 
E. The Revision Committee shall compile final lists of all electors in the 
Constituency. The Administrative Governor shall adopt the measures 
provided for in Paragraph (B) of this Article. 
F. The final hsts shall be adopted for the general parHamentary elections or 
the by-elections for the year up until the first half of August; the ballot 
process shall be conducted in accordance with these lists. 
Article 10: During the first half of August of every year, the Revision Committee shall 
review the Electoral Lists for the Constituency that falls within its 
competence, perform the additions thereto and deletions therefrom 
relying on the data and information coming to it from the relevant 
official departments, and shall record the reasons for the additions and 
deletions in the column assigned to remarks in those Lists, provided that 
these data and information do not contradict the entries of the 
Department of Civil Status. Every person may request the Committee to 
register his name in the Electoral List if he satisfied the legal 
requirements. 
Article 11: The competent courts in all the Constituencies shall provide the Revision 
Committee in that Constituency within the period from the 15th to the 
30th of July of every year with a list containing a summary of 
judgements regarding bankruptcy and interdiction, as well as those 
imposing prison sentences exceeding one year for non-political crimes 
which had not been pardoned. Furthermore, the Department of Civil 
Status shall provide the said Committee within the afore-mentioned 
period with a list of persons who have completed nineteen years of their 
age, or those who have died during the twelve months preceding the 
period covered by the revision procedures of the Electoral Lists. 
Article 12: Immediately after the end of the period specified pursuant to the 
provisions of Article (1) of the Law for the completion of its work, the 
Revision Committee shall display lists containing the names of Electors 
in the Constituency after performing the addition and deletion 
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proceedings thereto for a period of one week in a prominent public place 
designed by the Administrative Governor, and shall advertise them in the 
local newspapers. 
Article 13: Every person, whose name was unjustly excluded from the Lists provided 
for in Article (12) of this Law, or an error has been made in the data 
pertaining to his entry in those Lists, may submit an objection thereto to 
the Revision Committee within ten days of the date of their display. 
Furthermore, every person register in the Electoral Lists may object 
within the same period to the entry of any other person in those Usts, 
who the objector thinks does not have the right to elect, or to the 
omission of a person, who the objector thinks has such a right. 
Article 14: The Revision Committee shall issue its decisions concerning the objections 
submitted to it pursuant to Article (13) of this Law within three days of 
the end of the objection period, and shall notify its decisions to the 
objectors once they are issued. The decisions shall be subject to appeal 
before the Court of First Instance in the Constituency within three day of 
the date of its notification. The Court shall rule on the objections within 
five days of their submission; its decisions shall be final and not subject 
to appeal before any other authority. The court shall notify the 
Chairman of the Revision Committee with its decisions within three days 
of the date of their issuance in order to implement them. 
Article 15: After the Electors Lists have achieved their legal status, because there were 
no objection against them in accordance with the provisions of Article 
(13) of this Law, or because the decisions on objections against them 
have become final in accordance with the provisions of Article (14) of 
this Law, the Revision Committee shall compile for every Constituency 
final Electors Lists of all Electors in the concerned Department. The 
Committee shall send a copy of these final lists to the Ministry of 
Interior for safekeeping. 
Article 16: The Electoral Lists compiled in final form in accordance with the 
provisions of Article (15) of this Law shall be adopted for the general 
parliamentary elections or by-elections that are conducted during any 
year. 
Chapter Four: Candidature for Membership of the House of Deputies 
Article 17: After the King has issued his Decree to hold the elections for the House of 
Deputies in accordance with Paragraph (1) of Article (34) of the 
Constitution, the Council of Ministers shall decide to designate a date 
for the election, which shall be announced by the Prime Minister and 
published in the Official Gazette. 
Article 18: A candidate for membership in the House of Deputies must meet the 
following conditions: 
A. That he has been a Jordanian national for at least ten years and that he 
does not claim foreign nationahty or protection. 
B. That he is an Elector registered in one of the final Electors Lists. 
C. That he has completed thirty solar years of his age on the day the 
Candidature period ends. 
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D. That he has not been sentenced to a prison term exceeding one year for 
a non-poHtical crime from which he has not been pardoned, and that he 
has not been convicted of a moral felony of misdemeanour. 
E. That he does not belong to an unlawful organisation, defined as any 
party or organisation whose principles, objectives and aims contradict 
the provisions of the Constitution. 
F. That he does not have a material interest in any of the Government 
departments by virtue of a contract, other than contracts of land and 
property tenancy. This does not apply to anyone who is a shareholder in 
a company owned by more than ten persons. 
G. That he is not a relative of the King to a degree specified by special 
legislation. 
Article 19: Anyone may nominate himself for membership in the House of Deputies in 
only one Constituency. 
Article 20: Employees of Government Ministries and Departments and public ofiicial 
organisations who draw their salaries from the Government's Treasury 
or pubhc funds subject thereto or supervised thereby, as well as 
employees of international organisations and chairmen of municipal and 
rural councils, may not nominate themselves for membership in the 
House of Deputies, unless they have submitted their resignations from 
their positions at least one month prior to the date designated for the 
election. The concerned official department may accept or deny the 
resignation, but it shall be considered accepted by force of law if no 
decision has been taken thereon within the days of the date of 
submission thereof 
Article 21: Candidacy for membership in the House of Deputies shall start twenty five 
days before the day designated for the election and shaU continue for 
three days; no candidacy shall be accepted after the expiry of this period. 
Article 22: A. Anyone wishing to nominate himself for membership in the House of 
Deputies shall pay to the Treasury Director in the Constituency in which 
he wished to nominate himself the amount of (500) five hundred dinars 
which shall be entered as income for the Treasury and shall not be 
returnable under any circumstance. 
B. The candidate shall present his candidacy apphcation in dupUcate to the 
Administrative Governor in the Constituency in which he wished to 
nominate himself; he shaU attach the corroboratory documents and all 
the other declarations that are required in accordance with the provisions 
of this Law. The Administrative Governor shall give the appHcant advice 
of receipt of the application which may be submitted on the form 
determined by the Minister of the Interior. 
Article 23: The Administrative Governor shall verify whether the Candidate's 
application, documents and declarations conform with the conditions for 
candidacy provided in this Law; accordingly, he shall decide to approve 
or deny the appUcation within a period not exceeding three days of the 
date of submission thereof 
Article 24: I f the Administrative Governor decides to reject the candidacy appUcation 
because it does not conform with the provisions of the Law, the 
apphcant may submit an objection thereto before the Court of First 
Instance whose jurisdiction covers the Constituency, and within two 
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days of the date of receipt of notification of the Administrative 
Governor's decision. The Court shall fmally rule upon the objection 
within three days of its submittal. The Administrative Governor must 
specify the reasons for rejection in his decision. 
Article 25: The Administrative Governor shall keep a copy of the candidacy 
applications which he has accepted, or those accepted by a ruling of the 
Court of First Instance, and shall enter same in a special register in the 
chronological order of the date of submission. After the candidacy 
application have acquired final and absolute status and have been 
published in at least two local newspapers, the Administrative Governor 
shall compile a list of the names of the candidates for display in 
prominent pubHc places in the relevant Constituency. 
Article 26; Every Elector may appeal the acceptance of the candidacy of any candidate 
in his constituency before the Supreme Court of Justice within three 
days of the date of display of the lists of candidates provided for in 
Article (25) of this Law; the Court shall rule upon the appeal within five 
days from the date of submitting the appeal to the Court. 
Article 27: Immediately after being notified thereof, the Administrative Governor shall 
announce any amendments to the List of Candidates made by virtue of 
rulings of the Supreme Court of Justice in the same manner that he 
announced the List of Candidates pursuant to the provisions of Article 
(25) of this Law: This List shall be the Final List of Candidates for the 
parliamentary elections. 
Article 28: If the number of candidates in the Final List in any Constituency is equal to 
the number of parliamentary seats designated for that Constituency, 
these candidates shall be announced wirmers in the uncontested election. 
Article 29: AH petitions, objection and appeals submitted in accordance with this Law, 
as well as the rulings made thereon by courts, panels, committees and 
the Administrative Governor, are exempt from fees and stamps. 
Article 30: Any candidate may withdraw his candidacy appUcation before the end of 
official hours on the day immediately preceding the Elections Day. 
Chapter Five: Const i tuencies and their Allotted Sea ts 
Article 31: As of the date it is decided to hold the first general election to the House of 
Deputies conducted after the effective date of this Law in accordance 
with the procedures set out therein, the Hashemite BCingdom of Jordan 
shall be divided into a number of Constituencies in accordance with the 
schedule appended to this Law and each Constituency shall be allocated 
the parliamentary seats specified for it therein. 
Chapter Six: Elect ion Procedures 
Article 32: Voting to elect the deputies shall be general, secret and on one level. 
Article 33: Voting for the election of members of the House of Deputies shall be 
conducted on the same day for aU the Constituencies. The Minister of 
the Interior, however, may designate a special day for every 
Constituency, or for any number thereof, if the safety of the election and 
the public interest necessitated such action. 
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Article 34: A. In every Constituency, a Central Committee shall be formed headed by 
the Administrative Governor and having as members the Chief Judge of 
the Court of First Instance in the Constituency, or a Magistrate Judge in 
Constituencies that have no Court of First Instance, as well as a 
Government employee appointed by the Minister of the Interior. This 
Committee shall perform the function provided for in this Law. 
B. Before they carry out their work, the President and members of the 
Central Committee shall take an oath before the Minister of the Interior to 
perform their task with honesty and impartiality. 
Article 35: The Minister of the Interior shall issue a Personal Election Card to every 
Elector, containing a photograph of the Elector, the complete particulars 
of his identity taken from the Family Book issued by the Department of 
Civil Status, his Constituency, the Polling Centre in which he may vote, 
and his number in the List of Electors in the Centre. The Personal 
Election Card shall be vahd for the period, circumstances and conditions 
decided by the Minister of the Interior in the Card itself, or in 
accordance with any instructions he may issue thereon. 
Article 36: A. Within thirty days of the date when the registration or review procedures 
of the electors Lists in the relevant Constituency are completed and have 
become final in accordance with the provisions of Articles (12) and (15) 
of this Law, the Administrative Governor shall issue a decision, to be 
published in the Official Gazette, and in any other means he deems 
necessary, containing the following: 
1. Dividing the Constituency into Electoral Sub-districts. 
2. Designating one or more Ballot Centres for each Electoral Sub-district 
and specifying the number of voters in each Centre, provided that they do 
not exceed 700 voters in any case. 
3. Inviting the Voters registered in the Final Electors Lists to obtain, within 
the period he specifies in his decision, their Personal Election Card from 
the concerned authorities. 
B. In the decision he issues in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 
(A) of this Article, the Administrative Governor shall pay deference to 
the number of Voters in the designated Electoral Sub-districts and the 
Ballot Centres he designates for each of them and the available ways and 
means of transportation in the Sub-district with the view of facilitating 
the arrival of the Voters to these centres. 
C. Electoral Sub-districts and the Ballot Centres designated in the 
Administrative Governor's decision issued in accordance with the 
provisions of Paragraph (A) of this Article, and in any subsequent 
amendment thereof, shall be endorsed as vaUd in any general 
parliamentary elections or by-elections conducted at any time subsequent 
to the publication of such decision or amendments hereof as the case 
may be, provided that such Electoral Sub-districts and Ballot Centres be 
published again when general elections or by-elections are held. 
Article 37: Any Elector may object to the Minister of the Interior against the decision 
issued by the Administrative Governor in accordance with the provisions 
of Article (36) of this Law to estabUsh a Ballot Centre in the Electoral 
Sub-district in which his name is registered or to move any Ballot Centre 
therein, provided that such objection be submitted within three days of 
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the date of the pubhcation of the said decision and that the Minister shall 
issue within three days of the date of submission his ruling thereon which 
shall be final, not subject to appeal before any administrative or judicial 
authority. 
Article 38: A. Supervision of each PoUing Centre shall be the responsibility of a 
Balloting Panel, comprised of Government employees appointed by the 
Administrative Governor, who shall also appoint as Chairman one of 
them whose grade is not lower than Grade Seven. Furthermore, the 
Administrative Governor may appoint other employees to assist the 
Panel in carrying out its tasks; but, no Government employee related up 
to the fourth degree to one of the candidates in the Constituency may be 
appointed in the Balloting Panel. 
B. Before the beginning of the voting, the Chairman and the two members 
of the Balloting Panel shaU take an oath before the Central Committee of 
the Constituency to perform their task with honesty, integrity and 
complete impartiality. 
C. I f the members of the Balloting Panel, or its Chairman, or either of its 
two members are absent, the Administrative Governor shall immediately 
appoint another Balloting Panel or a replacement for its absent Chairman 
or member, as the case may be. 
Article 39: Voting begins on the designated day for general parliamentary elections or 
by-elections at 7 o'clock in the morning and ends at 7 o'clock that 
evening. 
Article 40: Any Candidate, or whomever he delegates in writing, may be present at any 
Polling Centre to observe the voting process; no Candidate, however, 
may have more than one delegate at the same time at any one Centre. 
Article 41: The Chairman of the Balloting Panel shall prohibit any action or attempt 
thereto in the Polling Centre if such action is likely to influence the 
freedom of the voters in casting their votes. He may also request anyone 
committing or attempting to commit such action to leave the PoDing 
Centre and may ask Public Security officers to evict such person by 
force i f he refuses to leave. 
Article 42: In spite of the provisions of this Law, the Chairman and members of the 
Balloting Committees, the employees charged with assisting them, the 
candidates and their delegates may exercise their right to vote in the 
polling Centre designated for them. In this case, the name of these 
Electors shall be compiled in an additional list in which are entered the 
names of those who have exercised their right in the elections in that 
Centre and the reason why each one of them voted in a Centre other 
than the one in which his name is registered. 
Article 43: A. Voting shall be carried out on papers on which the phrase "Ministry of 
the Interior" is printed, and are stamped with the seal of the 
Constituency and signed on the back by the Chairman of the Balloting 
Panel. 
B. Before beginning the ballot, the Balloting Panel shall ascertain the 
number of papers it has received. If the number is less than the required 
number, the Committee Chairman shall immediately request the 
Administrative Governor to complement the shortage of papers. 
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Article 44: A. Ballot boxes shall be constructed in a unified form approved by the 
Minister of the Interior and every Ballot Box shall have three different 
locks and one slot large enough for only one Ballot Paper. 
B. Before the voting, the Chairman of the Ballot Committee shall open the 
Ballot Box in the presence of the present candidates or their delegates to 
ascertain that the box is empty. He shall then close the box with the 
three locks; he and each of the two Balloting Panel members shall keep 
one of the three keys. He also shall minute the proceedings in a record 
to be signed by the Committee, as well as those present who may wish 
to sign it. 
Article 45: Each PoUing Centre shall have at least one booth, placed therein in such a 
manner that does not conceal from those present the voting process 
taking place in the Centre. Inside the booth, a list of candidates in that 
Constituency shall be displayed and pens shall be provided for the voters 
to use. 
Article 46: A. The voter shall appear before the Ballot Panel at the Polling Centre 
where his name is registered in the Electoral List of that Centre. After 
the Committee Chairman has ascertained that the Elector's name is 
registered in that List and verified the Elector's identify in accordance 
with his Personal Election Card, he shall enter a sign in the Elector's 
entry in the List indicating that the Elector has come to vote and hands 
him a Ballot Paper which he has signed and asks him to go to the Booth 
to exercise his right to vote. No one shall be permitted to vote unless he 
produces his Personal Election Card to the Balloting Panel. 
B. The Voter shall write the names of the candidates he wishes to elect on 
the Ballot Paper given to him by the Chairman of the Balloting Panel and 
shall return to the Ballot Box to deposit the Ballot Paper therein. An 
illiterate Voter may ask the Chairman of the Balloting Panel to write the 
names of the Candidates the Elector wished to elect; after having written 
down the names, the Chairman shall read the names out within earshot 
of the Balloting Panel. 
Article 47: The Balloting Panel shall immediately settle any objections submitted by the 
candidates or their delegates regarding the progress of the voting 
procedures; the Panel's decisions thereon are final. 
Chapter S e v e n : C a n v a s s i n g Votes and Announcing Election Returns 
Article 48: A. Following the completion of the polling process, the Balloting Panel 
shall minute a record to be signed by the candidates and their delegates 
who are present and wish to do so; the record shall include the 
following: 
1. The Number of registered Electors in the Electoral List in the Polling 
Center. 
2. The number of Electors who exercised their right to vote. 
3. The number of Ballot Papers received by the Balloting Panel. 
4. The number of Ballot Papers used in the voting, the number of those 
unused, and the number of those destroyed and the reason for such 
destruction. 
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B. The record mentioned in Paragraph (A) of this Article, together with the 
unused Ballot Papers, shall be placed atop the upper side of the Ballot 
Box and wrapped therewith with a piece of cloth sealed with a knot to 
be stamped with the seal of the Balloting Panel. 
C. The Balloting Panel shall transport the Ballot Box with the its three keys, 
as well as the Panel's seal and the Electoral List, to the Constituency 
Headquarters, where it shall deliver same to the Central Committee 
against an official receipt thereof signed by the Central Committee 
Chairman. 
Article 49: A. The canvassing of votes shall be conducted under the supervision of the 
Constituency's Central Committee, which may form sub-committees to 
assist it in its tasks, including the canvassing of the votes, provided that 
each sub-committee be formed under the chairmanship of a civil or a 
shari'ite judge, or a government employee whose grade is not lower than 
Grade Two, with two other employees as members. 
B. The Central Committee shall appoint two or more clerks for each 
canvassing sub-committee to assist them in counting the votes which 
each of the Candidates receives. 
C. Before they carry out their task, the Chairman and members of the 
Canvassing Sub-committees, as well as the clerks, shall take an oath 
before the Central Committee to perform their task with honesty and 
impartiahty. Any candidate or whoever represents him by virtue of a 
written letter endorsed by the Administrative Governor has the right to 
attend and observe the canvassing process; no one else may exercise this 
right. 
Article 50: The Chairman of the Canvassing Sub-committee shall open the Ballot Box 
in the presence of its two members and in front of the candidates or their 
delegates who are present. I f any or aU of the three keys to the Box are 
lost, the chairman of the Committee shall take the necessary measures to 
open the Box in the manner or means that he deems necessary. After the 
Ballot Papers in the box have been counted by the Committee, the 
Chairman, or one of the Committee members, shall start to read the 
names written thereon loud enough to be heard by those present, and in 
such a manner that permits them to see the Ballot Papers when they are 
being read. The Canvassing Committee shall supervise the entering of 
the votes which each candidate receives in two separate lists which shall 
be signed by the Committee Chairman and its two members. 
Article 51: If, after the votes in any Ballot Box have been canvassed, the number of 
Ballot Papers therein is more or less by more than 5 percent than the 
number of voters for the Box, the ballot for that Box shall be considered 
nuU and void and the voting shall be repeated the next day or the day 
after that in accordance with the Administrative Governor's decision. 
Article 52: A. I f any Ballot Paper contains a number of candidate names exceeding the 
number of deputies to be elected, the excess of names shall be omitted 
from the bottom of the paper for every category of the Constituency's 
deputies, and the rest of the names shall be taken. But, if the number of 
candidates in the Ballot Paper is less than the number of deputies to be 
elected, then the names therein shall be taken. 
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B. I f the Ballot Paper contains the name of a person who is not a candidate, 
this name shall be omitted therefrom, and the other names shall be taken. 
I f however, the name of a candidate is repeated, his name shall be taken 
only once and the repetitions thereof shaU be omitted from the Ballot 
Paper. 
C. If the name of any candidate in the Ballot Paper is not clearly readable, 
but the paper contains enough presumptions to indicate it and prevent 
any confusion, then the name shall be considered as that of the 
candidate. 
Article 53: A. In deference to the other cases in which the Ballot Paper is deemed null 
and void in accordance with the provisions of this Law, a Ballot Paper is 
considered nuU and void and does not enter in the count of votes in any 
of the following cases: 
1. I f the paper was not stamped with the seal of the Ministry of Interior and 
the seal of the Constituency and was not signed by the Chairman of the 
Balloting Panel. 
2. If it was not possible to read any of the names of candidates therein. 
3. I f it contained insulting expressions. 
B. The invalid Ballot Papers shall be added to the minutes of the Canvassing 
Sub-committee and signed by the Committee members who shall write 
on every paper the reason(s) for its invalidity. 
Article 54: The Central Committee shall settle the objections submitted during the vote 
canvassing procedure and shall issue thereon the decisions it deems 
appropriate and as soon as necessary for the canvassing procedure. 
Article 55: A. At the conclusion of canvassing the votes, every canvassing sub-
committee shall minute a record in dupUcate, signed by its Chairman and 
the two members and containing the following: 
1. The number of Electors registered in the PolHng Centre. 
2. The number of those who actually voted. 
3. The number of votes received by each Candidate. 
4. The number of papers used in the election, the number of unused papers, 
and the number of destroyed papers and the reason for the destruction 
thereof 
5. The number of BaUot Papers which the Canvassing Committee decides 
neither to accept nor to reject. 
B. To the record provided for in Paragraph (A) of this Article shaU be attached 
the Electors Lists on which are marked the names of those who actuaUy 
voted, as weU as the papers used and unused in the canvassing 
procedure. These shaU aU be immediately handed over to the Central 
Committee. 
Article 56: The Central Committee shall count the votes received by each Candidate 
and announce the results openly in the presence of the candidates or 
their delegates. It shall, further more minute the results in a record a 
copy of which, together with aU the Committee's decisions and the 
papers related to the election shaU be sent to the Ministry of Interior for 
safekeeping for at least six months. 
Article 57: The Candidate who receives the largest number of votes shall be deemed 
the winner of the Election. If two or more Candidates for the same seat 
receive the same number of votes, then the Election between or among 
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them, as the case may be shall be repeated on the day designated by the 
Minister of Interior, provided that this election shall take place not later 
than seven days from the date of the Election. 
Article 58: Results of the General Election, as minuted in the records of the Central 
Committees of the Constituencies, shall be announced by the Minister of 
Interior not later than two days of the arrival of said records to the 
Ministry of Interior. The Minister of Interior shall issue an "Election 
Certificate" to every person who has been elected member in the House 
of Deputies and shall pubUsh same in the Official Gazette. 
Article 59: Every Deputy may appeal the vaUdity of electing any person to the House 
of Deputies and submit the appeal to the General Secretariat of the 
House within fifteen days from the date of announcing the election 
results in his Constituency including the grounds of law upon which his 
appeal is based. 
Chapter Eight: E lect ions Publicity 
Article 60: A. According to the provisions of this Law, Election publicity shaU be free 
and every Candidate may resort thereto from the date of the beginning 
of the candidature period until the day immediately preceding the day 
designated for the Election, on which any kind of Elections Pubhcity is 
prohibited and subject to the penalties provided for in this Law. 
B. The organisation and convening of Electoral meetings and the deUvery 
of electoral speeches is prohibited in places of worship, institutions of 
learning and buildings occupied by Government ministries and 
departments and official pubhc institutions or those under the 
supervision of the Government. 
Article 61: A. Candidates may publish advertisements and pubhcations containing their 
objectives, as well as statements related to their plans and courses of 
action, provided that they bear the Candidate's expUcit name. Such 
advertisements, publications and statements are exempt from fees. 
B. The official Government Emblem may not be used in election meetings, 
advertisements and pubhcations and in aU other types of writings, 
drawings and pictures used for the purposes of election publicity. 
Furthermore, the use of loud speakers in transport vehicles is prohibited 
in election pubhcity. 
Article 62: The pubhcation or posting of any placard, sign or election tract, including 
pictures, drawings and writings on walls and other places, is prohibited. 
Places for such placards, signs or tracts shall be designated by the 
municipal and rural councils in the cities, towns and villages. The local 
municipal authorities may at any time remove any violation of this ban at 
the expense of the relevant Candidate without any warning. 
Article 63: Speeches, publications, advertisements, and other election publicity 
vehicles, issued or made by the candidate, may not include, directly or 
indirectly, any insinuation or slander of any candidate, or agitate 
sectarian, tribal or regional bias among the various groups of citizens. 
Article 64: Employees of the Government, official pubhc institutions and local 
authorities are prohibited from making election pubhcity for the benefit 
of any candidate. 
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Article 65: In their election pubUcity campaigns, Candidates are prohibited from 
presenting gifts, contributions or monetary or in-kind assistance, or any 
other benefits, or from promising to provide same to a natural or judicil 
person, be that directly or through others, with the purpose of 
influencing the voting; furthermore, anyone is prohibited from soUciting 
such gifts, contributions, or assistance, or the promise thereof from any 
Candidate. 
Chapter Nine: E l e c t i o n C r i m e s 
Article 66: A Court of First Instance shall punish with a prison term of not less than 
three months and not more than one year, or a penalty of not less than 
two hundred dinars and not more than five hundreds dinars, or both 
penalties, anyone convicted with any of the following acts: 
A. assuming the personaUty or name of another person with the intent of voting 
in the election. 
B. exercising his right to vote more than once. 
C. carrying a firearm or any other type of weapon or an instrument perilous to 
pubUc security and safety in any Polling Centre on the election day. 
D. entering by force the PoUing or Canvassing Centre to influence or delay the 
election procedures or to come up with wrongdoing against any of the 
officials in charge of the election. 
E. influencing the freedom of the election or hindering the election procedures 
in any way whatsoever. 
F. tampering with any of the Ballot Boxes of Electoral Lists or papers 
prepared for voting, or stealing or destroying any of these Usts or papers, 
or committing any act with the intention of affecting the integrity and 
secrecy of the election procedures. In this case he shall be served with 
the maximum punishment provided in this Article. 
G. committing any of the prohibited acts provided for in Articles 60, 61, 62, 
63, 64, and 65 of this Law. 
Article 67: Anyone who seizes or tries to seize a Ballot Box before the PoUing Papers 
therein have been canvassed shaU be punished with hard labour for a 
period of not less than five years and not more than ten years and with a 
penalty of not less than one thousand dinars and not more than five 
thousand dinars. Anyone who intervenes in carrying out this crime or 
instigates or assists in the perpetration thereof shall be served with the 
same punishment. 
Article 68: I f any committee member appointed to compile or review the Electoral 
Lists, or to conduct the voting and canvassing procedures, or to count 
the votes; or any employee entrusted with supervising any of these 
procedures in accordance with the provisions of this Law, committed 
any of the foUowing acts, he shaU be punished by imprisonment for not 
less than one year and not more than three years, or by a penalty of not 
less than five hundred dinars and not more than one thousand dinars, or 
by both penalties: 
A. DeUberately entering in any Electoral List the name of a person who does 
not enjoy the right to vote in accordance with the provisions of this Law, 
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or dehberately omitting from or not entering in such Lists the name of 
any person who enjoys the right to register therein as a voter in 
accordance with same provisions. 
B. Knowingly made a false statement in the appMcation or announcement of 
candidacy, or in any of the statements therein, or ki the date of the 
submission thereof, or in any of the records minuted in accordance with 
the provisions of this Law, or in the submitted objection to the Electoral 
Lists, or in any other document drawn in accordance with the provisions 
of this Law. 
C. Unjustly seized or hid any of the documents pertaining to the election, or 
committed any forgery therein, including the destruction, tearing or 
smearing thereof. 
D. Delayed without ground of law the time designated for the beginning of 
the voting procedures, or stopped without justification the said 
procedures before the time designated in accordance with the provisions 
of this Law, or lingered in any procedure thereof with the intent of 
hindering or delaying same. 
E. Failed to open the Ballot Box in the presence of the candidates or their 
delegates before beginning the voting process to make sure that it is 
empty. 
F. Refrained from implementing any provision of this Law pertaining to the 
processes and procedures of voting and vote canvassing, or violated that 
provision with the intent of influencing the result of the election. 
Article 69: Any attempt to commit any of the election crimes laid down under this 
Law, as well as the penalty therefor, shall be punishable in accordance 
with the provisions of the effective Penal Law in hght of the penalty 
specified therefor in this Law.. 
Article 70: The perpetrator of any violation of the provisions of this Law for which no 
penalty has been provided shall be punished by imprisonment for a 
period of not less than a month and not more than three months, or with 
a penalty of not less than fifty dinars and nor more than 200 dinars, or 
with both penalties. 
Article 71: AH election crimes provided for in his Law shall abate by prescription after 
the lapse of six months from the date of announcing the election results. 
Article 72: The Council of Ministers may issue the regulations necessary for the 
implementation of the provisions of this Law. 
Article 73: The Minister of Interior may issue the instructions necessary for the 
implementation of the provisions of this Law and the regulations issued 
in accordance therewith, provided that such instructions do not violate 
the provisions of the Law or the Regulations in any shape or form. 
Article 74: The Law of Election to the House of Deputies No. (24) for the year 1960, 
as well as the amendments thereto and the regulations issued in 
accordance therewith are replead; the procedures in accordance with 
which the members of the House of Deputies existing when this Law is 
issued shall, however, remain vaHd and legal until the term of that House 
expires for any reason whatsoever. 
Article 75: The Prime Minister and the Ministers are charged with the implementation 
of the provisions of this Law. 
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L I S T O F C O N S T I T U E N C I E S AND T H E S E A T S A L L O C A T E D TO E A C H 
C O N S T I T U E N C Y IN T H E H O U S E O F D E P U T I E S 
Article 1: In confirmation of the intended objectives of Article (31) of the Law of 
Election to the House of Deputies, the Constituencies in the Kingdom 
shall be designated as set forth in this List. 
Article 2: The provisions of the appUcable Administrative Divisions Regulation shall be 
used in determining the area(s) included in every Constituency: 
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No. GOVERNORATES DISTRIBUTION OF 
S EATS 
M c CI Total 
1 AMMAN 
1.1 City of Amman 5 1 1 7 
1.2 Al-Assima govemorate (Except City of Amman Area (A) and (B) 3 3 
1.3 Wadi al-Seer District 1 1 2 
1.4 Sahab, Muwaqqar and Jaza District (except the Central Bedouins) 1 1 
1.5 Na'our District 1 1 
1.6 Madaba District 1 1 2 
1.7 Dhiban district 1 1 
1.8 Al-Wihdat Camp in Amman 1 1 
1.9 Jabal al-Hussein Camp in Amman 1 1 
1.10 Al-Mahatta Camp 1 1 
1.11 Talbiyya Camp 1 1 
2 J E R U S A L E M 
2.1 Jerusalem City with Jericho District 6 4 10 
2.2 Ramallah District 6 2 8 
2.3 Bethlehem District 4 4 8 
3 mBiD .^ •.•••.v.••••v.^ •.•.•.^ .^•.••^ •^.•^ ^ 
3.1 Irbid Govemorate 7 1 8 
3.2 Irbid Camp 1 1 
3.3 Al-Husn Camp 1 1 
3.4 Ajloun District 2 1 3 
3.5 Jerash District 2 2 
3.6 Jerash Camp 1 1 
3.7 Souf Camp 1 1 
3.8 Ramtha District 1 1 
3.9 North Ghor District 1 1 
3.10 Koura District 1 1 
3.11 Bani Kinanali District 2 2 
4 NABLUS 
4.1 Nablus City and District 12 12 
4.2 Jenin District 6 6 
4.3 Tulkarm District 6 6 
5 H E B R O N 10 10 
6 B A L Q A 
6.1 Al-Salt City and Zai District 3 1 4 
6.2 Balqa Govemorate (except ai-Salt City and Zai District 2 1 3 
6.3 Baqa Camp 1 1 
7 K A R A K 
7.1 Karak Governorate 3 1 4 
7.2 A'y Disttict and Al-Safi District 1 1 
7.3 Soutli Mazar District 3 1 4 
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(Cont.) 1 No. G O V E R N O R A T E S DISTRIBUTION OF 
SEATS 1 M C CI Totol 
8 MA'AN 
8.1 Ma'an Govemorate (except Bedouin of Southern regions 2 2 
8.2 Aqaba District 1 1 
8.3 Shobak District 1 1 
8.4 Wadi Mousa District 1 1 
9 ZARQA 
9.1 Zarqa Govemorate 2 1 1 4 
9.2 Zarqa Camp 1 1 
9.3 Hittin Camp 1 1 
10 MAFRAQ 2 2 
11 T A F I L E H 3 3 
12 BEDOUIN REGIONS 
12.1 North Bedouin 2 2 
12.2 Central Bedouin 2 2 
12.3 Southern Bedouin 2 2 
T O T A L 120 19 3 142 
R E G U L A T I O N NO. (60) FOR T H E Y E A R 1986 
E L E C T I O N S R E G U L A T I O N I S S U E D B Y V IRTUE O F A R T I C L E (72) O F T H E 
L A W O F E L E C T I O N TO T H E H O U S E O F D E P U T I E S NO. (22) FOR T H E 
Y E A R 1986 
Article 1: This Regulation shall be called the "Election Regulation for the Year 1986" 
and shall become effective as of the date of its pubhcation in the Official 
Gazette. 
Article 2: The compilation of the Electoral Lists shall be done in accordance with the 
instructions, procedures and time schedules declared and determined by 
the Minister of Interior in accordance with the provisions of the 
appMcable Law of Election. He may also determine the method of 
compilation of said lists and the forms to be used for that purpose. 
Article 3: On the night preceding the day designated for conducting the election, the 
Central Committee shall hand over the Polling Boxes, Electoral Lists, 
Polling Papers, seals and the rest of the essentials designated for the 
election process to the concerned panels appointed to supervise the 
election procedure in the Constituency. A record thereof shall be 
minuted and signed by the chairmen of both the Central Committee and 
the concerned Balloting Panel. 
Article 4: Any Elector who has changed his usual place of domicile may request 
striking off his name from the Electoral List of the Constituency in which 
he has been registered and entering same in the Electoral List of the 
Constituency to which he has moved his place of domicile. The 
appMcation therefor, supported with the corroborative documents, shall 
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be submitted to the Minister of Interior, together with the appUcant's 
Elections Card, before the first day of August of every year, for a 
decision to be passed after the competent Review Committees have been 
consulted on the matter. When the Minister of Interior approves the 
request, he shaU instruct the competent Review Committee, during the 
first half of the same month, to strike off the appUcant's name, and to 
cancel his Elections Card in his previous Constituency and to register 
him in the Lists of the Constituency to which he has moved his place of 
domicile and to issue him a new Elections Card in this Constituency. 
Article 5: Nobody is aUowed to enter any of the BaUot Centres during the hours 
designated for the election, except members of the BaUoting Panel, the 
Candidates or whomever they appoint as delegates, and a number of 
Electors not exceeding five persons at any time. 
Article 6: After compiling the Constituency's fmal Ust of Candidates, the 
Administrative Governor shaU display same in a prominent way in the 
Polling Centre for the Electors to take a look at. 
Article 7: After ascertaining the existence of the Elector's name in the Electoral List 
and verifying his identity in accordance with his Elections Card, the 
Chairman of the BaUoting Panel shaU read audibly the Elector's name 
and then hand him the BaUot Paper after entering a notation in the 
Elector's entry in the Electoral List. 
Article 8: I f the elector is UUterate, or unable to write for any reason whatsoever, he 
may charge the Chairman of the BaUoting Panel with writing on the 
BaUot Paper the names of candidates he wishes to elect. When the 
Chairman of the Panel has done this, he shaU read to the Elector the 
names he had requested to be written and enter any modification the 
Elector requests thereof 
Article 9: A. The word "invaUd" shaU be written on any BaUot Paper the Canvassing 
Sub-committee considers invaUd in accordance with the provisions of 
this Law and the Chairman and members of the Sub-committee shaU 
then sign the invaUd papers and append them to the record which the 
Canvassmg Committee submits to the Central Committee. 
B. In its record to the Minister of Interior relevant to the fmal results of the 
election, the Central Committee shaU submit a report of the invaUd 
papers which were not counted during the canvassing procedure. 
Article 10: If, by virtue of the provisions of the Law, the Canvassing Sub-committee 
deems the voting in any BaUot Box nuU and void, because the number of 
papers therein exceeds or is less than the number of voters therein by 
more than 5%, it is required to submit a report thereof to the Central 
Committee in the Constituency to announce same and take the necessary 
action to repeat the voting for that Box in accordance with the 
provisions of the Law. 
Article 11: The Canvassing of votes shaU continue uninterrupted in the Constituency 
Headquarters until the results emerge. 
Article 12: When the election returns have been announced in the Constituency, the 
Central Committee shaU gather the poUing papers, the Electoral Lists 
and aU the records and special papers pertaining to the election in one 
pUe, seal it in such a manner that it cannot be opened without breaking 
the seal, and send it to the Minister of Interior to keep in a safe place 
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until any challenge which may be submitted thereto in accordance with 
the provisions of the Law has been setded. 
Article 13: The Minister of Interior may issue the instructions necessary for the 
implementation of the provisions of this Regulation. 
AMENDMENT 
PROVISIONAL LAW NUMBER (23) FOR THE YEAR 1989 AMENDING THE 
LAW OF ELECTION TO THE HOUSE OF DEPUTIES 
Article 1: In confirmation of the intended objectives of Article (31) of the Law of 
Election to the House of Deputies the Constituencies of the Kingdom 
shall be designated as set forth in this List: 
Article 2: The provisions of the applicable administrative divisions Regulation and 
the Administrative division of the Greater Amman Area designated by 
the Mayoralty Council in determining the region (s) included in each of 
the Constituencies: 
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No. GOVERNORATES DISTRIBUTION 
OF SEATS 
M C CI Total 
1 AMMAN 
1.1 First Constituency, including Basman, Marka and Tareq 3 3 
1.2 Second Constituency, including Yarmouk, Nasr, Ras Al-Ain, 
and Badr 
3 3 
1.3 Third Constituency, including the City Centre, Zahran and 
Abdali 
3 1 1 5 
1.4 Fourth Constituency, including Al-Quwaismeh, al-Juweidah 
Abu Alanda, Khreibet Al-Souq, Jawa, Al-Yadoudeh, Umm 
Qusair and Al-Muqablein, Al-Jizah and Al-Muwaqqar 
(Except Central Bedouin) 
2 2 
1.5 Fifth Constituency, including Shafa Badran, Abu-Nusseir, 
Al-Jubeiha, SuweHeh, Tla'a Al-AM, Umm Al-Summaq, 
Khaldah, Wadi Al-Seir and Na'our 
4 1 5 
1.6 Sixth Constituency, including Madaba and Dhiban District 2 1 3 
2 IRBID 
2.1 Irbid City 8 1 9 
2.2 Jerash District 2 2 
2.3 Ajloun District 2 1 3 
2.4 Ramtha District 3 3 
2.5 Al-Kourah and north Ghor Districts 2 2 
3 BALQA 6 2 8 
4 K A R A K 7 2 9 
5 MA'AN 5 5 
6 ZARQA 4 1 1 6 
7 MAFRAQ 3 3 
8 T A F I L E H 3 3 
9 BEDOUIN REGIONS 
9.1 Central Bedouin 2 2 
9.2 Northern Bedouin 2 2 
9.3 Southern Bedouin 2 2 
TOTAL 68 9 3 80 
INSTRUCTIONS GOVERNING THE ELECTION IDENTITY CARD 
Issued in accordance with Article (35) of the Law of Election to the House of Deputies 
No. 22 for the Year 1986 AD. Published in the Official Gazette, No. 3432, issued in 
Amman on Saturday, 29 Safar 1407 A.H., being 1 November 1986 AD. 
1. The Personal Election Card shall be issued by the Civil Registration Bureau in 
which the Citizen is registered in the Electoral List of his Constituency and shall 
be valid for ten years of the date of its issue. 
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2. Information in the Card is identical to information in the Family Book and the 
Electoral List. 
3. The Citizen shall apply for obtaining the Card on the form prepared for this 
purpose and shall provide two photographs, one of which shall be pasted to the 
application form and the other to the Card which shall be stamped with the 
Bureau's official stamp. 
4. The Head of the Family or any of its members entitled to vote may apply for 
obtaining the Cards for Members of his Family. 
5. A notation shall be entered in the Electoral List indicating that the Citizen has 
obtained his Card. 
6. A special register shall be opened in each Bureau in which the Cards are 
registered in seriated numerical order. 
7. The Civil Status Bureaus shall be provided with a copy of the Electoral Lists for 
the Constituencies located in the area served by each Bureau. 
PROVISION LAW NUMBER MS) FOR THE YEAR 1993 AMENDING THE 
LAW OF ELECTION TO THE HOUSE OF DEPUTIES 
Article 1: This Law shall be called the "Law Amending the Law of Election to the 
House of Deputies for the Year 1993" and shall be read with Law 
Number 22 for the year 1986 which shall hereunder be referred to as the 
Original Law and shall become effective as of the date of its publication 
in the Official Gazette. 
Article 2: Paragraph (B) of Article (46) of the Original Law shall be repealed and 
substituted with the following text: 
B. The Voter shall write the name of the Candidate he wished to elect on 
the Ballot Paper given to him by the Chairman of the Balloting Panel and 
shall return to the Ballot Box to deposit the Ballot Paper therein. An 
illiterate Voter may ask the Chairman of the Balloting Panel to write the 
name of the Candidate the Elector wishes to elect; after having written 
down the name, the Chairman shall read the name out within earshot of 
the Balloting Panel. 
Article 3: The test of Article (52) of the Original Law shall be repealed and 
substituted with the following text: 
A. I f any Ballot Paper contains more than one of the names of the 
Candidates, only the first name shall be taken and the other names 
therein shall be omitted. 
B. I f the name of the Candidate in the Ballot Paper is not clearly readable, 
but the paper contains enough presumptions to indicate it and prevent 
any confusion, then the name shall be considered as that of that andidate. 
Article 4: Any text contradicting with the provisions of this Law wherever it occurs in 
the Original Law or in any Regulation issued in the virtue thereof shall be 
repealed. 
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